CourtListener 10291321•People v. Fowler CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 12/10/24 P. v. Fowler CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087126
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CRF43675)
v.
MICHAEL RAY FOWLER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Kevin M.
Seibert, Judge.
Allan E. Junker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A.
Martinez, and Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Peña, J.
Defendant and appellant Michael Ray Fowler (defendant) was convicted by a jury
of assault with a deadly weapon and false imprisonment; the trial court found true
enhancements for two prior imprisonments and two prior serious felonies that also
qualified as strikes prior. The trial court sentenced defendant on the assault offense to
25 years to life plus 10 years imprisonment for the two prior serious felonies and stayed
all other aspects of the sentence. At a resentencing due to the recent passage of Senate
Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483), the trial court declined to strike
either of the strike priors but struck the two prior imprisonment enhancements and one of
the prior serious felony enhancements. During the course of resentencing, the court
concluded that defendant would not be a danger to the public upon release if the
enhancements were stricken. The trial court resentenced defendant to 25 years to life
plus five years for the remaining prior serious felony enhancement and stayed the
sentence for false imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the trial court
abused its discretion and prejudicially erred by failing to strike the second prior serious
felony enhancement; (2) if forfeiture of the issue is found, he received ineffective
assistance of counsel; and (3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to include time
credits earned up to the time of resentencing. We affirm defendant’s sentence but remand
for the court to amend the abstract of judgment.
BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2014, defendant and B.M. were packing the contents of a trailer in
preparation for a move. A neighbor called the police after she heard defendant yell that
he was going to kill B.M., and B.M. yelled back, “No, no!” When the police arrived at
the trailer, they separated defendant and B.M. B.M. told the police that she and
defendant had been arguing during the morning, but after she pulled a cord from their
satellite receiver, defendant became enraged, attempted to strangle her with the cord, and
physically prevented her from leaving the trailer. Although defendant maintained that he
and B.M. had been wrestling and got tangled in the cords and denied attempting to
2.
strangle B.M. or prevent her from leaving the trailer, defendant was arrested and
criminally charged. (People v. Fowler (Apr. 16, 2018, F073444 [nonpub. opn.]
(Fowler).)
Conviction and First Sentencing
On July 15, 2015, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1);1 count II) and false imprisonment (§ 236; count III.) In a
bifurcated proceeding in September 2015, the trial court found true enhancements for two
prior imprisonments (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), as well as two prior serious felony convictions
(§ 667, subd. (a)) that also qualified as strikes prior (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)). The two prior
felony convictions were for burglary in 1986 and assault with a deadly weapon in 2001.
(Fowler, supra, F073444.)
On January 26, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant. The court imposed a
sentence on the assault offense of 25 years to life plus 10 years for the two prior serious
felony enhancements. The court stayed a 16-month sentence on the false imprisonment
offense and stayed the two 1-year terms for the prior imprisonment enhancements.
(Fowler, supra, F073444.)
Second Sentencing
On April 10, 2023, the trial court issued an ex parte order that appointed counsel
and set a resentencing hearing in light of the passage of Senate Bill 483.
On October 5, 2023, the trial court held the resentencing hearing. The parties
generally argued application of factors and considerations under section 1385. The
People agreed that defendant was “eligible” to have the two 1-year prior imprisonment
enhancements stricken. However, the People argued that because of defendant’s criminal
history and violent conduct towards “his significant other,” it was not in the interest of
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3.
justice to dismiss either the strike or the corresponding enhancement because public
safety would be endangered.
Defense counsel focused “on the strike” because the People conceded that it was
appropriate to strike the prior imprisonment enhancements. Defense counsel argued that
the burglary strike was 36 years old, defendant was now 70 years old, and defendant was
incarcerated at the California Medical Facility due to COPD, diabetes, high blood
pressure, and arthritis. Defense counsel then argued that four factors identified by
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) applied, specifically: multiple enhancements were
involved (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)), application of the enhancements resulted in a sentence
greater than 20 years (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)), the offenses of conviction were not “violent”
under section 667.5, subdivision (c) (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(F)), and the underlying
conviction for the serious felony enhancement was more than five years old (id.,
subd. (c)(2)(H)). After extended argument regarding the application of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C), the court explained:
“However, there are other things on here that [section] 1385 says
that multiple enhancements, you should only get one enhancement, and
there is an issue … of prior conviction that’s over five years old. Those are
all factors the court is directed under 1385(c) to consider and give great
weight to these factors, unless to do so would endanger the public safety,
physical or serious injury to somebody else, okay.
