People v. Mack CA2/7

CourtListener 10292832Calctapp13 déc. 2024

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Filed 12/13/24 P. v. Mack CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B332388

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA491269)
v.

JAVON MACK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Peter S. Westacott, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Javon Mack of willfully inflicting corporal
injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a cohabitant, first
degree residential robbery, and assault. The jury found true
allegations Mack personally inflicted great bodily injury.
Mack argues the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of uncharged acts of domestic violence. He
also argues the court erred in imposing sentences on both his
robbery conviction and his infliction of corporal injury conviction
and in imposing an enhancement for great bodily injury on those
two convictions. Finally, he argues the court erred in imposing a
domestic violence fund fee. We agree the court erred in imposing
the fee and otherwise affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. February 2020: Mack Punches Andrea D. in the Face
In 2018 Mack and Andrea D. moved together from Georgia
to Los Angeles. Andrea paid the rent for the apartment she and
Mack shared. In February 2020 Andrea found a business card
with a woman’s name and phone number in Mack’s pants. When
Mack heard Andrea say something under her breath about the
card, he hit her in the nose, causing swelling in her face. He told
her that she was “stupid” and “a dumb prick” and that she “had
no right to be mad.” Andrea drove herself to the hospital. She
waited for two hours, but left before receiving care. The next day
Andrea returned to the hospital with Mack. She told the doctor
she slipped and fell in the bathtub.

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B. October 2020: Andrea Moves Out, and Mack Attacks
Her in Her New Apartment
Seven months later, Andrea decided to move out of the
apartment she shared with Mack. She told him she was looking
for a new apartment. In October 2020 Andrea moved out and did
not tell Mack where her new apartment was.
On October 25, 2020 Mack sent Andrea text messages
saying “Kill yourself,” “Stop saying youre gonna do it and fucking
do it,” “Fuck you you dumb fucking brick for brains girl,”
“I fucking hate you,” and “Jump off a bridge.” Also on October 25,
2020 Mack sent Andrea a text saying, “Tomorrow you will regret
this,” “I’ll tear your a [sic] little stupid ass down if I want to,” and
“You’ve gotten in my way so much.” Mack also asked Andrea for
money. Andrea responded, “I’ll just transfer the money over into
your account whenever I have it.” Mack replied, “No you’ll do it
tomorrow / you aren’t wasting another minute of my time / and
you won’t disagree with me again / I warned you.”
On October 26, 2020 Mack continued to call and text
Andrea, but she did not answer or respond. When Andrea
returned home from shopping and unlocked her door, Mack ran
up behind her and pushed her to the ground in the apartment.
Andrea’s bags fell on the kitchen floor. Andrea screamed for help
for several minutes, but Mack hit her harder and told her to stop
screaming. Mack attacked Andrea for hours. He hit her on her
face, head, arms, back, and torso. He also grabbed her by the
neck, kicked her, and slammed her to the ground several times.
And Mack hit Andrea twice on her head with her cell phone.
Mack demanded Andrea pay him $50,000 for the time they
spent as a couple. He took $2,000 from her wallet. Mack
continued to hit and choke Andrea after he took the money.

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Andrea talked to Mack and tried to calm him down.
Eventually she convinced him to drive her to the hospital. Mack
told Andrea not to tell anyone what had happened. He stopped
the car in the middle of the street two blocks from the hospital,
took Andrea’s keys, and said he was going to take a rideshare
vehicle back to Andrea’s apartment. Andrea drove herself the
rest of the way to the hospital. She was treated in the emergency
room and transferred to another hospital. She had a swollen eye,
blurred vision, a broken nose, an orbital fracture, a swollen lip,
a bruised spine, dizziness, and vertigo. She had bruises on her
back, neck, hands, and forearms. Andrea’s head wound (where
Mack struck her with the phone) required nine staples.
While Andrea was in the hospital, Mack called and texted
her. One of his text messages said: “If you’re out and not in the
hospital and still not at least saying something to let me know
you’re good you deserve to die. I’ve been looking in every hospital
for you all day since this morning and you haven’t told me
anything.” When Andrea left the hospital and returned to her
apartment, it appeared that Mack had stayed there and that he
had tried to clean the blood from the walls, floor, and bathtub.

