CourtListener 10298314•People v. Davis CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 12/20/24 P. v. Davis CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087690
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF194245A)
v.
BILLIE EARL DAVIS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G.
Bush, Judge.
Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Poochigian, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant and defendant Billie Earl Davis (appellant) was pulled over for a traffic
violation and found in possession of narcotics, a firearm, and ammunition. The trial court
denied his motion to suppress. Thereafter, he pleaded no contest to drug and firearm
offenses and he was sentenced to the indicated term of three years.
On appeal, his appellate counsel filed a brief which summarized the facts with
citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to independently review the
record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.
FACTS
The following evidence was introduced at the evidentiary hearing on appellant’s
motion to suppress. Officer Stella Chavez of the Bakersfield Police Department was the
only witness and testified as follows, supported by photographs from her body-worn
camera.
At approximately 6:48 p.m. on April 10, 2023, officers Chavez and Medrano were
in uniform and on patrol in a marked police vehicle. Medrano was driving and Chavez
was in the front passenger seat.
Chavez testified they were traveling northbound on Donna Avenue in Bakersfield,
when she observed a grey Ford Focus pass them in the opposite southbound lane.
Chavez testified the Ford’s rear window was completely covered by a black plastic bag,
which constituted an obstruction in violation of Vehicle Code1 section 26708,
subdivision (a)(1).2
1 All further statutory citations are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Section 26708, subdivision (a) states: “(a)(1) A person shall not drive any motor
vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied upon
the windshield or side or rear windows.”
2.
Medrano performed a U-turn, pulled behind the Ford, and activated the patrol
vehicle’s siren and overhead red lights to conduct a traffic stop to investigate the rear
window obstruction.3
The Traffic Stop
Chavez testified the Ford immediately stopped when the patrol vehicle’s siren and
lights were activated. Appellant was the driver and sole occupant. Within seconds of
stopping, appellant got out of the Ford before the officers approached the vehicle. He
walked away from the vehicle and went to the sidewalk.
Chavez testified she became concerned about officer safety as a result of
appellant’s conduct of immediately walking away from his vehicle, because “[f]rom my
training and experience I know that people who try to—their demeanor and them trying
to distance themselves from the vehicle leads me to believe that there’s something illegal
in that vehicle that they’re trying to distance themselves from.”
Medrano approached appellant and conducted a patdown search for officer safety
reasons. He asked appellant to raise his hands to the top of his head and did not place
him in handcuffs. Appellant complied with the patdown search, and he refused to
consent to a search of the Ford. There is no evidence that Medrano discovered any
contraband during the patdown search.4
Section 26708, subdivision (b)(8) states: “This section does not apply to any of
the following,” including “[t]he rear window or windows, if the motor vehicle is
equipped with outside mirrors on both the left- and right-hand sides of the vehicle that are
so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the highway through each mirror for a
distance of at least 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle.”
3 “[A] lawful traffic stop occurs when the facts and circumstances known to the
police officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the
Vehicle Code or another law.” (People v. Nice (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937–938.)
4 “During the traffic stop, an officer may ‘ “take such steps as [are] reasonably
necessary to protect [his or her] personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the
course of the stop.” ’ ” (People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 785.)
3.
Chavez inspected the Ford and saw normal side mirrors on the front driver’s and
passenger’s doors, and could see her reflection in the front side mirror. However, Chavez
testified the window on the front driver’s side door was tinted, and also constituted a
violation of the Vehicle Code.5
Search of Appellant’s Vehicle
Chavez ran a check on defendant’s driver’s license and was advised that it was
suspended. Based on appellant’s lack of a valid driver’s license, Chavez testified she had
authority to impound the Ford pursuant to section 14602.6, subdivision (a)(1), and
conduct an inventory search.6
Just as Chavez began to conduct the inventory search, appellant attempted to flee
the scene. Chavez ran over to assist Medrano, and appellant was arrested and searched.
Chavez conducted the inventory search of the Ford and found a backpack on the
floorboard of the front passenger side. The backpack contained a firearm and two jars of
marijuana.
