People v. Williams CA2/3

CourtListener 10296639Calctapp18 déc. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 12/18/24 P. v. Williams CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B333816

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A763191
v.

DARREN CHARLES WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.

Judith Kahn and Jennifer Peabody, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Darren Charles Williams appeals from an order denying
his petition to vacate his four second degree murder convictions
and for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 He
argues the trial court erred by failing to consider his youth
when determining whether he is entitled to resentencing.
Williams also argues his case must be remanded for a Franklin2
hearing. We reject his arguments and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The offenses and trials
On August 31, 1984, police found 58-year-old Ebora
Alexander dead in her Los Angeles home from multiple
gunshot wounds to the head. Alexander apparently had been
shot while sitting at her kitchen table having breakfast. Police
also discovered the bodies of Alexander’s 24-year-old daughter
Dietria and two of Alexander’s grandsons, ages 13 and eight.
All three had been shot execution style in their beds.
The People charged Williams with four counts of first
degree murder. At trial, Ida Moore testified that Williams and
Horrace Burns arrived at her house in the early morning of
August 31, 1984. Williams directed Burns to leave the house
to pick up Tiequon Cox. Burns and Cox returned 20 or 30
minutes later.
Williams asked Moore if she would drive him to the
house of a woman who owed him money. Moore agreed. Moore,
Williams, Burns, Cox, and Moore’s girlfriend—DeLisa Brown—
got into Moore’s van. Williams directed Moore where to drive,

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code.

2 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).

2
and he eventually told her to stop the van. Williams and Cox
got out of the van. Burns seemed to want to get out as well, but
Williams told him to stay in the van. Williams and Cox went
inside a house on the street where Moore had parked.
Moore heard gunshots a minute or two later, and Williams
returned to the van holding a pistol. He twirled the gun and
remarked that he had one bullet left. Moore described Williams’s
demeanor as “cool and natural.”
Cox returned to the van about three minutes later.
Cox was holding a rifle and said he “blew a bitch’s head off.”
Williams directed Moore to drive them to a nightclub
called the Vermont Club. Moore parked the van outside the club.
Williams told Moore he was going to pay her for gas. He got out
of the van along with Cox and Burns.
Moore saw Williams later that day. He gave her a $50 bill
and told her to buy hair products for him. Williams also told
her she better “ ‘not be talking,’ ” otherwise “ ‘somebody is going
to get hurt.’ ” Williams made similar warnings two more times.
Williams instructed Moore not to drive the van and said he
would have it repainted.
DeLisa Brown largely corroborated Moore’s testimony.
According to Brown, while she was in the van, she heard someone
say something about “killing everybody in the house.” Williams
showed Brown a piece of paper with an address written on it.
He told Moore to park the van a few houses down the street
from that address.
Williams and Cox got out of the van and walked down
the street. A few minutes later, Brown heard a lot of gunshots
and saw Williams running toward the van, holding a pistol.

3
Cox also returned to the van holding a gun. Williams and Cox
got in the van, and Williams directed Moore where to drive.
The People also presented evidence of statements Williams
made to the police.3 Williams said a club owner offered Cox
and Burns $50,000 or $60,000 to kill a woman who was suing
the club. Williams admitted driving to the house with Cox,
and he noted that Cox had “ ‘been doing murders all his life.’ ”
Williams claimed he ran away when Cox went up to the door.
The People’s evidence showed that a woman named Valarie
Taylor sued the Vermont Club a few months before the killings.
Taylor’s lawsuit alleged she suffered injuries after she was shot
inside the club. Taylor lived two houses from the Alexander
residence, on the same side of the street.
The People also presented evidence that on September 1,
1984—the day after the killings—Williams purchased a sportscar
from a dealership. Williams paid $1,500 for the car in large bills.
A week or two earlier, Williams’s wife had tried to purchase
a cheaper car from the same dealership, but she was not able
to obtain financing.
The trial court instructed the jury that a person who
aids and abets a crime is “liable for the natural and reasonable
or probable consequences of any act that he knowingly and
intentionally aided or encouraged.”
The jury convicted Williams of four counts of first degree
murder. But the jury failed to reach a verdict on the special
circumstance allegation of multiple murders. In 1987 the

3 The transcript of Williams’s conversation with the police
does not appear in the record on appeal. Therefore, we take
these facts from the summary of the conversation that the parties
provided to the trial court, which Williams does not dispute.

