CourtListener 10293373•Rahavi v. Chu CA4/3
Texte intégral
Filed 12/16/24 Rahavi v. Chu CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MICHAEL RAHAVI,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G063393
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-
01059110)
MARCUS CHU et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
David J. Hesseltine, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Stephen Abraham and Stephen E. Abraham for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Adam R. Rosenthal and
Luke J. Bickel for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
Michael Rahavi appeals from a defense judgment in favor of
Marcus Chu (Chu); Chu’s wife, Tracey Chu (Tracey); Autolnk, Inc., dba
Express Tire Distributor (Autolnk); and BCP Group, Inc., dba Beach City
Performance (BCP Group) (collectively, Defendants). Rahavi claimed he was
employed by Defendants and had not been paid wages for over two years,
reimbursed for expenses incurred on behalf of the businesses, or repaid loans
he had made to the businesses. Defendants argued Rahavi was not an
employee, but Chu’s partner in a business to grow Autolnk and BCP Group.
The trial court agreed with Defendants, finding that Rahavi’s monetary
contributions were largely buy-ins into the partnership and not loans; his
services were that of a partner, not entitled to remuneration; and any
expenses paid on behalf of the partnership were not recoverable in this action
because Rahavi had not made any claims against the partnership itself. On
appeal, Rahavi contends the court erred because there was no evidence the
partnership was a business “for profit” under Corporations Code section
16202, subdivision (a).1 We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
We recite only facts necessary to resolve the issues on appeal and
to provide context, and we do so “in a light most favorable to [the prevailing
parties at trial], resolving all conflicts in their favor.” (Cassim v. Allstate Ins.
Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 787.)
I.
THE PARTIES’ DEALINGS
Chu started BCP Group and Autolnk.
1
All further statutory references are to the Corporations Code.
2
BCP Group is a Nevada corporation doing business in California
as Beach City Performance (Beach City). Beach City is a tire shop in Corona
Del Mar. Beach City began in 2008 as Tire Masters. At some point it was
renamed Beamer’s Tire Shop, a nod to Chu’s pet dog Beamer, and then later
renamed Beach City. By 2012, BCP Group had been formed. In mid-2014,
Beach City moved to the Corona Del Mar location, when Chu bought a
commercial building for the shop.
There is only one class of stock for BCP Group, although physical
shares were never issued. It is owned 90 percent by Chu and Tracey, and
10 percent by Rahavi. Its tax returns, however, never reflected ownership of
shares by Rahavi.
Autolnk is a Nevada corporation doing business in California as
Express Tire Distributors. It was formed in 2014 as a tech development site
and later became an online e-commerce platform for tire sales. It had a
warehouse in Santa Ana, California. There is only one class of stock for
Autolnk, although physical shares were never issued. In February 2016, it
was owned 60 percent by BCP Group, 10 percent by Rahavi, and 30 percent
by others not a party to this lawsuit. Its tax returns, however, never reflected
ownership of shares by Rahavi.
Chu first met Rahavi sometime between 2007 and 2010. In 2010,
Rahavi began providing Chu with short-term financing of so-called “tire
specials.” In a nutshell, Rahavi would give Chu money for the tire shop to buy
shipping containers of tires at lower than wholesale prices, and the tire shop
would then resell the tires at wholesale prices. About a month after loaning
Chu the cash for these tire specials, Rahavi would receive the principal
amount of the loan plus typically anywhere between $5,000 to $10,000.
3
Sometime in 2014, Chu knew they would become business
partners. Chu and Rahavi signed a “Hold Harmless Agreement,” dated
October 2, 2014. It stated Rahavi was “interested in investing and joint
venture” with Chu to open an auto repair shop at an existing tire store in
Costa Mesa. To this end, Chu agreed to let Rahavi train at Beach City, where
Rahavi would “work in every phase of the shop operation” and Chu would
“train [Rahavi] for free with a potential equity in future stores, where
[Rahavi] will be funding or find equity partners. [Rahavi] is receiving no
compensation from [Chu] or Beach City.” Rahavi’s “training and all business
and financial disclosed [sic] to [Rahavi] will be confidential and not to be used
or disclosed to others. [Rahavi] agree[s] to Hold Harmless Beach City
Performance of any liabilities in regards to the training.” Both Chu and
Rahavi “mutually agree[d] to Hold each other Harmless of any liabilities, in
the event a location could not be secured.” In October 2014, Rahavi trained
with, or “shadowed,” Chu for two weeks, but the business at the Costa Mesa
location never came to fruition.
