Smith v. CF United CA3

CourtListener 10288099Calctapp4 déc. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 12/4/24 Smith v. CF United CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

ANTHONY SMITH, C099314

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. STK-CV-
UOE-2019-0008249)
v.

CF UNITED, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

This case requires us to interpret and apply Code of Civil Procedure section
1281.97,1 which provides, “In an employment . . . arbitration that requires . . . the
[employer] to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration can proceed, if the fees or
costs to initiate an arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date,”
the employee is permitted to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court, and the
court is required to impose sanctions against the employer by ordering it to pay the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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employee’s attorney fees. (§§ 1281.97, subds. (a), (b), (d), 1281.99, subd. (a).)
Plaintiff and respondent Anthony Smith asserted several claims against his former
employers, defendants and appellants Apro, LLC, CF United, LLC, and Raymond Young
(collectively Apro), and he submitted them to arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA). Shortly thereafter, Smith claimed Apro paid AAA’s fees more than
30 days after the due date, and Smith attempted to withdraw his claims from arbitration.
The trial court initially found the due date was ambiguous due to a series of clerical errors
made by AAA. Because of these errors and ambiguities, the trial court found the later of
two possible due dates applied, and the fees were timely paid.
Over two years later, however, the trial court reconsidered its initial ruling in light
of several recently published opinions holding the payment deadline in section 1281.97
must be strictly enforced and is subject to no exceptions. This time, the trial court
allowed Smith to withdraw from arbitration and it awarded him $19,942.50 in attorney
fees. Apro appeals the trial court’s second order on several grounds. We find the trial
court got it right the first time, and thus reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Smith is Compelled to Arbitrate
In 2019, Smith filed a complaint against Apro that included individual causes of
action for violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code,
§ 12900 et seq.) (we will refer to these as the “individual claims”), and a representative
cause of action brought under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (Lab.
Code, § 2698 et seq.), or PAGA (we will refer to this as the “representative PAGA
claim”). Apro filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing Smith agreed to arbitrate all
disputes arising out of his employment. The trial court granted the motion as to the
individual claims and denied it as to the representative PAGA claim. The trial court
ordered the action stayed “pending conclusion of the parties’ arbitration proceedings,”
and the stay “shall be lifted upon notice filed with the court by either party that arbitration

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has concluded.” Pursuant to this order, Smith’s individual claims would be arbitrated
first, and once the arbitration was concluded, the parties would return to court to litigate
the representative PAGA claim.
In June 2020, Smith submitted his individual claims to AAA. The arbitration was
never actually held. We explain why in the next section.
2. Smith’s Withdrawal from Arbitration and Motion for Attorney Fees
In August 2020, Smith filed a “notice” informing the trial court that Apro had
failed to pay AAA’s required filing fee within 30 days of the due date as required by
section 1281.97, and he thus elected to withdraw his individual claims from arbitration
and proceed in court. The notice did not actually ask the court to take any action.
Instead, it simply stated, “the stay in the above-entitled matter is lifted upon the filing of
the instant notice.” Two weeks after filing this notice, Smith filed a motion for attorney
fees pursuant to section 1281.99 (we will refer to this as the “fee motion” or the “initial
fee motion”).
Apro opposed both the fee motion and what it characterized as Smith’s attempt to
withdraw from arbitration and reinstate the litigation, and it asked the court to order
Smith to resume arbitration. Apro argued it paid the filing fee on time or its failure to do
so should be excused.
Because they are important, we explain the facts underlying the timeliness issue in
some detail (all dates are in 2020).
On June 9, AAA sent a letter to both parties about the arbitration. The record
contains two different versions of this letter. One version states:
“We have received the employee’s portion of the filing fee in
the amount of $300.00. Accordingly, we request that the
employer pay its share of the filing fee in the amount of
$1,900.00 on or before June 23, 2020. Upon receipt of the
balance of the filing fee, the AAA will proceed with
administration.”
The other version states:

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“Per the agreement submitted with this filing, the employer is
responsible for payment of the full filing fee, $2,200.00.
Accordingly, we request that the employer submit payment in
the amount of $2,200.00 on or before June 23, 2020. Upon
receipt of the balance of the filing fee, the AAA will proceed
with administration.”
Other than this one paragraph, the letters are identical.2 Both versions reiterate,
“Payment is due on June 23, 2020,” and state, “As this arbitration is subject to California
Code of Civil Procedure 1281.97 . . . , payment must be received by July 24, 2020[3] or
the AAA will close the parties’ case. The AAA will not grant any extensions of this
payment deadline. [¶] Please note payment should be submitted by credit card or
electronic check. A secured paylink will be forthcoming with instructions to submit
payment via either method.”
On June 25, AAA sent a letter to both parties stating it had not received payment
from Apro, it would “close its case on July 24, 2020 if payment is not received,” and
payment should be made by credit card or electronic check utilizing a secured paylink.
Counsel for Apro stated he realized that same day that AAA had not yet sent a paylink,

2 We note Apro never mentions the fact that there are two versions of the June 9
letter, and it is unclear whether it is aware of this fact because all of its filings (in both the
trial court and this court) reference only the version stating they owed $1,900. Moreover,
it appears Smith may not have realized there were two versions until sometime around
June 2023, because that is the first time he mentioned that fact in the trial court. Finally,
it appears clear the only version of the letter the trial court was aware of was the version
stating Smith had paid $300 and Apro thus owed $1,900. Although not mentioned by the
parties, the fact that AAA sent two conflicting letters provides further support for the trial
court’s finding, discussed below, that AAA made a series of clerical errors that created
ambiguity about Apro’s payment obligation.
3 As noted at the outset, payment must be within 30 days after the due date, and 30
days after June 23 is July 23, not July 24. It thus appears AAA miscalculated the
statutory payment deadline, and if Apro had paid on July 24, their payment would
technically have been one day late. Although neither party mentions this fact, it is yet
another example of an error on the part of AAA creating ambiguity about Apro’s payment
obligation.

4
and he e-mailed AAA to request one. AAA sent a paylink that day along with a message
that stated, “You have requested to make a payment of an amount due to the American
Arbitration Association as follows: [¶] . . . [¶] Amount: $2,200.00.”
The next day (i.e., June 26), counsel for Apro asked AAA to send him a copy of
the invoice so his client could process payment, and AAA e-mailed an invoice that same
day. The invoice stated the amount due was $2,200, the “Due Date” was July 24, and
payment should be made by check and mailed to AAA’s New Jersey address.
On July 24, which was a Friday, AAA sent Apro’s counsel an e-mail stating, “You
have requested to make a payment of an amount due to the American Arbitration
Association as follows: [¶] . . . [¶] Amount: $1,900.00.” The e-mail also stated, “Please
note payment is due today, 7/24.” Apro’s counsel stated he was “confused” by this e-mail
because it appeared AAA had two invoices in its system — one for $1,900 and one for
$2,200 — with different due dates (June 23 and July 24). He also learned his client could
not pay the fee that day because its comptroller was on vacation. He thus e-mailed AAA
that afternoon to ask for a two-week extension, but he did not receive a response.
On Monday, July 27, Apro’s counsel e-mailed AAA to follow up on his request for
a two-week extension. AAA responded that day, copied Smith’s counsel on its e-mail,
and asked if Smith agreed to the extension. Smith’s counsel responded within an hour
that Smith did not agree to the extension because the July 24 deadline for payment had
already passed, and Smith therefore elected pursuant to section 1281.97 to withdraw his
claims from arbitration and proceed in court. Later that afternoon, Apro paid $2,200 to
AAA, and AAA sent a letter to both parties stating it was closing its file on the matter
because Apro “did not submit the filing fee by the due date provided on our June 9, 2020
and June 25, 2020 correspondence” and Smith had informed it he intended to withdraw
the claim from arbitration.
Based on the above timeline of events, Smith’s position was that Apro had to pay
the filing fee by July 24, it failed to do so, and he was thus entitled to withdraw from