“The presence of one or more factors weighs greatly in dismissing
them and we have multiple factors here and that’s what, you know, the
code, it talks about.
“The man is 70 years old and in bad health. I mean, I think that
would suggest he’s not a danger – his release wouldn’t endanger the public
safety. [¶] … [¶]
“The application of the multiple enhancements alleged in a single
case in this instance all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall
be dismissed. That’s what the code says. So the enhancements that I’ve
heard are two one-years that the People concede and two five years. Those
are the enhancements I’m hearing, right? [¶] … [¶]
4.
“So I think that the code requires that we – that I dismiss one of the
five, the nickel priors and both of the one-year sentences.
“That now takes us to the issue about whether we should strike the
strike, right?”
Defense counsel clarified that the basis for attempting to strike the 1986 strike
prior was section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
Defense counsel then again emphasized defendant’s rehabilitative efforts in prison, age,
and poor health. The People again argued that, even though the defendant was 70 years
old and in poor health, the strike prior was part of a lengthy criminal course of conduct
that included eight prior convictions, the “Three Strikes” law was passed for people who
continually violate the law, and the present offense involved violence while defendant’s
prior offenses also involved violence. Defendant addressed the court and in part
described his health problems. The court explained to defendant that his health was at
issue because the court was “trying to make the determination where the code says
whether you’d be likely person to endanger public safety.” The court explained that
section 1385 “says proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the Court finds that the dismissal
would endanger public safety.”
At the conclusion of the parties’ arguments and the court’s questions, the court
explained what it intended to do:
“All right. So based on the information I’ve heard, I’m going to
deny the Romero motion. The long and extended criminal history and
consistently long criminal history [does not] take[] this case outside of the
purview of the three strikes rules and the intention of the three strikes laws.
“However, with regard to the actual striking of enhancements I am
striking the two one-year nickel prior – one-year priors and I’m also
striking one of the five-year enhancements, as I think I’m required to do
under 1385 based on the fact that there were multiple enhancements alleged
in a single case.
5.
“The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision C of Section 667.5, and the Court is required to take those into
consideration and give weight, great weight to these factors unless to do so
can endanger the public safety, and I can’t make a finding that doing so
would make it – would be a danger to public safety in this case under any
circumstances, not the least of which is he’s still in there for a 25-year-to-
life sentence due to these changes.”
After additional discussion, defendant was ultimately sentenced on the assault offense to
25 years to life plus five years for the 2001 prior serious felony enhancement. A 16-
month sentence on the false imprisonment offense was stayed pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
I. STRIKING THE ENHANCEMENTS UNDER SECTION 1385
A. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the
enhancement for the 2001 felony assault. Defendant avers that section 1385 requires a
court to dismiss an enhancement if one or more enumerated factors are present and the
court determines that striking the enhancement would not endanger public safety.
Defendant argues that because multiple enumerated factors applied, and the trial court
found that without an enhancement, defendant’s release would not endanger public
safety, the court was required to dismiss the 2001 prior serious felony enhancement.
Further, in reply, defendant argues that the trial court never acknowledged its authority to
dismiss the 2001 prior serious felony enhancement or made any determinations regarding
that enhancement. Defendant argues that the court focused on section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B) and erroneously concluded that it was required to leave one prior
serious felony enhancement in place. Defendant contends that the court’s failure to
address or consider striking the 2001 prior serious felony enhancement was the result of a
misconception of its discretion and duty under section 1385 and thus, an abuse of
discretion.
6.