4
allegation was tried before a second jury. The jury in the second
trial found the special circumstance allegation to be true and
returned a verdict of death.
2. The appeals and habeas petition
The California Supreme Court set aside the jury’s finding
on the special circumstance, reversed the judgment of death,
and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. (People v. Williams
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 647 (Williams I).) On remand, the
trial court sentenced Williams to four consecutive terms of
25 years to life. A different panel of this court affirmed the
judgment and sentence (People v. Williams (Nov. 18, 1999,
B120766) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams II)), and the Supreme Court
denied Williams’s petition for review (People v. Williams
(Mar. 1, 2000, S084630) [nonpub. opn.]).
In November 2016, Williams filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the superior court, seeking to have his first
degree murder convictions set aside based on People v. Chiu
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155. In January 2018, the superior court
granted Williams’s petition, reduced his first degree murder
convictions to second degree murder, and resentenced him to
four consecutive terms of 15 years to life. Williams appealed
and a different panel of this court affirmed. (See People v.
Williams (Nov. 29, 2018, B287899) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams III).)
3. Williams’s petition for resentencing, the trial court’s
decision, and the appeal
On February 14, 2019, Williams filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6.4 On December 4, 2020,

4 Williams filed his petition under former section 1170.95,
which was later renumbered as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022,

5
the trial court issued a memorandum of decision denying
Williams’s petition. The court stated it was “bound by” “the
recitation of facts stated by the California Supreme Court” in
Williams I. The court concluded, “Based on these facts, the court
finds that the People have met their burden beyond a reasonable
doubt as to four counts of second degree murder (Penal Code
section 189(a)–(b)) whether on conspiracy or direct aiding and
abetting theories of liability.” Williams appealed.
While Williams’s appeal was pending, Senate Bill No. 775
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), went into effect.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1(a).) Based on Senate Bill 775’s changes
to the law, a different panel of this court reversed the order
denying Williams’s petition and remanded for the trial court
to hold a new evidentiary hearing. (See People v. Williams
(June 30, 2022, B310320) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams IV).) We
explained that, “both at the evidentiary hearing and in its
written memorandum of decision, the trial court did not cite or
refer to any specific testimony at trial, or any exhibit or other
evidence. In acting as the factfinder, the court appears to have
relied heavily—if not exclusively—on the Supreme Court’s
factual summary and factual conclusions in Williams’s direct
appeal. After Senate Bill 775’s changes to the statute, this
is no longer permissible.” (Ibid.)
4. The proceedings on remand
On remand, the People filed a brief responding to
Williams’s petition. The brief summarized the evidence at trial,
citing the trial transcripts. The People argued, despite the

ch. 58, § 10.) For the sake of simplicity, we refer only to section
1172.6 throughout this opinion.

