CourtListener 10291932•People v. Campbell CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 12/11/24 P. v. Campbell CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B334456
(Super. Ct. No. TA058243)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
SIDNEY CAMPBELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Sidney Campbell appeals from the trial court’s summary
denial of his petition for resentencing on his 2003 second degree
murder conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6.)1 He contends the trial
court erred in denying his petition for resentencing at the prima
facie stage. Because the record of conviction conclusively
establishes that appellant was convicted of malice murder, he is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Facts2
In 1999, appellant and his brother, Christopher Campbell,
shot and killed 15-year-old Kenneth Colter. Earlier that day,
Colter and another boy, 15-year-old Damien Culpepper, were
“horse playing” and bent the bicycle tire rim of nine-year-old
“Little Chris” Campbell. Little Chris went home and told his
father, Christopher, what had happened. Christopher, along
with his brother Clinton, angrily confronted Colter and
Culpepper. After Christopher and Clinton left, Colter and
Culpepper went to Culpepper’s garage to get a replacement rim.
Sometime later, Christopher returned, this time with appellant.
A witness, Gerrina Hawes, saw Christopher and Colter arguing
and went to get Colter. Appellant, who was standing in the area
and appeared to be angry, told Hawes to mind her own business
and leave.
Hawes saw Colter backing away from Christopher. She
saw appellant take out a gun, motion for Colter to come to him,
and start shooting. Culpepper, who was inside his house at the
time, looked out his bedroom window and saw that appellant,
Christopher, and Colter all had guns and were shooting them.
Colter ran away from the scene but was shot in the neck and
arm. He died from the gunshot wound to his neck.
In 2003, appellant was convicted by jury of second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The jury found true the special
allegations that appellant personally used and discharged a
firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subds. (b),
(c)). The jury found not true the allegation that appellant
2 These facts are summarized from our prior opinion in
appellant’s direct appeal. (People v. Campbell (Jan. 5, 2005,
B170224) [nonpub. opn.].)
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intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Appellant was sentenced to an
aggregate term of 35 years to life.
We affirmed appellant’s conviction in a nonpublished
opinion. (People v. Campbell, supra, B170224.)
Section 1172.6 Petition
In 2022, appellant filed a form petition for resentencing.
He declared he could not presently be convicted of murder
“because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.” The trial court appointed counsel and accepted
briefing. Appellant argued that even though the jury was not
instructed on felony murder and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, he “may . . . have been convicted on a
theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on
his participation in a crime” and ambiguous language in the jury
instructions for aider and abettor liability.
Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court conducted a hearing on whether appellant
had made a prima facie case for relief.
After reviewing the briefs, the jury instructions, and the
prior appellate opinion, the trial court summarily denied the
petition. The trial court explained the jury was not instructed on
CALJIC No. 8.31, the second degree implied malice murder
instruction, the jurors “determined that Mr. Campbell was in fact
a shooter who fired a weapon,” and “the People’s theory of
liability for second-degree murder was based solely on aiding and
abetting.” The trial court concluded, “for those reasons, Mr.
Campbell is not entitled to resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6.”
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Discussion
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
To that end, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 by
adding a requirement that, when the felony-murder rule does not
apply, a principal in the crime of murder “shall act with malice
aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).)
Senate Bill 1437 also enacted section 1172.6, which created
a procedural mechanism for defendants who could not be
convicted of murder or attempted murder under the amended
laws to seek retroactive relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section
1172.6 to expand eligibility for resentencing to include not only
those “convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine,” but also those convicted of
murder under any “other theory which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§
1172.6, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
In deciding whether a petitioner has a made a prima facie
showing for relief, “‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
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or her factual allegations were proved. . . .”’” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) The trial court may consider the record of
conviction, which will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima
facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Ibid.)
“‘However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) At this preliminary stage, the trial court
should not engage in factfinding, weighing the evidence, or the
exercise of discretion. (Id. at p. 972.)
We independently review a trial court’s determination on
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
Appellant is Not Entitled to Relief as a Matter of Law
Appellant makes several arguments as to why the trial
court erred in summarily denying his petition for resentencing.
First, he contends the trial court engaged in “judicial
factfinding” at the prima facie stage. It did not. The trial court
examined the record of conviction to determine if that record
conclusively established that appellant was ineligible for relief as
a matter of law. This did not require the trial court to make
“evidentiary findings” and was entirely permissible under Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-972. Any reference to the appellate
opinion and the undisputed factual summary therein was
harmless based on the jury’s findings in this case.