Appellant’s Statements
After the discovery of the contraband, Chavez advised defendant of the warnings
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Appellant said he understood his
rights and answered questions. Appellant said the Ford was his mother’s vehicle, he was
5 Tinted windows constitute a Vehicle Code violation and the lawful basis for a
traffic stop. (People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1091; § 26708,
subd. (a)(2).) Section 26708, subdivisions (d) and (e) state the circumstances where
“clear, colorless, and transparent material may be installed, affixed, or applied” to a
vehicle’s windows, and may not constitute statutory violations, depending upon the
degree of light and visibility. (§ 26708, subds. (d)(1)–(5), (e)(1)–(5).)
6 An officer is authorized to impound a vehicle when the driver does not have a
valid driver’s license. (§§ 14602.6, subd. (a)(1), 12500, subd. (a).) “If officers are
warranted in impounding a vehicle, a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle pursuant
to a standardized procedure is constitutionally reasonable.” (People v. Williams (2006)
145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761.)
4.
using the vehicle to move his things from one place to another, and everything in the
vehicle belonged to him. Appellant said he tried to flee because he had drugs in his
pocket. He also said there were a lot of drugs in the backpack.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 3, 2023, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Kern
County charging appellant with count 1, transportation of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11352, subd. (a)); count 2, possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11351.5); count 3, felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1));
count 4, felon in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)); count 5,
misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a));
count 6, misdemeanor driving with a suspended or revoked license (§ 14601.1, subd. (a));
and count 7, misdemeanor obstruction of a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)).
The information alleged the following aggravating circumstance as to count 1, that
appellant was armed with a weapon; and as to counts 2 through 4, that his prior
convictions and/or juvenile petitions were numerous or of increasing seriousness. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2), (b)(2).)
APPELLANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION
On October 23, 2023, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code,
§ 1538.5) and asserted the initial traffic stop was not authorized by the Vehicle Code, he
was unlawfully detained, and his vehicle was unlawfully searched without a warrant or
probable cause.
On October 26, 2023, the People filed opposition and argued the traffic stop was
valid, defendant did not have a valid driver’s license, the vehicle was going to be lawfully
impounded, and the officers properly conducted an inventory search of the vehicle.
On December 11, 2023, the trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing on
appellant’s suppression motion. Chavez testified as set forth above.
5.
The Parties’ Arguments
After Chavez’s testimony, the prosecutor argued the officers properly conducted
the traffic stop because of Vehicle Code violations for obstruction to the rear window, and
the traffic stop revealed the driver’s side window was tinted. Appellant attempted to flee
before the officers had completed their inspection of the vehicle, and the traffic stop,
impoundment, and inventory search were valid.
Appellant’s counsel replied the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the
initial traffic stop even if the rear window was obstructed in violation of section 26708,
subdivision (a)(1), because the Ford still had two functioning side mirrors that satisfied
the exception in subdivision (b)(8), and those two mirrors were visible to the officers
when they drove past the Ford and then pulled behind it. Counsel further argued there
was no evidence about the degree of the tint on the side window, and whether the tint
violated the limits in section 26708, subdivisions (d) and (e). Counsel also argued the
officers lacked probable cause to search the Ford for weapons for safety reasons pursuant
to Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332,7 and the inventory search was invalid because it
started before appellant attempted to run away.
The prosecutor responded the officers had “probable cause” to pull the vehicle
over because of the obstructed rear window in violation of section 26708,
subdivision (a)(1). The prosecutor acknowledged that section 26708, subdivision (b)(8)
provided an exception to the obstruction violation “if upon inspection the two driver’s
side mirrors are dually outfitted and the driver can see to the rear 200 feet,” but the
officers were permitted to conduct the traffic stop to inspect the vehicle and actually
7 Gant established a two-part rule for a valid automobile search incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest: Either the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the
search (thereby justifying the search to protect officer safety or prevent the destruction of
evidence), or the police have reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest. (Arizona v. Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 343; People v. Johnson (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1035.)
6.
make that determination. The officers were advised appellant did not have a valid
driver’s license, and they were authorized to impound the vehicle and conduct an
inventory search.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court denied appellant’s suppression motion and made lengthy findings.