6
reduction from first degree to second degree murder, the evidence
at trial was overwhelming that Williams was a direct aider
and abettor who harbored a specific intent to kill. According
to the People, Williams was the mastermind and “shot-caller”
in a conspiracy to commit murder for hire. Williams planned to
murder Valarie Taylor and he recruited Cox, Burns, and Moore
to help him. Williams aided and abetted Cox—who committed
the actual killings—and did so with express malice. Williams
also was part of a conspiracy to commit murder.
Williams, through appointed counsel, filed a response to
the People’s brief. He argued that, because he had been convicted
of second degree murder, the trial court could not consider other
theories of murder to determine his eligibility for relief under
section 1172.6. According to Williams, there is insufficient
evidence that he acted with express or implied malice, as
required for second degree murder. Williams asserted the only
dangerous act he engaged in was driving Cox to the house.
The court considered the petition at a hearing on July 12,
2023. Williams suggested the evidence shows he realized he
was at the wrong house and walked back to the van before Cox
killed the victims. He asserted the People did not try him under
a felony murder theory because they could not prove he entered
the house or had the intent to kill. According to Williams, the
prosecutor accepted a reduction in his convictions from first
degree to second degree murder—rather than retrying the case—
for the same reason.
The court took the matter under submission at the end
of the hearing. The court later issued a written order denying
Williams’s petition for resentencing. After summarizing the
evidence presented at trial, the court found Williams planned

7
the attack and directed an accomplice to drive him and two
accomplices to Alexander’s street. Once there, Williams tried
to locate a house matching an address he had written on a
piece of paper. Williams voiced no disagreement when someone
mentioned killing everyone in the house. Williams told one of
his accomplices to stay in the van while he and Cox went into
the house. Both Williams and Cox were armed, Williams was
aware of Cox’s propensity for violence, and Williams and Cox
decided to kill everyone inside the house. After the murders,
Williams went to a night club and collected a large sum of money
as payment on a contract to kill a victim.
Based on these factual findings, the court concluded the
People proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Williams is guilty
of four counts of murder under multiple theories. According
to the court, Williams is guilty because he acted with implied or
express malice and “conspired, planned and led, [and] directly
aided and abetted the group of codefendants.” The court stated
Williams also is guilty under a felony murder theory because
he was a major participant in the underlying crime and acted
with reckless indifference to human life.5
DISCUSSION
1. Resentencing under section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) took effect on January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,

5 The court did not identify the underlying crime in which
Williams participated. Given the court found Williams entered
the home with the intent to commit murder, we presume the
crime was burglary. (See §§ 189, subd. (a), 459 [any person
who enters a house with the intent to commit a felony is guilty
of burglary].)

8
§ 4.) The bill limited accomplice liability under the felony murder
rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as it relates to murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis).) “It amends sections 188, which defines malice,
and 189, which defines the degrees of murder to address
felony-murder liability, and it adds section [1172.6], which
provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder can
seek retroactive relief if the changes in the law would affect
their previously sustained convictions.” (People v. Gutierrez-
Salazar (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417.)
Under the law as amended, a defendant is guilty of murder
under a felony murder theory only if: (1) the defendant was
the actual killer; (2) with the intent to kill, the defendant aided
or abetted the actual killer in the commission of murder in
the first degree; or (3) the defendant was a major participant
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference
to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism by which a person
convicted of murder under the former law may be resentenced
if he could no longer be convicted of murder because of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708; see generally Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 843; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.) Once
a petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief and the
superior court issues an order to show cause, the matter proceeds
to an evidentiary hearing. (Strong, at pp. 708–709; People v.
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) The prosecution has
the burden at the hearing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the petitioner is guilty of murder notwithstanding the

9
amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Strong, at pp. 708–709;
Vargas, at p. 951.)
2. Remand is not required for the trial court to consider
Williams’s youth
Williams argues the case must be remanded for a new
hearing because the trial court failed to consider his youth
at the time of the offenses—24 years old—when determining
whether he possessed the requisite mental state for murder.
Williams’s argument fails for several reasons. First,
Williams forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in the trial
court. Generally, an appellant may not raise an issue on appeal
unless he raised it below. (See People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th
622, 653 [defendant “forfeited this claim by failing to raise this
issue below, when the trial court could have remedied the alleged
shortcoming”]; Sander v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
651, 670 [“ ‘It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial
court are forfeited on appeal.’ ”].) As Williams seems to concede,
he never argued—in his papers in support of his petition or orally
before the trial court—his youth was relevant to whether he
possessed the requisite mental state for murder. By failing to
raise the issue below, Williams has forfeited it on appeal.
Williams argues his failure to raise the issue below is
excusable because, at the time of the hearing on his petition,
no cases had held a court must consider a petitioner’s youth
when determining his culpability at a section 1172.6 hearing.
Williams is mistaken. The court considered Williams’s petition
at a hearing in July 2023. By that time, at least six published
cases had stated an offender’s youth is relevant to whether
he is guilty of murder for purposes of a section 1172.6 petition.
(See People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 (Harris);

