People v. Bailey CA1/5

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Filed 12/10/24 P. v. Bailey CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168887
v.
TEAUNTE BAILEY,
(Alameda County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 21CR003247A)

Teaunte Bailey appeals after he was convicted of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count
one),1 second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c);
count two), evading a peace officer with willful disregard for
safety (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count three); first degree
robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a); count four); and
residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count five). The trial
court sentenced Bailey to 25 years to life in state prison for the
murder count and concurrent determinate terms for the
remaining counts. Bailey argues that the trial court’s jury
instruction allowed the jury to convict him of first degree felony
murder on a legally inadequate theory. He also contends that the
trial court committed two sentencing errors. We agree (and the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
People concede) that the matter must be remanded for
resentencing. We otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND
A.
On March 9, 2021, at around 6:45 in the morning, 75-year-
old Pak Chung Ho left his condominium, on Jayne Avenue in
Oakland, for a walk. He walked with a cane and was carrying his
wallet and iPhone. Another person out walking on Jayne Avenue
saw a yellow truck speed past Ho, stop briefly for the passenger
and driver to switch seats, and then make a U-turn and drive
back down Jayne Avenue towards Ho. The truck stopped near
Ho. Then the witness saw a man get out of the truck, walk to Ho,
and lunge for his cane. The witness was afraid, ran away, and
did not see the remainder of what occurred between Ho and the
man. After a few minutes, the witness called 911, returned to the
scene, and found Ho lying on the ground. He was nonresponsive
and bleeding from a wound on the right side of his head.

Surveillance video obtained from a nearby house identified
the truck. The video further showed that, as the truck pulled up
next to Ho, the truck’s passenger held his arm out the window,
holding what appeared to be a firearm. The passenger then
exited the truck, ripped something from Ho in a tugging motion,
and punched Ho on the side of the head, knocking him to the
sidewalk.

Ho never regained consciousness and died in the hospital a
few days later. A forensic pathologist testified that Ho’s cause of
death was excessive bleeding in the brain due to blunt head
trauma. Ho had injuries to both the left and right side of his
head, including an abrasion to the right side of his scalp, and
hemorrhaging underneath. Ho’s cardiovascular disease
contributed to the bleeding in his brain, but the pathologist

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testified that “[h]is main issue was the head injury and the
swelling.”

The pathologist testified that the bruising and laceration
on Ho’s left cheek were consistent with having been hit by a gun
or being punched while wearing glasses (driving the frame into
his cheek). The abrasion on the right side of his head was
consistent with falling and hitting that side of his head on
pavement.

B.

After contacting Ho’s daughter and logging into his iCloud
account, police located Ho’s phone around 37th Street and Martin
Luther King Jr. Way. Officers found Bailey nearby in a truck
matching the description of the truck used in the robbery.
Officers tried to stop the truck, but Bailey refused to pull over.
After a high-speed chase with police, Bailey lost control of the
vehicle and struck a light pole. He abandoned the truck and fled
on foot but eventually surrendered to police.

Police found Ho’s cell phone in Bailey’s pants pocket. In a
backpack Bailey had dropped, officers also found Bailey’s photo
identification, a card bearing Ho’s name, and four additional cell
phones. Bailey was wearing an ankle monitor and had a small
cut on his right knuckle—consistent with a strike mark. When
Bailey was interviewed by police, he admitted that he exited the
truck’s passenger door and interacted with Ho.

At the time of the robbery, Bailey was subject to monitoring
via a GPS ankle monitor. The ankle monitor reported Bailey’s
physical location to his parole agent once every minute. This
data showed that, at 6:30 a.m. on March 9, 2021, Bailey was near
an Arco station on Shattuck Avenue.2 At 6:48 a.m. and again at

2
This was confirmed by surveillance video showing the
same truck, Britton, and Bailey at the Arco station. Bailey was
driving.
3
6:50 a.m., Bailey’s electronic monitor showed he was on Jayne
Avenue—in precisely the same location where Ho was later
found.

When Bailey’s codefendant (on counts one and two)
Demetrius Britton was arrested—three days after the robbery—
Britton had one of Ho’s credit cards in his wallet. Police also
found a replica pellet gun nearby.

