CourtListener 10293177•People v. Clark CA2/2
Texte intégral
Filed 12/16/24 P. v. Clark CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B333463
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA480456)
v.
BOBBY CLARK,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Craig Elliott Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J.
Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________________
Appellant Bobby Clark appeals the judgment entered
following a jury trial in which he was convicted of the felony of
fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s vehicle while driving recklessly,
which is a wobbler offense (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). Appellant
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor (Pen. Code,
§ 17, subd. (b)).1 We disagree and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
At 11:15 p.m. on August 17, 2019, two officers on patrol
saw a BMW sedan drive slowly through a Starbucks parking lot.
The windows were illegally tinted. The officers ran a search of
the license plate and found that the registration was suspended.
The officers then “initiated a traffic stop.”
They approached appellant’s parked car from both sides,
but the car’s windows remained closed, and the window tint
prevented the officers from seeing inside. The officer at the
driver’s side repeatedly told appellant to roll down his window.
Appellant did not comply and indicated that his window on that
side did not roll down. He eventually rolled down the back
passenger’s side window two inches. The officer on the
passenger’s side noticed the smell of burnt marijuana coming
from the car and saw a gun between the center console and
appellant’s leg. The officers told appellant to “step out of the car”
“more than ten times,” but he refused, and the officers called for a
backup unit. Appellant rolled up the window, started his car,
and drove away. The officers and the backup unit they had called
then pursued appellant in a dangerous four-mile chase through
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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traffic, during which appellant sped over twice the limit and
committed “more than a dozen” traffic violations that resulted in
near collisions.
After losing sight of appellant’s car, officers eventually
located it nearby. They searched it but did not find a gun.
II. Procedure
In an information filed February 14, 2020, the People
charged appellant with “fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor
vehicle while driving recklessly, . . . a felony” (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2). The People further alleged he had served time in
prison and suffered a prior strike (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (b),
1170.12).
The first jury trial, at which appellant testified, resulted in
a mistrial.
In the second trial, appellant testified to significant facts he
did not mention in the first. He testified that upon initiating the
traffic stop, one of the officers “hopped out of his car, gun in
hand,” and said “ ‘get the fuck out of the car.’ ” He also testified
that he repeatedly asked one officer to turn his body camera on,
and that one officer tried to calm the other officer down during
the interaction. Appellant claimed that he fled the officers
because he feared for his life. His testimony, however, conflicted
with the officers’ testimony as well as the body camera footage
showing appellant calmy ask the approaching officer, “How you
doing, sir?”
A jury found appellant guilty as charged on June 8, 2023.
Appellant requested that the trial court reduce the
conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b), or,
in the alternative, for the court to strike his prior strike under
section 1385, subdivision (a). At the sentencing hearing, defense
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counsel drew the court’s attention to the fact that appellant’s
prior robbery conviction occurred 13 years ago, when he was 18
years old, and that appellant’s son had recently died. The court
denied the motion to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor, but
granted appellant’s request to strike his prior strike. Appellant
was placed on probation for two years with a suspended 180-day
jail sentence.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor under
section 17, subdivision (b). We review the denial of the motion for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14
Cal.4th 968, 980 (Alvarez).) To show an abuse of discretion, an
appellant must show the trial court’s decision fell outside the
bounds of reason, i.e., that it was arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd. (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433;
People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605 [“A merely
debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion”];
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.)
I. Pertinent Law
Although most crimes fall into one category, felony or
misdemeanor, some crimes—called “wobblers”—are punishable
as either, depending on the severity of the surrounding facts.
(People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 885 (Tran).) A
wobbler offense charged as a felony is a felony for all purposes
until the imposition of the sentence. (Id. at p. 886.) The trial
court has discretion to reduce a wobbler offense from a felony to a
misdemeanor upon imposing a punishment other than state
prison (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b)(1)) or by declaring it a
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misdemeanor after granting probation (Pen. Code, § 17, subd.
(b)(3)). (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 974.) Fleeing a peace
officer’s pursuit while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) is a
wobbler offense. (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 685.)
In deciding whether to reduce a felony conviction to a
misdemeanor, courts consider such factors as “ ‘the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and
attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced
by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 14
Cal.4th at p. 978.) “ ‘When appropriate, judges should also
consider the general objectives of sentencing such as those set
forth in California Rules of Court, rule [4.]410.’ ” (Tran, supra,
242 Cal.App.4th at p. 888.) Those objectives include: protecting
society, punishing the defendant, encouraging the defendant to
lead a law-abiding life, and deterring others from criminal
conduct. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
The trial court acted well within reason in denying
appellant’s motion to reduce his conviction to a
misdemeanor. Although it saw fit to strike appellant’s
prior strike, given that this offense was “not quite or even
nearly as aggravated as some [strike] cases can be,” it also
acknowledged that appellant had a criminal history and
that his fast and reckless driving posed a serious danger,
making it “fortuitous[] no one was injured.” It observed
that the way appellant pulled out during the traffic stop
was “almost even casual,” and that his “driving off like that
. . . afford[ed] him an opportunity to discard a gun if, in
fact, there was one in the car.”
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To justify his fleeing, appellant also fabricated events
in the second trial by testifying that one officer initiated the
traffic stop holding a gun and yelling at him. Such
“behavior and demeanor” does not reflect a character
meriting the court’s favorable exercise of discretion. In
sum, “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense,’ ”
appellant’s “ ‘appreciation of and attitude toward the
offense,’ ” and “ ‘his . . . character as evidenced by his
behavior and demeanor at the trial’ ” all show that the
court’s decision was reasonable, and not arbitrary or
capricious. (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978.)
Appellant argues that his youth when he was
convicted of robbery at age 18, and certain facts underlying
this offense, including that no one was injured and that
appellant was not aggressive toward the officers, “weighed
in favor of reducing [his] convictions to misdemeanors.”
This argument ignores the fact that our task is not to
“ ‘ “ ‘substitut[e] [our] judgment for the judgment of the
trial judge,’ ” ’ ” but rather to determine whether the lower
court’s decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377; People v. Giminez (1975) 14
Cal.3d 68, 72.) We conclude it was not.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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