The People argue in part that, contrary to defendant’s argument, section 1385,
subdivision (c) does not mandate striking an enhancement if any of the statutorily
enumerated factors are present and there is no finding that striking the enhancement
would endanger public safety. The People also argue that the trial court properly applied
section 1385 by giving great weight to the appropriate mitigating factors, which resulted
in the striking of three of the four enhancements.2 The People argue that the court was
concerned about defendant’s criminal history and implicitly found that it would not
further justice to strike all the enhancements.
B. Legal Standards
Unless prohibited by an initiative statute, section 1385 instructs courts to dismiss a
sentence enhancement “if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1); People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032 (Walker); People v. Gonzalez
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 221.) In exercising its discretion, the trial court must give
great weight to evidence that establishes any of nine statutorily enumerated mitigating
factors. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); Walker, at p. 1032; Gonzalez, at p. 1024.) The presence of
any of the nine mitigating factors “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); Walker, at p. 1032; Gonzalez, at p. 1024.) Stated
differently, “absent a finding that dismissal [of the enhancement] would endanger public
safety, a court must assign significant value to the [nine] enumerated mitigating [factors]
when they are present.” (Walker, at p. 1038.) Section 1385, subdivision (c), however,
does not create a presumption in favor of dismissal if any of the nine mitigating factors
2 The People further argue that defendant forfeited the issue of whether the trial
court abused its discretion by not striking both prior serious felony enhancements because
defense counsel did not object. Assuming defendant forfeited the issue, we exercise our
discretion to address the merits of defendant’s argument. (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6.)
7.
are present. (Walker, at p. 1034.) Rather, section 1385, subdivision (c) requires a trial
court to engage in “ ‘holistic balancing’ ” of relevant considerations with a “ ‘special
emphasis’ ” on the nine enumerated mitigating factors in order to determine whether
dismissal of the enhancement would be in furtherance of justice. (Walker, at pp. 1035–
1036.) In the absence of a finding that public safety would be endangered, and in order
for the trial court to find that it would not further justice to strike the enhancement, “there
must be substantial, relevant, and credible evidence of aggravating factors to neutralize
the ‘great weight’ of the [nine enumerated] mitigating [factors].” (Id. at p. 1036.) If the
trial court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety, the court
may not give the enumerated mitigating factor(s) “great weight,” but may still consider
the factor(s) for “whatever weight it deserves.” (Couzens et al., Sentencing California
Crimes (The Rutter Group 2023) § 12:11 (Couzens).) “In practice, the presence of an
enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the
mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1038.)
A trial court’s determinations under section 1385, subdivision (c) are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 224–225; People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298; see also People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 373.) A trial court abuses its discretion if its refusal to dismiss an enhancement “is
so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, at
p. 377; Mendoza, at p. 299.) A trial court may also abuse its discretion if it is unaware of
or misunderstands its discretion. (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988;
People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1096–1097.) However, a trial court’s
order is presumed to be correct, and a reviewing court will indulge all intendments and
presumptions to support the order on matters to which the record is silent. (People v.
8.
Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666; People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 330
(Allen).) As a result, uncertainties in the record are construed against the defendant and
in favor of the trial court’s order (People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 866
(Moore); People v. Clifton (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 860, 862 (Clifton)), and a defendant
cannot rely on a silent record but instead must affirmatively show error and an abuse of
discretion (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866; People v. Davis (1996) 50
Cal.App.4th 168, 172 (Davis)).
C. Analysis
1. The Finding that Defendant Would Not Endanger the Public
There is no dispute, and we agree, that the section 1385 mitigating factors of
multiple enhancements (subd. (c)(2)(B)),3 nonviolent current felony (subd. (c)(2)(F)), and
an older than five years prior conviction (subd. (c)(2)(H)) all apply to this case.4 The
dispute is the effect these factors have in light of the trial court’s finding that defendant
would not pose a danger to the public if the enhancements were dismissed. Defendant
maintains that the effect of this finding, when combined with the presence of multiple
enumerated factors, is that the trial court was required to dismiss the 2001 prior serious
felony enhancement. Defendant misreads section 1385.
3 All further references to a “subdivision” refer to section 1385.
4 Defendant’s argument regarding subdivision (c)(2)(C) (a sentence of greater than
20 years) is incorrect. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life due to application of
the Three Strikes law, which is an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement.
