CourtListener 10293171•People v. Murray CA2/7
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Filed 12/16/24 P. v. Murray CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B332053
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. MA042564-02)
JONATHAN ALVIN MURRAY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.
George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Jonathan Alvin Murray appeals from the superior court’s
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 In 2013 a jury convicted
Murray of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him
to a prison term of 55 years to life. Murray appealed, and we
reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to give the
People the option of accepting a reduction to second degree
murder or retrying the case. The People decided not to retry the
case, and the court entered a conviction for second degree murder
and sentenced Murray to 35 years to life.
After the Legislature amended the statutes defining
murder, Murray filed a petition for resentencing. The court held
an evidentiary hearing and found beyond a reasonable doubt
Murray could still be convicted of murder under current law.
Murray contends substantial evidence did not support the court’s
finding. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Murray and His Brother Chase and Kill a Friend
Murray and his brother Jason Cutler lived with their
mother Bernadette Young. Chris Elmore, a friend of Murray’s,
also lived in Young’s apartment. One late night in April 2008,
Murray and Cutler began fighting with Elmore because he
“disrespected” Young. The three men left Young’s apartment and
went into the street, where the altercation “escalated.”
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
According to a witness, Murray and Cutler appeared to be
“attacking” and acting aggressively toward Elmore, who was
saying, “Leave me alone” and “Come on, man. I’m leaving. I’m
leaving.” Murray picked up a metal pole and swung it at Elmore,
who swung a cane at Murray in self-defense. Murray and Cutler
returned to the apartment, retrieved knives from the kitchen,
and went back out into the street. Meanwhile, Elmore continued
walking down the street, away from Young’s apartment.
Murray and Cutler ran after Elmore. Cutler caught up to
Elmore first and stabbed him in the neck. Murray and Cutler
ran back into Young’s apartment, and according to a neighbor,
Young said, “‘Those are my sons. That guy disrespected me.
They had to do what they had to do.’”
Elmore died from the knife wound in his neck.
Investigators found the two knives from Young’s kitchen within
16 feet of each other in a neighbor’s yard; one had blood on it, the
other did not. (People v. Murray (June 1, 2015, B252166)
[nonpub. opn.].)
At trial, the People introduced the transcript of two
interviews detectives conducted with Murray. The jury also
heard a recording of the interviews, and one of the detectives
testified about inculpating statements Murray made during the
interviews. In the first interview, four days after the murder,
Murray told the detectives, “I’m just going to . . . put it out there,
man. You know, my mom didn’t have nothing to do with it. You
know, it was me and my brother.” Murray said that he got into a
fight with Elmore because Elmore “disrespected” his mother and
that the fight moved to the street, where Murray hit Elmore with
a pole when Elmore swung his cane at Murray; Cutler also went
out into the street and “was just watching.” According to Murray,
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the fight lasted only a few minutes before Young told him to go
back inside the apartment. Murray stated that he and Cutler
each grabbed a knife from the kitchen and that they both “ran
after” Elmore. Murray said that, when he was on the street and
saw Cutler running, he said to himself, “I fucking can’t do this”
and went back inside Young’s apartment. Murray claimed he did
not know anything about what Cutler did.
In the second interview a month later, Murray explained to
the detective that he believed the prosecutor would charge him
with accessory to murder: “I was there. I had a knife. . . . My
brother had a knife and it, it happened.” Murray stated
“everything” would “pinpoint” to him because Cutler was his
“crimey.” Murray admitted, “You know, my intention was to kill
his ass. That was my intention, ’cause he said that shit to my
momma. My mom took him in. You know, he [was] running from
his gun charge. My mom took him in and . . . I was about to kill
him.” Murray also said, “You know. And me and my brother ran
down there, I was about to kill him. That was my intention, you
know.” The detective summarized Murray’s statements back to
him, “So, you’re telling us your intent was to kill him, but you
didn’t kill him. [Cutler] did.” Murray responded, “He caught up
to him faster than I could.”
B. The Jury Convicts Murray of Murder, the Trial
Court Sentences Him, and Murray Appeals
The trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder as
an aider and abettor with CALJIC No. 3.01 and on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine with CALJIC No. 3.02. The
jury convicted Murray of first degree murder and, in a bifurcated
proceeding, Murray admitted he had a prior conviction that was a
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serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a),
and a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three
strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The
trial court sentenced Murray to a prison term of 55 years to life:
25 years to life for first degree murder, doubled under the three
strikes law, plus five years for the enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a).
