C.T. v. K.W. CA1/4

CourtListener 10292845Calctapp13 déc. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 12/13/24 C.T. v. K.W. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

C.T.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A170819

v. (San Francisco City &
K.W., County
Super. Ct. No. FDV-19-
Defendant and
814465)
Appellant.

Defendant K.W. purports to appeal from a family court
move-away order granting C.T.’s request that the court affirm
C.T.’s ability to relocate to Denmark with the parties’ child.
Because the order is not appealable, we dismiss K.W.’s appeal.
BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2024, C.T. moved ex parte for an order
shortening time (OST) on a request for an order affirming that he
could relocate with the parties’ child to Denmark.1 At the time,

1 C.T. expressed his request as one for an order affirming

his right to relocate with the parties’ child. “ ‘The question for
the trial court [however, was] not whether the parent may be
permitted to move; the question [was] what arrangement for

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C.T. had maintained temporary sole legal and physical custody of
the parties’ child for five years. C.T. stated that he had been
unemployed for at least six months, and he had received a job
offer in Denmark with a starting date of May 6, 2024. The court
granted the OST, issued a briefing schedule, and set a mediation
session and short-cause hearing for April 25, 2024.
The court heard argument on April 25, 2024, including
K.W.’s argument that the court should set a hearing under
Family Code section 217, and the court took the matter under
submission. On April 29, 2024, K.W. filed a VL-110 seeking to
file, “FL-300 Req. for Order: Joint legal custody, rebut 3044, 20%
parenting time, Family Code 3025, there is no final custody
order, thus an evidentiary hearing must precede before move-
away.” She did not seek sole or joint physical custody of the
parties’ child.
The trial court granted C.T.’s request regarding the move
to Denmark and issued a written order on May 2, 2024, which it
amended on May 9, 2024 to correct a typo (move-away order). In
the move-away order, the court recited that there had been no
final custody order in this matter. The court also recited that,
prior to C.T.’s request to relocate, K.W. had not sought to rebut
the Family Code section 3044 presumption that applied because
of the domestic violence restraining order issued against K.W.
The court granted C.T.’s relocation request utilizing the best

custody should be made [if and when the parent moves].’ ” (Mark
T. v. Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1126.)

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interest analysis and concluding that it would be in the child’s
best interest to remain in C.T.’s sole legal and physical custody.
The court then addressed the following subjects: “Ongoing
Visitation Pending Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Request for
Termination of Visitation and Newly Filed Request for Child
Custody and Rebuttal of the [Family Code section] 3044
Presumption,” and “Child Custody Evaluation.” Pending a
further hearing, the court ordered interim therapeutic visitation
for K.W. to continue either in California or in Denmark, with C.T.
to provide a list of acceptable foreign providers. The court set a
June 11, 2024 hearing to “confirm and order the visitation
schedule,” and set a schedule for the parties to submit briefing
and updated income and expense declarations (so the court could
consider cost allocation should C.T. elect to have visitation in
Denmark). The court also granted K.W.’s request for a custody
evaluation: “The Court orders a full custody evaluation,
investigation, and assessment addressing all issues related the
child’s health, safety, welfare, and best interests. The evaluation
shall include recommended custody orders and a proposed
parenting plan.” The record in this appeal reflects that the trial
court set a July 24, 2024 “long[-]cause” hearing to determine final
visitation and custody, during which hearing the court would also
consider K.W.’s request that C.T. post a bond to secure
enforceability of the court’s order once C.T. moved, the custody
evaluation, any evidence presented by K.W. to rebut the Family
Code section 3044 presumption, and K.W.’s request for joint legal
custody.

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K.W. filed a notice of appeal on June 24, 2024, stating that
she appealed from “5/2/2024 and 5/9/2024” orders under Code of
Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2)–(14).
After K.W. appealed, this court issued an order requesting
briefing on the appealability of the move-away order, citing
authorities finding that interim custody orders are not
appealable. The parties filed letter briefs. In her letter brief,
K.W. stated that she was appealing “other adjudicated matters”
along with the move-away order, so this court issued a second
order requesting supplemental briefing, asking K.W. to specify
what orders she was appealing and why those orders were
appealable. This court also asked K.W. to address whether this
court could and/or should treat her appeal as a writ, and the
court set a seven-page limitation for the supplemental briefing.
In response, K.W. filed a letter brief that exceeded the page
limitation. This court struck everything in K.W.’s filing that
exceeded the page limitation, which included her argument for
why the court should treat this matter as a writ. In response to
the court’s query, K.W. stated that, in addition to the move-away
order, she was appealing the court’s denial of her request for a
Family Code section 217 hearing and discovery with respect to
the move-away.
DISCUSSION
“ ‘The existence of an appealable judgment is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.’ [Citation.] ‘California is
governed by the “one final judgment” rule which provides
“interlocutory or interim orders are not appealable, but are only