(People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243–244.) Because the alternative
sentencing scheme by itself resulted in a sentence greater than 20 years, the additional
five-year enhancement for the 2001 prior serious felony did not cause the sentence to
exceed 20 years. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C); Couzens, supra, § 12.11 [“There will be no
entitlement to relief unless it is the application of the term for the enhancement that
results in a sentence longer than 20 years”].) Therefore, subdivision (c)(2)(C) has no
application.
9.
Our Supreme Court recently interpreted section 1385 in Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th
1024. Resolving a split among the courts of appeal, Walker explained that subdivision (c)
did not create a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal if any of the enumerated
mitigating factors were present. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1029, 1034.) Rather,
Walker explained that the ultimate inquiry is whether dismissing an enhancement is in the
furtherance of justice. (Id. at p. 1036; see § 1385, subd. (c)(1).) That inquiry requires the
trial court to engage in a holistic consideration of all appropriate factors but give the
enumerated factors “ ‘great weight.’ ” (Walker, at pp. 1035–1036.) If a trial court finds
that the public would be endangered by the dismissal of an enhancement, then the court
does not give the enumerated factors “great weight.” (Id. at p. 1034; see Couzens, supra,
§ 12.11.) If the trial does not find that the public would be endangered by striking the
enhancement, then the “ ‘great weight’ ” of the enumerated factors can be overcome and
the enhancement applied only if there is substantial and credible evidence of
countervailing factors that are sufficient to neutralize the great weight of the enumerated
factors. (Walker, at pp. 1036, 1038; see Rutter, at § 12.11 [“The court is not directed to
give conclusive effect to the mitigating factors”].) Because Walker makes clear that a
trial court is not automatically required to strike an enhancement when there is both the
presence of enumerated mitigating factors and a finding that a defendant would not
endanger the public if the enhancement was stricken, defendant’s argument is incorrect
and does not entitle him to relief. (Walker, at p. 1038.)
2. Trial Court’s Understanding of Its Discretion
Defendant contends the transcript of the resentencing hearing shows that the trial
court misunderstood its discretion and obligations under section 1385. We cannot agree
with defendant.
We are required to resolve all uncertainties in the record in favor of the court’s
order and to indulge in all presumptions in favor of the order on matters to which the
record is silent. (Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 866; Allen, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
10.
p. 330; Davis, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 172; Clifton, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 862.)
Through these lenses, the record reflects that the trial court informed the parties that it
was required to consider the prior imprisonment enhancements and the two prior serious
felony enhancements. The court placed no limitations on its consideration of the
enhancements and thus, recognized that all four enhancements were at issue. The court
also identified and considered three of subdivision (c)(2)’s nine enumerated factors. The
court mentioned the multiple enhancements factor (subd. (c)(2)(B)) most prominently,
but it also expressly recognized that the nonviolent offense factor (subd. (c)(2)(F)) and
the five-year old conviction factor (subd. (c)(2)(H)) were applicable. The court further
recognized that, because it found defendant would not endanger the public if the
enhancements were dismissed, it was required to give each applicable enumerated factor
“great weight.” We have no reason to read the court’s statements as establishing that the
court considered only subdivision (c)(2)(B), that subdivision (c)(2)(B) constrained its
ability to strike the prior serious felony enhancement for the 2001 assault, that it did not
consider striking all four enhancements, or that it did not afford the three enumerated
mitigating factors “great weight” as it considered all four enhancements. (Allen, at p. 330
[“ ‘The court is presumed to have considered all relevant factors in the absence of an
affirmative record to the contrary’ ”]; Davis, at p. 172.) Rather, considering the court’s
identification of the enhancements without limitation, and its recognition that three
separate enumerated mitigating factors were to be given “great weight,” the record can
reasonably be read as showing that the court recognized its obligations under
subdivision (c)(2) with respect to all four enhancements. This is how we interpret the
record. (Moore, at p. 866; Allen, at p. 330; Davis, at p. 172; Clifton, at p. 862.) As a
result, the record supports implied findings by the court that, although it gave the three
mitigating factors “great weight,” the court nevertheless concluded that it would not
further justice to dismiss the 2001 prior serious felony enhancement in light of the
defendant’s criminal history and the nature of the current assault conviction, but that it
11.
would further justice to strike the two one year prior imprisonment enhancements and the
1986 prior serious felony enhancement pursuant to subdivision (c)(2)(B). These findings
are consistent with subdivision (c) and do not reflect a misunderstanding by the court of
its discretion and obligations under subdivision (c). (Allen, at p. 330.)
