People v. Hampton CA4/3

CourtListener 10288101Calctapp4 déc. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 12/4/24 P. v. Hampton CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083234

v. (Super.Ct.No. BAF2001115)

RICHARD SHANE HAMPTON, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Samah Shouka, Judge.

Affirmed.

Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Paige B. Hazard and Steve

Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant Richard Shane Hampton was being housed at the Larry

D. Smith Correctional Facility awaiting trial; he and two other inmates targeted the

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victim after discovering he was awaiting trial on child molestation charges. All three

inmates waited for a security check to be completed and then Hampton’s cohort put

blankets up to obscure a set of bunk beds. The three then assaulted the victim and left

him dead on his bunk covered in a sheet. Surveillance video showed the assault. The

victim died as a result of strangulation. Defendant was convicted of one count of first

degree murder.

Defendant, relying on the recent California Supreme Court decision in People v.

Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 453 (Brown), claims that the jury was erroneously instructed on

the theory of lying in wait first degree murder requiring reversal of his conviction.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder within the meaning of Penal Code

section 189, subdivision (a).1 In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that

defendant had suffered one prior serious felony conviction, and one prior serious and/or

violent felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a), (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(a)).2

Defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life, plus a determinate sentence of five years, to

be served in state prison.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Defendant was additionally charged with the special allegation of intentionally
killing the victim while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) but the jury found the
allegation not true.

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FACTUAL HISTORY

A. PROSECUTION CASE-IN-CHIEF

Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Zackary Carter was assigned to the Larry D.

Smith Correctional Facility (jail) in September 2020 and knew defendant, who was an

inmate. Deputy Carter explained that when inmates wanted to make phone calls from the

jail, they had to use a specific number to identify who was making the call. All calls

were monitored and recorded.

Deputy Carter reviewed defendant’s phone calls on September 5, 2020.

Defendant made a phone call to his mother at 8:16 p.m. Defendant told his mother he

needed her to look somebody up and it was “really, really important.” He spelled out the

name “Roseno [sic] Echevarria.” The time for the call was almost up (inmates were

only allowed to make 15-minute calls) and defendant’s mother was still looking up the

name. She told defendant to call her the next day but he told her “I need to know this real

soon.” They agreed that defendant would call her back in five minutes. Another call was

made by defendant to his mother at 8:42 p.m.3

On September 8, 2020, defendant was housed in Housing Unit 14. Jason Barton

and Aaron Aubrey were also inmates in the same housing unit. Rosendo Echevarria was

also an inmate in the same housing unit.

Deputy Adrienne Morrow was working at the jail on September 8, 2020. He

indicated that inmates at the jail were housed in different dayrooms. The dayrooms had

3 The transcript for this call has not been made a part of the record on appeal.

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several bunk beds where the inmates slept. They did not stay in separate cells. Deputies

did not stay in the dayrooms all the time; they did security checks every hour. Security

cameras recorded all the time in the dayrooms.

On September 8, 2020, at 8:00 p.m., Deputy Morrow was working at the

switchboard in charge of opening and closing security doors. He was in a separate room

that had windows looking out into the different dayrooms. He was doing several things

at this time and was not looking into the dayrooms at all times. At 8:33 p.m., an inmate

in the dayroom where defendant, Aubrey, the victim, and Barton were housed attempted

to get Morrow’s attention. Morrow told the inmate to give him a minute. The inmate got

his attention again, making a motion with his eyes and surreptitiously pointed to another

part of the dayroom. He looked to the area and saw that a blanket was draped over a

bunk bed, obscuring the lower bunk. There was a rule that blankets were not to be

draped over bunks.

Deputy Morrow enlisted Deputy Zachary Johnson to go into the dayroom to

check. Deputy Johnson entered the dayroom and went to the bunk bed that had a blanket

draped over it. He moved the blanket and found the victim face down on the bunk

covered with a sheet. The victim was not breathing and had a “blueish-purplish” color to

him. He had blood on his clothes and had no pulse. CPR was performed on the victim

but it was not successful and he was pronounced dead.

