CourtListener 10292374•People v. Ward CA2/6
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Filed 12/12/24 P. v. Ward CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B332407
(Super. Ct. No. 1351702)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
MICHAEL WARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Michael Ward appeals from an order recalling his sentence
and resentencing him pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.7 or
1172.75.1 He contends the trial court erred when it denied his
request to dismiss certain sentence enhancements pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). We will direct the trial court to
amend the abstract of judgment: (1) to reflect additional post-
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
sentencing custody credit, and (2) to correct a transcription error
in Section 6 of the abstract. We will otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury convicted appellant of one count of kidnapping
(§ 207); five counts of corporal injury to spouse/cohabitant
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)); two counts of witness dissuading by force
(§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)); one count of forcible rape (§ 261, subd.
(a)(2)); one count of dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1);
and one count of false impersonation (§ 529). The jury found
several enhancements true: a domestic violence great bodily
injury enhancement on four counts (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)); a deadly
weapon enhancement on two counts (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); and a
prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subdivision (b)). The
trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 32 years,
four months in state prison. It awarded him 631 days of
presentence credit, including 549 days of actual credit and 82
days of conduct credit. We affirmed his conviction on appeal.
(People v. Ward (May 28, 2014, B243098) [nonpub. opn.].)
The trial court found appellant eligible for resentencing
under section 1172.7 and/or 1172.75. At the hearing, it struck
the one-year prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) as legally invalid. It commended appellant for
participating in rehabilitation and education programs over the
prior four years and reduced the base term on the kidnapping
count from eight years (the upper term) to five years (the middle
term). The trial court reimposed all other components of the
original sentence, resulting in a new aggregate term of 28 years,
four months in state prison. It re-awarded appellant 631 days of
presentence credit and ordered CDCR “to calculate post sentence
credits.”
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DISCUSSION
Enhancements
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it declined
his request to dismiss three bodily injury enhancements and one
deadly weapon enhancement from his sentence pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) provides in part:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss
an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so,
except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
initiative statute.
“(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances
in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of
one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.”
The parties agree two of subdivision (c)(2)’s nine mitigating
circumstances are present here, i.e., subparagraphs (B) and (C).
Subparagraph (B) states: “Multiple enhancements are alleged in
a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), italics
added.) Subparagraph (C) states: “The application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this
instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(C), italics added.)
Appellant contends the “shall be dismissed” language of
subparagraphs (B) and (C) makes dismissal mandatory for the
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trial court. None of the remaining seven mitigating
circumstances listed in subdivision (c)(2) contain this language.
Subparagraph (B), it follows, “required the trial court to dismiss
three of the four enhancements” imposed on him. (Bold omitted.)
Similarly, subparagraph (C) “required the trial court to dismiss
[all] four enhancements.” (Bold omitted.) We review this
contention de novo as a question of statutory interpretation.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
Our Supreme Court recently rejected an argument that the
presence of one or more mitigating circumstances creates a
rebuttable presumption obligating a trial court to dismiss an
enhancement. (See People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029
(Walker) [“[A]bsent a finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety,” it held, “a court retains the discretion to impose or
dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value
to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are
present”].) A corollary of this holding is that the presence of
mitigating circumstances did not “require” the trial court to
dismiss appellant’s enhancements here. Walker did not identify
subparagraphs (B) and (C) as exceptions to its holding.
Appellant points out that Walker did not decide whether
the “‘shall be dismissed’” language entitles subparagraphs (B)
and (C) “to a different construction” than the other mitigating
circumstances listed in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). (Walker,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1035, fn. 5.) We need not decide the issue
either. The presence of mitigating factors “weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing an enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), italics added.) We decline to read the “shall
be dismissed” language as “requir[ing] the sentencing court to
endanger public safety. That cannot be what the Legislature
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intended.” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296,
italics omitted.) The construction of subparagraphs (B) and (C)
relative to the other mitigating circumstances would come into
play only once the trial court has made this threshold
determination.
The trial court found unequivocally that dismissing
appellant’s enhancement would endanger public safety. It stated
as follows at the resentencing hearing: “Given the extent of the
violence that existed in these offenses, given Mr. Ward’s previous
criminal history, the number of criminal convictions, the
increasing seriousness of them, the status of being on parole
when he committed these . . . the court does believe that
dismissing all of those enhancements . . . would endanger public
safety. He is on the right track of rehabilitating himself. The
court doesn’t doubt that. But given the number of years that he
has shown – the violence he has shown and . . . the history he has
had, [four] years doesn’t, in the court’s mind, necessarily equate
to the feeling that, okay, we could let him out, and, . . . he
wouldn’t pose a danger to the community or to public safety.
And, quite frankly, the court doesn’t think it is in the furtherance
of justice to dismiss those enhancements.” The trial court here
acted within its discretion based on appellant’s offenses and
criminal record. (See People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
at p. 298 [the trial court’s exercise of discretion “‘“‘must not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’”’”
Credits
The trial court re-awarded appellant his original custody
credit and ordered CDCR “to calculate post sentence credits” for
the time between his original sentence and resentencing.
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Appellant contends, and the People agree, the trial court should
have calculated his actual credit instead of delegating the task to
CDCR. (§§ 2900.1, 2900.5, subd. (d); People v. Buckhalter (2001)
26 Cal.4th 20, 29.) The parties also agree Section 6 of the current
abstract of judgment, titled “Total Time on Attached Pages,”
mistakenly reflects 19 years, four months when it should reflect
nine years, zero months. The abstract of judgment should be
corrected in both respects.
DISPOSITION
The October 10, 2023, order directing CDCR to recalculate
custody credits is vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial
court and the trial court is directed to recalculate appellant’s
custody credits for actual time served and to amend the abstract
of judgment: (1) to reflect appellant’s custody credits, and (2) to
correct the total time reflected in Section 6. The trial court shall
then forward the amended abstract to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
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Kay S. Kuns, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
The Law Offices of Aaron J. Schechter, Aaron J. Schechter,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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