CourtListener 10291942•Hitt v. Hitt CA4/1
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Filed 12/11/24 Hitt v. Hitt CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CHESTER HITT, D083704
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2308875)
REBEKAH HITT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Joseph T. Ortiz, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded
with instructions.
Kronenberger Rosenfeld, Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld and Leah Rosa Vulić for
Defendant and Appellant.
David J. Greiner Law Corp., David J. Greiner, Ashton Stine and Kierre
L. Coghill for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Chester Hitt sued his former wife, Rebekah Hitt, for defamation based
on statements made by Rebekah in three Facebook and Instagram posts.
Rebekah filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP
statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,1 claiming the statements
were protected speech within the meaning of the statute. She appeals the
trial court’s order denying her motion.
We affirm in part and reverse in part. On our de novo review, we
conclude the statements in two of Rebekah’s social media posts qualified for
protection under the public forum category of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3). Because we further conclude Chester’s claims for
defamation based on the protected statements in these posts are time-barred,
we direct the trial court on remand to strike those allegations. We affirm the
trial court’s order denying Rebekah’s motion to strike the allegations based
on statements in her third post, as Rebekah has failed to sustain her burden
of proving they “furthered[ ] the discourse that makes an issue one of public
interest.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 151
(FilmOn).)
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.
Chester’s Complaint
Rebekah and Chester were married on September 29, 2018 and
separated on April 5, 2020. A stipulated judgment of dissolution was entered
on April 22, 2021. Roughly two years later, on April 28, 2023, Chester sued
Rebekah. In the operative complaint, he alleged two causes of action for
defamation, one for libel per se and the other libel per quod. He alleged
Rebekah defamed him in a series of social media posts. Four of the posts
were made in late 2021. A fifth, longer post was made in 2023.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
“ ‘SLAPP’ is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 381, fn. 1 (Baral).)
2
Chester alleged Rebekah’s friends would have “reasonably understood”
the statements in Rebekah’s posts to refer to him and to assert he
domestically abused her, illegally stole her intellectual property, and
criminally defrauded her by causing her “to forfeit salary and retirement
contributions.” Chester alleged he “never abused anyone,” he was “the true
and rightful owner of the [i]ntellectual [p]roperty pertaining to all of his
businesses,” and he had “never violated any legal or ethical duty owing by
him to [Rebekah].”
II.
Rebekah’s Social Media Posts
Chester’s complaint alleged five social media posts by Rebekah
contained defamatory statements. Statements in three of those posts are at
issue here.
The first post was to Facebook on December 11, 2021. It stated, “If you
or someone you know is experiencing relationship abuse, help is available.
The National Domestic Violence Hotline provides free, confidential support
24/7/365. Text ‘START’ to 88788, call 1-800-799-SAFE (7233), or chat online
at TheHotline.org. [¶] #domesticviolencesurvivor.” The post linked to a
Rolling Stone article entitled, “Marilyn Manson: The Monster Hiding in
Plain Sight.” For this post, Rebekah chose the Facebook setting that allowed
any member of the public to see it.
The second post was made about two weeks later. It consisted of a
change Rebekah made to the public portion of her Instagram profile on or
about December 27, 2021. Rebekah updated her biography to state she was a
“Domestic Abuse Survivor.” This post was also visible to any member of the
public.
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Rebekah’s third post was made more than a year later and was not
public. It was to a restricted audience consisting of Rebekah’s Facebook
friends (as well as the friends of her friends if they chose to forward it), and
her Instagram followers. The post was placed on Instagram and Facebook on
February 24, 2023. It listed 10 lessons Rebekah said she had learned in
2020. That was the year she and Chester had separated.
We quote Rebekah’s third post verbatim here, and italicize the
statements that Chester alleged to be defamatory:
2020 was a lightening rod in my life. Lessons I learned:
1. Just because someone doesn’t hit you doesn’t mean they
are not an abuser or an addict: it can be emotional,
psychological, financial, or relational….or all of the above.
If they have something else in their life above you, as their
partner, and they can not put it down, they are addicted: to
attention, fame, their phone. Pay attention.
