People v. Davis

CourtListener 10296635Calctapp18 déc. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 12/10/24; Certified for Publication 12/18/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168530
v.
CHAROME DAVIS, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 158104)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Charome Davis appeals from the trial court’s order denying
his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 following an
evidentiary hearing. Davis contends the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s findings that he was the actual killer and
that he acted with reckless indifference for human life. Finding sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s ruling, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Plea to Voluntary Manslaughter
In 2008, the Alameda County District Attorney charged Davis with the
murder of Rudy Henderson, Jr. on or about March 23, 2006 (Pen. Code,1
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), and possession of a firearm by a felon (former
§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 2). As to count 1, it was alleged the murder was

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
aided and abetted by Davis while he was engaged in the commission of a
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)).
In August 2010, Davis pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a); amended count 1) and admitted he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to 21
years in prison.
Petition for Resentencing
In April 2022, Davis filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6),2 seeking to vacate his voluntary
manslaughter conviction on the ground he could not be convicted of murder
based on recent changes to the murder statutes. The prosecution conceded
Davis made a prima facie case, and the trial court scheduled an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
The Prosecution’s Evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing
The prosecution argued Davis was not entitled to relief under section
1172.6 because he was the actual killer of Henderson. For the evidentiary
hearing, the prosecution submitted (1) the reporter’s transcript of the
preliminary hearing held in January 2008 and (2) the audio recording and
transcript of a police interview with witness R.L.3
Police Interview with R.L.
On May 16, 2006, Oakland Police Sergeant Derwin Longmire and his
partner Sergeant Nolan interviewed R.L. in an interview room at the

2 The statute was renumbered section 1172.6 without substantive

change, effective June 30, 2022, before the trial court denied the petition in
this case. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
708, fn. 2 (Strong).) We refer to the current statute in this opinion.
3 The recording had been played and admitted into evidence at the

preliminary hearing.

2
Oakland Police Department. R.L. told the police that “Charome [Davis] and
Moose” were involved in the shooting of Henderson.
R.L. said that, on the night of the shooting, she was out on Hamilton
Street with “Timothy,” “Moose,” “Roscoe,” “Kevin”, and “J,” and Moose was
talking about doing something. Longmire asked what Moose was talking
about doing, and R.L. responded, “Uh . . . premeditated murder, basically” of
“Rudy [Henderson].” She reported that Moose was talking on the phone with
Davis, and Moose told Davis, “ ‘Come down here right now. He ridin’ around
right now. Before you leave the ‘hood, hurry up. Get here. I see him right
now. He just turned the corner, so hurry up. He has some money on him.’ ”
R.L. said Moose “basically wanted [Henderson] robbed.”
R.L. told the police that Davis arrived and talked with Moose. Davis
“was nervous, and he said he couldn’t do it by hisself, and ‘Let me use his car
so I’ll go get somebody else.’ ” Davis drove away in Moose’s car and returned
10 or 20 minutes later with a “young guy,” whom R.L. described as 15 or 16
years old, short, light-skinned, with dreads. R.L. heard Davis say he needed
something to cover his face, and J gave him a t-shirt.
R.L. said Davis and the “young guy” walked toward 70th Avenue, and
“Moose told J to distract Rudy [Henderson]” by showing Henderson some
shoes and asking him if he wanted to buy them. Henderson drove by, and J
asked him if he wanted to buy some shoes. Henderson stopped his car, and J
walked up to the car with a “shoe in his hand.” R.L. said Henderson opened
the door of his car, but he did not get out. Then “Charome and his little
friend” ran up to Henderson’s car, and R.L. saw Davis had a gun in his hand.
Davis ran to the driver’s side and said, “ ‘Get out the car. Get out the car.’ ”
R.L. said that when Davis ran to the car, he “grabbed Rudy, said, ‘Get out the
car,’ but didn’t give him a chance to get out. He shot him.”