C. December 2020: Mack Chases Andrea in His Car
On December 5, 2020 Andrea came out of a building in
Orange County and saw Mack in his car in the parking lot.
Andrea got in her car and drove away, and Mack followed her.
Andrea called the 911 emergency operator. Mack chased Andrea,
at one point pulling up next to her car and telling her to “give
him his money.” A sheriff’s deputy stopped Mack’s car. On the
front passenger seat the deputy saw a backpack containing a
baseball bat, duct tape, and rope still in its original packaging.

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D. The Jury Convicts Mack, and the Trial Court
Sentences Him
The People charged Mack with two counts of willfully
inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on
someone with whom the defendant had a dating relationship
(Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)),1 one count of assault with a deadly
weapon (the phone) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of first
degree residential robbery (§ 211). The People alleged that, for
all counts, Mack personally inflicted great bodily injury under
circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)).
The People also alleged as aggravating factors for all counts that
the crimes involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1)); that the manner in which the crimes were
carried out indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism
(id., rule 4.421(a)(8)); that Mack engaged in violent conduct that
indicated a serious danger to society (id., rule 4.421(b)(1)); and
that Mack’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in
juvenile delinquency proceedings were numerous or of increasing
seriousness (id., rule 4.421(b)(2)).2
The People presented their case, and Mack testified in his
defense. He stated Andrea moved out of their apartment in
October 2020 after they argued. Mack testified that, soon after
Andrea left, their landlord threatened to evict him. Mack tried to
contact Andrea because he needed her to sign something to stop

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The People withdrew the aggravating factor under
rule 4.421(b)(2) before the trial court instructed the jury.

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the eviction, but Andrea did not respond to his calls or text
messages. Although Andrea did not give Mack her new address,
he was able to find the building she lived in because, before she
moved out, he tracked the location of her cell phone. Mack went
to Andrea’s new apartment building, but he could not find her
name on the call box. He entered the parking garage when the
gate opened. Mack walked through the parking garage and
found Andrea’s car. He entered a stairwell and looked for Andrea
on four or five floors, then climbed 20 floors to check the rooftop.
Mack returned to the garage, sat down next to Andrea’s car, and
waited for her until eventually a janitor told him to leave.
The next day Mack went to Orange County to look for
Andrea at her workplace, but he did not find her. He returned to
Andrea’s apartment building, but he did not find her there either,
so he went to a nearby skate park. While Mack was at the skate
park, Andrea contacted him by video call and asked him to take
her to the hospital. Andrea gave Mack her apartment number.
When he arrived, Andrea was bloody and sitting on the floor.
She said she had been “jumped.” Mack talked with Andrea for an
hour. He asked her about her relationship with another man.
Andrea was bleeding, but coherent. Mack drove Andrea to the
hospital in her car. She wanted to go into the hospital by herself,
so Mack dropped her off at the emergency room entrance.
Andrea gave Mack the key to her apartment, and he took a ride
share vehicle to the apartment. Mack denied taking money from
Andrea’s wallet while he was at her apartment.
Mack next saw Andrea on November 1, 2020, when she and
her father came to the apartment she had shared with Mack to
retrieve her belongings and serve Mack with a temporary
restraining order. Andrea’s father retrieved clothing from the

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apartment. Mack testified Andrea’s father took Mack’s money
from a drawer.
On December 5, 2020 Mack went to Andrea’s workplace in
Orange County. When she drove away, he followed her in his car.
He pulled up next to her and said: “Give me my money.” Mack
testified he had all his belongings in the car, including a baseball
bat for protection.
The jury found Mack guilty of first degree robbery and
willfully inflicting corporal injury for the October 2020 incident.3
The jury found true the allegation Mack personally inflicted great
bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). The jury found Mack not guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon, but guilty of the lesser included offense of
misdemeanor assault (§ 240). The jury found true two of the
three aggravating factors: that the crimes involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other
acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); and that the
manner in which the crimes were carried out indicated planning,
sophistication, or professionalism (id., rule 4.421(a)(8)).
The trial court sentenced Mack to a prison term of 10 years
four months, consisting of the middle term of four years for
robbery, plus four years for the great bodily injury enhancement,
and a consecutive term of one year (one-third the middle term of
three years) for inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant, plus
16 months (one-third the middle term of four years) for the great
bodily injury enhancement. On the misdemeanor assault
conviction, the court sentenced Mack to 180 days in county jail