In February 2016, Chu and Rahavi began a partnership—
according to Chu—“to build ourselves a real estate empire and to build the
automotive empire.”
Chu and Rahavi signed a document, drafted by Chu’s father,
titled “Stock Option Agreement.” It is undated, and it is unclear from the
record when it was signed. It provides that “MIKE RAHAVI (MR), consultant
[has] invested the sum of $250,000 for expansion (working capital &
inventory purchased) for BCP Group . . . and Autolnk . . . for Stock Option to
be exercise[d] within twenty four months from date of agreement.” It
indicates the $250,000 is for 10 percent of the company stock of Autolnk and
10 percent of the company stock of BCP Group.
4
The Stock Option Agreement further states (verbatim): “MR –
will also be a working partner / manager for the companies – with no pay,
however, will have the right to convert the salary due to stock purchase.
Stock value to be determined at time of purchase[ ], determined by Income
and Gross sales. [¶] MR – can also assist with credit as required for company
expansion – not mandatory [¶] USE OF FUNDS – Marcus Chu is already
using his personal credit to secure working capital and credit lines for the
expansion of both companies. Marcus can use some of the funds to buy
personal real estate and reimburse company the funds used as needed.”
In February 2016, Rahavi made two payments toward the
businesses totaling $70,000 and started working at the Autolnk warehouse.
On June 14, Rahavi made another payment of $50,000. The next day, he
made a $70,000 payment toward Beach City’s purchase of Federal-branded
tires. In addition to these payments, which totaled $190,000, Rahavi paid for
certain expenses for the businesses.
In August 2016, Chu sent an attorney an e-mail with the subject
line “Agreement with Michael Rahavi.” In the e-mail, Chu stated their deal
terms, which included: “We agreed Marcus [referring to himself] would take
no less than [six] times Michael[’]s salary which we would say is $5,000 per
month to be paid in arrears so that company could use funds to grow[.] [¶] . . .
[¶] We are currently trying to raise additional capital to grow the business so
we have not put [M]ike on corporate paperwork[.] [¶] If we need to put the
10 percent on paper maybe we can put it as preferred stock.” No signed
agreement resulted from this email.
At the end of 2016, Rahavi “swapped places” with Chu and began
working at Beach City. During his time at the businesses, Rahavi worked
“five, six days a week” for eight hours a day. He worked from February 2016
5
to November 2018 without receiving any pay, except for a few months at the
end of 2017 and start of 2018 when he took money out, as reflected in entries
Rahavi made in the cash log.
In March 2018, Chu and Rahavi had a disagreement about
Rahavi taking his new puppy to work. When Chu texted Rahavi not to bring
the puppy to work, Rahavi responded, “don’t talk to me like I’m an employee.”
In November 2018, Chu and Rahavi had another argument, this time in
person at Beach City, and Rahavi “walked out in the middle of the day.”
II.
THE PLEADINGS
In March 2019, Rahavi sued Defendants based on two main
claims. First, Rahavi claimed he was an employee of Defendants and that
Defendants had not paid him full wages for about two years. Based on this
allegation, Rahavi brought causes of action for unpaid overtime wages,
failure to pay minimum wages, failure to provide meal and rest periods, and
failure to furnish timely and accurate wage statements (first through fourth
causes of action). Second, Rahavi claimed he made various loans to and
payments on behalf of Defendants for the operation of their businesses, none
of which were repaid or reimbursed. Based on this allegation, Rahavi brought
causes of action for breach of contract, account stated, and common counts
(fifth through seventh causes of action).
