CourtListener 10290464•Stead Financial v. Cal. Statewide Communities Devopment CA1/5
Stead Financial v. Cal. Statewide Communities Devopment CA1/5
CourtListener 10290464Calctapp9 déc. 2024
Texte intégral
Filed 12/9/24 Stead Financial v. Cal. Statewide Communities Devopment CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
STEAD FINANCIAL, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A169218
v. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
No. C22-00991)
CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE
COMMUNITIES DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY,
Defendant and Respondent.
Respondent and defendant California Statewide Communities
Development Authority (Authority), “a joint powers authority,” issued bonds
to fund the development of a business park in the City of Tracy (City). Under
the trust agreement for the bonds, the Authority agreed that $875,000
received from SNB Tracy, LLC (SNB), one of the developers, would be
deposited into a reserve fund that would be used to pay for the bonds only if
other funds established by the agreement were insufficient. Any unused
monies in the reserve fund as of September 2, 2016, would be returned to
SNB or its successors.
One of the other developers, however, filed for bankruptcy in 2013. In
the bankruptcy proceeding, SNB filed a creditor claim for fees and costs that
it incurred for the business park development based on a cost sharing
1
agreement with the bankrupt developer. SNB assigned that claim to
appellant and plaintiff Stead Financial, Inc. (Stead) in January 2015.
Although none of the monies in the reserve fund were returned to SNB
or its successors on September 2, 2016, Stead did not inform the Authority of
its claim to those monies until November 2021. After Stead and the
Authority were unable to resolve their dispute over the reserve fund, Stead
filed this action against the Authority. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the Authority, holding that Stead’s causes of action were
untimely because Stead did not present its government claim to the
Authority within one-year after their accrual as required by Government
Code section 911.2, subdivision (a).1
Stead appeals, contending, among other things, that the discovery rule
postponed the accrual of its causes of action. According to Stead, it did not
learn about its causes of action against the Authority until it reviewed the
pleadings in the bankruptcy proceeding and obtained the cost sharing and
trust agreements “for the first time” in August 2021. But Stead could and
should have obtained both the pleadings and the agreements no later than
November 2019. Because Stead did not present its claim to the Authority
until at least roughly two years later, its causes of action are time-barred.
We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
On September 10, 2010, the City entered into a development agreement
with Tracy Gateway LLC (Tracy Gateway). Under the terms of the
development agreement, Tracy Gateway was “to develop parcels of land
collectively known as the Tracy Gateway Business Park” (Business Park).
1 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2
Approximately two-and-a-half weeks later, Tracy Gateway entered into
a Cost Sharing Agreement with SNB, the owner of certain parcels of land to
be used for the Business Park, “to divide the costs of the [Business Park]
development.” Under the terms of the Cost Sharing Agreement, Tracy
Gateway and SNB agreed that “all fees and costs incurred relating to the”
Business Park development “shall be borne by the parties in accordance with
their Proportionate Share.” Tracy “Gateway’s Proportionate Share []
equal[ed] 58 [percent] and [SNB’s] Proportionate Share [] equal[ed] 42
[percent].” Reimbursement of the fees and costs incurred by Tracy Gateway
and SNB would “occur as part of the [] bond financing” for the development.
“To the extent such reimbursement does not occur from the [] bond financing,
the party advancing any such fees shall retain a claim, payable on demand
for funds advanced on behalf of the other party.”
“On September 1, 2011, the Authority issued Statewide Community
Infrastructure Program Revenue Bonds [(Bonds)] to fund the [Business Park]
development . . . .” Upon issuance of the Bonds, the Authority entered into a
Trust Agreement with Wells Fargo Bank, the trustee of the Bonds.