3
Sergeant Longmire asked R.L. how much time passed from when she
heard Davis tell Henderson to get out of the car to when she heard the
gunshots, and R.L. said, “like two minutes apart.” Longmire followed up,
“Okay. Say . . . say it for me, what you heard, and then wait as long as it was
until you heard the gunshots.” R.L. responded, “ ‘Get out,’ POW POW.” Her
response took less than two seconds. R.L. agreed with Longmire that “it was
just like that” and “It was fast.”
R.L. said, “Charome fired the shots,” and she thought Davis was
holding the gun “near his chest,” but when she was asked if she saw the flash
from the gun, she said, no, “I was running when I heard the shot.” She
explained, “I never did look back when I heard the shot. I just kept runnin.’ ”
Longmire asked whether it was “fair to say, then, that you’re not sure which
one of the two fired, because you weren’t looking,” and R.L. said, “Yeah.”
R.L. told the police that the day after the shooting, Davis asked R.L. if
she saw anything and, “have I heard anything else about it, what’s been
happenin,’ what’s been goin’ on?” Davis said something like, “ ‘I don’t . . . I
don’t wanna go down,’ ” which R.L. understood to be an implicit admission
that he had fired the gun.
At the end of his questioning, Longmire asked R.L. if he (meaning
Longmire himself) had made her any promises, and she responded, “I don’t
remember.” R.L. said Longmire did not threaten her and he was not rude or
uncourteous, and she agreed she told him everything “under [her] own free
will.”
Preliminary Hearing Transcript
The preliminary hearing was held in January 2008, about 20 months
after R.L.’s recorded police interview. R.L., Sergeant Longmire, and another
officer testified.

4
R.L.
R.L. was 20 years old at the time of the hearing, and she did not want
to testify.4 R.L. “knew of” Davis and a person called “Moose,” but she denied
she knew Davis from school.5 Asked if she knew about a shooting at 70th and
Hamilton in March 2006, R.L. responded, “I’m not sure of that” and “I don’t
know about the shooting.” She acknowledged that she heard a shooting but
said she did not see it. She testified she could not remember being at the
location before the shooting. R.L. did not remember hearing Moose in a
phone conversation, overhearing a conversation about a plan to stop a car, or
seeing Davis the night of the shooting.
R.L. testified, “All I remember is talking to a lady. I sold her a bag.
Next minute I know, I’m running. We all running. I don’t remember. Me
and her.” They “[were] running because [they] heard gunshots.” R.L.
testified she was talking to a lady “about my money that her dope fiend
friend owed me. Because I gave her weed. She didn’t give me my money.”
R.L. did recall talking with two Oakland Police Department homicide
detectives, but she did not remember the conversation. She testified that she
forgot the interview because “last year I tried to kill myself and just a few

4 It is apparent from the reporter’s transcript that R.L. was taken into

custody to secure her testimony at the preliminary hearing. R.L. described
Davis as wearing “[j]ail clothes like me”; in cross-examination, defense
counsel asked R.L. whether she had been to Santa Rita jail “other than the
time you’re here now for this”; and at the end of questioning, the court stated
R.L. “may be released from custody” subject to recall.
5 In the police interview, R.L. said she recognized Davis because she

“[b]een knowin’ him from the streets, and seein’ at school when I was at
school.”

5
weeks ago I got beat up and my head was banged to the concrete.”6 R.L.
acknowledged it was her voice in the interview recording, but listening to the
recording did not refresh her memory. She did not remember any of the
events she described in the interview and denied she knew a person called J.
R.L. testified she had “a threatened conversation” with Sergeant
Longmire. Asked what she meant, R.L. responded, “ ‘If you don’t do what I
say, I’ll hunt you for the rest of your life,’ D. Longmire.” She did not
remember when this conversation occurred, but she testified, “I’m scared of
him. I don’t want to look at him. He scares me. That’s why I take psych.
meds now, because of him.” R.L. testified she lost two jobs because Longmire
went to her jobs. “He kept following [her]” and “went to all [her] family’s
houses, every last one of them.” R.L. testified she and her father reported
Longmire to Internal Affairs.
R.L. was prescribed medication while in custody in advance of her
testimony because she was hallucinating and talking to herself.
Sergeant Longmire
Sergeant Longmire interviewed R.L. on May 16, 2006. R.L. was placed
in an interview room at 2:15 p.m., Longmire began interviewing her at 2:45
p.m., and he started recording the interview at 3:55 p.m. In the 70 minutes
before he began recording, Longmire talked with R.L. about the shooting, and
he testified, “she was semicooperative,” meaning she was “willing to talk
about herself,” but she “[d]id not want to be specific about the actual murder