Murray appealed, arguing the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court
decided People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, which held a
defendant cannot be convicted of first degree murder as an aider
and abettor under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Id. at pp. 158-159.) Rather, the Supreme Court stated,
the defendant’s liability for first degree murder “must be based
on direct aiding and abetting principles.” (Id. at p. 159.)2 We
agreed with Murray, reversed the judgment, and directed the
trial court to allow the People to accept a reduction of Murray’s
2 The Supreme Court also held “punishment for second
degree murder is commensurate with a defendant’s culpability
for aiding and abetting a target crime that would naturally,
probably, and foreseeably result in a murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Chiu, supra,
59 Cal.4th at p. 166.) Following the Legislature’s amendments in
2019 to the statutes defining murder, which we will discuss, a
defendant may no longer be convicted of second degree murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory. (See People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 851 [section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), “bars conviction for second degree murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory”].)
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murder conviction to second degree or to retry the charge of first
degree murder. (People v. Murray, supra, B252166.)
On remand the trial court vacated Murray’s sentence, and
the People stated they did not intend to retry Murray on the first
degree murder charge. The court entered a conviction for second
degree murder and sentenced Murray to a prison term of 35 years
to life.
C. Murray Petitions for Resentencing Under
Section 1172.6
In 2021 Murray filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. Murray alleged the facts required under
section 1172.6, subdivision (a), and requested counsel. After the
court appointed counsel to represent Murray, the parties filed
briefs, and the court found Murray had made a prima facie
showing for relief and issued an order to show cause. The People
filed an evidentiary brief, arguing the evidence at trial
established Murray was a direct aider and abettor of murder.
Murray filed a reply, arguing the evidence did not show he
assisted Cutler during the stabbing “by cornering, holding,
distracting, or touching Elmore in any fashion.”
At the hearing on the petition the parties stipulated to the
statement of facts from this court’s opinion in Murray’s direct
appeal. Counsel for Murray argued the evidence at trial did not
show that the brothers planned to stab Elmore, that Murray had
any physical contact with Elmore, or that Murray cornered or
distracted Elmore. Counsel argued the record did not indicate
how far away Murray was when Cutler stabbed Elmore. The
prosecutor, citing Murray’s admissions he intended to kill
Elmore, argued the evidence established Murray directly aided
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and abetted Cutler. Regarding the actus reus element of aiding
and abetting, the prosecutor argued Murray aided and abetted
Cutler in “a number of ways,” including encouraging his brother
to catch up with Elmore and preventing Elmore from attempting
to fight back.
The court stated it considered “what led up to the motive to
get into the fight in the first place,” that the brothers went back
to the apartment to arm themselves with knives, and that they
“then reengaged the victim after the victim specifically tried to
leave and get away.” The court found the evidence showed
Murray and Cutler “were working in concert,” were both armed,
and had the “same motives” when they both “took off after that
victim before his death.” The court stated, “There is strength in
numbers,” and denied the petition. Murray timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6 and the Standard of Review
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th
457, 467, 468; People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440 (Curiel);
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986 (Reyes); People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile)) and significantly
narrowing the felony-murder exception to the malice requirement
for murder (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
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participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule
in section 189, subdivision (e). (Arellano, at pp. 467-468; Curiel,
at p. 449; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.) Section 1172.6 authorizes an
individual convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the
superior court to vacate the conviction and to resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts if he or she could not now be
convicted of murder because of the legislative changes to the
definitions of the crime. (See Curiel, at pp. 449-450; Strong, at
p. 708; Lewis, at p. 957; Gentile, at p. 843.)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner if requested. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 962-963; see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3).) The prosecutor
must then file a response to the petition, the petitioner may file a
reply, and the court must hold a hearing to determine whether
the petitioner has made a prima facie showing he or she is
entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 450.)
If a petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief, the
superior court issues an order to show cause, and the matter
proceeds to an evidentiary hearing “at which the prosecution
bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under state
law as amended by Senate Bill [No.] 1437.” (People v. Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 709; see § 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3); People
v. Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 631-632.)