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arbitration and proceed with litigation. Apro’s position was that its payment was timely
in light of AAA’s failure to send a paylink until after the due date and its conflicting e-
mails and invoices, or, alternatively, that its failure to make timely payment should be
excused due to mistake or inadvertence.
The trial court issued a written order denying Smith’s fee motion. This order is
critical to the resolution of this appeal because it is the order that Smith ultimately
persuaded the trial court to reconsider, and we thus describe it at some length.
The trial court began by noting, “this case revolves around two dates: 1) the ‘due
date’ for the payment of the arbitration fees; and 2) the [section] 1281.97 deadline of ‘30
days after the due date.’ ” Smith argued the due date was June 23, as stated in AAA’s
June 9 letter (which would make July 24 the statutory payment deadline);4 Apro argued
the due date was July 24, as stated in the June 26 invoice (which would make August 23
the statutory payment deadline); and it was undisputed Apro paid the fee on July 27.
The trial court found it was “impossible” for Apro to pay the fee by the June 23
due date because AAA did not send a secured paylink until June 25, and “[c]onfusing
matters more, the paylink sent . . . by AAA now asked for a higher payment of $2,200
instead of the initial $1,900.” The trial court found this was a “clerical error” on AAA’s
part, and that AAA “compounded its initial clerical error” by sending out a “second
invoice” on June 26 for $2,200 that stated the due date was July 24.5 It noted, “There is
no doubt that the two invoices . . . were internally inconsistent on the issue of the ‘due
date,’ ” and these inconsistent due dates led to inconsistent payment deadlines pursuant to

4 See ante, footnote No. 3.
5 The trial court noted these errors occurred “in the middle of an unprecedented
COVID-19 global pandemic.” In particular, they occurred three months after the
Governor declared a state of emergency and directed all Californians not providing
essential services to stay home. (See E.P. v. Superior Court (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 52,
54-55.) This may explain the errors.

6
section 1281.97. If the due date was June 23, then Apro’s payment was untimely, but if
the due date was July 24, its payment was timely.
The trial court then explained: “The crucial issue [is] whether this Court can . . .
find[] that [Apro was] in material breach of the arbitration agreement [thereby] waiving
[its] right to arbitrate, in the face of such ambiguity. The answer is no. Because of the
ambiguity regard[ing] the ‘due date’ of the arbitration fee created by the two invoices,
this Court cannot reject the later possible due date of [July 24] indicated by the [June 26]
invoice, and its [section] 1281.97 date of [August 23], under which [Apro’s] payment of
the arbitration fee on [July 27] would be timely.” It also noted there was “no conduct by
[Apro] that is inconsistent with pursuing arbitration. [Apro has] consistently sought to
arbitrate, did not unduly delay arbitration, [and] paid the fee as soon as possible when it
was able to do so. . . . The Legislature intended to punish the ‘strategic refusal to pay
fees.’ It is apparent that none of the concerns that actuated the Legislature are implicated.
[Apro’s] actions were neither ‘strategic’ nor a ‘refusal.’ ” The trial court thus found
Smith failed to establish Apro violated section 1281.97 by paying the fee after the
statutory deadline, and because it found no violation of section 1281.97, it denied the
request for attorney fees.
The result was that Smith had to arbitrate his individual claims, and his
representative PAGA claim remained stayed until the arbitration concluded.
3. Smith’s Motion for Reconsideration
Over two years later, in March 2023, Smith filed a motion to lift the litigation stay,
arguing that, pursuant to several recently published cases interpreting section 1281.97,
the trial court had relied on impermissible factors when it determined Apro did not violate
that statute. Apro opposed the motion, arguing it was actually a noncompliant motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the initial fee motion. The trial court denied the
motion without prejudice, ruling, “While [Smith’s] substantive argument has merit, the
problem is the procedural device that [Smith] has used. If, as [Apro] argue[s], the Motion