6 R.L. could not remember where she had been beaten up and did not

know why she had been attacked, but she testified, “they snatched me from
the back with a plastic bag over my head and hit me upside my head” and “I
wasn’t out enough for them and they banged my head to the concrete and I
was out. I don’t remember what they did after that.” The attack was not
reported to the police.

6
of Rudy Henderson, Jr.” Longmire testified it “took some time to actually get
to the point where she was actually willing to discuss it in detail.” He denied
that he threatened R.L. or that she was under arrest when he spoke with her.
Longmire recalled that he told R.L. if she had information pertinent to the
case, she could apply to the Witness Protection program.
Officer Armerding
Oakland Police Officer Samuel Armerding testified that around 12:15
a.m. on March 23, 2006, he was dispatched to 71st and Hamilton on a report
of a shooting. Armerding spoke with potential witnesses at the scene. A
young woman named Woods approached Armerding. She was crying, and she
told him she had been with the victim that night. Armerding testified that
Woods told him Henderson had been driving her around in his black Lexus.
Woods said that Henderson stopped the car and spoke with two Black males
who offered to sell him a pair of shoes. She said Henderson got out of the car
to look at the shoes, and three Black males wearing dark clothing and masks
came out from behind a van. At least one of the assailants had a black
handgun, and they shot Henderson outside his car. Woods said she got out of
the car and ran eastbound, and she saw the three men get in Henderson’s
Lexus and drive westbound.
Trial Court Ruling
The trial court heard argument on the petition for resentencing on
June 16, 2023, and issued a written decision denying the petition on June 27,
2023.
In its written order, the court concluded the prosecution “has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner is guilty of the murder of Rudy
Henderson, Jr. under California law . . . .” The court wrote, “Although the
evidence presents a close question, the Court finds that [the prosecution] has

7
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was the actual killer” and
further that he was a major participant in the underlying robbery who acted
with reckless indifference to human life.
The court summarized R.L.’s interview with the police and her later
testimony at the preliminary hearing and determined her statements in the
police interview were more credible than her subsequent testimony. The
court noted that in the police interview, R.L. “gave a detailed description of
the events that she witnessed,” “[h]er answers did not reveal any motive to
fabricate or exaggerate her account,” and her “demeanor” (which the court
assessed by listening to the audio recording) “was calm.” The court found
R.L. “answered the investigators’ questions in a fairly detai[l]ed manner,
directly and without hesitation or obfuscation,” and she was not
“argumentative or combative with the investigators.” In contrast, at the
preliminary hearing, R.L. “was combative and sarcastic” and “expressed that
she did not want to testify.”
The court wrote, “According to RL’s witness statement, Petitioner
participated, from the beginning, in the plan to commit an armed robbery.
He armed himself, recruited a co-participant, concealed his identity, waited
in the background for J to distract the victim then rushed to the car, gun in
hand. Within a very short period of time, Petitioner ordered the victim to
exit the car and grabbed him. Almost immediately thereafter, RL heard
gunshots. There is no evidence that the Minor [that is, Davis’s confederate
described by R.L. as a ‘young guy’] possessed a gun. The following day,
Petitioner made statements demonstrating consciousness of guilt, although
the statements fall short of admitting to being the actual killer.”
The court concluded Davis was the actual killer based “upon
circumstantial evidence.” It reasoned, “Given that Petitioner was armed, ran