“While the superior court acts as an independent fact finder
in determining whether the People have met their burden, on
8
appeal, the reviewing court applies the substantial evidence
standard to the superior court’s findings.” (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951; see People v. Arnold (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383.) “Under this standard, we review the
record ‘“‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is,
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988;
see People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066; People
v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) We presume
“‘“‘every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could
have reasonably deduced from the evidence.’”’” (Hill, at p. 1066;
see People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.) In
conducting this review, “‘“‘[w]e resolve neither credibility issues
nor evidentiary conflicts.’”’” (People v. Schell (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 437, 442.) “‘“Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence.”’” (People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
458, 476.)
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Murray’s
Petition
1. Applicable Law
“Murder, whether in the first or second degree, requires
malice aforethought.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 844; see
§ 187, subd. (a); People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 385.)
“Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought, but without the premeditation or deliberation
9
required for first degree murder.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th
593, 600; see People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88 [“If the
murder is ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated,’ it is first degree
murder.”].) Malice “may be express or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a);
see People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 974.) “It is express when
there is a manifest intent to kill.” (Gentile, at p. 844; see § 188,
subd. (a)(1); People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 601 [one
theory of second degree murder is “unpremeditated murder with
express malice”]; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 547
[same].) “Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the
killing is proximately caused by “‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.’”’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988;
see People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 414.)
“‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined
actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own
mens rea.’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990-991; see People
v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118.) Direct aiding and
abetting “requires that ‘the aider and abettor . . . know and share
the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.’” (Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 850.) “[A]n aider and abettor will ‘share’ the
perpetrator’s specific intent when he or she knows the full extent
of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or
encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984)
35 Cal.3d 547, 560; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463
[“‘an accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another
[e.g., murder] if the accomplice aids the commission of that
10
offense with “knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful
intent and [with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful
ends”’”].) “‘The aider and abettor doctrine merely makes aiders
and abettors liable for their accomplices’ actions as well as their
own. It obviates the necessity to decide who was the aider and
abettor and who [was] the direct perpetrator or to what extent
each played which role.’” (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243,
279.)
“Aiding and abetting may be shown by circumstantial
evidence.” (People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599.)
“‘Factors to be considered by the trier of fact in determining
“whether one is an aider and abettor include presence at the
scene of the crime, failure to take steps to attempt to prevent the
commission of the crime, companionship, flight, and conduct
before and after the crime.”’” (People v. Vargas, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 955; see Glukhoy, at p. 599 [“Motive is
another circumstance to be considered in determining aiding and
abetting liability.”].)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Superior
Court’s Findings
Substantial evidence supported the superior court’s finding
Murray could still be convicted of aiding and abetting second
degree murder under current law. First, Murray admitted he
acted with express malice. Referring to Elmore, Murray told the
detectives his intention “was to kill his ass.” Murray also knew
Cutler acted with express malice because he saw Cutler retrieve
a knife from Young’s kitchen, leave the apartment, and run after
Elmore. The brothers shared the intent to kill Elmore. (See
People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 716-717
11
[“the evidence supported a finding that [the defendant] shared
the intent to kill with the stabber”].) Second, Murray’s actions,
which mirrored Cutler’s, showed he intended to assist Cutler in
achieving Cutler’s “unlawful ends” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 463), i.e., killing Elmore. Though the record does not reflect
what, if anything, the two brothers said to each other, Murray
fully cooperated and acted in concert with Cutler. The evidence
supported the reasonable inference that each brother knew the
other had armed himself with a knife (they both went into
Young’s kitchen to get one) and that Murray ran out the
apartment with Cutler (a witness saw the brothers run in and
back out together). Third, Murray’s actions supported and
encouraged Cutler: Murray and Cutler both attacked Elmore in
front of Young’s apartment, armed themselves with the same
deadly weapons, chased Elmore, discarded their knives after
Cutler stabbed Elmore, and returned together to Young’s
apartment after they completed their mission. (See People v.
Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 599 [brothers supported and
encouraged each other as aiders and abettors where they
together planned to commit car burglaries, stole a car and a
truck, evaded law enforcement by taking turns driving recklessly,
and fled the scene after a fatal crash].)