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is a ‘disguised’ motion for reconsideration, then this Motion to Lift Stay is deficient
because it does not attempt to address the standards for reconsideration under California
law. The Court concludes the more prudent course is to deny without prejudice [Smith’s]
Motion to Lift Stay, and grant leave to [Smith] to file the appropriate motion using the
appropriate procedural device that lays out the proper standards this Court is to use.”
Smith then filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to section 1008. He once
again argued that several recently published cases “expressly disallow a trial court from
considering” the types of factors the trial court considered in finding Apro’s payment was
timely. We will discuss these cases in more detail below. For present purposes it is
sufficient to note they all hold the statutory payment deadline in section 1281.97 must be
strictly enforced and is not subject to defenses like inadvertent error, lack of prejudice, or
substantial compliance. Smith argued it was “indisputable” Apro failed to pay the fee by
the statutory deadline, it was thus in material breach of the arbitration agreement as a
matter of law, and he was entitled to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court and
to recover his attorney fees.
Apro opposed the motion, arguing Smith failed to comply with the requirements of
section 1008, and, in any event, the recent cases were inapplicable because the trial court
had already found Apro timely paid the fee.
The trial court granted the motion. It first found it had authority to reconsider its
prior order denying the initial fee motion pursuant to both section 1008, subdivision (c),
and its inherent authority “to reconsider its previous interim orders on its own motion, as
long as it gives the parties notice that it may do so and a reasonable opportunity to litigate
the question.” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1097.)
It then noted that, when it issued the prior order in 2020, there was “no guidance
from the courts of appeal” on how to interpret section 1281.97, but since that time, five
published cases had interpreted section 1281.97 and held its payment deadline establishes

8
a “clear” and “bright-line” rule that courts must “strictly enforce.” The trial court found
these new cases “constitute a change of law” requiring it to reconsider its prior order.
The trial court then rejected Apro’s argument that these new cases were
distinguishable because they all involved a mistake by the defendant rather than a
mistake by the arbitration provider, explaining, “based upon the strict interpretation of the
relevant statutes, and the Legislature’s preference for a clear rule, this Court cannot find
an exception to the application of these statutes based upon who made the mistake.”
Finally, it found, “Based upon the strict construction of . . . sections 1281.97 through
1281.99, and the bright-line rule established by the five Court of Appeal decisions, this
Court . . . now finds that [Smith] has carried his burden of establishing that [Apro has]
failed to pay the fees or costs to initiate the arbitration proceeding, and that this failure
constituted a material breach of the arbitration agreement under section 1281.97.” The
trial court thus permitted Smith to withdraw his claims from arbitration and proceed in
court and awarded him $19,942.50 in attorney fees (the amount requested in the initial
fee motion).
This appeal followed.6
DISCUSSION
Apro challenges the order granting the motion for reconsideration on four
grounds: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it agreed to reconsider the order
denying the initial fee motion; (2) the trial court erred when it found on reconsideration
that Apro violated section 1281.97; (3) the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)

6 Section 1294, subdivision (a), provides an order denying a petition to compel
arbitration is appealable, and case law teaches “orders that are the ‘functional equivalent’
of orders denying a petition to compel arbitration” are appealable as well. (Williams v.
West Coast Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1064.) “[A]n order under section
1281.97 is the functional equivalent of denying a petition to compel arbitration, and
therefore, appealable.” (Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
222, 237, review granted Aug. 21, 2024, S285696.)

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preempts section 1281.97; and (4) the attorney fee award must be either vacated entirely
or reduced. For the reasons explained below, we find the trial court had authority to
reconsider its prior order, but that neither section 1281.97 nor the cases interpreting it
required the trial court to find on reconsideration that Apro violated section 1281.97.7
1. The Trial Court Had Authority to Reconsider Its Prior Order
Apro first argues the trial court abused its discretion when it agreed to reconsider
its order denying the initial fee motion. “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for
reconsideration is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” (Farmers Ins.
Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106.) We find no abuse here.
Section 1008, subdivision (b), provides when a party makes an application for an
order that is denied, they may make a subsequent or renewed application for the same
order based on “new . . . law,” and case law teaches this subdivision “imposes no time
limitations on such motions.” (Graham v. Hansen (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 965, 971.)
Section 1008, subdivision (c), provides a court may reconsider a prior order on its own
motion “at any time” if it determines there has been a “change of law.” Apro argues the
trial court abused its discretion in reconsidering its prior order because there was no new
law or change of law within the meaning of section 1008. It argues the underlying law —
i.e., section 1281.97 — never changed, and appellate opinions interpreting the law do not
constitute either new law or a change of law for purposes of reconsideration. We
disagree. Although a trial court is not required to find new appellate decisions are “ ‘new
law’ for purposes of reconsideration,” it is not “preclude[d]” from doing so either.
(Wilson v. The La Jolla Group (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 897, 921; see also Valdez v.

7 Given this conclusion, we need not, and do not, address Apro’s argument that
section 1281.97 is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (and we note our Supreme
Court is poised to decide the issue, having granted review in Hohenshelt v. Superior
Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1319, review granted June 12, 2024, S284498, and
Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, Inc., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 222, review granted).