Video surveillance from the dayroom starting at 7:40 p.m. was shown to the jury.

Defendant was with Barton. Barton was then seen sitting on a bunk bed talking with

Aubrey. At 7:46 p.m., defendant, Barton, and Aubrey were all together in the dayroom.

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A security check was conducted by one of the correctional deputies at 7:55 p.m. At 8:09

p.m., Aubrey hung a blanket over one of the bunk beds. He then hung a blanket on

another bunk bed. At 8:12 p.m., the victim could be seen sitting at a table in the

dayroom. He was seen near the covered bunk beds at 8:15 p.m. Defendant could be seen

heading between the covered bunk beds at 8:17 p.m. Defendant and the victim appeared

to be having a conversation. Barton moved to the area near defendant and the victim at

8:18 p.m. Movement could be seen between the two bunk beds.

The victim escaped out from between the two bunk beds and Aubry chased him to

a wall in the back of the dayroom. Aubrey assaulted the victim in the back of the room.

Defendant and Barton emerged from the covered bunk beds. At 8:20 p.m., the victim

was on the ground in the back corner of the dayroom. Barton was standing nearby but

defendant and Aubrey could not be seen. Barton went to wash his hands. At 8:22 p.m.,

defendant washed his hands. Defendant went back by the bunk beds. Barton could be

seen cleaning the back of the room with a towel. Aubrey emerged from the area of the

bunk beds at 8:28 p.m. and had removed his orange jumpsuit. At 8:34 p.m., defendant

again washed his hands. Deputy Johnson entered the dayroom at 8:37 p.m. Defendant

was on another bunk bed. He took off his socks and threw them aside.

Deputy Johnson immediately asked for medical help for the victim. Several other

deputies came to assist and paramedics arrived. All the other inmates were removed

from the dayroom.

Deputy Alvin Calhoun was working in the intake area of the jail at 3:48 a.m. on

September 9, 2020. Defendant came into the area waiting to be seen by medical staff.

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Deputy Calhoun was aware of the incident in the dayroom. Defendant asked Deputy

Calhoun “How you doing?” Deputy Calhoun responded, “Alright, better than you.”

Defendant responded “I’m perfect,” and “I’m doing fine.” Deputy Calhoun asked for

defendant’s identification number. He then asked defendant, “You good?” Defendant

responded, “I made the world a safer place.” Deputy Calhoun said, “Yeah.” Defendant

continued, “for the children anyway.”

Justin Rinkert was a fraud investigator for San Bernardino County but previously

was employed as a Riverside County deputy sheriff. He was assigned to the jail as an

investigator in September 2020 and investigated the victim’s death. He obtained the

surveillance video for the dayroom and also for a nearby exercise room where the

inmates were moved after the victim’s death.

In the video surveillance, he observed defendant, Barton, and Aubrey put the

victim on the bunk bed and cover him. The footage also showed defendant standing

between the two covered bunk beds keeping the victim from leaving the area. Defendant

and Barton both appeared to be assaulting defendant on the bunk beds. The victim

momentarily escaped but was chased by Aubrey. The victim then fell to the ground.

Defendant, Barton, and Aubrey were all in the area by him.

The video surveillance from the exercise room showed defendant and Aubrey

hugging other inmates after the victim was found dead. It appeared they were being

congratulated. Aubrey and defendant could be seen hugging and shaking hands. At 8:41

p.m. defendant could be seen taking off his pants and dropping them behind a wall.

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Rinkert noted that the assault occurred shortly after a correctional deputy had

completed the hourly security check. This was significant to Rinkert in that it appeared

the parties preplanned the assault and were waiting for the security check to be completed

to begin their attack. Other evidence that the assault was planned was Aubrey putting up

the blankets. Rinkert indicated there were jail politics among inmates. It was permissible

for an inmate to commit violent acts against another inmate who has committed crimes

against children, specifically molestation. The victim was incarcerated on charges of

sexual molestation of a child.