3 The jury found Mack not guilty of willfully inflicting
corporal injury for the February 2020 incident.

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and stayed execution of the sentence under section 654. Mack
timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Admitting Evidence of Mack’s Uncharged Act of
Domestic Violence
Mack argues the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence he chased Andrea’s car in December 2020.
He contends the evidence’s probative value was “substantially
outweighed by its risk of causing undue prejudice and confusion.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a),
evidence of specific instances of a person’s conduct is generally
inadmissible to prove that person’s conduct on a particular
occasion. (People v. Robinson (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1345,
1351-1352.) However, under Evidence Code section 1109,
subdivision (a)(1), when a “defendant is accused of an offense
involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible
by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to
Section 352.” “Critically, section 1109 is ‘an express exception to
the prohibition against [bad character or] propensity evidence set
forth in . . . section 1101, subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he
statute reflects the legislative judgment that in domestic violence
cases, as in sex crimes, similar prior offenses are “uniquely
probative” of guilt in a later accusation. [Citation.] Indeed,

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proponents of the bill that became section 1109 argued for
admissibility of such evidence because of the “typically repetitive
nature” of domestic violence. [Citations.] This pattern suggests a
psychological dynamic not necessarily involved in other types of
crimes.’” (People v. Megown (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 157, 168; see
Robinson, at p. 1352 [section 1109 reflects “the Legislature’s
determination that in sexual offense cases and domestic violence
cases, ‘similar prior offenses are uniquely probative of a
defendant’s guilt on a later occasion’”].)
Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court has
discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” When exercising discretion whether to
admit evidence of uncharged acts of domestic violence, the trial
court must balance the probative value of the evidence “‘“against
four factors: (1) the inflammatory nature of the uncharged
conduct; (2) the possibility of confusion of issues; (3) remoteness
in time of the uncharged offenses; and (4) the amount of time
involved in introducing and refuting the evidence of uncharged
offenses.”’” (People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630;
accord, People v. Robinson, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1352;
People v. Barefield (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 890, 905; see People
v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917 [similar factors for
determining the admissibility of evidence of defendant’s prior sex
offenses under Evidence Code section 1108].) “‘The principal
factor affecting the probative value of an uncharged act is its
similarity to the charged offense.’” (People v. Hollie (2010)
180 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274; see Thomas, at p. 630.) We review

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the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of domestic violence
for abuse of discretion. (Robinson, at p. 1351.)

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Admitting Evidence Mack Chased Andrea’s Car
in December 2020
The December 2020 incident was similar enough to the
uncharged October 2020 incident to be probative of Mack’s
propensity to commit domestic violence. As the trial court
recognized, unlike the October 2020 incident, the uncharged
offense involved “no direct physical contact.” However, in both
incidents Mack tracked Andrea down and was, in the trial court’s
words, “lurking around” and “lying in wait for her.” Though the
two incidents had differences, they were part of a pattern of
exerting control over Andrea by monitoring her activities and
following her. (See People v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222,
1237 [evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence
against the victim was admissible as “indicative of defendant’s
‘“larger scheme of dominance and control,’”’’ which the defendant
attempted to assert over the victim “as he became angry, watched
her activities, followed her, and tried to prevent her from having
any other relationships”].)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
the probative value of the December 2020 incident was not
substantially outweighed by the probability it would create
substantial danger of undue prejudice. The evidence of the car
chase was less inflammatory than the evidence Mack beat and
kicked Andrea for hours in her apartment, fractured bones in her
face, and left her with a head wound. (See People v. Wang (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1078 [uncharged incident was less

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inflammatory than the charged offense, “reducing the possibility
the jury’s passions would be inflamed by the uncharged
conduct”].) There was little risk the evidence of the uncharged
conduct would confuse the issues: The charged and uncharged
incidents occurred at different times and places. Nor was the
uncharged conduct remote in time: It occurred less than two
months after the charged offense. (See ibid. [incident that
occurred three years earlier was not remote].) The evidence of
the December 2020 incident did not consume much time either:
The testimony of the deputy sheriff who pulled over Mack’s car
covered only 10 pages of more than 3,000 pages of trial
transcript, and the descriptions by Andrea and Mack about the
incident comprised relatively small portions of their testimony.
(See People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 533 [47 pages
was not inordinate].)
Mack argues there were “significant dissimilarities”
between the charged offenses and the uncharged conduct. Mack
asserts that in December 2020 he followed Andrea in a car,
whereas in October 2020 there were “no direct barriers” between
the two. But Mack cites no authority for the proposition an
uncharged incident of domestic violence that does not result in
physical contact is not probative of the defendant’s propensity to
physically harm the same victim. And although Mack did not
physically harm Andrea in the December 2020 incident, the
evidence Mack had a baseball bat, rope, and duct tape with him
supported the inference Mack intended to physically harm
Andrea, but was stopped before he could do so.
Mack also argues the evidence of the baseball bat, rope,
and duct tape was unduly prejudicial because it “invited the jury
to completely speculate about [his] nefarious intentions.” He also