10
Himmelfarb (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1275 [appellate decision can “certainly”
constitute “a change in the law from what the trial court believed the law to be”];
International Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 784, 787-788 [similar].)
Ultimately, however, we need not decide whether new appellate decisions
constitute new law or a change of law within the meaning of section 1008 because
“[e]ven without a change of law, a trial court has the inherent power to reconsider its
prior rulings on its own motion at any time before entry of judgment.” (State of
California v. Superior Court (Flynn) (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 94, 100.) As our Supreme
Court explained in Le Francois v. Goel, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1094, a trial court has inherent
authority to reconsider its prior interim rulings on its own motion, even in the absence of
new facts or law, if it determines a prior ruling was erroneous. (Id. at p. 1107.)
Moreover, “it should not matter whether the ‘judge has an unprovoked flash of
understanding in the middle of the night’ [citation] or acts in response to a party’s
suggestion. If a court believe ones of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be
able to correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that belief.” (Id. at p. 1108.)
In its order granting Smith’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court cited Le Francois,
quoted the portions we have just quoted, and stated it “exercises its discretion to
reconsider its previous Order.” We agree the trial court had authority to reconsider its
order denying the initial fee motion and we find it did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
Even where a trial court properly exercises its discretion to reconsider a prior
order, however, if “the court is not persuaded the earlier ruling was erroneous, the proper
course is to grant reconsideration and to reaffirm the earlier ruling.” (Randy’s Trucking,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 818, 844.) As we explain in the next
section, the trial court’s order denying the initial fee motion was not erroneous and the
proper course was thus to reaffirm the order denying the initial fee motion.

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2. The Trial Court Properly Found Apro Timely Paid the Filing Fee When It Denied
the Initial Fee Motion
In its order denying the initial fee motion, the trial court found Apro timely paid
the fee to initiate arbitration in light of the ambiguity surrounding the due date. And
because Apro timely paid the fee, it did not materially breach the arbitration agreement,
and Smith thus had no basis to withdraw his claims from arbitration and proceed in court.
Apro argues these findings are all supported by the evidence, and the trial court erred in
reversing itself when it granted the motion for reconsideration. We agree.
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (See, e.g.,
Burton v. Cruise (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 939, 946.) Here, however, neither party
challenges the trial court’s factual findings. To the extent this appeal is based on the
proper interpretation of section 1281.97 or on the application of section 1281.97 to the
unchallenged and thus undisputed findings, our review is de novo. (De Leon v. Juanita’s
Foods (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 740, 749.)
A. The relevant law
Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature added sections 1281.97, 1281.98, and
1281.99 to the Code of Civil Procedure to ensure “that a company’s failure to pay
arbitration fees pursuant to a mandatory arbitration provision constitutes a breach of the
arbitration agreement and allows the non-breaching party to bring a claim in court.”
(Stats 2019, ch. 870, § 1.) Section 1281.97 provides, “In an employment . . . arbitration
that requires . . . the [employer] to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration can
proceed, if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30
days after the due date the [employer] is in material breach of the arbitration agreement,
is in default of the arbitration, and waives the right to compel arbitration.” (§ 1281.97,
subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Section 1281.98 contains a similar rule for fees or costs
“required to continue the arbitration proceeding.” (§ 1281.98, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
These two provisions are “largely parallel and ‘require no different analysis.’ ”