C.
Counts four and five involved the events of February 19,
2021. That evening, 76-year-old Zhi Cheng Shi heard noise in the
backyard of his ground-floor apartment. When Shi investigated,
he found that his sliding screen door had been opened. Shi
opened his sliding glass door and Bailey forced the sliding glass
door open and entered Shi’s apartment—hitting Shi’s shoulder as
he did so. Shi fell to the ground, but then got up and ran outside
and yelled for help. Shi heard Bailey saying, “ ‘money, money’ ”
as Bailey walked around the apartment. Bailey took Shi’s phone,
eight to 10 Chinese New Year red envelopes, and a sealed
delivery package.

D.

The jury convicted Bailey on all counts. As to count one,
the jury found that the information’s special felony-murder
allegation— that Bailey was the actual killer and a participant in
the perpetration of a robbery that resulted in Ho’s death (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1))—was true. With respect to count two, the jury found
true great bodily injury allegations—that Bailey personally
inflicted great bodily injury on Ho that caused him to become
comatose due to brain injury and that Bailey personally inflicted
great bodily injury on a senior over the age of 70 (§ 12022.7,
subds. (b), (c)). The jury found Bailey’s codefendant (Britton) not
guilty of murder and was unable to reach a verdict (and a

4
mistrial was declared) on the additional robbery charge against
him.

The trial court sentenced Bailey to a prison term of 25
years to life on count one. The trial court also imposed,
concurrent to count one, an aggregate determinate sentence of 23
years—composed of a three-year term on count two, a five-year
term for each of the two great bodily injury enhancements
(§ 12022.7, subds. (b), (c)), a two-year term on count three, a four-
year term on count four, and a four-year term for count five.3

DISCUSSION
A.
Bailey contends that the trial court’s instruction on first
degree felony murder—by giving the jury an incorrect
definition—allowed the jury to convict him without finding he
was the actual killer. After reviewing the instructions
independently (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210), we
agree that the trial court’s instruction was erroneous but
conclude the error was harmless.

1.

“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) “The malice required by
section 187 may be express or implied. It is express when there
is a manifest intent to kill. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 844 [272 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814, 477 P.3d 539] (Gentile),

3
According to the abstract of judgment and minute order,
Bailey received a two-year term on count five. But the trial court
orally pronounced a four-year term on count five. When the oral
pronouncement of judgment conflicts with the minute order or
abstract of judgment, the trial court’s oral pronouncement
controls. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) The
abstract of judgment must be modified to correct the clerical
error.
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superseded by statute [on other grounds] as stated in People v.
Hola (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 362, 370 [292 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476].) It
is implied if someone kills with ‘ “no considerable provocation …
or when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart.” ’ (Gentile, at p. 844.) Implied
malice has both physical and mental components. [Citation.]
The physical component is satisfied by the performance of an act,
the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life.
The mental component is established when the defendant knows
his or her conduct endangers another person’s life yet acts with a
conscious disregard for life.” (People v. Vang (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 64, 81 (Vang).)

“In California, the felony-murder rule provides an
exception to the malice requirement for murder. [Citation.] The
rule imputes the requisite malice to those who commit a homicide
during the perpetration of a felony inherently dangerous to
human life. [Citation.] The requisite mental state is simply the
specific intent to commit the underlying felony. (People v. Cavitt
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197 [14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281, 91 P.3d 222].)
The purpose of the rule is to deter criminals from killing by
holding them strictly responsible for deaths that occur during the
perpetration (or attempted perpetration) of an inherently
dangerous felony, regardless of whether the killing was done by
the perpetrator or an accomplice, and regardless of whether the
killing was intentional, negligent, or accidental.” (Vang, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 81.) First degree felony murder is a killing
committed during a specified felony, such as rape, burglary, or
robbery. (§ 189, subd. (a); People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
762, 774.) Under the felony-murder rule, both the actual killer
and an accomplice can be convicted of murder. (People v. Cruz
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740, 752.)

Several years before Bailey’s trial, Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony-murder rule by

6
adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a
defendant can be convicted of felony murder only if they are the
“actual killer,” an aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill,
or a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subds. (e)(1)-(3);
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 50.) The legislature also amended section 188, subdivision
(a)(3), to require that all principals to murder must act with
express or implied malice to be convicted of that crime, “[e]xcept
as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3),
italics added; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; Harden, at p. 51.)

“In criminal cases, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues
raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding
of the case.” (Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 83.) “When
considering a claim of instructional error, we view the challenged
instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the
trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.”
(People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229.)

2.