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asserts the audio of Andrea’s call to the 911 emergency operator,
which “was so provocative that the court needed to pause the
proceedings to wait for Andrea . . . to calm down,” was highly
prejudicial. Mack argues the trial court abused its discretion in
failing “to consider less prejudicial alternatives such as excluding
irrelevant, though inflammatory, details surrounding the
offense,” in particular, “the testimony and photograph regarding
the baseball bat, rope, and duct tape.”
Mack is correct in suggesting the trial court could have
admitted the recording of the call to the 911 emergency operator
and the testimony of Andrea and the deputy sheriff who pulled
over Mack’s car, but excluded evidence of the baseball bat, rope,
and duct tape. (See People v. Disa (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 654, 672-
674 [in a murder prosecution, although a prior conviction for
domestic violence was admissible, the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting highly inflammatory evidence of the
“defendant’s extensive planning and waiting in the prior
incident”]; see also People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917
[trial court should consider “excluding irrelevant though
inflammatory details surrounding the offense”].) But the trial
court recognized the prejudicial nature of those details and
weighed the risk of undue prejudice against the probative value
of the evidence. The court stated: “I have to say I was a little
concerned about the rope, duct tape, and the bat. So I went back
to the facts. If those were . . . in the trunk of the car, not
together, I think it is a different analysis because there could be a
very possibly totally innocent reason you might have that. . . .
Having those items together in a backpack . . . next to him in the
vehicle, I think is significant. I do think it will have a prejudicial
effect on the defendant, but . . . I find that the probative value

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outweighs the prejudicial effect.” That ruling was within the
trial court’s discretion. (See People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1,
53 [trial court “‘“has broad discretion”’” under Evidence Code
section 352]; People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 58 [trial
court “has broad discretion” under Evidence Code section 1108].)4

B. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Section 654 in
Sentencing Mack
Mack argues the trial court erred in not staying under
section 654 execution of the sentence on one of his two felony
convictions. He contends “the infliction of corporal injury was
incidental to and facilitated the robbery.” He also contends the
trial court should have stayed execution of the great bodily injury
enhancement on one of his two felony convictions.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides: “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case
shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” Section 654 “precludes multiple punishments for a
single physical act that violates different provisions of law

4 Mack also argues admitting evidence of the December 2020
incident violated his due process rights under the United States
Constitution. It did not. (See People v. Merchant (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1194 [“admission of propensity evidence
under Evidence Code section 1109 does not violate due process”];
see also People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917 [“trial
court’s discretion to exclude propensity evidence under Evidence
Code section 352 saves Evidence Code section 1108 from
defendant’s due process challenge”].)

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[citation] as well as multiple punishments for an indivisible
course of conduct that violates more than one criminal statute.”
(People v. Newman (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 103, 111-112, italics
omitted.) “Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and
therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of
section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all
of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may
be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than
one.” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354, internal
quotation marks omitted.)
“‘The question of whether section 654 is factually applicable
to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law
gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination.’
[Citation.] A court’s expressed or implied findings on this point
must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (People
v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 91; see People v. Pinon (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 956, 968.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
Court’s Finding Mack Had Separate Objectives
in Committing Robbery and Infliction of
Corporal Injury
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding
Mack robbed Andrea and inflicted corporal injury on her with
separate intents or objectives. The violence Mack inflicted on
Andrea went far beyond the force necessary to take her money.
In an attack that lasted for hours, Mack hit her, grabbed her,
kicked her, and hit her on the head with her cell phone. The trial
court reasonably concluded that, for purposes of section 654,
Mack’s attack on Andrea was not merely a means of committing