Defendants denied these claims, asserting the case was really “a
dispute between partners masquerading as a wage and hour case.” They
claimed Rahavi’s involvement in the businesses was that of partner and
investor, not employee. As such, Defendants argued Rahavi’s entitlement to
compensation was based on a partnership agreement and not subject to the
Labor Code and wage orders applicable to employees.
6
Autolnk and BCP Group cross-complained against Rahavi for
breach of contract. The entities alleged that they entered into an agreement
with Rahavi for Rahavi to buy in and become a partner/manager in the
operation of these businesses and that he breached that agreement in a
variety of ways.
Nobody brought a claim to dissolve any partnership that was
formed.
III.
THE BENCH TRIAL
The case was tried as a bench trial. At trial, Rahavi claimed that
he was an employee of BCP Group and Autolnk, and that he made the
following loans and expenses that were never repaid: (1) $35,000 on
February 12, 2016; (2) $35,000 on February 20, 2016; (3) $50,000 on June 14,
2016; (4) $70,000 on June 15, 2016; (5) $11,000 on January 24, 2017;
(6) $7,000 on October 2, 2017; (7) $35,000 on May 20, 2015, for medical
expenses relating to Chu’s shoulder surgery; (8) about $32,600 charged on his
American Express credit card to pay business expenses, plus interest; (9)
$14,600 charged on his Visa credit card to pay business expenses, plus
interest; and (10) about $3,600 toward the financing of a vehicle for the
businesses.
At trial, Chu testified that prior to his business relationship with
Rahavi, Chu had been in at least five business partnerships with other
friends and business contacts—all without written documentation of the
partnership. Chu testified that Rahavi was not an employee of either Autolnk
or BCP Group, but instead was a partner. Chu, however, was not entirely
clear on who was in the partnership: “Mike and I were partners, but the
partnership is with Autolnk and BCP Group. But we were still partners.”
7
When asked for a description of the partnership business, Chu responded,
“The Partnership just manages.” He later stated “[t]he Partnership manages
the companies that fix the car” and its purpose was “management, growth,
expansion.”
Chu testified that he and Rahavi “both managed both businesses,
Autolnk and BCP [Group]. I was on Autolnk majority of the time and he was
at BCP [Group] majority of the time. And we managed. [¶] And then we
joined to get together and discussed both companies and where we need to
get them.” Rahavi was “overseeing” employees, talking to customers, quoting
repair jobs, making invoices, making payroll, writing checks, and “talk[ing] to
vendors about bigger deals that we were working on.”
When asked what the partnership charged Autolnk and BCP
Group for management services, Chu said that “[t]here was no charge.” Chu
confirmed the partnership did not have a bank account.
According to Chu, they agreed Rahavi was not going to be paid or
draw a salary for the first year and a half, and Rahavi had said he did not
“need money right now.” Chu explained, “Until you make a profit, until you,
until we grow, we are a small business. Working super hard to grow the
business. So until we grow the business, we are not taking distributions or
salary, or I don’t know how you call it, draws or whatever.” When the
businesses were profitable, distributions were to be “basically just like a six
to one. Whatever [Rahavi] took out, [Chu] would take out six times.”
When asked about Autolnk and BCP Group, Chu acknowledged
business practices that could be characterized as unconventional, to say the
least. For example, the businesses “shared” employees—e.g., a Beach City
employee would sometimes work at the Autolnk warehouse, and vice versa,
but be paid only by the main business they worked for. Sometimes, workers
8
would be paid wages from petty cash, which would not be reflected in the
payroll taxes. In addition, some of Autolnk’s tax returns did not report having
any employees.
Rahavi testified after Chu. In 2008, while Rahavi was in college
for a degree in Business Management with an emphasis in Entrepreneurship,
he started a series of “asset buying” companies called Newport Capital
Recovery Group (NCRG), NCRG II, and NCRG III. The companies acquired
discharged debt from credit card companies and banks, largely incurred
during the global financial crises and recession in 2008, and sought
repayment on the discharged debt. These entities bought hundreds of
thousands of dollars of consumer debt for pennies on the dollar and employed
a “team of lawyers” to recover on that debt.