10
In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454 (Moore); People v.
Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 987 (Ramirez); In re Harper
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470 (Harper); People v. Keel (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558–559 (Keel); People v. Jones (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1093 (Jones).)
In Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 939, for example, the
court reversed a summary denial of a resentencing petition,
noting “given [the petitioner’s] youth at the time of the crime,
particularly in light of subsequent case law’s recognition of
the science relating to adolescent brain development [citations],
it is far from clear that [the petitioner] was actually aware ‘of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 944–945, 960.) About six months later, in August
2021, the court in Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 434, went
“one step further” and explicitly held “a defendant’s youth is
a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted
with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at p. 454.) Several
cases followed—Ramirez in November 2021, Harper in March
2022, Keel in October 2022, and Jones in December 2022—that
discussed the relevance of an offender’s youth in the context
of resentencing petitions. (See Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th
at p. 987; Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 470; Keel, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 562; Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088,
fn. 7.) Given the state of the law at the time of Williams’s
hearing, we decline to excuse his failure to raise the issue in
the trial court.
Williams contends People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
400 (Pittman)—decided in October 2023—was the first case to
hold a trial court must consider a petitioner’s youth when

11
determining his culpability for purposes of a section 1172.6
petition. (See id., at p. 416.) It seems the Pittman court was
the first to hold explicitly that a petitioner’s youth is relevant
to whether he acted with implied malice. (Id. at pp. 417–418.)
However, it was not the first to hold a court must consider a
petitioner’s youth in connection with a section 1172.6 petition.
In December 2022, the court in Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
1076, plainly stated “a defendant’s youthful age must be
considered” when determining whether he acted with reckless
indifference to human life for purposes of a section 1172.6
petition. (Id. at p. 1088, fn. 7, italics added.) Here, the court
considered Williams’s petition more than six months after Jones
was decided. At that time, Williams may not have realized his
youth was relevant to whether he acted with implied malice.
However, he should have known it was relevant to whether he
acted with reckless indifference to human life, which was one
of the grounds on which the trial court denied his petition.
Williams’s reliance on People v. Jimenez (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 994 is misplaced. In Jimenez, the trial court denied
a resentencing petition in 2021 after finding the defendant
could be found guilty of implied-malice second degree murder.
The defendant filed a second petition in 2023, which the
trial court denied at the prima facie stage on the ground that
there was no legal basis to revisit its prior ruling. (Id. at pp. 999–
1000.) The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for
reconsideration. (Id. at pp. 997–998.) The court explained that
“since the time of the trial court’s original ruling of August 2021,
there have been significant changes in the law relating to the
culpability of defendants who were young adults in their teens
or early 20s at the time of their crimes.” (Id. at p. 997.) Given