Among other things, the Trust Agreement established the Tracy
Gateway Reserve Fund (Reserve Fund). The Reserve Fund, funded “by a
deposit of $875,000 from the Tracy Gateway Developer,” was to be used “to
pay for the [B]onds in the event that the primary interest and principal funds
did not have sufficient money.” The Trust Agreement further provided that
“[a]ny money remaining in the Reserve Fund on September 2, 2016, together
with any interest earnings thereon, was to be returned to the Tracy Gateway
Developer.” Finally, the Agreement identified SNB “and its successors” as
the “ ‘Tracy Gateway Developer.’ ”
3
On March 15, 2013, Tracy Gateway filed for bankruptcy. On August 8,
2013, SNB “filed a creditor claim” in the bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to
the Cost Sharing Agreement.
SNB entered into an Assignment of Assigned Matters and Claims
(Assignment Agreement) with Stead on January 28, 2015, and provided
notice of the assignment in the Tracy Gateway bankruptcy proceeding on
“that same day.” Under the terms of that Agreement, SNB agreed to
“ ‘transfer and assign to’ ” Stead “ ‘all of [its] right, title and interest in and to
any and all present or future claims . . . with respect to any and all of its
claims and money due regarding the [Business Park] Project . . . related to
[its] claims as a creditor’ ” in the bankruptcy proceeding. (Italics and
underlining omitted.) This included SNB’s creditor claim.
In the Tracy Gateway bankruptcy proceeding, Rosebrook 58, LLC,
(Rosebrook) purchased the parcels of land to be used for the Business Park
owned by Tracy Gateway. The bankruptcy court approved Rosebrook’s
purchase of the parcels on June 2, 2015.
“Beginning in 2015, Rosebrook made multiple attempts over the course
of [the next] several years to obtain documentation and information from the”
Authority relating to the Bonds. The Authority provided Rosebrook with
“some of the requested documents,” including the “Trust document,” in
November 2019. Unlike Rosebrook, Stead did not communicate with the
Authority regarding the Reserve Fund before August 2021.
In August 2021, Stead and Rosebrook obtained the pleadings in the
Tracy Gateway bankruptcy proceeding. According to Stead, this allowed
them to review the Trust and Cost Sharing Agreements “together for the first
time.” Based on this review, Stead discovered SNB’s interest in the Reserve
Fund. As a result, neither Stead nor Rosebrook actually knew about their
4
interests in the Reserve Fund until August 2021. Similarly, the Authority
was not aware of Stead’s or Rosebrook’s interest in the Reserve Fund until
August 2021 and remains unsure that “any funds are owed or due” to them.
On or about November 18, 2021, Stead and Rosebrook sent a joint
letter to the Authority. The letter claimed, among other things, that Stead
and Rosebrook “were entitled to the money in the Reserve Fund.” In
December 2021, the Authority “offered to settle all matters . . . for a single
payment to” Stead and Rosebrook “of $875,000.” In May 2022, the Authority
informed Stead and Rosebrook that it “did not know or agree that [they] are
the successors in interest to the” Reserve Fund and therefore needed them “to
provide the” Authority “with immunity from potential third parties with
claims over the funds to receive any payment.”
Rather than agree to the terms proposed by the Authority to resolve the
dispute, “Stead and Rosebrook separately submitted written claims against
the Authority to the California Department of General Services”
(Department) on March 21, 2022. Even though they had already submitted
their claims to the Department, Stead and Rosebrook sent a letter to the
Authority on April 6, 2022, stating that they “would file a government claim
against the Authority with” the Department. In its response dated May 13,
2022, the Authority explained that the submission of any claims to the
Department “would not satisfy the requirements of the Government Claims
Act.”
Stead and Rosebrook filed this action on May 12, 2022. In the
complaint, Stead alleged seven causes of action against the Authority.2 Stead
does not dispute that all of its causes of action arise “from the Reserve Fund.”
