CourtListener 10292740•People v. Rodriguez CA2/7
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Filed 12/13/24 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B331150
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA093062)
v.
ERIC RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hayden Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
Alice Newman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Blake Armstrong, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Eric Rodriguez appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of attempted murder and found true allegations
that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in
committing the crime and that he inflicted great bodily injury on
his victim. He argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to strike his prior serious or
violent felony conviction for purposes of the three strikes law and
in imposing the enhancements. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. A Jury Convicts Rodriguez of Attempted Murder
One evening in June 2019 Alejandro Lugo was hanging out
with Pablo Rivas and several other friends in the parking lot of
their apartment building drinking beer. Rodriguez came up to
the group and asked for beer. Rodriguez also asked Lugo, whose
father was the manager of the apartment building, if he could
smoke, and Lugo said Rodriguez could smoke, but to be careful
because the building had cameras. Rodriguez and a woman Lugo
did not recognize went to the other side of the parking lot to
smoke.
A little later the group heard a fight break out at the other
end of the parking lot. Lugo and the others walked over and saw
Rodriguez arguing with another man Lugo had never seen before.
Rivas stepped between Rodriguez and the other man and told
them both to calm down and said, “It’s over.” When the fight
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turned physical, Rivas got in the middle to break it up and put
his arms out to separate the two men.
The man who had been fighting Rodriguez turned to leave.
Rivas had his back to Rodriguez, who had a knife. Rivas felt
“a blow from behind” to the back of his head. Rivas fell to his
knees, stood up, felt “a second blow” to his cheek, followed by two
more blows, one to his chin and one to his throat. Rivas was
bleeding profusely from knife wounds on the left side of his face,
his chin, his jaw, his throat, and his chest.
Rivas’s friends grabbed Rivas as he stumbled and took him
into the apartment building to protect him from Rodriguez.
Rivas passed out several times along the way. His friends
brought Rivas to his apartment, put him on the floor, and called
the 911 emergency operator.
Paramedics came and took Rivas to the hospital, where
doctors treated his knife wounds with staples and stitches. Rivas
later identified Rodriguez in a six-pack photographic line up and
at trial.
The People charged Rodriguez with attempted murder
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664)1 and alleged that he used
a deadly or dangerous weapon, within the meaning of
section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), and that he personally inflicted
great bodily injury, within the meaning of section 12022.7,
subdivision (a). The People also alleged Rodriguez had been
convicted of a prior serious or violent felony, within the meaning
of the three strikes law. (See §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d).) The jury found Rodriguez guilty of attempted
murder and found true the weapon and great bodily injury
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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allegations. The trial court subsequently found true the prior
felony conviction allegation.
B. The Trial Court Denies Rodriguez’s Motion To Strike
His Prior Conviction and Sentences Him as a Second
Strike Offender
Rodriguez filed a motion under section 1385 and Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike his prior serious or violent felony
conviction, a 2010 adjudication for robbery Rodriguez suffered as
a juvenile offender when he was 16 years old. Rodriguez argued
that, because he “was only 16 at the time” and “did not have the
full capacity to understand what a ‘strike’ can do to his life,” he
did not understand the juvenile court’s admonitions about the
three strikes law. Rodriguez also pointed out the adjudication
was 11 years old. At the sentencing hearing counsel for
Rodriguez argued “accepting a strike at 16 to go home on
probation, which is over 10 years old, is not something the
Legislature meant to be in the spirit of the three strikes law.”
The prosecutor stated that Rodriguez’s argument “would
carry more weight if there had not been a series of intervening
criminal activity by Mr. Rodriguez.” The prosecutor argued that,
since Rodriguez’s 2010 adjudication for robbery, he was convicted
in 2011 of transporting or selling marijuana, where he received
felony probation; in 2013 of leaving the scene of an accident
without exchanging information (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a));
in 2013 of grand theft of property taken from the person of
another (§ 487), pleaded down from robbery, where he was
sentenced to 365 days in jail; in 2015 of domestic violence
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)); and in 2017 of soliciting prostitution (§ 647,
subd. (b)(2)).
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The court denied Rodriguez’s motion under Romero. The
court agreed with the prosecutor that Rodriguez had engaged in
“a pattern of recidivism since the prior strike was sustained or
the conviction occurred.” The court also stated Rodriguez’s
juvenile court history, before the sustained robbery adjudication,
included two additional sustained petitions in 2008, one for
burglary and one for theft and resisting an officer, which the
court found reflected “a flurry of [criminal] activity” and
culminated in the robbery adjudication that showed he had not
“learned not to reoffend.” Observing that robbery involves using
force or fear, the court recounted Rodriguez’s criminal convictions
in 2011, 2013 (two of them), 2014, 2017, and 2019 (this
conviction). The court stated Rodriguez’s current conviction for
attempted murder “resulted in pretty severe injuries to the
victim,” who had a scar that looked like “open heart surgery,
basically.” The court stated that it was “disturbed by the pattern
of recidivism” and that Rodriguez was not “outside the letter and
spirit of the three strikes law.”