2. If you see [a red flag] …. likely it is not a carnival: act
accordingly.
3. People want to ignore what you say about abuse, and it’s
because that means they have to sit with their own
discomfort about the truth of an abuser. Doing nothing is
being complicit. They have to live with that.
4. You are stronger than you know and smarter than you
give yourself credit for.
5. If the blood, sweat, and tears ….countless hours….and
intellectual property including social media and name of a
business is never credited to you, you still know you were the
catalyst. That’s all that matters.
6. Never be ashamed of someone who walked away and
refused to change. Your people are out there that know
your worth……and predators do not change.
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7. You have accomplished so much in such a short time:
what was meant to destroy you, launched this chapter.
8. Focus on the gain: don’t focus on the lost salary from
your professional career, potential relationships that were
forgone, the retirement contributions you didn’t get by being
under a false pretense for years, and the years you gave to
an idea that was a false one. Be a better assessor of truth in
the future.
9. Your vindication is that Life has a way of sorting it out.
Papa God has got you.
10. Champions always rise . . . .
#whatsyourstory
#nurselife
#survivor
#realestateinvestor”
The complaint alleged this third, “Lessons I learned” post specifically
referred to Chester. It alleged Rebekah’s friends and followers were aware
she worked for him as his employee, and that her romantic relationship with
him had ended when they separated in April 2020. It alleged Rebekah’s
friends therefore would have reasonably understood the statements in this
post to pertain to him.
III.
Rebekah’s Anti-SLAPP Motion and Supporting Evidence
In July 2023, Rebekah filed an anti-SLAPP motion seeking to strike the
complaint or portions of the complaint pursuant to section 425.16. She
claimed four of the allegedly defamatory statements identified in the
complaint were protected speech because they “contributed to the public
debate about domestic abuse,” and there was no reasonable probability
Chester could prevail on the merits of his defamation claims with respect to
those particular four statements. She asserted the posts “contribute[d] to the
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discussion surrounding domestic abuse because they invite[d] discussion on
identifying, responding to, and preventing abuse.” She claimed, “she
participated in and contributed to the public discourse by sharing her story
and the general lessons she has learned in her life about domestic abuse.”
In support of the motion, Rebekah filed a declaration that addressed
each of the three posts. First, she attached a copy of the public post she made
on December 11, 2021, which circulated the Rolling Stone article and
provided contact information for the National Domestic Abuse Hotline. She
averred the post “did not mention, reference, or otherwise concern” Chester.
Second, she asserted the purpose of identifying herself publicly as a
“Domestic Abuse Survivor” in her Instagram biography “[i]n or around
December 2021” was to “let others know that they are not alone and to
encourage them to also speak out.” She explained her identification as a
domestic abuse survivor was true because she “suffered domestic abuse in
previous relationships other than with [Chester.]” She also averred the
statement “did not mention, reference, or otherwise concern” Chester.
Finally, Rebekah addressed the private “Lessons I learned” post she
made on February 24, 2023. She asserted the third post was
“presented . . . in the form of motivational statements written by [her].” She
averred the statements “regarding domestic abuse” did not “mention,
reference, or otherwise concern” Chester. (Italics added.) She did not
address whether the other statements in the “Lessons I learned” post referred
to him.
Chester opposed Rebekah’s anti-SLAPP motion. He disputed
Rebekah’s contention that her statements were intended to increase
awareness of “the horrors of domestic violence or contribute to the public
discourse on the matter.” He claimed the statements “were intended to
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defame [him] by falsely alleging that [he] engaged in crimes of moral
turpitude, that [he] was a domestic abuser, and that [he] was a thief in
business through the stealing of business ideas.” According to Chester, his
friends and associates assumed the posts were about him, and “began
approaching [him] and informed [him] about what was being said about
[him].” He averred, “I have never domestically abused [Rebekah], was never
accused of domestically abusing [Rebekah], and did not steal any of
[Rebekah’s] business ideas, or cause [Rebekah] to forgo her professional
career.”