2 Stead alleged one cause of action for breach of contract, two causes of
action for negligence, one cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, one
5
The Authority moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other
things, that Stead’s claims “were time-barred under [] section 911.2.” The
trial court granted the motion. In its order, the court held that Stead’s claims
were barred because: (1) Stead did not submit its claim to the correct entity
under section 915; (2) Stead did not substantially comply with the claim
presentation requirement because “there is no evidence to indicate actual
receipt by the Authority’s clerk, secretary, auditor, or board;” and (3) delayed
discovery did not postpone the accrual of Stead’s causes of action because “all
the documents needed were available and/or public before the alleged
‘discovery’ of” Stead’s “claims” and because “there was nothing secret or
hidden about the existence of” Stead’s “rights.”
Stead timely appealed.3
DISCUSSION
Stead does not dispute that its causes of action are subject to the claim
presentation requirement found in the Government Claims Act, §§ 900 et seq.
(§§ 905, 911.2, 915 & 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde)
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 [“failure to timely present a claim for money or
damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that
entity”].) Stead also does not dispute that it had to present its claim for
“money or damages” to the Authority “not later than one year after the
accrual of [its] cause[s] of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) Finally, Stead does not
dispute that, absent the discovery rule, its causes of action would have
accrued on September 2, 2016—the date that any monies in the Reserve
cause of action for declaratory relief, one cause of action for money had and
received, and one cause of action for unjust enrichment.
3 Rosebrook apparently did not file a notice of appeal.
6
Fund should have been returned to SNB or its successors under the Trust
Agreement.
Instead, Stead contends that the discovery rule postponed the accrual
of its causes of action against the Authority until August 2021 when it
obtained the pleadings in the Tracy Gateway bankruptcy proceeding and was
able to review both the Cost Sharing and Trust Agreements “together for the
first time.” Stead, however, should have suspected that it had a claim for
“fees and costs incurred relating to the” Business Park development on
January 28, 2015—the date SNB assigned its creditor claim in the Tracy
Gateway bankruptcy proceeding to Stead. And Stead, upon exercising
reasonable diligence, should have discovered its right to any monies in the
Reserve Fund no later than November 2019. Because the earliest date that
Stead even arguably presented its claim to the Authority is November 18,
2021—roughly two years after the latest possible accrual date under the
discovery rule—its causes of action are time-barred under section 911.2,
subdivision (a).
“We review the trial court’s order on summary judgment de novo,
liberally construing the evidence in favor of plaintiff[], the party opposing
summary judgment.” (Hahn v. New York Air Brake LLC (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 895, 899.) “While resolution of the statute of limitation issue
is normally a question of fact, where the uncontradicted facts established
through discovery are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary
judgment is proper.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112
(Jolly).)
“[S]tatutes of limitation do not begin to run until a cause of action
accrues.” (Fox v. Ethicon-Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806
7
(Fox).) “[A] cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is
complete with all of its elements.’ ” (Ibid.)
“An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery
rule,’ which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers,
or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 807.) “A potential plaintiff ‘discovers the cause of action . . . when . . . [it]
at least “suspects . . . that someone has done something wrong” to [it],
“wrong” being used, not in any technical sense, but rather in accordance with
its “lay understanding.” ’ ” (Rosas v. BASF Corp. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
1378, 1389, quoting Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397–398.)
Thus, a “plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ necessary to
establish the claim” in order to trigger the applicable statute of limitations.
(Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1111.) Instead, the plaintiff need only have
“inquiry notice” (Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 340, 361 (Baxter))—i.e., “a suspicion of wrongdoing, and
therefore an incentive to sue” (Jolly, at p. 1111). Once the plaintiff suspects
wrongdoing, that plaintiff has constructive knowledge of any facts that it
“should have discovered” “in the exercise of reasonable diligence.” (Baxter, at
p. 361.) “So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go
find the facts; [it] cannot wait for the facts to find [it].” (Jolly, at p. 1111.)
This is because “[e]very person who has actual notice of circumstances
sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact has
constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such
inquiry, he or she might have learned that fact.” (Civ. Code, § 19.)