The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to the middle term of
seven years, doubled under the three strikes law, plus
three years for inflicting great bodily injury and one year for
using a deadly or dangerous weapon. The court found it was not
in the interest of justice to strike the weapon enhancement. The
court also imposed various fines and fees. Rodriguez timely
appealed.
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DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Rodriguez’s Motion To Strike
Rodriguez argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to strike his prior serious or violent felony
adjudication and sentencing him as a second strike offender. In
particular, Rodriguez argues he is not within the spirit of the
three strikes law because the nature and extent of his criminal
history “is hardly comparable” to other career criminals and three
strike offenders; the adjudication that brought him within the
three strikes law occurred long ago and when he was 16 years
old; and his mental illness “is a mitigating factor that supports
dismissing [his] strike.” The trial court, however, considered and
weighed these and other proper factors. The court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Rodriguez’s motion under Romero.
1. Standard of Review
The trial court has discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a), to dismiss in furtherance of justice a serious or
violent felony conviction (or, here, an adjudication) for purposes
of sentencing a defendant under the three strikes law. (Wheeler
v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1193,
1206; People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 582; Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) The sentence a trial court imposes
under the three strikes law often depends on “the trial court’s
exercise of discretion in determining whether, in furtherance of
justice, to strike any of the serious or violent prior convictions
that have been charged by the prosecutor and, if so, how many
prior convictions to strike.” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524,
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559-560; see Clancey, at p. 582; People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 158.)
“[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing
norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart
from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its
decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony); see People v. Brugman (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) In ruling on a motion to strike a
serious or violent felony conviction or adjudication for purposes of
the three strikes law, “the sentencing court must consider both
the defendant’s constitutional rights and society’s interest in the
prosecution of crimes. Therefore, a court may not dismiss a
strike solely for judicial convenience, in exchange for a guilty
plea, or based on antipathy to the Three Strikes law. Instead, in
determining whether to strike a prior conviction, the trial court
must look to ‘factors intrinsic to the [Three Strikes] scheme.’
[Citation.] It ‘must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.’” (People v. Johnson (2015)
61 Cal.4th 674, 688-689; see Carmony, at p. 377; People v.
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
“It is not enough to show that reasonable people might
disagree about whether to strike one or more prior conviction
allegations. Where the record is silent, or where the record
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demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the
law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have
ruled differently in the first instance. Because the circumstances
must be extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be
deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which
he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and
continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law
was meant to attack, the circumstances where no reasonable
people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of
the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.”
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378, cleaned up.)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Rodriguez’s present felony conviction was for a crime that
was violent, unprovoked, and bloody. (See People v. Gaston
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 320 [“the nature of the current crime
is a proper factor” under Romero].) He attacked Rivas with a
knife four times, inflicting lasting and disfiguring injuries that
nearly killed him and required extensive emergency medical
treatment. The trial court commented at the sentencing hearing
Rivas’s injuries were severe and included significant “slash”
wounds to his face, throat, and chest that reminded the court of
hospital patients after open heart surgery. And Rivas was
unarmed, unprepared, and only trying to break up a fight. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the “nature and
circumstances” of Rodriguez’s attempted murder of Rivas
weighed strongly against striking the prior adjudication. (See
People v. Solis (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124-1125
[trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s
8
motion under Romero where the defendant “personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon” and “inflicted great bodily injury”
in a “violent attack with a screwdriver”]; People v. Finney (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1039 [trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the defendant’s motion under Romero
where the “‘crime involved great violence, great bodily harm,
threat of great bodily harm, acts dis[cl]osing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness or callousness’”].)
The nature, number, and circumstances of Rodriguez’s
prior adjudications and convictions showed an extensive,
consistent, and sometimes (but admittedly not always) violent
history of committing crimes. In addition to the 2010
adjudication for robbery, Rodriguez had adjudications for
burglary (a felony that is serious if it is a residential burglary and
violent if a non-accomplice is present (see §§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21);
1192.7, subd. (c)(18); People v. Denard (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
1012, 1025), theft, and resisting an officer in the performance of
the officer’s duty. After 2010 Rodriguez committed a steady
stream of crimes every year or two: transporting or selling
marijuana (2011), hit-and-run (2013), grand theft (2013),
domestic violence (2015), and soliciting prostitution (2017),
culminating in his current crime of attempted murder (2019).
Not the kind of crime-free life that would take a defendant
outside the spirit of the three strikes law. (See People v. Mayfield
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1108 [trial court abused its
discretion in striking the defendant’s prior serious or violent
felony conviction where the defendant “failed to reform his
behavior during the decade plus that elapsed between his first
strike conviction and his third strike conviction”]; People v.
Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1113 [defendant’s “‘lengthy’
9
and ‘fairly consistent’ criminal history” meant “he fell squarely
within the three strikes law”]; People v. Bernal (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1170 [“trial court acted within the
applicable standards when it declined, based on defendant’s
‘unrelenting’ criminal behavior, to find that he falls outside the
spirit of the three strikes law”].)
Rodriguez argues he is not within the spirit of the
three strikes law because the nature and extent of his criminal
history “is hardly comparable” to other career criminal, three
strike offenders. True, Rodriguez’s many convictions from
2010 to 2019 were misdemeanors, but misdemeanors are still
crimes (see § 16, subd. 2); People v. Liu (2019) 8 Cal.5th 253,
257), and they count in the analysis under Romero (see, e.g.,
People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 154; People v.
Anderson (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 780, 786). When considering
whether the defendant has lived a crime-free life since suffering a
serious or violent felony conviction under the three strikes law,
courts consider whether the defendant has committed
misdemeanors as well as felonies. (See People v. Strong (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 328, 331 [a defendant does not take himself
outside the spirit of the three strikes law “by the additional
commission of a virtually uninterrupted series of nonviolent
felonies and misdemeanors over a lengthy period”].) And
Rodriguez’s misdemeanor convictions were not all non-violent:
Domestic violence is, among other things, a crime of violence.
(See People v. Laino (2004) 32 Cal.4th 878, 897.)
Rodriguez argues that the 2010 adjudication occurred too
long ago and when he was young and that the “ten-year gap
between the juvenile robbery and the current offense weakens
the connection to potential recidivism.” True, Rodriguez
10
committed the robbery 10 years before he attempted to kill Rivas.
But Rodriguez did not spend those 10 years as a law-abiding
citizen. As discussed, Rodriguez committed numerous and varied
crimes during those years. “In determining whether a prior
conviction is remote, the trial court must evaluate whether the
defendant has had a ‘crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation
after a defendant has had the opportunity to reflect upon the
error of his or her ways.’ [Citation.] If the ‘defendant has led a
continuous life of crime after the prior, there has been no
“washing out” and there is simply nothing mitigating about a
[decades]-old prior.’” (People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362,
372; see People v. Vasquez (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390
[“A prior strike conviction is not considered ‘remote’ for the
purposes of mitigation where the defendant has not
demonstrated a prolonged period of rehabilitation (a crime free
life) in the interim.”]; People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
740, 749 [remoteness has little mitigating force “‘where, as here,
the defendant has led a continuous life of crime’”]; see also People
v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 415-416 [“remoteness, by
itself, cannot be the basis for dismissing a prior strike
conviction,” although “a remote conviction may be dismissed if it
is followed by a long crime-free period evidencing rehabilitation”],
review granted May 29, 2024, S283924.)2 “[O]lder strike
convictions do not deserve judicial forgiveness unless the
defendant has used them as a pivot point for reforming his ways.”
2 The Supreme Court granted review in People v. Dain,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 399 to decide whether the Court of Appeal
erred in remanding the case with directions to reinstate the
strike finding and to resentence the defendant as a person who
has suffered a prior strike conviction under the three strikes law.
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(People v. Mayfield, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.) Rodriguez
never pivoted.
Rodriguez also argues that his “age at the time of the prior
strike is not just relevant to his culpability for the strike offense
but also to his decision to accept a strike in a plea agreement”
and that, because he was 16 years old at the time, he did not
have the capacity to understand all the ramifications of an
adjudication under the three strikes law. But juvenile
adjudications for certain crimes, including robbery, constitute
prior serious or violent felony convictions under the three strikes
law where the minor was 16 years old (or older). (§ 667,
subd. (d)(3); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b)(3); People v.
Pacheco (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 343, 346.) In addition, as the
trial court stated, the juvenile court in Rodriguez’s robbery case
advised him that his robbery adjudication constituted a serious or
violent felony conviction under the three strikes law and that the
adjudication could double the time he might spend in custody for
future convictions. Quoting from the transcript of the hearing in
the juvenile court, the trial court observed that “Rodriguez was
advised, ‘You also need to be aware, this felony, a robbery, that’s
what is called a serious or violent felony. California has
something called the three strikes law.’ . . . ‘This conviction can
cause the time you spend in custody to be longer. It can be
doubled.’” And, though he may have been 16 years old at the
time, Rodriguez gained significant experience with the criminal
justice system over the next 10 years to understand the
consequences of committing another felony. (Cf. People v.
Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 302 [“previous experience in the
criminal justice system is relevant to a recidivist’s knowledge and
12
sophistication regarding his [legal] rights” (internal quotation
marks omitted)].)