Chester’s opposition included a declaration by his friend Becky L.,
which attached a text message Rebekah allegedly sent Becky on June 3,
2020, shortly after Chester and Rebekah separated. In the purported text
message, Rebekah stated Chester “abused, disrespected, and neglected her.”2
The trial court denied Rebekah’s motion to strike the complaint for two
reasons. First, the court ruled, “[Rebekah] has not met her initial burden to
establish that the challenged causes arise from protected activity. While
domestic violence is a matter of public concern, the alleged statements are
not all within the four corners of that topic.” (Italics added.) Second, the
court ruled in the alternative that the statements relating to domestic
violence did not “further the public discourse.”
The trial court explained, “not all of [Rebekah’s] statements [at issue]
relate to or even implicate ‘domestic violence.’ For instance, some of the
statements at issue relate to intellectual property misuse and fraud.
Further, to the extent some [of Rebekah’s] statements can be interpreted to
2 We disregard the portions of Becky’s declaration ruled inadmissible by
the trial court judge.
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touch on the topic of domestic violence, [Rebekah] has not met her burden of
establishing that the statements further public discourse. . . . [T]he posts to
the couple’s ‘friends’ do not further public discourse. Rather, those
statements (especially in the context of other statements that do not imply
violence but simply wrongdoing) do no more than paint [Chester] as an
abuser and bad romantic partner.” (Italics added.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Principles
“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).) The anti-SLAPP statute applies to
causes of action against a person that “arise[ ] from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.” (§ 425.16.)
“A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. ‘Initially, the
moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “arise from” protected activity in which the defendant
has engaged.’ ’’ (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) “The defendant’s
first-step burden is to identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and
demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.”
(Ibid.) “To determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts
must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by
the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for
liability.’ ” (Ibid.) “Courts then must evaluate whether the defendant has
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shown any of these actions fall within one or more of the four categories of
acts protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) “At this
stage, the question is only whether a defendant has made out a prima facie
case that activity underlying a plaintiff’s claims is statutorily protected, not
whether it has shown its acts are ultimately lawful.” (Id. at p. 888 [cleaned
up].) “If the acts alleged in support of the plaintiff’s claim are of the sort
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, then anti-SLAPP protections apply.”
(Id. at p. 887.)
If the defendant carries their first-step burden, the plaintiff must then
demonstrate their claims have at least minimal merit. “If the plaintiff fails to
meet that burden, the court will strike the claim.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 884 [cleaned up].) “Minimal merit” means “the plaintiff has established
that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
(§ 425.16.)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.”
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1057, 1067 (Park).) “We exercise independent judgment in determining
whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise
from protected activity.” (Ibid.)
II.
First-Step Analysis
Rebekah claims her allegedly defamatory statements about domestic
abuse fall within two categories of speech protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute, specifically subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4) of section 425.16. The public
forum category under subdivision (e)(3) includes “any written or oral
statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest.” (Id., subd. (e)(3).) The catch-all
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category of subdivision (e)(4) includes “any other conduct in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
Important to our analysis, each of Chester’s causes of action—for libel
per se and libel per quod—are based on statements made in a series of
separate internet posts. Rebekah claims that some, but not all, of the
statements in the posts are protected speech. When a “ ‘mixed cause of
action’ ” in a complaint combines claims concerning both unprotected activity
and allegedly protected activity, we address the separate claims within the
single pleaded cause of action separately; we do not consider them together.
(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 381, 392, 396.) Doing so, we conclude
Rebekah’s first two posts were protected speech under the public forum
category of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). But she fails to establish her
third post was protected speech under either provision.
A. The Statements in Rebekah’s First Two Posts—But Not Her
Third—Were Protected Speech Under the Public Forum Category
We conclude Rebekah’s first two posts are comprised of protected
speech within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. They were both
“written or oral statement[s] or writing[s] made in a place open to the public
or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(3).)
Both posts were to a public forum. “Web sites accessible to the
public . . . are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the ant-SLAPP statute.”
(Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 41, fn. 4.) This includes public
postings on both Facebook and Instagram. (Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 190, 197 [Facebook]; Jackson v. Mayweather (2017)
10
10 Cal.App.5th 1240 [Instagram].) Rebekah’s declaration and attached
exhibit demonstrate her first post, to Facebook on December 11, 2021, was
made using the setting that allowed access by members of the public. And,
although Rebekah’s declaration fails to provide similar information about her
second post, made on or about December 27, it is self-evident from a copy of
the post attached to the complaint that her Instagram biography was visible
to users who were not following her, i.e., to members of the public.
Both posts were also plainly made “in connection with an issue of
public interest” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(3).) There are generally three categories of activity that constitute a
public issue for purposes of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3): (1) statements
that “concern[ ] a person or entity in the public eye”; (2) conduct that “could
directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants”; and
(3) “a topic of widespread, public interest.” (Rivero v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th
913, 924.) Domestic violence indisputably falls into the third category as “an
extremely important public issue in our society.” (Sipple v. Foundation for
Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 238 (Sipple).)
Here, Rebekah’s first post stated, “If you or someone you know is
experiencing relationship abuse, help is available. The National Domestic
Violence Hotline provides free, confidential support 24/7/365. Text ‘START’
to 88788, call 1-800-799-SAFE (7233), or chat online at TheHotline.org.
[¶] #domesticviolencesurvivor.” The post also circulated an article about
domestic violence that had been published in a nationally known magazine,
as well as contact information for the National Domestic Violence Hotline.
The post recommended that anyone “experiencing relationship abuse” contact
the hotline. And in her second post, Rebekah publicly identified herself as a
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domestic abuse survivor. According to her declaration, she did this “to let
others know that they are not alone and to encourage them to also speak
out.”
The trial court erred when it considered Rebekah’s three posts together
as a single unit instead of considering them each separately as required by
Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pages 381, 392, 396. When considered separately,
Rebekah’s first two posts fall squarely within the ambit of the public forum
category of protected speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) The trial court should
have proceeded to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis with respect to
these two posts.
By contrast, Rebekah published the third, “Lessons I learned” post to
private groups consisting of her friends on Facebook and her followers on
Instagram. She contends, nevertheless, the post was to a public forum within
the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). According to Rebekah, the
two groups were “comprised of a much larger audience than just people who
knew Chester and Rebekah as a couple.”
The problem with Rebekah’s contention is that she has failed to adduce
evidence to support it. We can envision many situations in which a post
using the private settings on Facebook or Instagram might qualify as a post
to a public forum within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). As
two examples, a post to a private account might qualify if the owner of the
account has an exceptionally large number of friends or followers, like some
celebrities do. And a post might qualify if the owner has a small following,
but one comprised mainly of experts or activists who regularly discuss plans
to resolve a specific matter of public interest. But we are unable to consider
these possibilities—or any others—here. This is because Rebekah did not
discuss her friends and followers in the declaration she submitted in support
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of her motion. She did not discuss who they were, how many there were,
whether they regularly discussed the topic of domestic abuse, or any specific
details about the members of the Facebook and Instagram groups at all.
Consequently, she has not met her prima facie burden to establish her third,
private post to her friends and followers was to a public forum for purposes of
the anti-SLAPP statute. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 888.)
B. The Statements About Domestic Abuse in Rebekah’s Third Post Did Not
Qualify as Protected Speech Under the Catch-all Category
Rebekah contends in the alternative her “Lessons I learned” post is
within the scope of the catchall category of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
As noted, the catchall category extends anti-SLAPP protection to “any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right . . . of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) In FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th 133, 149, our high court
explained that the “public interest” inquiry of this prong of the statute “calls
for a two-part analysis rooted in the statute’s purpose and internal logic.”
First, a court must ask what issue of public interest is implicated by
the speech in question. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.) The first
step “calls for an objective inquiry, without deference to the movant’s framing
or personal motivations.” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1254
(Geiser) [“A court evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion should take the position
of a reasonable, objective observer”].) “[T]he movant’s beliefs, motivations, or
characterizations may be relevant, and if objectively reasonable, will inform
the analysis. But they are not themselves dispositive and, if not objectively
reasonable, will not carry weight.” (Ibid.)