12
the timing of those developments, the court could not presume
the defendant had an adequate incentive to present evidence of
his youth in connection with his first petition for resentencing.
(Ibid.)
Here, in contrast, the most significant changes to the law
occurred well before the hearing on Williams’s petition. As we
noted above, by the time of the hearing in July 2023, at least
six published cases had held a defendant’s youth is relevant
to a section 1172.6 petition. One of those cases—Jones, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th 1076—states explicitly that a court “must . . .
consider[ ]” a defendant’s age when determining whether he
is guilty under a felony murder theory. (Id. at pp. 1087–1088,
fn. 7.) Given the state of the law at the time of Williams’s
hearing, he had every incentive to present evidence of his youth.
His failure to do so forfeits the issue on appeal.
Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would
reject Williams’s arguments on the merits. As a general rule,
we presume the lower court was aware of, and followed, the law
while performing its duties. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1092.) Given this presumption, in “the usual case, the fact
that a court did not specifically mention certain evidence does
not mean that the court ‘ignored’ that evidence.” (Ibid.) Instead,
we presume the lower court “duly considered the evidence
presented to it.” (Ibid.)
Here, there is nothing in the record that affirmatively
demonstrates the court failed to consider Williams’s youth before
denying his petition. Therefore, we may presume the court was
aware of the numerous cases holding a petitioner’s youth is a
relevant factor when considering whether to grant relief under
section 1172.6. We also may presume the court followed those

13
cases when it determined the People proved Williams is guilty
of felony murder as a major participant in an underlying offense
who acted with reckless indifference to life. Because that finding
is sufficient to deny Williams’s petition, the presumption is
fatal to his argument on appeal. (Cf. People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466, 488–490 [noting it was unlikely the
trial court knew to consider the petitioner’s youth where the
resentencing hearing was held before Harris, Moore, Ramirez,
and Harper were decided]; Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1091–1092 [declining to presume trial court considered the
petitioner’s youth where the resentencing hearing was held
before Moore, Ramirez, and Harper were decided].)
Even if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that the
court failed to consider Williams’s youth, remand still would
not be required because any error was harmless. The parties
seem to agree that this type of error is subject to the Watson6
harmless error standard. (See Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 417–418; Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489, fn. 8.)
Under that standard, we ask whether it is “reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to [Williams] would have been
reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, at p. 836.)
Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th 466 is instructive. In that
case, a jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder after
his accomplice killed a man during a drug-related robbery. (Id.
at pp. 470–471.) While planning the robbery with the defendant,
the accomplice said he would kill the victim if the victim was
alone. (Id. at p. 472.) The defendant and accomplice later met
the victim in person, telling him they wanted to purchase $60,000

6 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

14
worth of cocaine. When the victim revealed the cocaine, the
accomplice shot him in the chest. (Id. at pp. 470–472.)
A few decades later, the defendant filed a petition for
resentencing under what is now section 1172.6. The trial court
denied the petition after finding the defendant could be convicted
of first degree murder under a still-valid felony murder theory.
(Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 476–477.) On appeal, the
defendant argued his case must be remanded for the trial court
to consider his youth as part of the totality of the circumstances
relevant to whether he was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (Id. at p. 485.)
The Court of Appeal held remand was not required
because, even if the trial court should have considered the
defendant’s youth, any error was harmless. (Oliver, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) The court explained that an offender’s
age is “just a proxy for maturity.” (Id. at p. 490.) The defendant
was 23 years old at the time of the murder, and “the presumption
of immaturity weakens as a defendant approaches 26.” (Id. at
p. 489.)
The court also pointed to the lack of evidence showing
the defendant’s behavior was motivated by impulsivity or
vulnerability to peer pressure, which are the two primary
areas that differentiate youthful offenders from their adult
counterparts. (Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) The
record showed the defendant participated in the robbery despite
being aware his accomplice planned to kill the victim if the
opportunity arose. The court also noted the lack of evidence
that the defendant felt compelled to assist his accomplice. (Ibid.)
The court concluded the defendant “made an intentional and
volitional choice to take a calculated risk. That risk failed