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‘reviewable on appeal’ from the final judgment.” [Citation.] The
rule was designed to prevent piecemeal dispositions and costly
multiple appeals which burden the court and impede the judicial
process. [Citation.] In keeping with this rule, [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 904.1 generally authorizes appeals from
superior court judgments, except those which are interlocutory.’
[Citation.] Interlocutory rulings ‘ “within the statutory classes of
appealable interlocutory judgments” ’ remain appealable;
however, the appellant bears the burden of establishing the
appealability of such a ruling.” (Brown v. Upside Gading, LP
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 140, 144; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(2)(B).)
Interim custody orders are not appealable. (See Banning v.
Newdow (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 438, 456 [interim custody orders
are not appealable]; Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536,
559 [temporary custody orders are “interlocutory” by definition
and not appealable]); Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377 [“[T]he right to appeal a child
custody determination is generally limited to final judgments and
orders made after final judgments”].)
In her statement of appealability (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(2)(B)) and in her supplemental letter briefing, K.W.
argues that the move-away order is appealable under Code of
Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) and In re
Marriage of Lasich (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 702, 705, fn. 1. Her
reliance on these authorities is misplaced. Lasich concerned a
postjudgment move-away order, appealable under Code of Civil

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Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). (Lasich, at p. 705,
fn. 1.) Here, there was no final custody and visitation order, so
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) does not
apply.
In her supplemental letter briefing, K.W. also relied on In
re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, and F.T. v. L.J.
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1 (F.T.), but neither case establishes that
the order at issue is appealable. Skelley addressed the
appealability of a collateral order reducing temporary spousal
support and denying attorney’s fees and costs. (Skelley, at
p. 367.) Here, the move-away order is not collateral to the main
custody and visitation issues in this litigation, so Skelley does not
assist K.W.
F.T., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th 1, is also unhelpful to K.W. In
F.T., the court decided an appeal of a denial of a move-away order
where there previously had been no final custody judgment (id. at
p. 19), but the issue of appealability was never discussed.
“Because the opinion does not suggest either that the parties
raised the jurisdictional issue or that the court considered it,
[F.T.] is not authority for [K.W.’s] position.” (Doe v. Luster (2006)
145 Cal.App.4th 139, 149–150.) The move-way order in this case
was not a final order, as it expressly contemplated further
proceedings on custody and visitation, including an evidentiary
hearing on K.W.’s request for joint legal custody and to rebut the
Family Code section 3044 presumption and on C.T.’s request to
terminate visitation. In addition, the court ordered a child
custody evaluation that “shall include recommended custody

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orders and a proposed parenting plan.” As such, the move-away
order was interlocutory, and K.W. has not established that it was
appealable.
Alternatively, K.W. suggests in her supplemental briefing
that each of the orders that she identifies are appealable under
In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236. In re Karla C. is an
inapposite appeal of a juvenile dependency disposition order. (Id.
at p. 1242.) K.W. also incorrectly argues that the orders at issue
were void and a void order is appealable in and of itself. A void
order that is otherwise appealable may be appealed (see Varian
Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 200), but
K.W. fails to show that the “otherwise appealable” requirement is
met.
In sum, K.W. does not satisfy her burden of establishing
the appealability of the orders she purports to appeal. (Brown v.
Upside Gading, LP, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.)
Finally, we decline to treat this appeal as a writ petition.
“An appellate court has discretion to treat a purported appeal
from a nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate, but
that power should be exercised only in unusual circumstances.
[Citation.] ‘A petition to treat a nonappealable order as a writ
should only be granted under extraordinary circumstances,
“ ‘compelling enough to indicate the propriety of a petition for
writ . . . in the first instance . . . .’ ” ’ ” (H. D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v.
County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1366–1367.)
We are not persuaded that unusual circumstances support
reviewing the interim custody order here by writ petition.

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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.

C.T. v K.W. (A170819)

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