Rahavi testified that he was never Chu’s partner, and that he
and his father had loaned Chu money. In February 2016, Rahavi began
working as an Autolnk employee and Chu promised to pay him a salary.
Rahavi explained Chu “had offered me a job to work there so I would feel
more comfortable loaning him such a large amount of money.” Rahavi stated
that he “explicitly told [Chu] that I wasn’t going to be his partner, but I felt
comfortable enough to give him the money as a loan. Because he had
described certain issues that I didn’t want to be associated with.” When asked
to elaborate on those issues, Rahavi stated, “He had told me that his books
and records weren’t clean; did a lot of business in cash; his employees were
paid under the table. And that idea of paying the employees under the table
was uncomfortable for me to be associated with that.” While working at the
businesses, Rahavi provided loans and paid for business expenses on his
personal credit cards. He explained that he stayed working for more than two
9
years without payment “[b]ecause [Chu] was holding my money hostage
against the repayment of my father’s loans.”
Rahavi testified he never signed the Stock Option Agreement and
that he first saw a copy of it after he sued, when it was produced in discovery.
In cross-examination, Rahavi was presented with a January 2016 e-mail he
sent to Chu in which he provided “deal points on our deal buying into BCP
Inc.,” including a “$100,000 buy in.” The following colloquy occurred between
Chu’s counsel and Rahavi:
“Q Well, how do you define buy-in, sir?
A Writing a check for a hundred thousand.
Q Is that a loan?
A At that time, it wasn’t defined.
Q I’m asking when you wrote -- I didn’t write this document,
clearly. When you wrote this ‘hundred thousand dollar buy-
in,’ that was to buy equity in BCP [Group]; that wasn’t to
loan money; correct?
A It wasn’t defined.
Q I’m asking: When you wrote this document, what’s your
testimony, sir, as to what you meant by ‘buy-in’?
A When I wrote the document, ‘buy-in’ was not defined one
way or the other. [¶] . . . [¶]
Q So it’s possible that we can read buy-in to mean loan?
A You can read it however you like.
Q How do you read it?
A I read it as buy-in.
Q What does that mean?
10
A I’ve told you I don’t have any particular description for it
one way or the other.
Q So buy-in could have meant something other than buying
equity; is that your testimony?
A Buy-in, to me, is writing a check for a hundred thousand.
Q And what do you get in return for that check?
A We never got that far.” (Boldface omitted.)
A former Beach City employee testified that Rahavi had “the
same role” as Chu, which was “ownership,” and that “it was pretty known by
everybody that worked there” that they were partners. The employee testified
Rahavi’s role as a partner was “payroll, overseeing the customer sales
relationships, and then overseeing everybody inside the shop as well.”
A Beach City customer testified Rahavi was Chu’s partner at
Beach City, and that each referred to the other as “his business partner.”
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
In its written decision, the trial court stated the main issue—
whether Rahavi was an employee or a partner—“largely c[ame] down to
which party the court f[ound] more credible.” Although the court expressed
concerns about the credibility of both Chu and Rahavi, it found Chu “overall
to be believable—especially in comparison to Rahavi.”
The trial court found Chu “very fast and loose with how he does
everything. He flies by the seat of his pants and has little concern for
understanding corporate or business formalities or requirements, let alone
complying with them.” The court, however, credited Chu with being “honest
about much of” his business practices.
11
The court “found significant portions of [Rahavi’s] testimony hard
to believe.” The court explained: “During his testimony, Rahavi seized control
of the cross-examination many times. He was aggressive and avoidant. He
would redefine terms and rephrase questions. He would not admit to even
simple matters that were clearly true and he had an explanation for every
exhibit or piece of testimony that was inconsistent with his narrative.