8
to the car, physically assaulted the victim, and the almost instantaneous
sequence of the assault and the gunshots, the Court finds that the ‘only
reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that’
Petitioner was the actual killer,” quoting CALCRIM No. 224.7 The court
further wrote that “the totality of the evidence” left it “with an ‘abiding
conviction’ that Petitioner was the actual killer,” quoting CALCRIM No. 220.8
The court also found Davis was a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference for human life, observing Davis
“displayed a ‘willingness to kill’ ” (quoting People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th
522, 617) in that he “took multiple steps to coordinate with his co-
participants in a plan to commit a violent robbery” and Davis, with a “loaded
gun held near his chest, then ran to the victim’s car, ordered him out,
physically grabbed him, and within seconds shots were fired, killing the
victim.”

7 CALCRIM No. 224 provides in part, “[B]efore you may rely on

circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced
that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence
is that the defendant is guilty. If you can draw two or more reasonable
conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable
conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you must accept the one
that points to innocence. However, when considering circumstantial
evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are
unreasonable.” (Italics added.)
8 CALCRIM No. 220 provides in part, “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt

is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true.
The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.”

9
DISCUSSION
A. Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “significantly narrowed
the scope of the felony-murder rule” and “created a path to relief for
defendants who had previously been convicted of murder on a felony-murder
theory but who could not have been convicted under the new law.
Resentencing is available under [section 1172.6] if the defendant neither
killed nor intended to kill and was not ‘a major participant in the underlying
felony [who] acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2.’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 703, quoting § 189, subd. (e)(3).)
Under section 1172.6, a person who was convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or voluntary manslaughter under the prior law may file a
petition “to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) “If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause
(id., subd. (c)) and “shall hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall the
sentence and resentence the petitioner . . . .” (id., subd. (d)(1)).
“At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief,
the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

10
B. Standard of Review
Because the trial court denied the petition based on its factual finding
that Davis was the actual killer and, alternatively, its mixed finding of fact
and law that he was a major participant in the underlying robbery and acted
with reckless indifference to human life, we review the court’s ruling for
substantial evidence. (See People v. Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303,
314 [reviewing the trial court’s findings that the petitioner acted with an
intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life for substantial
evidence]; People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 301 (Clements)
[reviewing the denial of a resentencing petition for substantial evidence
because the question whether the petitioner acted with reckless indifference
to human life was “predominantly a factual determination”].)
This means “[w]e ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value
that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty]
beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614,
657-658.) Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding
the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence,
evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)
“ ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion
do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or

11
falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We
resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for
substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient
evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the [fact
finder]’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).)
“ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1, 57.)
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding that Davis is
Guilty of Murder Under Current Law Because He Was the Actual Killer
R.L. told the police she observed Davis and Moose plan to rob
Henderson and she subsequently saw Davis and a confederate run up to
Henderson’s car and Davis had a gun in his hand.9 R.L. said that Davis
grabbed Henderson and told him to get out of his car, and then R.L. heard
gunshots. She described what she heard as, “ ‘Get out,’ POW POW,” with the
gunshots following immediately after Davis commanded Henderson to get out
of his car. This was substantial circumstantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could determine that it was Davis who shot and killed
Henderson. As the court explained, “Given that [Davis] was armed, ran to
the car, physically assaulted the victim, and the almost instantaneous
sequence of the assault and the gunshots, . . . the ‘only reasonable conclusion

9 Davis does not dispute that R.L.’s statements in her police interview

are admissible for purposes of the evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). Further, Davis admitted that he personally used a
firearm, which “ ‘ “waives any right to raise questions regarding the
evidence” ’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 458) that he
personally used a gun in the killing of Henderson.