Finally, Rodriguez argues the trial court did not give
enough weight to his mental health issues. Rodriguez admits
that the trial court “was evidently aware of appellant’s mental
health problems,” but argues that the court did not give “this
issue appropriate weight in balancing the relevant factors and
deciding whether to dismiss the strike prior.”
“‘The trial court is not required to state reasons for
declining to exercise its discretion under section 1385’ [citations],
and ‘is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in
the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.’” (People v.
Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 637; see Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Although there was no evidence Rodriguez
had been diagnosed with any mental health illnesses or
conditions, the trial court was aware Rodriguez had some
struggles with his mental health. Counsel for Rodriguez raised it
in his Romero motion, stating Rodriguez had been “in the mental
health court for a mentionable period which was due to his
mental incompetency at the time he was arrested.” Counsel for
Rodriguez also raised the issue several times at the sentencing
hearing. And when sentencing Rodriguez after denying his
motion under Romero, the trial court acknowledged that the
factor under California Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b), which
directs the court to consider as a mitigating factor whether the
defendant “was suffering from a mental or physical condition that
significantly reduced culpability for the crime,” might apply to
Rodriguez. But the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding other factors outweighed this one. (See People v.
Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 861 [the Supreme Court’s
13
decision in People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148 gives a trial
court ruling on a Romero motion “substantial leeway in
determining the most significant facts in each case”].)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Imposing the Two Enhancements
As stated, the trial court imposed a three-year
enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), for inflicting
great bodily injury and a one-year enhancement under
section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), for using a deadly or dangerous
weapon. Rodriguez argues the court abused its discretion in
imposing these enhancements by “failing to afford great weight”
to his mental illness and by imposing both enhancements.
Rodriguez cites section 1385, subdivision (c), which states that, in
exercising discretion whether to strike an enhancement, the court
“shall consider and afford great weight to,” among other things,
whether the “current offense is connected to mental illness” and
whether “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A), (D) & (B).)
Rodriguez, however, forfeited this argument by not raising
it in the trial court. (See People v. Coleman (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724 [defendant forfeited his argument the
trial court should have stricken an enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (c), by failing to make that request at
sentencing]; see also People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406
[“‘A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims
involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate
its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did not object to
the sentence at trial.”’]; Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 375-
376 [“any failure on the part of a defendant to invite the court to
14
dismiss under section 1385 . . . waives or forfeits his or her right
to raise the issue on appeal”].)
Rodriguez argues that, if he forfeited the issue, his trial
counsel was ineffective for not asking the trial court to dismiss
one or both of the enhancements. We cannot resolve this issue,
however, on direct appeal.
“An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two
elements: a defendant must show that their counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that this deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88;
see People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 615; People v. Price
(1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 386.) When considering whether trial
counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney,
“a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical
decisions, and there is a presumption counsel acted within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009; see People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th
415, 443 [“we presume counsel’s decision not to raise [a] claim
was a reasonable, tactical one unless the record affirmatively
demonstrates otherwise”].)
Thus, “[i]t is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate
claim of ineffective assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction [or,
here, an enhancement] will be reversed for ineffective assistance
only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
(2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or
(3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other
claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in
a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 1009; accord, People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711;
15
see People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 972 [“claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on habeas
corpus, not on direct appeal,” because “‘the failure to object will
rarely establish ineffective assistance’”].)
Rodriguez’s ineffective assistance claim is more
appropriately resolved on habeas. Trial counsel for Rodriguez
may have decided the best strategy was to emphasize Rodriguez’s
motion to strike his prior serious or violent felony adjudication,
which doubled the length of Rodriguez’s sentence for attempted
murder from seven to 14 years, rather than the enhancements,
which together added four years to Rodriguez’s sentence. In
addition, “[c]ounsel does not render ineffective assistance by
failing to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably
determines would be futile.” (People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at
p. 387; see People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 562.) Given the
trial court’s emphasis on Rodriguez’s repeated use of a knife and
the gruesome injuries he inflicted, trial counsel for Rodriguez
could reasonably have concluded that asking the court to strike
the enhancements based on those circumstances was futile. It
would be better to decide Rodriguez’s ineffective assistance claim
on habeas, where the court can consider extra-record evidence
submitted with the petition. (See People v. Woodruff (2018)
5 Cal.5th 697, 736 [“Rarely is ineffective assistance of counsel
established on appeal since the record usually sheds no light on
counsel’s reasons for action or inaction.”]; People v. Mickel (2016)
2 Cal.5th 181, 198 [“certain practical constraints make it more
difficult to address ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal
rather than in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding,”
including that the “record on appeal may not explain why counsel
chose to act as he or she did,” so that “a reviewing court has no
16
basis on which to determine whether counsel had a legitimate
reason for making a particular decision, or whether counsel’s
actions or failure to take certain actions were objectively
unreasonable”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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