15
to turn out as he had hoped, not because [the victim] ended up
dead, but because he and his cohorts were caught. Under such
circumstances, we see no reasonable likelihood that the trial
court would have reached a different conclusion had it focused
specifically on [the defendant’s] age.” (Id. at p. 490.)
Here, too, there is no reasonable likelihood the court would
have reached a different conclusion had it focused on Williams’s
youth. Williams was 24 years old at the time of the killings,
which is older than the defendant in Oliver. Accordingly, the
presumption of immaturity is even weaker than in that case.
More importantly, as in Oliver, the circumstances of the
killings do not reveal the sort of impulsivity or susceptibility
to peer pressure that are the hallmark characteristics of youth.
The trial court found the murders occurred during the execution
of a murder-for-hire scheme that Williams masterminded.
Williams recruited several people to help him execute his plan,
including Cox, whom Williams acknowledged had “ ‘been
doing murders all his life.’ ” Given the nature of the plan,
it is reasonable to infer Williams chose Cox for that reason,
not despite it.
The court also found Williams took on a leadership role on
the day of the killings. Among other things, he instructed Burns
to pick up Cox, directed Moore where to drive, and told Burns to
stay in the van once they arrived at their destination. Williams
then accompanied Cox into the house while both men were
armed. After the killings, Williams directed Moore to a
nightclub, where he collected on the contract.
The trial court’s findings—which find ample support in
the record—demonstrate that Williams engaged in substantial
planning activity prior to the killings, refuting any suggestion

16
that he acted impulsively. The fact that he failed to kill
his intended victim does not show otherwise. Rather, it
demonstrates only that his execution of the plan was poor.
Nor does Williams point to anything in the record even to suggest
he was acting under the influence of peer pressure. If anything,
as the leader of the group, Williams may have used peer pressure
to convince the others to assist him. On this record, and
considering all the circumstances, there is no reasonable
probability the trial court would have reached a different decision
had it given full consideration to Williams’s youth. Accordingly,
any error was harmless and does not require remand.
3. We decline to remand the case for a Franklin hearing
Williams argues his case must be remanded for the trial
court to conduct a Franklin hearing so he has the opportunity to
make a record of evidence that may be relevant at a future youth
offender parole hearing. (See § 3051; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th
261.)
On April 1, 2022—while Williams’s first appeal of the
denial of his resentencing petition was pending in this court—
Williams filed a pro per request for a Franklin hearing. The
court found Williams had made a prima facie showing that he
is entitled to such a hearing. The court requested additional
briefing and appointed counsel—Fay Arfa—to represent Williams
in connection with the hearing.
Sometime later, we decided Williams IV and remanded
the case for a new hearing under section 1172.6. On remand,
the trial court appointed Joseph A. Markus and Andrew M. Stein
to represent Williams in connection with his resentencing
petition. In the interests of judicial economy, the court appointed
Markus to represent Williams in connection with the Franklin

17
hearing as well. The court terminated Arfa’s appointment at
the same time.
A few weeks later, on August 31, 2022, the People filed
a concession letter acknowledging that Williams is entitled to
a Franklin hearing. After receiving the letter, the court ordered
the parties to meet and confer to set the matter for a status
conference related to the Franklin hearing.
On May 22, 2023, the trial court granted Williams’s request
to appoint an expert to examine him, prepare a report, and testify
on his behalf at a Franklin hearing. The record does not contain
further references to the Franklin hearing.
The Attorney General concedes Williams is entitled to a
Franklin hearing. Nevertheless, he contends Williams forfeited
his opportunity for a Franklin hearing in connection with these
proceedings by failing to object below. According to the Attorney
General, Williams’s remedy is to file a motion under section
1203.01 requesting a new Franklin hearing.
Unlike the parties, we see no connection between
Williams’s section 1172.6 petition and his request for a Franklin
hearing. Apart from the fact that the court appointed the same
counsel to represent Williams in connection with both, it seems
the two proceedings are entirely separate. Because this appeal
concerns only Williams’s resentencing petition, there are no
grounds for us to remand the case with directions to conduct
a Franklin hearing. To the extent Williams is ready for the
trial court to set a hearing, he should direct his request to
that court. Alternatively, as the Attorney General suggests,
he may request a new hearing under section 1203.01. (See
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 458.)

18
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

19

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.