12
supported by the circumstantial evidence is that’ [Davis] was the actual
killer.”
On appeal, Davis argues R.L.’s statements to the police do not provide
substantial evidence because R.L. did not see the shooting, and “[t]here were
questions about [her] credibility both in the interview and in her preliminary
hearing testimony.” These arguments are unconvincing. First, viewed in the
light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence showed that Davis—while
holding a gun—ran up to Henderson and grabbed him, and, as the trial court
found, “almost instantaneous[ly]” Henderson was shot and killed. This was
sufficient circumstantial evidence for the trial court to find that Davis shot
Henderson and, thus, was the actual killer, even if R.L. did not see Davis
shoot Henderson. Second, it was “ ‘the exclusive province of the trial judge’ ”
in this case to determine R.L.’s credibility; on appeal, we do not reweigh
credibility issues or resolve evidentiary conflicts. (Zamudio, supra, 43
Cal.4th at p. 357.)
Davis points out that Officer Armerding testified that another witness,
Woods, told him that two Black males offered to sell Henderson shoes, that
Henderson got out of his car to look at the shoes, and that three Black males
came out from behind a van. Davis suggests that the inconsistencies between
Woods’s account and R.L.’s account (as to the number of purported shoe
sellers, the number of assailants, and whether Henderson was out of his car
when the assailants ran up to him) render R.L.’s statements insufficiently
reliable to provide substantial evidence. In response, the Attorney General
notes that Woods’s account actually bolsters R.L.’s credibility in significant
part, as Woods also described the selling of shoes (a ruse to get Henderson to
stop his car) and stated that one (“at least one”) of the assailants had a gun.
The Attorney General further argues that, between the two witnesses, R.L.

13
likely had a better view of the incident because she was on the street, while
Woods was inside Henderson’s car. But our role on appeal is not to decide
whether R.L. or Woods should be deemed more credible. It is enough that
R.L.’s statements, “contradicted or uncontradicted” (Clements, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 298), support the trial court’s finding that Davis was the
actual killer.
Next, Davis notes that R.L. initially said “two minutes” passed between
when she heard Davis tell Henderson to get out of the car and when she
heard the gunshots, but, when Longmire asked her to demonstrate, she
described what she heard as, “ ‘Get out,’ POW POW.” Davis asserts the trial
court’s determination that the gunshots followed almost instantaneously
after Davis assaulted Henderson is “untenable” given the “significant
inconsistency” in R.L.’s statements regarding the timing of events. But,
again, we do not reweigh credibility issues or resolve evidentiary conflicts on
appeal. (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.) “ ‘[E]ven testimony [that] is
subject to justifiable suspicion do[es] not justify the reversal of a judgment,
for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness.’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court in this case was free to
accept R.L.’s description that gunshots followed within a second or two of
Davis telling Henderson, “Get out.”
We also reject Davis’s claims the trial court “failed to consider”
Sergeant Longmire’s testimony suggesting R.L. was reluctant to give her
statement to the police and Officer Armerding’s testimony about what Woods
told him on the night of the shooting. The court was not required to describe
every piece of evidence in making its ruling, and we will not presume the
court failed to consider the evidence presented. (See People v. Bryant, Smith

14
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 398 [“As a general rule ‘ “a trial court is
presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law” ’ ”].)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Davis is guilty of murder as the actual killer, and, consequently, the court
properly denied Davis’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. We
therefore need not consider Davis’s second appellate claim that insufficient
evidence supports the court’s additional (and unnecessary) finding that Davis
is guilty of murder as a major participant in the underlying robbery who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition under section 1172.6 is
affirmed.

15
_________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P. J.

_________________________
Desautels, J.

A168530, People v. Davis

16
Filed 12/18/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168530
v.
CHAROME DAVIS, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 158104)
Defendant and Appellant.

BY THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on December 10, 2024,
was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause and
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105, it now appears that the
opinion should be published in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

Dated: _________________ ____________________________
Stewart, P.J.

1
Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Thomas Stevens

Audrey R. Chavez, under appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant

Rob Bonta, Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General; Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General; Eric D. Share,
Katherine Seaman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent

A168530, People v. Davis

2

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.