Everything about his demeanor and the way he conducted himself during his
testimony and the trial more generally led the court to give little credibility to
much of Rahavi’s testimony, and find it hard to believe Rahavi’ s version of
events. The foregoing are just a few examples of the many reasons the court
did not believe much of Rahavi’s testimony.”
Finally, the court found many exhibits supported Chu’s testimony
of the existence of the partnership, but no “credible documentation to support
[Rahavi’s] testimony he was an employee.”
Based on the weighing of all the evidence and the evaluation of
all witnesses’ credibility, the trial court made the following findings. Rahavi
was a partner, not an employee. Chu and Rahavi formed an unnamed
partnership to manage and grow the businesses of BCP Group and Autolnk—
and to make a profit. The partnership’s purpose “was to expand BCP [Group]
to additional locations and to grow Autolnk as a tire retailer and distributor.”
For a $250,000 buy-in, Rahavi was to receive ten percent of both BCP Group
and Autolnk and could increase his share through sweat equity and
additional contributions. Rahavi made a total equity contribution of
$190,000. Between February and June 14, 2016, Rahavi contributed $120,000
toward his buy-in. And on June 15, Rahavi made another $70,000 equity
contribution in connection with the large purchase of Federal tires. Chu
testified Rahavi had a ten percent interest, even though he didn’t contribute
12
the full $250,000. The parties agreed to share profits or distribution on a six-
to-one ratio, with Chu receiving the greater amount. In sum, the trial court
found that “based on the parties’ words, conduct, and agreements, . . . Chu
and Rahavi associated together to carry on as co-owners of a business for
profits and formed a partnership.” The court clarified, “BCP [Group] and
Autolnk were not the partnership, but rather their management, operation,
and growth were the subject and purpose of the partnership between Chu
and Rahavi.”
The court addressed Rahavi’s arguments, including that there
were no partnership filings or bank accounts, that BCP Group and Autolnk
could not be partnerships because they were corporations, and that the
purported partnership was not compensated for management services it
allegedly rendered. It stated: “[W]hen persons join together to do business
and do not satisfy the requirements for other forms of a business entity, such
as a corporation, they form a partnership, and the court finds that is what
the parties intended here. Chu’s and the partnership’s failure to make any
filings, report income, and comply with various other requirements may
subject them to liability or have other consequences, but it does not defeat the
formation of the partnership the parties intended. Indeed, having intended to
form a partnership, Rahavi cannot exploit the parties’ failures (including his
own) to follow formalities and now claim there was not partnership and he is
entitled to hundreds of thousands of dollars in back wages.”
Given the trial court’s finding Rahavi was a partner and not an
employee, the court found against Rahavi on his wage claims (first through
fourth causes of action). The court also found against Rahavi on his contract
claims (fifth through seventh causes of action). The court found Rahavi
loaned $35,000 in May 2015, but that Chu had repaid it. As for all other
13
money paid by Rahavi, the court found that either they were not loans or that
Rahavi had failed to show they were loans subject to repayment, that most
constituted equity buy-ins, and that some were expenses personally incurred
by Rahavi as a partner in connection with the management and operation of
the businesses. Concerning the expenses incurred as a partner, the court
acknowledged Rahavi may have a claim for reimbursement against the
partnership but that he did not bring any claims in this action against the
partnership.
On the cross-complaint for breach of contract, the trial court
found against BCP Group and Autolnk because they failed to prove the
existence of any agreement between them and Rahavi (as opposed to Chu and
Rahavi).
Rahavi timely appealed the judgment.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue Rahavi raises on appeal is whether the trial court
erred by finding the existence of a partnership between him and Chu.
According to Rahavi, the court erred because there was no evidence the
alleged partnership engaged in a business “for profit.” Rahavi argues that
because the alleged partnership did not charge for its services, it was not
engaged in a business “for profit” and thus cannot meet the definition of
partnership under section 16202. We disagree.
Generally, a partnership is formed when at least two persons
associate “to carry on as coowners a business for profit . . . , whether or not
the persons intend to form a partnership.” (§ 16202, subd. (a).) An association
organized as another entity (e.g., a corporation) is not a partnership.
