People v. Jo CA2/5

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Filed 12/19/24 P. v. Jo CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B332220

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA105123)
v.

UNG RAE JO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Scott T. Millington, Judge. Affirmed.
Spolin & Dukes, Aaron Spolin and Caitlin Dukes for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Taylor Nguyen,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
The jury found Ung Rae Jo guilty of kidnapping to commit
rape (Pen. Code,1 § 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1), assault with intent
to commit a felony (§ 220, subd. (a)(1); count 2), attempted
forcible rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 664; count 3), sexual
penetration by use of force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 4),
forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 5 & 6),
injuring the mother of his child (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 7, 11 &
13), first degree residential burglary with person present (§ 459;
count 8), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 9), forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 10), dissuading a witness by force or
threat (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); count 12), stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (b);
count 14), and misdemeanor contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1);
count 15). The trial court sentenced Jo to a consecutive term of
34 years plus life in prison. The court additionally imposed a
concurrent sentence of 364 days.
On appeal, Jo contends the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for kidnapping to commit rape in count 1.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS2

A. Prosecution Evidence

Jo and the victim, M.J., lived together for approximately 32
years and had one son. The couple owned and operated a shoe

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Our recitation of the facts is limited to facts that relate to
the July 3, 2021 kidnapping and attack, as Jo only challenges the
kidnapping to commit rape conviction on appeal.

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store together. Their relationship was very difficult for M.J. Jo
continuously disrespected and harassed her. She kept hoping the
situation would improve, but it did not. M.J. moved out of their
shared residence around May 12, 2021.
M.J. continued working at the shoe store after she left Jo.
The store had a retail area on the main floor and a storage area
located on the floor below it. The storage area had only one exit.
There were desks at the front of the storage room and several
aisles of merchandise further inside. The storage room had
approximately 16 surveillance cameras, but at the relevant time
4 were not functioning.
On July 3, 2021, M.J. and Jo were working at the shoe
store together. They were the only people working at the store
that day. Between approximately 11:00 and 11:30 a.m., M.J. was
fulfilling orders in the storage room when Jo approached her and
began dragging her towards the back of the room.3 M.J. grabbed
onto the shelving in an attempt to stop Jo from dragging her,
thereby causing merchandise to fall from the shelves. Jo dragged
and pushed M.J. into an aisle next to some shelving, further
away from the door. M.J. struggled with Jo, but he physically
overpowered her and attempted to have vaginal sex with her. Jo
pinned M.J.’s legs with his legs and laid on top of her. He
attempted to make her orally copulate him by putting his penis
over her face. M.J. continued to scream and resist. She told Jo to
stop and turned her legs to block him. Jo covered M.J.’s mouth
with his hand to prevent her from screaming. M.J. knew that the
security cameras would capture the attack. She repeatedly asked

3 A video recording that captured the attack was played for

the jury.

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Jo how he could do this when it would be recorded. Jo kept
trying to insert his penis into M.J.’s vagina but was unable to.
He spread her legs apart, but she kept closing them. Jo’s penis
touched the outer part of M.J.’s vagina. Jo did not have a full
erection, so he was unable to penetrate M.J.’s vagina with his
penis. When Jo first attacked M.J., the door to the storage area
was open. Jo left M.J. briefly to close and lock the door. M.J.
screamed at Jo to let her go and to stop. She screamed asking if
anyone was there and for help.
Jo said it would be better if they went deeper into the
storage area. He pulled M.J. to the innermost section of the
room, which was the area furthest away from the door. M.J.
resisted hard in an attempt not to be pulled inside. She
sustained abrasions and scratching as she was being pulled on
the floor. M.J. told Jo she was in pain. He pulled her into an
upright position and hit her with his fist where she was injured,
while at the same time asking “ ‘Is this where you’re having
pain?’ ” Jo spread M.J.’s legs apart again and tried
unsuccessfully to insert his penis into her vagina. He inserted
his finger in her vagina, and pushed, twisted, and turned it. He
hit M.J. in the face and forced her to orally copulate him many
times. The attack lasted for approximately one and a half hours.
M.J. suffered a sprained neck. The attack also exacerbated her
back pain from a previous injury. She estimated that Jo dragged
her 10 meters.

B. Defense Evidence

Jo admitted that he tried to have vaginal and oral sex with
M.J. on July 3, 2021, and that he did not complete those acts

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because he was physically unable to. He first testified that the
interaction was consensual, but then admitted that M.J. resisted
and he used force. Jo admitted that he dragged M.J.

DISCUSSION

Jo argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the
asportation element of aggravated kidnapping because he only
moved M.J. a short distance within the storage room, and he
moved her because the back of the storage room was more
spacious—a reason incidental to the rape. We reject his
arguments.