Second, appellant contends, “contrary to the People’s
argument and the superior court’s ruling,” the jury was
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instructed on implied malice. Respondent agrees that the jury
was instructed on implied malice—not imputed malice, which
remains a valid theory. Relying on People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), appellant contends he “may have been
convicted on an imputed malice theory with respect to his second
degree murder conviction.”
In Langi, the defendant was convicted of second degree
murder as an aider and abettor after he and three other men beat
and robbed the victim, who died after a punch caused him to fall
and hit his head. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975-977.)
On appeal from the summary denial of Langi’s section 1172.6
petition, the appellate court considered whether a petitioner
convicted of second degree murder established a prima facie case
for relief based on the jury instructions given in that case,
specifically CALJIC Nos. 8.31 (second degree murder) and 3.01
(aiding and abetting). (Langi, at pp. 980-982.)
The Langi court determined that the instruction on aiding
and abetting, as given, created an ambiguity in the context of
second degree implied malice murder, which may have allowed
the jury to “find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting
second degree murder without finding that he personally acted
with malice.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.)
Several recent cases have disagreed with Langi. (E.g.,
People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921 (Berry-
Vierwinden); People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862 (Burns);
People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164.)
For example, the Court of Appeal in Berry-Vierwinden
distinguished Langi because it “did not consider the language of
section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) requiring that defendants show
they can no longer be convicted of murder ‘because of changes’
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made by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 936.)
As the Court of Appeal explained, “Senate Bill No. 1437 did
not change the law to prohibit direct aider and abettor liability on
an imputed malice theory—this was already settled California
law by the time of Berry-Vierwinden’s 2010 trial.” (Berry-
Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 936.) “[A] court may
deny the petition at the prima facie stage if the record of
conviction conclusively establishes that the petitioner was
convicted on a theory not affected by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Id.
at p. 931; see also Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 867 [“A
[section 1172.6] petition . . . supplements a defendant’s
traditional direct appeal by providing an opportunity to make
arguments that did not exist at the time of the appeal, but have
arisen since 2019 as a result of recent statutory amendments”];
id. at p. 868 [“The Supreme Court’s McCoy decision [People v.
McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111], as explained and developed in
[later cases], made clear that the direct perpetrator’s mental
state could not be imputed to an aider and abettor, whose mental
state had to be independently evaluated”].)
In Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 862, the petitioner was
convicted of murder after the jury had been instructed pursuant
to former CALCRIM No. 400. The trial court denied Burns’s
section 1172.6 petition. It reasoned that the instruction “did not
operate to offer the jury a theory of legal liability that can no
longer support a conviction for murder as a result of the recent
statutory changes” made by Senate Bill No. 1437. (Burns, at pp.
868-869.)
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We agree with Berry-Vierwinden and its progeny. A
petitioner may not raise a claim on a section 1172.6 petition that
could have been raised on direct appeal.
Like the petitioners in Berry-Vierwinden and Burns,
appellant cannot satisfy the section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3)
requirement that he “could not presently be convicted of
murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” The record of conviction conclusively
establishes that appellant was convicted on a theory not affected
by Senate Bill No. 1437. (See Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 931; Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 869.)
Here, the only offense charged was murder. The jury was
instructed with CALJIC Nos. 3.01 (aiding and abetting), 8.11
(malice aforethought), CALJIC No. 8.20 (deliberate and
premeditated murder), and 8.30 (unpremeditated murder of the
second degree). To find appellant guilty of murder, the jury had
to find he personally harbored malice either as the perpetrator or
as a direct aider and abettor. The jury rejected the first degree
murder option and convicted appellant of second degree murder.
As instructed, the jury could not have found appellant guilty of
second degree murder without finding he personally harbored a
malicious mental state.
Based on the foregoing, appellant’s contention that he “may
have been convicted on an imputed malice theory” fails.
Third, appellant contends the trial court erred in relying on
the jury’s true findings on the firearm use and discharge
allegations at the prima facie stage because those findings did
not require a finding of malice aforethought. (Citing People v.
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 597-599.) This contention is
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meritless because the record shows appellant was convicted
based on a theory of actual malice.
Where, as here, the record does not permit conviction on
felony murder, murder under a natural and probable
consequences, or any theory of imputed malice, appellant is not
entitled to relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Daniel (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677.)
Disposition
The order summarily denying appellant’s section 1172.6
petition for resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Laura R. Walton, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
_____________________________
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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