Second, the court must “ask what functional relationship exists
between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public
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interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.) Importantly, “ ‘it is not
enough that the statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest;
the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate.’ ”
(Id. at p. 150.)
For both steps of the analysis, courts consider both the content and
context of the statements. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1252 [first step];
FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th 149, 152 [second step].) Context requires
considerations of audience, speaker, location, purpose, and timing. (Geiser, at
pp. 1252–1253.) Significantly, in making this assessment, it is often the case
that many of the same contextual considerations apply to both the question of
whether a statement implicates public issues as well as the question of
whether a statement furthered public discussion of them. (Id. at p. 1256.) In
such situations, “it may be more efficient to look to the whole context from
which the conduct underlying the lawsuit arises, rather than attempting to
parse which considerations fall under which of FilmOn’s two steps.” (Ibid.)
This is the approach we take here.
While a very close case, we conclude the trial court did not err in
finding Rebekah’s third post failed to qualify as protected speech in the
catchall category. We determine that Rebekah satisfied her first-step burden
of demonstrating that her statements about domestic abuse reasonably
implicate a question of public interest. She fails, however, at the second step
of showing that her post furthered the public discourse on the topic of
domestic abuse.
We start with content. We read Rebekah’s third post to unambiguously
address a personal experience in 2020 overcoming a relationship with a
specific person she describes as a “predator[ ].” The 10 lessons she lists
describe that person, albeit by inference, as having failed to credit her for
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intellectual property she created, having used false pretenses to deprive her
of contributions to her retirement fund, being addicted “to attention, fame,
their phone,” and walking away from the relationship and refusing to change.
The post also asserts, by clear implication, that this person abused Rebekah
emotionally, psychologically, and financially. The post includes two allegedly
protected statements concerning generic characteristics of relationships
involving domestic abuse. These statements distill to two general points.
First, domestic abuse is not limited to physical abuse; it can be “emotional,
psychological, [or] financial.” Second, people are uncomfortable when
confronted with evidence of domestic abuse by someone they know.
Turning to context—purpose, speaker, location, audience, and
timing—Rebekah submitted an exceptionally sparse declaration to support
her motion. In terms of Rebekah’s identity as the speaker/author of the third
post, the declaration describes her as a person who “ha[s] suffered domestic
abuse in previous relationships other than with [Chester].” The declaration
also makes two assertions about the purpose behind her third post. First, she
claims, “[t]he statements regarding domestic abuse in the February 24, 2023
posts do not mention, reference, or otherwise concern [Chester].” Second, she
claims, “[t]he lessons were presented in the post in the form of motivational
statements written by me.” We infer the “motivational” purpose of the third
post to be the same as her asserted purpose for the second post, to “let others
know that they are not alone and to encourage them to also speak out.”
On the other hand, in terms of location, we can see from the parties’
exhibits that Rebekah chose to privately post the “Lessons I learned”
statements, making it available to the newsfeeds of her friends and followers
only. This limitation stands in direct contrast to her decision to make the
first two posts visible to the public and available to all Facebook and
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Instagram users. We also find the timing to be significant. The first two
public posts were made in December 2021. But the “Lessons I learned” post
was privately posted on February 24, 2023, more than 14 months later. The
timing of the third post tends to show it was unconnected to the public
discussion in the two December 2021 posts. And Rebekah provided no
evidence that she participated in public discussion about domestic abuse at
any other time in between.
As for the audience, we know virtually nothing about Rebekah’s friends
and followers. She did not provide any details about them at all. We further
observe that none of the comments made by Rebekah’s friends and followers
in response to the third post engaged in debate about domestic abuse.
Instead, one commentor wrote: “Cream always rises to the top my friend. So
much to learn from these hard life lessons, for sure. Love you and miss you.”
Another commented, “So good.” And another, “Love the pic … Hope all is
good for you.”