Here, SNB had a suspicion of wrongdoing when it filed its creditor
claim in the Tracy Gateway bankruptcy proceeding. Specifically, SNB had a
suspicion that it was owed “fees and costs incurred relating to the” Business
8
Park development. And when Stead became the assignee of SNB’s creditor
claim on January 28, 2015, Stead acquired that same suspicion.4 (See
Schmidt v. Trinut Farm Management, Inc (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 997, 1011,
fn. 14 [“Appellant [], as assignee of the creditor claim . . . does . . . stand in the
shoes of the assignor”].) Thus, Stead was on “inquiry notice” of any claim for
fees and costs advanced by SNB for the Business Park development as of
January 28, 2015. (Baxter, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 361.) This means
that Stead, as of that date, had to “exercise of reasonable diligence” in
discovering its claim to any of SNB’s monies deposited in the Reserve Fund.
(Ibid.)
4 In footnote 4 of its opening brief, Stead asserts that it did not learn
about the Assignment Agreement “until August of 2021.” But Stead does not
cite to anything in the record to support this assertion. Moreover, Stead
admitted in its complaint that it entered into the Assignment Agreement
with SNB on January 28, 2015. To the extent that Stead may have disputed
that the assignment occurred on January 28, 2015, in its separate statement
of undisputed material facts, Stead did not state “the nature of the dispute”
or “describe the evidence that supports the position that the fact is
controverted” as required by rule 3.1350(f)(2) of the California Rules of Court.
(See also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3) [“Each material fact contended
by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the
supporting evidence”].) We may therefore treat the date of the assignment as
an undisputed fact. (See Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 554, 570 [court may disregard disputes
over facts that are not supported by evidence].) Finally, even if Stead did not
learn about the Assignment Agreement until August 2021, it offers no
explanation for the more than six-year gap between the date of the
assignment and Stead’s purported discovery of that assignment. Indeed,
Stead, as a named creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, should have
learned about the assignment when SNB provided notice of it in that
proceeding. Thus, Stead cannot establish reasonable diligence in discovering
the assignment. (See Community Cause v. Boatwright (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d
888, 902 (Community Cause) [no reasonable diligence because the plaintiff
“alleges no facts to explain the gap between the date . . . documents first
became available and the alleged date of discovery”].)
9
Stead did not, however, do so. As Stead admitted, it discovered its
causes of action against the Authority when it obtained the pleadings in the
Tracy Gateway bankruptcy proceeding in August 2021. This, in turn,
allowed Stead to review the Cost Sharing and Trust Agreements “together for
the first time.” But the bankruptcy proceeding was closed in November
2019.5 Thus, Stead could have obtained the pleadings it needed to discover
its causes of action no later than November 2019.
Despite this, Stead offers no explanation for its failure to obtain and
review those pleadings by November 2019. And under the undisputed facts,
there is no reasonable explanation. Indeed, it is undisputed that Stead was a
separately named creditor and was assigned SNB’s creditor claim in the
Tracy Gateway bankruptcy proceeding. Under these circumstances,
“[r]easonable diligence would have included staying abreast of the record” in
that proceeding. (Missionary Guadalupanas of Holy Spirit Inc. v. Rouillard
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 421, 438–439 [party moving for new trial did not
“exercise[] reasonable diligence in discovering and producing evidence”
available in the court records of a related case]; see also Utility Cost
Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1185, 1197
[diligent plaintiff seeking refund of capital facilities fees charged by public
utility would have reviewed information made publicly available by that
5 We, on our motion, take judicial notice of the docket in the bankruptcy
proceeding, In re Tracy Gateway LLC (Bankr. E.D.Cal. 2013, case No. 2:13-
bk-23517). (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1681, fn. 23 [taking judicial, on its own motion, of the
docket in a United States Supreme Court case].) According to the docket, the
last filing in the proceeding occurred on November 24, 2019. (See Van Zant
v. Apple Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 965, 971 & fn. 3 [taking judicial notice of
the docket of a federal case to determine whether there has been any
“subsequent litigation as of the filing of [the] opinion”].)