An autopsy was performed on the victim on September 15, 2020. The victim had

bruises, contusions, and scrapes all over his body. He had blunt-force injuries to his

head. He had signs on his neck and in his eyes of strangulation. His windpipe was

fractured and all the muscles in his neck were bruised. He had brain hemorrhaging. The

cause of death was strangulation.

B. DEFENSE

Defendant presented no evidence on his behalf.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the standard instruction given on first degree murder,

CALCRIM No. 521, was erroneous because it omitted the mental state element required

to prove lying in wait for first degree murder. Relying on Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th 463,

he insists that missing from the jury instruction was the requirement that while he was

lying in wait, he harbored a state of mind more culpable than the malice required for a

second degree murder conviction. Defendant further contends the trial court

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compounded the error when the jury asked a question about first degree lying in wait

murder and they were referred back to CALCRIM No. 521.

A. ADDITIONAL FACTS

The prosecutor argued that the instructions included CALCRIM No. 521, first

degree murder, under the theories of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, as well

as lying in wait. The prosecutor noted that the difference between lying in wait under

CALCRIM No. 521, and the special circumstance, was that implied malice murder could

be elevated to first degree even without the intent to kill the victim. Defense counsel

made no objections to the instructions or the theories of murder proposed to be argued by

the prosecutor in closing.

The jury was instructed on express and implied malice theories of murder

(CALCRIM No. 520). Relevant here, they were instructed on implied malice as follows:

“The defendant had implied malice if he . . . intentionally committed the act or failed to

act; [¶] Two, the natural and probable consequence of the act or failure to act or

dangerous to human life; [¶] And, three, at the time he acted or failed to act, he knew his

act or failure to act was dangerous to human life; [¶] And, four, he deliberately acted or

failed to act with conscious disregard for human life.”4 The jury was instructed with

CALCRIM No. 521 as follows: “The defendant has been prosecuted for first-degree

murder under two theories: [¶] One, that he acted willfully and deliberately and with

4 We note that CALCRIM No. 520 was amended effective March 2024 to require
that “the natural and probable consequences of that act involved a high degree of
probability that it would result in death.” Defendant has made no argument that the
change to the instruction impacts this case and we will not make such argument for him.

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premeditation; [¶] And two, that he acted while lying in wait.” The instruction further

provided the definition of premeditated and deliberate murder, and CALCRIM No. 520

provided the definitions of express and implied malice.

CALCRIM No. 521 also provided the definition of first degree murder while lying

in wait. It provided, “Additionally, the defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the

People have proved that the defendant committed murder while lying in wait or

immediately thereafter. The defendant committed murder by lying in wait if, one, he

conceals his purpose from the person killed; [¶] Two, he waited and watched for an

opportunity to act; [¶] And, three, . . . from a position of advantage, he intended to and

did make a surprise attack on the person killed. The lying in wait does not need to

continue for any particular period of time, but its duration must be substantial enough to

show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation. [¶] Deliberation means

carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice, and knowing the

consequences, deciding to act. . . . [A]n act is done with premeditation if the decision to

commit the acts is made before the act is done. A person can conceal his or her purpose

even if the person killed is aware of the person’s physical presence. The concealment can

be accomplished by ambush or some other secret plan.”

During deliberations, the jury asked, “If a second degree murder charge is believed

to be lying in wait, does this change the charge to one count of first degree murder?” The

trial court and the parties addressed the question off the record. The trial court, though,

noted on the record, “As we all interpret this, the answer would be yes.” The trial court

proposed to refer the jury to CALCRIM No. 521 and all parties agreed. The written

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response to the jury was “Instruction 521 explains the law that applies to first degree

murder.”

B. ANALYSIS

“A trial court must instruct on each element of a charged offense, even when the

defendant does not propose a complete instruction or object to the court’s failure to

provide one.” (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 461.) “ ‘To prove first degree murder of

any kind, the prosecution must first establish a murder within section 187—that is, an

unlawful killing with malice aforethought.’ ” (People v. Maldonado (2023) 87

Cal.App.5th 1257, 1262.)