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(Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1325, fn. 2, review granted.)
If the employer fails to pay any required fees “within 30 days after the due date,” the
employee may elect to “[w]ithdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of
appropriate jurisdiction,” and if the employee so elects, the court “shall impose
sanctions” on the employer by ordering it “to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee . . . as a result of the material breach.”
(§§ 1281.97, subds. (b)(1), (d), 1281.98, subds (b)(1), (d), 1299, subd. (a).)
When they were initially enacted, sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 did not define the
term “due date” or prescribe how to establish it. Effective January 1, 2022, both sections
were amended to add the following provision: “To avoid delay, absent an express
provision in the arbitration agreement stating the number of days in which the parties to
the arbitration must pay any required fees or costs, the arbitration provider shall issue all
invoices to the parties as due upon receipt.” (§§ 1281.97, subd. (a)(2), 1281.98, subd.
(a)(2), italics added; compare Stats. 2019, ch. 870, §§ 4 & 5 with Stats. 2021, ch. 222,
§§ 2 & 3.) The due date is thus now statutorily defined as the date the invoice is received
(absent a provision in the arbitration agreement stating otherwise). In this case, the
relevant events all occurred in 2020, before the statutes were amended, and the due date
was thus the date specified by the arbitration provider for payment. (See Reynosa v.
Superior Court (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 967, 984.)
Beginning in mid-2022, the Courts of Appeal have issued a series of decisions
holding the statutory payment deadline in sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 must be strictly
enforced and is subject to seemingly no exceptions, and the trial court relied on this line
of cases when it granted the motion for reconsideration. In Cvejic v. Skyview Capital,
LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1073, for example, the court held, “The Legislature sought a
clear rule for determining whether the late payment of a fee by [the employer] constituted
a material contract breach,” and if the fee is not paid by the statutory deadline, the
employer is in material breach and the employee is entitled to withdraw from arbitration

13
— “It is that simple.” (Id. at p. 1078.) Other cases are similar. (See Gallo v. Wood
Ranch USA, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 621, 644 [§ 1281.97 “statutorily defines a
material breach as a matter of law to be the failure to pay anything less than the full
amount due by the expiration of the statutory grace period, rather than leaving materiality
as an issue of fact for the trier of fact to determine”]; Espinoza v. Superior Court (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 761, 775-777 [statutory payment deadline is a “bright-line rule” that must
be “strictly applied” and is subject to no exceptions]; De Leon v. Juanita’s Foods, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 753, 745 [statute “establishes a simple bright-line rule that . . .
failure to pay outstanding arbitration fees within 30 days after the due date results in [a]
material breach of the arbitration agreement” and courts may not consider “factors in
addition to [the] late payment — for example, whether the delayed payment delayed
arbitration proceedings or prejudiced” the employee]; Williams v. West Coast Hospitals,
Inc., supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074 [“the Legislature in enacting sections 1281.97 and
1281.98 chose to neither require nor permit an inquiry into the reasons for [the
employer’s] nonpayment”]; Doe v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 346, 357 [“the
Legislature established strict breach provisions for nonpayment that did not involve any
inquiry into the intent or good faith of an employer or the reasons for nonpayment”].)
These cases thus teach that section 1281.97 establishes a clear, simple, and bright-
line rule that must be strictly enforced. And in determining whether a defendant
complied with the rule, the court is permitted to do just two things: (1) identify the due
date, and (2) calculate the statutory payment deadline by adding 30 days to the due date.
If payment is made after the statutory payment deadline, the defendant breached the
agreement and the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw from arbitration — no ifs, ands, or
buts.
B. Analysis
Apro does not challenge the case law or its strict enforcement of the statutory
payment deadline, nor do we. Instead, it contends the trial court got it right the first time

14
when it denied the initial fee motion because it found Apro timely paid the fee to initiate
arbitration. In particular, the trial court found the payment was timely based on AAA’s
June 26 invoice that specified the due date was July 24, which would make August 23 the
statutory payment deadline (and the invoice was paid on July 27).8 We agree.
As the trial court found when it denied the initial fee motion, AAA made a series
of errors that created ambiguity and confusion around Apro’s payment obligation. In
particular, the trial court found the following:
(1) On June 9, AAA sent a letter to both parties stating Apro owed $1,900 by
June 23, and payment had to be made by credit card or electronic check
utilizing a secured paylink that would be “forthcoming with instructions.”
Although not found by the trial court, we reiterate what we noted above (see,
ante, fn. No. 2) — namely, (1) that AAA sent the parties a second letter that
same day stating Apro owed $2,200, and (2) that it is probable the parties did
not realize at the time that there were two letters (and it is clear the trial court
did not know this).
(2) On June 25, AAA sent Apro a secured paylink along with an e-mail requesting
payment in the amount of $2,200. The secured paylink was sent two days after
the June 23 due date identified in AAA’s June 9 letter.
(3) On June 26, AAA sent Apro an invoice for $2,200 that stated the “Due Date”
was July 24, and that included instructions to mail a check to its New Jersey
address.