At trial, the prosecution’s theory was that both Britton and
Bailey were guilty of felony murder—Bailey as the actual killer
and Britton as an accomplice in the robbery.

With respect to Bailey, the trial court instructed the jury on
malice murder and felony murder. On the latter theory, the court
used a former version of the standard felony-murder instruction
(former CALCRIM No. 540A (Sept. 2019 rev.)), which told the
jury: “To prove that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder
under [a felony-murder] theory, the People must prove that: [¶] 1.
The defendant committed or attempted to commit robbery; [¶] 2.
The defendant intended to commit robbery; [¶] AND [¶] 3. While
committing or attempting to commit [r]obbery, the defendant
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caused the death of another person. [¶] A person who was the
actual killer may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing
was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.” (Italics added.)

Approximately three months before Bailey’s trial began,
the Judicial Council of California revised CALCRIM No. 540A to
replace the third (italicized) element above with the following: “3.
While committing [or attempting to commit] _______ <insert
felony or felonies from . . . § 189>, the defendant personally
committed (an/the) act[s] that directly caused the death of
another person.” (CALCRIM No. 540A, as revised March 2023,
italics added and bold omitted.)

Neither Bailey’s counsel nor the prosecutor objected to the
instruction the trial court gave. Nor did they advise the trial
court that the instruction had been recently revised.4 In fact,
defense counsel proposed the language that the trial court gave.

3.

Bailey maintains that, under the current felony-murder
rule, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437), he could be liable for felony murder only if he
was proven to be the “actual killer” and that the former version of
CALCRIM 540A erroneously instructed the jury on the meaning
of that term.5 We agree that, because the prosecutor was trying

4
Although Bailey did not object to the instruction below,
we do not treat his instructional error argument as forfeited.
(See § 1259; Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 80, fn. 4.)
5
Bailey is wrong as a general legal matter that he had to be
the actual killer to be guilty of felony murder. (See § 189, subds.
(e)(2), (3).) However, that was only theory on which Bailey was
tried for felony murder. Furthermore, to the extent Bailey
suggests that the instruction was erroneous because it did not
require that the actual killer act with intent to kill, he is
incorrect. “As amended by Senate Bill No. 1437, the text of
section 189 provides no additional or heightened mental state
requirement for the ‘actual killer’ prosecuted under a felony-
8
Bailey on solely an actual killer theory, the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that it had to find Bailey “caused” Ho’s
death. The instruction should have required the jury to find
Bailey personally committed the act that directly killed Ho. (See
Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 69, 91.) But the error was
harmless.

Bailey relies on recent cases drawing a distinction between
causing someone’s death and actually killing the person. (Vang,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 86-88; People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, 4, 18-19 (Lopez); People v. Garcia (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 123, 151 (Garcia).) “Actual killer” means the person
who personally committed the homicidal act. (Vang, at pp. 86-88;
Lopez, at p. 4; Garcia, at p. 151.) “In other words, the intent [of
Senate Bill No. 1437] was to conform California law to the
‘agency theory’ of felony-murder liability, under which criminal
culpability is restricted to deaths directly caused by the
defendant or an accomplice, as distinguished from the ‘proximate
cause’ theory of felony murder, under which a defendant is
responsible for any death that proximately results from the
unlawful activity.” (Vang, at p. 88.)

In both Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 123 and Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 1, it was not clear if the defendant himself
directly killed the victim. (Garcia, at pp. 134-137, 140-141, 145-
146 [defendant either handed co-perpetrator roll of duct tape
used to cover victim’s mouth (and causing asphyxiation) or taped
the victim’s mouth himself]; Lopez, at pp. 7-10 [defendant
admitted being at scene of murder (where his DNA was also
found) but claimed he never went into room where another
person killed victim].) In Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at page 69,
the defendant forced the victim into his car, but she later jumped

murder theory; it requires only that ‘[t]he person was the actual
killer.’ (§ 189, subd. (e)(1).)” (People v. Garcia (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 956, 967; accord, § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
9
out of the moving car of her own volition. In all three cases, the
jury had been instructed that, to find the defendant guilty of
felony murder, the jury had to conclude that, while committing
the felony, the defendant “caused the death of another person.”
(Vang, at p. 80 & fn. 3; Lopez, at p. 16; cf. Garcia, at pp. 149-150
[CALCRIM No. 730].) The reviewing courts found these
instructions inadequate. (Vang, at p. 91; Garcia, at pp. 153-155;
see Lopez, at pp. 10, 16-17, 20 [deciding the instruction meant, in
former § 1170.95 (renumbered § 1172.6 by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, §
10, eff. June 30, 2022) context, that the record was inconclusive
as to whether the defendant was actual killer and thereby
ineligible for resentencing].) Reversal was required because
CALCRIM No. 540A “created the possibility the jury convicted
defendant of felony murder . . . without finding him to have been
the actual killer.” (Lopez, at p. 20; accord, Garcia, at pp. 155-
157.)