(§ 16202, subd. (b).) “[T]he existence of a partnership is a question of fact” to
be determined from the parties’ agreement, their conduct, and the
14
surrounding circumstances. (Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc. (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 1141, 1157 (Persson).) A partnership agreement can be “written,
oral, or implied.” (§ 16101, subd. (a)(10).) “‘In that sense, any partnership
without a written agreement is a “de facto” partnership.’” (Eng v. Brown
(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 675, 694 (Eng).) The actual sharing of profits is
“evidence of a partnership, rather than a required element of the definition of
a partnership.” (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 454, fn.
omitted.)
We review the trier of fact’s determination on whether a
partnership exists for substantial evidence. (Cochran v. Board of Supervisors
(1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 75, 81.) “Where an appellant argues that a particular
verdict is not supported by [substantial] evidence, our review ‘begins and
ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination.’” (DeNike v. Mathew Enterprises, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
371, 381.) “The testimony of a single witness may constitute substantial
evidence as long as it is not physically impossible or inherently improbable.”
(Ibid.) However, “[t]he proper interpretation of a statute, and its application
to undisputed facts, presents a question of law that is subject to de novo
review.” (Compulink Management Center, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 289, 295.)
Here, the trial court found Chu and Rahavi entered into a
partnership with the purpose of managing, operating, and growing Autolnk
and BCP Group. Unless they agree otherwise, partners typically are not
compensated for their services, on the theory that their contributions offset
each other. (Vangel v. Vangel (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 615, 631; see also
§ 16401, subd. (h) [unless the agreement provides otherwise, “[a] partner is
15
not entitled to remuneration for services performed for the partnership,
except for reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up the
business of the partnership”].) The court found the two men agreed to share
profits or distribution from the companies on a six-to-one ratio, with Chu
receiving the greater amount. The court also found it difficult to believe
Rahavi would continue to contribute significant sums of money to the
businesses when he was not receiving any of the wages he claims he was
entitled to as part of the arrangement. These findings are amply supported
by Chu’s testimony and trial exhibits, including the Stock Option Agreement.
We are not persuaded by Rahavi’s interpretation that, to
constitute a partnership under section 16202, the partnership itself must
generate the “profit,” as opposed to generating profit for a related entity in
which the partners will reap the profit. All that is required for a partnership
is coownership of “a business for profit.” (§ 16202, subd. (a).) Nothing in the
statutory language compels that the business itself make the profit, and
Rahavi does not cite any case law that directly supports his position.
Ordinarily, “a partnership does not continue to exist after the
formation of a corporation.” (Persson, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.)
“[A]fter a partnership is incorporated, the rights or obligations which
partners can enforce against each other no longer exist. . . . They have the
rights and obligations of shareholders, not partners . . . .” (Id. at p. 1159.) But
this rule is subject to an exception: “a pre-incorporation agreement or
evidence the corporate form was disregarded.” (Ibid.) “Partners may, by
agreement, continue their relations as copartners in conjunction with their
relationship as stockholders of a corporation, and ‘the law [will] take
cognizance of such dual relationship and deal with “the parties in the light of
their agreement . . . , independently of their incorporation” . . . .’ [Citations].”
16
(Id. at p. 1158; see also Eng, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 695–696 [proponent
of the partnership may “offer[ ] evidence that the partners intended to retain
their partnership notwithstanding incorporation”]; Elsbach v. Mulligan
(1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 354, 359–362, 368 [plaintiff, who with defendant had
formed joint venture that was later incorporated, allowed to personally sue
defendant for breach of fiduciary duty under original joint venture for
usurping corporate opportunities].) For this reason, the trial court could
reasonably find a partnership between Chu and Rahavi, notwithstanding the
corporate status of Autolnk and BCP Group.
In sum, we conclude the court did not err in finding the existence
of a partnership between Chu and Rahavi.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs
on appeal.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
17
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.