Defendant points out that the trial court relied heavily on the multiple
enhancements factor of subdivision (c)(2)(B), the court made no specific findings
regarding the 2001 assault conviction as an enhancement, and no party argued for the
specific dismissal of the 2001 assault enhancement. We agree with these observations,
but they do not aid defendant. First, silence and uncertainty do not demonstrate error. To
the contrary, we resolve silence and uncertainty in favor of the court’s order. (Moore,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 866; Allen, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 330.) While no party
made arguments that were specifically aimed at the 2001 assault conviction as an
enhancement, defense counsel nevertheless discussed four subdivision (c)(2) factors. The
court at various times recognized that three of the four mitigating factors applied, it was
dealing with four enhancements, and that it was to give great weight to those mitigating
factors. The court never stated it could not strike all four enhancements or that it was
considering striking only three of the four enhancements. Given the applicable appellate
presumptions, we cannot conclude that the court failed to meaningfully consider striking
all four enhancements. Second, while the court stated that it was required to dismiss all
enhancements save the 2001 prior serious felony enhancement pursuant to
subdivision (c)(2)(B), this statement can be read as the court simply applying the plain
language of that subdivision. Subdivision (c)(2)(B) provides that if multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case, then “all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) In contrast,
subdivisions (c)(2)(F) and (c)(2)(H) contain no such language; they merely identify a
factor without identifying a consequence relating to that factor. That is, these
subdivisions do not purport to require a trial court to dismiss any enhancement if either or
12.
both of the mitigating factors apply. (Cf. § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B) with § 1385,
subds. (c)(2)(F), (c)(2)(H).)5 Simply because the court explained what it was doing
through operation of subdivision (c)(2)(B) does not mean that the court did not consider
or give the other mitigating factors “great weight,” nor does it mean that the court failed
to consider dismissing the 2001 assault as an enhancement. (Allen, at p. 330 [“ ‘Thus, the
fact that the court focused its explanatory comments on [one factor] does not mean that it
considered only that factor’ ”].)
In sum, defendant has not adequately demonstrated the court misunderstood its
discretion or misconceived its obligations under subdivision (c) and thus, has not
demonstrated an abuse of discretion.
II. New Abstract of Judgment
“Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment
based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is
modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any
subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or
acts.” (§ 2900.1; People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 32; People v. Sek (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673.) Through application of section 2900.1, when a defendant is
serving a sentence and then is resentenced, the defendant is entitled to a new abstract of
judgment that includes time credits for the time he served on the original sentence up to
the time of resentencing. (Buckhalter, at p. 41; People v. Trammel (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
415, 436–437; Sek, at p. 673; People v. Garner (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1118–1119;
People v. Saibu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012.)
5 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(F) reads in its entirety: “The current offense is
not a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of [Penal Code section] 667.5.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(F).) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H) reads in its entirety: “The
enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(H).)
13.
Here, defendant correctly points out that the abstract of judgment issued on
October 6, 2023, after resentencing, does not include time credits for the time he served
in prison up to the time of resentencing. The People do not address the issue in any way.
Given the October 6, 2023 abstract of judgment, as well as the above law, we take the
People’s silence to be a concession of defendant’s point. We agree and will instruct the
trial court to amend the October 6, 2023 abstract of judgment to include all custody
credits to which defendant was entitled up to the October 5, 2023 resentencing.
DISPOSITION
This matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an amended
abstract of judgment that includes all appropriate custody credits to which defendant was
entitled as of October 5, 2023. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
14.
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