With this context in mind, we conclude Rebekah has satisfied the first
step of the catch-all provision analysis. She has met the “threshold” burden
of demonstrating the statements about domestic abuse in the third post
reasonably implicate a question of public interest. (Equilon Enterprises v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) It is true the third post
addresses a failed relationship of no interest to the general public. But
“challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, may
reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates
a private dispute.” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1253.) Here, the third
post can also reasonably be understood—through its “motivational,” “lessons
learned” style—to be a commentary on the value to survivors of identifying
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themselves and speaking out about domestic abuse, an issue that is
indisputably a matter of public interest. (Sipple, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at
p. 238.) “[T]hose who speak on public issues are often driven to do so by
circumstances that affect them personally.” (Geiser, at p. 1254.) “Only when
an expressive activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably be understood as
implicating a public issue does an anti-SLAPP motion fail at FilmOn’s first
step.” (Id. at pp. 1253–1254.)
Turning to the second step, however, we conclude the evidence is
insufficient to demonstrate a “functional relationship” between Rebekah’s
personal experience with the domestic abuse she discusses in her third post
and a specific “public conversation.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–
150.) Rebekah’s remarkably limited declaration and the inferences that can
be drawn from the post itself fall short of demonstrating the required link
between the third post and public debate. As our high court has repeatedly
explained, defendants who invoke the catchall provision are “virtually
always” able to satisfy the first step of the analysis and “succeed in drawing a
line—however tenuous—connecting their speech to an abstract issue of public
interest,” as Rebekah has done here. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150,
italics added; accord Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1250.) But a connection
to public debate about an issue in the abstract is not enough to succeed at the
second step. “The fact that a broad and amorphous public interest can be
connected to a specific dispute is not enough.” (FilmOn, at p. 150 [cleaned
up].)
It is not enough that Rebekah’s private post venting to her friends and
followers about a specific failed relationship was also intended—in a general
sense—to be motivational to abuse survivors. Nor is it enough that it
contained two generic references to common aspects of domestic abuse.
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Without more evidence about the reason Rebekah chose to post to a private
instead of public audience and the composition of that audience, speculation
is required to conclude the third post contributed to public debate. “[A] court
must consider whether a statement—including the identity of its speaker, for
example, or the audience sought—contributes to or furthers the public
conversation on an issue of public interest. It is by carefully observing this
[interplay] of content and context that we can discern if conduct is ‘in
furtherance of’ free speech ‘in connection with’ a public issue or issue of public
interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p 154, quoting § 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
Rebekah had the burden to establish a concrete connection between the third
post and public debate, and she failed to do so.
For the first time on appeal, Rebekah contends there is a connection
between the statements in her posts and public debate because she made
them as a nurse to educate her followers. Her opening brief states that her
experience of being “domestically abused by a former romantic partner” had a
“profound effect on [her] and caused her to pay specific attention to symptoms
and signs of domestic abuse she observed in other situations, whether
involving people she knew personally, professionally as a registered nurse, or
in public situations, i.e., involving celebrities. As a result of the abuse she
personally suffered, Rebekah knows it is difficult for a victim to, first of all,
recognize that she is a victim of domestic abuse, due to the deep personal ties
victims have to their abusers, and second, to stand up and speak out about it
and seek help. And both personally and as a registered nurse, Rebekah
understands failing to recognize relationship abuse is seriously damaging to
one’s own personal health, mentally, physically, and emotionally; and it is
essential for victims to find support to escape that cycle of abuse.” Her reply
brief states she “has seen situations of domestic abuse in her professional
18
practice as a nurse.” Her reply brief further asserts that her posts, including
the third post, were made “as a nurse educating her followers.” (Boldface
omitted.)
We have no issues with the substance of Rebekah’s arguments. The
difficulty we have is that there are no citations to the record for these
statements. Rebekah’s declaration in support of her motion says nothing
about observing domestic abuse in her practice as a nurse or seeking to
educate her followers as a nurse. These statements in Rebekah’s appellate
briefs are not evidence and our analysis cannot consider them.