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robbery. (See People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737
[“Section 654 ‘cannot, and should not, be stretched to cover
gratuitous violence or other criminal acts far beyond those
reasonably necessary to accomplish the original offense.’”]; People
v. Bui (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1016 [“an act of ‘gratuitous
violence against a helpless and unresisting victim . . . has
traditionally been viewed as not “incidental” to robbery for
purposes of Penal Code section 654’”]; People v. Perry (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1527 [“At some point, the degree of force or
violence used or threatened may evince ‘a different and a more
sinister goal than mere successful commission of the original
crime,’ i.e., an independent objective warranting multiple
punishment.”]; People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263,
271-272 [defendant who repeatedly hit a 66-year-old, unresisting
victim with a board used “far more” force than necessary to
achieve the single objective of robbery].)
Substantial evidence also supported the trial court’s finding
that, although Mack committed the robbery and inflicted corporal
injury on the same night in Andrea’s apartment, they were “two
discrete events” for purposes of section 654. Mack attacked
Andrea as she arrived at her apartment. He beat her and
demanded money. At some point Andrea went to her closet and
retrieved her wallet. After Mack took her money, he continued to
hit and choke her. Substantial evidence supported the court’s
findings that, once Mack took Andrea’s money, the robbery was
complete and that, from that point on, Mack had a different
objective for the violence he inflicted. (See People v. Coleman
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162 [trial court properly concluded the
defendant had separate objectives in committing robbery and
assault where, “[p]rior to the assault, defendant had essentially

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completed the robbery”]; People v. Sandoval (1994)
30 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1299-1300 [trial court properly imposed
separate sentences for attempted robbery and attempted murder
where the defendant shot the victim after the victim refused to
hand over money from a cash register]; People v. Phan (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1466 [robbery and assault were separately
punishable under section 654 where the defendant threatened to
hurt the victim’s son after taking the victim’s wallet]; People
v. Foster (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 27 [false “imprisonment of the
victims occurred after the robbers had obtained all of the money,
and therefore was not necessary or incidental to committing the
robbery”].)
The cases Mack cites do not support his position. In People
v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036 the court held section 654
precluded imposition of unstayed sentences for both torture and
the underlying offenses of rape and infliction of corporal injury on
a spouse. (Id. at pp. 1044-1045.) The court in Mejia concluded
“all of the acts of spousal rape and of infliction of corporal injury
on a spouse were included among the acts underlying the torture
count and were essential to satisfying an element of that offense.”
(Id. at p. 1046.) Here, as discussed, Mack’s violent conduct
exceeded what was required to commit robbery, and he continued
to commit violent acts after he had obtained Andrea’s money.
Similarly, in People v. Mitchell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 349, the
court held the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences
for robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. (Id. at p. 354.)
But in Mitchell the defendant, unlike Mack, committed robbery
and assault in a single act (threatening a store clerk with scissors
and stealing merchandise). In addition, the court in Mitchell
stated the assault with a deadly weapon “was not a gratuitous

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violent act or committed after the robbery.” (Ibid.) Unlike the
defendant in Mitchell, Mack committed gratuitous violent acts
and continued to use force against Andrea after he completed the
robbery.

3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Imposing
Multiple Sentencing Enhancements
Mack argues the trial court erred in imposing
enhancements for great bodily injury under section 12022.7,
subdivision (e), on his conviction for robbery and on his conviction
for infliction of corporal injury. The trial court did not err.
If “section 654 does not bar punishment for two crimes,
then it cannot bar punishment for the same enhancements
attached to those separate substantive offenses. This is true even
if the same type of sentence enhancement is applied to the
underlying offenses.” (People v. Wooten (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
121, 130.) Because, as discussed, section 654 did not preclude the
trial court from imposing terms on Mack’s convictions for robbery
and infliction of corporal injury, section 654 did not preclude the
court from imposing enhancements on the two convictions.

C. The Trial Court Erred in Imposing a Domestic
Violence Fund Fee
The trial court ordered Mack to pay $500 to a domestic
violence fund under section 1203.097. Mack argues, the People
concede, and we agree the trial court erred in imposing this fee,
which is authorized only when the court grants the defendant
probation. (§ 1203.097, subd. (a).) Therefore, the court must
correct the abstract of judgment to delete the $500 fee.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
correct the abstract of judgment to delete the requirement Mack
pay a $500 fee to a domestic violence fund and to send a corrected
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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