Contrary to Murray’s assertion that Cutler stabbed Elmore
“before [Murray] arrived and could provide Cutler with any
assistance,” Murray’s statements showed he in fact arrived close
to the scene of the stabbing, where his large physique and
weapon, at a minimum, provided backup for Cutler. Murray also
supported and encouraged Cutler to catch up with Elmore by
12
running with him.3 (See People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011)
52 Cal.4th 254, 296 [“Because [the defendant] was armed, his act
of standing backup aided and encouraged [his codefendant] in
shooting [the victims] by providing further deadly force in case
the victims resisted.”].) As Murray told the detectives, he “was
about to kill” Elmore, but Cutler got there first. (See People
v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1120 [“When two or more
persons commit a crime together, both may act in part as the
actual perpetrator and in part as the aider and abettor of the
other, who also acts in part as an actual perpetrator.”].)
Murray argues he and Cutler “were acting independently,
and not jointly, at the time Cutler fatally stabbed Elmore.” The
evidence, however, belies this characterization. As discussed,
a witness saw the brothers attack Elmore in the street, go back
into the apartment, return outside, run toward Elmore, and
finally return to Young’s apartment. The spatial and temporal
proximity of Murray and Cutler to each other throughout most of
their altercation with, and pursuit of, Elmore undermines
Murray’s assertion Cutler killed Elmore “entirely on his own.”
Young’s statement her boys “had to do what they had to do”
(presumably to defend her honor) shows she also viewed the
killing as a joint enterprise. And Murray described the venture
as a team effort: “It was me and my brother.” Finally, as
discussed, the factors to consider in determining whether Murray
aided and abetted the murder are not limited to the precise
moment Cutler drove his knife into Elmore’s neck. Murray
provided moral support to Cutler, his “crimey,” before and after
the stabbing, taking the exact same steps (albeit a bit slower)
3 A detective testified Murray was six feet tall and weighed
approximately 235 pounds at the time of the crime.
13
Cutler took to achieve their common goal of killing Elmore. (See
In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 464 [substantial evidence
supported the court’s finding the defendant aided and abetted the
perpetrator’s assault with intent to rape because, knowing the
perpetrator’s intent, the defendant did not stop the perpetrator,
but instead told him to “‘go and get her,’” acted as the “‘lookout
guy,’” and helped the perpetrator to flee].)
Murray also could still be convicted of second degree
murder under an implied malice theory. “‘In the context of
implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the
commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and
abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding
the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for
an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by
words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act,
not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be
personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge
that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the
perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act
is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for
human life.’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991; see People v.
Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 389-390.)
The evidence showed Murray knew Cutler intended to
attack Elmore with a deadly weapon, intended to aid Cutler,
knew the attack was dangerous to Elmore’s life, and acted in
conscious disregard of Elmore’s life. As discussed, Murray knew
Cutler took a knife from the kitchen drawer, which supported the
reasonable inference Murray knew Cutler intended to attack
Elmore with the knife (if not kill him). The evidence also showed
Murray intended to aid Cutler in committing the assault when he
14
ran out of the apartment with Cutler, armed with a knife.
Murray’s admission he intended to kill Elmore and his decision to
arm himself was substantial evidence he knew stabbing Elmore
with a knife was dangerous to human life. In addition, Murray
ran after Elmore, knowing Cutler was chasing Elmore too, which
further showed a conscious disregard for Elmore’s life. As for
Murray’s acts that aided Cutler in assaulting Elmore, the same
evidence that supported Murray’s liability as an aider and
abettor to second degree express malice murder also supported
his liability as an aider and abettor to second degree implied
malice murder: encouragement, support, companionship, conduct
before and after the crime, and flight. (See People v. Vargas,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 955; People v. Glukhoy, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 599.) Murray’s pursuit of Elmore (even if he
fell behind Cutler) encouraged Cutler, who could count on him for
moral and physical support and assistance if necessary (if, for
example, Elmore used his cane as a weapon again). Murray did
nothing to dissuade Cutler, but instead armed himself with a
knife and ran after Cutler. (See People v. Schell, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 443 [defendant’s “presence at the scene, his
participation in the attack on the victim, his companionship with
other perpetrators, his conduct before and after the crimes, and
his motive of retaliation for disrespect all support the finding that
he aided and abetted an implied malice murder”].) As the
superior court observed, the brothers had strength in numbers,
and after the crime they both discarded their weapons in a
neighbor’s yard and returned home together, to the approval of
their mother. Substantial evidence supported the court’s
conclusion that the brothers committed the murder in concert.
15
DISPOSITION
The order denying Murray’s petition under section 1172.6
is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
PULOS, J.*
* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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