A. Legal Principles

“In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether
‘ “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’
[Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary
conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]
“Kidnapping to commit rape involves two prongs. First, the
defendant must move the victim and this asportation must not be
‘merely incidental to the [rape].’ [Citations.] Second, the
movement must increase ‘the risk of harm to the victim over and
above that necessarily present in the [rape].’ [Citation.] The two
are not mutually exclusive, they are interrelated. [Citation.]
“For the first prong, the jury considers the distance the
defendant moved the victim and the ‘scope and nature’ of the
movement. [Citations.] For the second, it considers whether the

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movement gave the defendant ‘the decreased likelihood of
detection’ and an ‘enhanced opportunity to commit additional
crimes.’ ” (People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164, 168.)
“ ‘Whether a forced movement of a rape victim . . . was
merely incidental to the rape, and whether the movement
substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, is difficult
to capture in a simple verbal formulation that would apply to all
cases. . . . [T]he jury must “consider[ ] the ‘scope and nature’ of
the movement,” as well as “the context of the environment in
which the movement occurred.” [Citations.] This standard
suggests a multifaceted, qualitative evaluation rather than a
simple quantitative assessment. Moreover, whether the victim’s
forced movement was merely incidental to the rape is necessarily
connected to whether it substantially increased the risk to the
victim. “These two aspects are not mutually exclusive, but
interrelated.” [Citation.]’ (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th
1141, 1151–1152, quoting People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1,
12.) The Supreme Court has ‘articulated various circumstances
the jury should consider, such as whether the movement
decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger
inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances
the attacker’s opportunity to commit additional crimes.
[Citation.]’ (Dominguez, at p. 1152.)” (People v. Power (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 126, 138.)

B. Analysis

As to the first prong, the movement was not incidental to
the attempted rape. “ ‘[A] rape . . . does not necessarily require
movement to complete the crime.’ (People v. Salazar (1995) 33

6
Cal.App.4th 341, 348, fn. 8.) Where a defendant drags a victim to
another place, and then attempts a rape, the jury may reasonably
infer that the movement was neither part of nor necessary to the
rape.” (Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 169.) A distance of
nine feet may be substantial. (Ibid.) Here, Jo did not begin his
efforts to rape or otherwise sexually assault M.J. until after he
moved her. (Ibid. [asportation element of kidnapping satisfied
where defendant did not attempt to rape victim until after
moving her a distance of nine feet].) Moreover, “[a]lthough ‘the
actual distance the victim was forced to move’ is a ‘relevant
factor,’ the Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly stated no minimum
distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement.’
([People v. Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1162].) Actual
distance ‘must be considered in context, including the nature of
the crime and its environment. . . . [E]ach case must be
considered in the context of the totality of its circumstances.’
(Ibid.)” (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 984.)
“ ‘Where movement changes the victim’s environment, it does not
have to be great in distance to be substantial.’ ([People v.]
Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169, 167–169.)” (People v.
Robertson, supra, at p. 986.) M.J. testified that Jo physically
dragged her approximately 10 meters. While that may have been
a relatively short distance, it took her further away from the only
exit. It was only after Jo dragged M.J. away from the door that
he closed and locked it. M.J.’s environment changed significantly
at that point. She testified that she could not flee because she
knew she could only get a few steps away before he would
overtake her. The difference between running a few feet to
escape the storage room with the door open and having to run 30
feet and unlock the door to escape was significant.

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With respect to the second prong, Jo’s movement of M.J.
increased the risk of harm to M.J. over and above what was
necessary to the attempted rape. Jo’s act of dragging M.J. 10
meters across the storage room in and of itself caused physical
harm to her back and neck. Jo then used those physical injuries
to harm and humiliate M.J. further—mockingly asking whether
those places on her body hurt and then purposefully hitting her
where she had been injured. M.J.’s movement to the furthest
depths of the storage room decreased the chance that Jo would be
detected, allowing him to close and lock the storage room door
with less risk that M.J. would attempt escape, or be heard
screaming for help. As we have already observed, the increased
distance made it much harder for M.J. to escape. Additionally,
moving M.J. made it easier for Jo to commit additional crimes;
indeed, Jo told her it would be better if they were deeper in the
storage room. When he was unable to rape M.J., he beat and
digitally penetrated her. The first area that he moved her to did
not afford him as much space in which to harm her. M.J.
testified that it was “much harder” for her to resist after Jo
dragged her all the way to the back of the storage area. “He
spread my two legs with his two legs apart, and I was not able to
do anything. My back was hurting, my neck was hurting, and I
was pleading that I was having pain, and I was asking to please
stop.”
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s asportation
findings.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

I CONCUR:

KIM (D.), J.

9
The People v. Ung Rae Jo
B332220

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

Affirmance of defendant and appellant Ung Rae Jo’s
(defendant’s) aggravated kidnapping conviction stretches
the law too far. The problem is not the distance of the
asportation itself—even shorter distances have been held
sufficient. (See, e.g., People v. Shadden (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 164, 167 [sufficient asportation when the
defendant dragged the victim nine feet from the front
counter of a video store into a small back room].) The
problem is that the forced movement relied on as
nonincidental and to show an increased risk of harm (1)
occurred entirely within a storage room where the victim
was already present and (2) did not appreciably increase,
given the location and features of that room, the risk of
harm to the victim. That distinguishes this case from other
cases where aggravated kidnapping convictions have been
properly affirmed. (See, e.g., People v. Dominguez (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1141, 1151 [movement of victim down a road’s
embankment and out of sight of passersby sufficient for
aggravated kidnapping]; Shadden, supra, at 167; see also
Dominguez, supra, at 1152.)
The majority concludes otherwise by reasoning the
victim was moved further away from the door of the storage
room. That principle, i.e., movement within a room some
distance away from a door (or other point of egress) during
a sexual assault will warrant an aggravated kidnapping
conviction, too greatly expands the circumstances in which
such convictions may be had. I would therefore reverse the
conviction on count one but remand to give the trial court
the opportunity to reconsider its earlier sentencing
determinations. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857,
893; People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259
[“[U]pon remand for resentencing after the reversal of one
or more subordinate counts of a felony conviction, the trial
court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the
defendant’s sentence on the counts that were affirmed,
including the term imposed as the principal term”].)

BAKER, Acting P. J.

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