Finally, also for the first time on appeal, Rebekah claims her intent to
add to the public conversation with her third post is “evidenced by her
inclusion of the hashtags ‘#whatsyourstory,’ ‘#nurselife,’ and ‘#survivor’ ” at
the end of her third post. She omits to mention the “Lessons I learned” post
also includes the hashtag “#realestateinvestor.” Nevertheless, Rebekah did
not make this argument in the trial court. And here she fails to discuss the
use of hashtags in enough detail for us to meaningfully consider whether
their use can connect a private post to a public debate in a manner that
satisfies the requirements of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). We are
compelled to deem Rebekah’s newfound contention as forfeited, inadequately
briefed, and lacking evidentiary support. (Industrial Waste & Debris Box
Service, Inc. v. Murphy (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1150 [failure to raise anti-
SLAPP issue in trial court forfeited the issue on appeal]; Noble v. Draper
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1, 7, fn. 2 [“We disregard points not adequately
briefed”]; Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061 [“the moving defendant bears the
burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’
protected activity”].) Rebekah’s declaration does not discuss her use of these
hashtags. It does not explain how it would have been possible for members of
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the public to see the privately posted “Lessons I learned” post through her use
of these hashtags. And it does not explain what content concerning domestic
abuse her friends and followers would have seen if they chose to conduct a
search using these particular hashtags.3 Rebekah’s assertions made for the
first time on appeal are not ones we can consider absent adequate briefing
and evidentiary support below.
We thus conclude that Rebekah failed to carry her burden of
demonstrating the third post qualified for anti-SLAPP protection under the
catchall provision. This is not because a person’s statements discussing a
personal experience involving domestic abuse can never qualify for
anti-SLAPP protection. It is instead because, based on the scanty evidence
supporting Rebekah’s motion, the particular statements she made to private
groups of friends and followers were “too remotely connected to the public
conversation about those issues, to merit protection under the catchall
provision.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 140.) As explained by our
Supreme Court, “[a]t a sufficiently high level of generalization, any conduct
can appear rationally related to a broader issue of public importance. What a
court scrutinizing the nature of speech in the anti-SLAPP context must focus
on is the speech at hand, rather than the prospects that such speech may
conceivably have indirect consequences for an issue of public concern.” (Rand
Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th at pp. 610, 625.) We do not
proceed, as a consequence, to the second step of the analysis with respect to
Rebekah’s third post.
3 Notably, the third post did not include a hashtag that is indisputably
dedicated on its face to collecting and hosting public discussion about
domestic abuse, like the one she used for her first public post,
“#domesticviolencesurvivor.”
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III.
Second-Step Analysis on Rebekah’s Two December 2021 Posts
Rebekah contends Chester’s defamation claims with respect to her first
two posts about domestic abuse are barred by the statute of limitations. We
agree. We exercise our discretion to address this issue despite the trial
court’s failure to reach it. (Muddy Waters, LLC v. Superior Court (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 905, 922 [“Because our review is de novo, both parties have fully
briefed the issue, and neither party contends the record is incomplete such
that the issue cannot be fully considered in this appeal, we choose to consider
the merits of whether plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on
its claims”].)
The statute of limitations for defamation claims is one year from the
date of publication. (§ 340, subd. (c).) Rebekah’s first two posts were made in
December 2021. Chester’s complaint was filed more than two years later, on
April 28, 2023, over a year after the deadline. Chester admits he learned
about the first two posts “in or around December 27, 2021.” Chester’s claim
that Rebekah’s first two statements were defamatory is accordingly
time-barred. On remand, the trial court shall strike the allegations based on
the protected activity of Rebekah’s first two posts supporting Chester’s
claims. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
IV.
Attorney Fees and Costs
Both parties claim entitlement to attorney fees and costs pursuant to
section 425.16, subdivision (c). However, both parties erroneously assume
that neither of them will partially prevail. The analysis of whether a party is
entitled to a partial award of attorney fees is fact intensive and, here, it has
not yet been briefed. (See Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006)
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139 Cal.App.4th 328, 338–340, disapproved on other grounds in Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 385.) We therefore direct the trial court to
decide whether to order attorney fees on a pro-rated basis to Rebekah, after
an opportunity for both parties to brief the issue, and if so, to determine the
appropriate amount.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to strike is affirmed in part and reversed
in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Upon appropriate motion by Rebekah, the trial court is directed to
determine whether she is entitled to attorney fees and costs in connection
with her SLAPP motion and on appeal, and if so, the appropriate amount.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3).)
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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