10
utility]; Crabbe v. White (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 356, 360 [no reasonable
diligence where the plaintiff failed to obtain a copy of the will “by a simple,
routine process in everyday use by lawyers”].) Yet, Stead waited until
August 2021—over eight years after Tracy Gateway filed for bankruptcy and
over six years after SNB provided notice of the assignment of its creditor
claim to Stead—to obtain and review the pleadings in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Stead therefore did not exercise reasonable diligence. (See
Community Cause, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 902 [plaintiff cannot establish
reasonable diligence because it “alleges no facts to explain the gap between
the date these [public] documents first became available and the alleged date
of discovery”].) If Stead had acted with reasonable diligence, it would have
obtained the pleadings and discovered its causes of action no later than
November 2019, when the bankruptcy proceeding was closed.
Moreover, even if Stead’s failure to obtain the pleadings in the Tracy
Gateway bankruptcy proceeding by November 2019 is excusable, it still could
and should have obtained the Cost Sharing and Trust Agreements no later
than November 2019.
First, Stead could and should have obtained the Cost Sharing
Agreement when it acquired SNB’s creditor’s claim on January 28, 2015.
That claim was expressly based on the Cost Sharing Agreement. In addition,
Tracy Gateway identified that Agreement in its bankruptcy petition. Yet,
there is no evidence that Stead ever asked SNB or Tracy Gateway for a copy
of the Agreement. By failing to do so, Stead did not exercise reasonable
diligence. (See Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 875 (Miller)
[where, as here, the plaintiff “chose not to pursue their inquiry . . . we cannot
assume that such an inquiry would have been unavailing”].)
11
Second, Stead could and should have obtained the Trust Agreement
from the Authority by November 2019. This is because Rosebrook, Stead’s co-
plaintiff in this action, was able to obtain that Agreement from the Authority
in November 2019. Once again, Stead does not explain why it could not have
done the same.6 Indeed, Stead admits that it never “engaged in any
communications with the Authority in relation to the Developer’s Reserve
Fund since it became SNB’s successor in interest.” By failing to ask the
Authority for any documents pertaining to “fees and costs incurred relating
to” the Business Park development, Stead did not exercise reasonable
diligence in obtaining the Trust Agreement as well. (See Miller, supra,
33 Cal.3d at p. 875.)
Thus, Stead, in exercising reasonable diligence, should have obtained
and reviewed both the pleadings in the Tracy Gateway bankruptcy
proceeding and the Cost Sharing and Trust Agreements by November 2019.
Because Stead admitted that it discovered its claims against the Authority as
soon as it obtained those pleadings and reviewed those Agreements, Stead’s
causes of action accrued no later than November 2019. Stead therefore had
to present its government claim to the Authority by November 2020.
6 Stead asserts that the documentation provided by the Authority to
Rosebrook in November 2019 “was both incomplete and inaccurate.” But
Stead admitted in its complaint that the Authority provided Rosebrook with
the documents it requested “regarding the Bonds” in November 2019. These
documents presumably included the Trust Agreement. Indeed, Stead
acknowledged that Rosebrook received the “Trust document” and never
disputes that Rosebrook obtained a copy of the Trust Agreement in November
2019. Instead, Stead only asserts that the “Trust document” provided in
November 2019 did not inform Rosebrook “whether the [Reserve Fund] could
or should be used to satisfy or be applied towards Rosebrook’s outstanding []
Bond assessment balance, or if any amount thereunder could be due to
Rosebrook.”
12
(§ 911.2, subd. (a).) It did not. Rather, the earliest date that Stead could
have even arguably presented its claim to the Authority is November 18,
2021—the date of its first letter to the Authority regarding the Reserve Fund.
Stead’s causes of action are therefore time-barred as a matter of law.