The court acknowledged appellant’s argument that the Ford’s two side mirrors may have
negated the underlying violation of the obstructed rear window. However, the court
found the “relatively very low standard” for a traffic stop was a reasonable articulable
suspicion, and the officers met that standard to conduct the initial traffic stop:
“[T]he officers in this case seeing a vehicle with large plastic
covering the back window as I saw in the pictures there, they were justified
in making that initial stop again just to warrant further investigation.…
[E]ven if they noticed … a side mirror it still warrants further investigation
because the exception to that rule as cited by the defense is very specific. A
stop would be necessar[]y to make sure that both side mirrors are present,
not just the actual housing, the plastic housing, but the actual glass mirror
inside the housing that it’s present, that the glass is not broken or missing
and technically I think even conduct a test or experiment to see if they are
capable of allowing the driver to see a distance of 200 feet to the rear. So
all of that justifies further inquiry and examination of the vehicle. And if it
turns out that that exception is present then of course there’s no underlying
violation and they go on. But when it comes to the actual stop itself it
doesn’t change the fact that it appears to have been justified here based on
that legal standard. And then from there I think everything else becomes
justified based upon other legal standards including the detention for officer
safety and then you have the fleeing, the report of driving on a suspended
license, all of that adds up the justification for further inquiry and searches
and so forth all the way up to and including probable cause for the arrest
and the inventory search. So for all of those reasons I will deny the
motion.”
PLEA AND SENTENCE
On January 5, 2024, appellant pleaded no contest to count 1, transportation of a
controlled substance; count 3, felon in possession of a firearm; count 6, misdemeanor
driving with a suspended or revoked license; and count 7, misdemeanor obstruction of an
7.
officer; and admitted the aggravating circumstance alleged for count 1. The trial court
granted the People’s motion to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations.
On February 28, 2024, the trial court sentenced appellant to the lower term of
three years for count 1, with concurrent terms for the other counts, consistent with the
negotiated disposition.
On February 29, 2024, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, appellant’s counsel filed a Wende brief with this court. The brief
also includes the declaration of appellate counsel indicating that appellant was advised he
could file his own brief with this court. By letter of October 4, 2024, we invited him to
submit additional briefing. He has not done so.
“ ‘On appeal from a motion to suppress evidence, all presumptions are in favor of
the trial court’s factual findings, whether express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence, and we review de novo the facts most favorable to the People to
determine whether the officer’s conduct in performing the traffic stop was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v. Colbert (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1072.)
“A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the
vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.”
(Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 U.S. 54, 60.) “[A] lawful traffic stop occurs when
the facts and circumstances known to the police officer support at least a reasonable
suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or another law.” (People v. Nice,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 937–938.)
To show reasonable suspicion, the detaining officer must “point to specific
articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide
some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal
activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) Reasonable suspicion requires
less than probable cause to believe a violation has occurred. (People v. Brown (2015) 61
8.
Cal.4th 968, 981.) The detaining officers may rely on their experience and specialized
training to draw inferences from the circumstances, but they cannot rely on a mere hunch
or speculation. (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273–274.)
In this case, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe appellant violated
section 26708, subdivision (a)(1) and conducted the traffic stop, based on Chavez’s
observations as they drove past and then behind the Ford, of the black plastic bag that
completely obstructed the vehicle’s rear window. As noted by the trial court, the officers’
reasonable suspicion supported the traffic stop to inspect the vehicle and determine
whether both side mirrors were “so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the
highway through each mirror for a distance of at least 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle,”
as required to trigger the exception stated in subdivision (b)(8) of section 26708. Upon
further inspection, however, Chavez determined the side window was tinted, constituting
a separate violation of subdivision (a)(2) of section 26708.
While Medrano conducted a patdown search of appellant, there is no evidence that
any contraband was found on him, or that it unnecessarily prolonged the traffic stop.
(See, e.g., People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 672.)
Shortly after the initiation of the traffic stop, however, Chavez was advised that
appellant’s driver’s license was invalid. In conducting a traffic stop, an officer’s “mission
for issuing a ticket or warning for the suspected traffic violation included the task[] of
determining whether [the driver] had a valid driver’s license….” (People v. Gyorgy,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 672.)
At that point, Chavez lawfully decided to impound the vehicle and conduct the
inventory search. An inventory search must not be a “ ‘ruse for a general rummaging in
order to discover incriminating evidence.’ ” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119,
126; People v. Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 791.) There is no evidence the
impoundment and inventory search were pretextual ruses motivated by subjectively
improper investigatory purposes.
9.
After independent review of the record, we find that no reasonably arguable
factual or legal issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
10.
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