Malice is expressed when there is an intent to unlawfully kill. (§ 188, subd.

(a)(1).) “Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the

natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately

performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who

acts with conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139,

152.) “ ‘Wanton disregard for human life’ ” and “ ‘ “conscious disregard for human

life” ’ ” articulate the same standard for implied malice. (Id. at p. 152.) “ ‘Ordinarily, . . .

[an implied malice] killing would be murder of the second degree. However, if this

murder is perpetrated by means of lying in wait, it is, by statutory definition, murder of

the first degree.’ ” (People v. Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1262-1263; §

189, subd. (a)).)

“All that is required of lying in wait is that the perpetrator exhibit a state of mind

equivalent to, but not identical to, premeditation and deliberation. [Citation.] This state

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of mind simply is the intent to watch and wait for the purpose of gaining advantage and

taking the victim unawares in order to facilitate the act which constitutes murder.”

(People v. Laws (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 786, 795 (Laws).) “The act of lying in wait with

secret purpose in order to gain advantage and take a victim unawares is particularly

repugnant and of aggravated character so as to justify harsher punishment when the lying

in wait results in murder, even if the waiting and watching were not done with the intent

to kill or injure.” (Id. at p. 793, italics added; see also People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28

Cal.4th 1083, 1148 [“ ‘[M]urder by means of lying in wait requires only a wanton and

reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death . . .” as opposed to the lying in wait

special circumstance which requires an intent to kill].) In Laws, the court rejected a

similar claim as raised by defendant that there was instructional error by not advising the

jury that it had to find a particular mental state while a defendant was lying in wait,

concluding “nothing in section 189 requires the lying in wait to have been done with the

intent to kill. Likewise, nothing in the statute requires the lying in wait to have been done

with the intent to injure.” (Laws, at p. 794.)

Defendant relies on Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th 453, contending the jury had to be

instructed that first degree lying in wait murder required a state of mind more culpable

than the malice required for a second degree murder conviction. He insists that

CALCRIM No. 521 omitted an element of the offense and requires reversal of his first

degree murder conviction. Although defendant does not clearly state what the jury

instruction should have been, it appears he is arguing that while lying in wait, he had to

possess the mental state of a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause

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death, rather than just at the time when he committed the murder. Brown does not

support his contention.

In Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th 453, the defendant was charged with first degree

murder under section 189 by means of poison for breastfeeding her baby while taking

methamphetamine. The baby died with traces of methamphetamine in her system. The

court found, as a matter of first impression, that to elevate murder from second degree to

first degree murder by means of poison, the People must show the defendant deliberately

gave the victim poison with intent to kill or inflict injury likely to cause death. (Brown,

at pp. 456-457)

The Brown court reviewed the history of section 189 and the mental state required

for the other means of first degree murder, lying in wait, and torture. The court stated, in

assessing the language of section 189, “We previously have interpreted this language to

require proof of a mental state more culpable than the malice required for second degree

murder, in keeping with the Legislature’s determination that murders perpetrated by these

means warrant the greater punishment reserved for first degree murder. For torture

murder, the prosecution must show ‘wilful, deliberate and premeditated intent to inflict

extreme and prolonged pain.’ [Citation.] For lying in wait murder, the prosecution must

show the defendant performed the acts of watching, waiting, and concealment with the

intent to take the victim by surprise to facilitate the infliction of injury likely to cause

death. [Citation.] However, since in a typical first degree murder by poison case there is

no question that the defendant acted with willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation, we

have never addressed whether there is a mental state component of first degree poison

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murder. We now clarify that to prove a murder by poison is in the first degree, the

prosecution must show that the defendant deliberately gave the victim poison with the

intent to kill the victim or inflict injury likely to cause death.” (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th

at pp. 456-457.) It further noted that “This case brings to light the need for us to

elaborate on the meaning of the phrase ‘murder . . . perpetrated by means of . . . poison,’

just as prior cases have required us to elaborate on the meanings of ‘torture’ and ‘lying in

wait.’ ” (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 466.) The Brown court concluded that “the trial

court was required to instruct the jury that to find Brown guilty of first degree murder, it

had to find that she deliberately gave her newborn daughter poison with the intent to kill

her or inflict injury likely to cause her death. Its failure to so instruct was error.”

(Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 472.)

The Brown court made it clear that it had already resolved the issue of intent for

lying in wait first degree murder, finding, “ ‘[I]t is not sufficient to merely show the

elements of waiting, watching and concealment. It must also be shown that the defendant

did those physical acts with the intent to take [the] victim unawares and for the purpose

of facilitating [the] attack.’ [Citations.] We have also established that the defendant must

act with a ‘ “wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death,” ’[citation]

and the period of lying in wait must be sufficient to show that the defendant had ‘ “ ‘a

state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation’ ” ’ [citation]. Only upon these

specific showings of the defendant’s mental state in lying in wait do we consider the

defendant to have acted with ‘the functional equivalent of’ a premeditated, deliberate

intent to kill [citation], such that ‘no further evidence of premeditation and deliberation is

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required in order to convict the defendant of first degree murder’ [citation.].” (Brown,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 465.)

Brown never stated there was an additional mental component required while

lying in wait different from what it had found in previous cases. The Brown court cited

to Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1083, which addressed the differences between lying in

wait first degree murder and the special circumstance of lying in wait. The Gutierrez

court specifically noted that the lying in wait first degree murder only required a “wanton

and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death.” (Id. at pp. 1148-1149.) On the

other hand, the special circumstance required an intentional murder. Gutierrez also

noted, “the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires ‘that the killing take place during

the period of concealment and watchful waiting, an aspect of the special circumstance

distinguishable from a murder perpetrated by means of lying in wait, or following

premeditation and deliberation.” (Id. at p. 1149.) The Gutierrez court did not establish

that the defendant must have a specific additional mental state while lying in wait for first

degree murder.

The Brown court also cited to Laws, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 786. (Brown, supra,

14 Cal.5th at p. 465.) As stated, in Laws, “[a]ll that is required of lying in wait is that the

perpetrator exhibit a state of mind equivalent to, but not identical to, premeditation and

deliberation. [Citation.] This state of mind simply is the intent to watch and wait for the

purpose of gaining advantage and taking the victim unawares in order to facilitate the act

which constitutes murder. [Citation.] It does not include the intent to kill or injure the

victim.” (Laws, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 795.)

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There is no additional requirement that, while lying in wait, a defendant had to

have a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death. He must though

possess such intent while committing the act resulting in the murder of the victim, which

the jury here concluded based on its finding of implied malice second degree murder.5

The additional element of lying in wait that elevates the murder from second degree

murder to first degree murder is the intent to watch and wait for the purpose of gaining

advantage and taking the victim unawares. (Laws, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 795.)

Nothing in Brown requires that a defendant have the mental state during the period of

watching and waiting. As stated, “[N]othing in section 189 requires the lying in wait to

have been done with the intent to kill . . . [or] the intent to injure.” (Laws, supra, 12

Cal.App.4th at p. 794.) The Brown case referred to both Laws and Gutierrez with

approval. Hence, the reasoning in Laws applies, which does not require the additional

mental state proposed by defendant.

CALCRIM No. 521 properly advised the jury of the elements of first degree

murder on a theory of lying in wait. As such, the trial court properly directed the jury to

the instruction in response to their question. No instructional error occurred in this case.

5 Although the jury could have found defendant guilty on a theory of
premeditated and willful first degree murder, based on their question, and it finding the
special circumstance not true, it does appear it relied on the first degree lying in wait
theory of murder in convicting defendant.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed in full.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

RAPHAEL
J.

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