That the Authority continues to question Stead’s claim, as SNB’s
successor, to the monies in the Reserve Fund does not help Stead. The
accrual of a cause of action depends on the plaintiff’s “suspicion of
wrongdoing”—and not on the defendant’s suspicion. (Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d
at p. 1111.) Contrary to Stead’s suggestion, a cause of action does not accrue
when the defendant acknowledges that the cause of action may be
meritorious. Otherwise, no cause of action would ever accrue if the defendant
chooses to dispute liability.
Likewise, the fact that the documents provided to Rosebrook by the
Authority in November 2019 did not allow Rosebrook to determine how it
may use the Reserve Fund to reduce its liabilities for the Bonds makes no
difference here. “A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ necessary
to establish the claim” in order to trigger the statute of limitations. (Jolly,
supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1111.) In any event, Stead admits that it discovered its
claim to the Reserve Fund when it obtained the pleadings in the bankruptcy
proceeding and reviewed the Cost Sharing and Trust Agreements “together
for the first time.” Because Stead could and should have obtained those
pleadings and Agreements by November 2019 (see, ante, at pp. 10–12),
Rosebrook’s purported inability to discover the full scope of its claims against
the Authority at that time is irrelevant.
13
Finally, Gryczman v. 4550 Pico Partners, Ltd. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1
(Gryczman), is distinguishable.7 In that case, the plaintiff entered into an
agreement giving him “the right of first refusal to purchase certain real
property owned by” the defendant. (Id. at p. 3.) Under the agreement, the
“plaintiff was entitled to written notice . . . of a bona fide offer” for the
property from the defendant. (Id. at p. 4.) The defendant, however, sold the
property to a third party without providing the plaintiff with notice. (Ibid.)
When the plaintiff discovered the sale roughly three years later, he sued the
defendant. The trial court held that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred,
but the court of appeal reversed based on the discovery rule. In concluding
that the rule postponed accrual until the plaintiff discovered the sale, the
court of appeal found that “the failure to give [the] plaintiff notice of the
happening of a certain event is both the act causing the injury and the act
that caused [the] plaintiff not to discover the injury.” (Id. at p. 6.) It also
found that the plaintiff did not have “a duty to continually monitor public
recordings to determine whether [the] defendant [] had accepted an offer on
the property inconsistent with the terms of the first-refusal contract
especially when [the defendant’s] duty to give [the] plaintiff personal notice of
such an offer was one of the terms bargained for in the contract.” (Ibid.)
Neither finding can be made here. First, the Authority’s alleged
breach—i.e., its failure to return the monies in the Reserve Fund to SNB—
did not “cause” Stead “not to discover [its] injury” because the Authority had
7 Stead’s reliance on Comcast of Sacramento I, LLC v. Sacramento
Metropolitan Cable Television Co. (E.D.Cal. 2019) 250 F.Supp.3d 616, vacated
and remanded on other grounds by 923 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2019), is also
misplaced. That case did not involve the discovery rule. Instead, the district
court only determined what action triggers the statute of limitations for a
conversion claim—a claim that Stead did not allege here. (Id. at p. 622.)
14
no contractual duty to notify SNB about those monies. (Gryczman, supra,
107 Cal.App.4th at p. 6.) Second, SNB and Stead, as SNB’s assignee, should
have been aware of any fees and costs that SNB had advanced for the
Business Park development, including the Reserve Fund deposit, that may
have been subject to reimbursement under the Cost Sharing Agreement.
Finally, Stead, both as a named creditor and as the assignee of SNB’s creditor
claim under the Cost Sharing Agreement, had a duty to monitor the
pleadings in the Tracy Gateway bankruptcy proceeding. (See, ante, at
pp. 10–11.)
Accordingly, we find that Stead’s causes of action accrued no later than
November 2019 under the discovery rule. Stead did not, however, submit a
claim to the Authority by November 2020. Its causes of action against the
Authority are therefore time-barred under section 911.2, subdivision (a).
Because we affirm on this ground, we do not address the Authority’s other
arguments in support of summary judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
15
CHOU, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.
(A169218 – Stead Financial, Inc. v. California Statewide Communities Development)
16
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