Here, the trial court instructed the jury with the same
language found problematic in all these cases. This instruction
did not necessarily require the jury to find Bailey personally
killed Ho. Instead, the instructions permitted the jury to convict
Bailey if it concluded Ho’s death occurred during the commission
of robbery, and Bailey caused Ho’s death. The People provide no
persuasive reason to reach a result contrary to that reached in
Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at page 91—that the jury
instructions were inadequate. However, the People have carried
their burden to show that the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18; Vang, at p. 91.)

First, Bailey cannot establish prejudice because the jury
found the personal infliction of great bodily injury enhancement
allegations (§ 12022.7, subds. (b), (c)) true. (See People v. Wright
(2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 98 [there can be no prejudice if “ ‘factual
question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily

10
resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given
instructions’ ”]; People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 55
& fn. 9, 58 [distinguishing Lopez and concluding trial court
correctly denied resentencing petition at prima facie hearing
because jury necessarily found defendant personally killed
victim].) With respect to the section 12022.7, subdivision (b),
allegation, the jury was instructed: “[T]he People must prove that
defendant Bailey personally inflicted great bodily injury on Pak
Ho during the commission of the crime, and the defendant’s acts
caused Pak Ho to become comatose due to brain injury.” (Italics
added.) It was this brain injury that the pathologist testified
caused Ho’s death.

Second, on the record before us, we fail to see how the jury
could have found that Bailey was not the actual killer but
proximately caused Ho’s death. In Vang, Lopez, and Garcia,
there was at least a plausible scenario in which the defendant
was found guilty of murder even though he was not the actual
killer. In contrast, Ho died of head trauma after he was punched.
The evidence was overwhelming that it was Bailey, not Britton,
who exited the truck and punched Ho. The error was harmless.

B.

Next, we accept the People’s concession that remand is
necessary because the trial court committed two sentencing
errors.

First, the trial court erred, in connection with count two, by
imposing two five-year great bodily injury enhancements
(§ 12022.7, subds. (b), (c)). (Id., subd. (h) [“[t]he court shall
impose the additional terms of imprisonment under either
subdivision (a), (b), (c), or (d), but may not impose more than one
of those terms for the same offense”]; People v. Ausbie (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 855, 864, disapproved on another ground by People v.
Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1011, fn. 6.) Accordingly, one of

11
the five-year enhancements must be stricken. (See § 12022.7,
subd. (h).)

Second, Bailey and the People are correct that section 654
barred the trial court from imposing unstayed sentences on both
counts four and five (first degree robbery and residential
burglary) because it is undisputed that both counts were
committed during a single course of conduct and pursuant to a
single objective—taking items from Shi’s apartment. (See § 654,
subd. (a) [an act that is “punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act . . . be punished under
more than one provision”]; People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290,
294; People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 229.)
Bailey’s failure to assert an objection below did not forfeit this
error. (See Hester, at p. 295.)

Effective 2022, the Legislature amended section 654 by
removing the requirement that a defendant be punished under
the provision providing for the longest term of imprisonment and
granting the trial court discretion to impose punishment under
either applicable provision. (§ 654, subd. (a) [“[a]n act . . . that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may
be punished under either of such provisions,” italics added]; Stats.
2021, ch. 441, § 1; People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343,
379.) Accordingly, we must remand for resentencing pursuant to
section 654. (See Mani, at p. 381.)

DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court so that (1) the
trial court may strike one of the section 12022.7 enhancements to
count two, as mandated by section 12022.7, subdivision (h); (2)
the court may exercise its discretion to stay execution of sentence
on either count four or count five, pursuant to section 654,
subdivision (a); and (3) for correction of the clerical error in the
abstract of judgment (noted in footnote three) with respect to
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count five. The trial court is further directed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy
thereof to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.

People v. Bailey (A168887)

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