8 Apro posits two other payment deadlines based on a complicated argument
involving impossibility, coupled with the rule that “[i]f the last day for the performance
of any act . . . is a holiday [which includes weekends], then that period is hereby extended
to and including the next day that is not a holiday.” (§ 12a.) We need not address this
argument, and note the trial court did not address it either.

15
(4) On July 24, AAA sent Apro an e-mail stating payment of $1,900 was “due
today.”
(5) Apro paid $2,200 on July 27.
The trial court found these letters, invoices, and e-mails from AAA were
“internally inconsistent,” “confus[ed] matters,” and created “ambiguity” around the due
date, the amount due, and the payment method. It also found, “Because of the ambiguity
regard[ing] the ‘due date’ of the arbitration fee created by the two invoices, this Court
cannot reject the later possible due date of [July 24] indicated by the [June 26] invoice,”
in which case Apro’s payment was timely, because “to find otherwise would allow
[Smith] to take advantage of AAA’s clerical errors and the ambiguity regarding the ‘due
date’ of the arbitration fee.” In effect, the trial court found that, because of AAA’s clerical
errors, it would deem July 24 the due date. And if July 24 was the due date, then
August 23 was the statutory payment deadline, and Apro’s payment, which was made on
July 27, was timely.
Smith does not challenge any of these underlying factual findings (and they are all
supported by the evidence in any event). And, as Apro accurately notes, the facts did not
change between the time the trial court denied the initial fee motion and the time it
granted the motion for reconsideration. Moreover, the trial court did not make any new
factual findings when it granted the motion for reconsideration, and it did not explicitly
reverse or change any of its prior factual findings. Indeed, the trial court did not mention
any of its prior factual findings. Instead, it held only that, “[b]ased upon the strict
construction of . . . sections 1281.97 through 1281.99, and the bright-line rule established
by the five Court of Appeal decisions, this Court . . . now finds that [Smith] has carried
his burden of establishing that [Apro has] failed to pay the fees and costs to initiate the
arbitration” by the statutory payment deadline. It appears to us that the trial court
believed the cases interpreting section 1281.97 required it to find Apro’s payment was not

16
timely, even in light of the factual findings it had already made. We are not convinced
that section 1281.97 or the case law interpreting it requires such a finding.
Section 1281.97 provides payment must be made “within 30 days after the due
date,” and case law teaches that statutory payment deadline must be strictly enforced. At
the time of the events giving rise to this appeal, however, section 1291.97 did not define
the “due date” or prescribe how to establish it. (See Reynosa v. Superior Court, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) Here, when the trial court denied the initial fee motion, it
found AAA’s clerical errors created ambiguity about whether the due date was June 23 or
July 24, and, as a result of this ambiguity, it deemed the later date (i.e., July 24) was the
due date. This finding is fully supported by the evidence, and nothing in section 1281.97
or the cases interpreting it required the trial court to deem June 23 as the due date.
As Apro accurately notes, in most of the cases interpreting section 1281.97, it was
undisputed the defendant’s payment was made after the statutory deadline, and the issue
whether the late payment could be excused or the deadline could be extended. (See, e.g.,
Gallo v. Wood Ranch USA, Inc., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 632 [the defendant paid fee
late because partner failed to forward invoice to associate handling case]; Espinoza v.
Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 772 [the defendant paid fee late due to its
own clerical error]; De Leon v. Juanita’s Foods, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 748 [the
defendant agreed it paid fee late]; Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc., supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1063 [the defendant paid fee “[m]ore than 30 days after the
deadline”]; Cvejic v. Skyview Capital, LLC, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075 [arbitration
provider confirmed fees not paid by deadline].) Apro argues this case is distinguishable
because there was no late payment to excuse and no need to extend the statutory payment
deadline. Instead, the trial court found the due date was July 24, the statutory payment
deadline was thus August 23, and Apro’s payment was timely made on July 27. We agree
with Apro that most of the cases are distinguishable on this basis. To this we would add

17
that most of the cases are also distinguishable because they do not discuss the “due date”
or how to ascertain it.
One case — Reynosa v. Superior Court, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 967 — briefly
discusses the due date, and it supports the trial court’s finding that Apro’s payment was
timely. As relevant here, the arbitration provider in Reynosa sent the parties an e-mail on
July 19 stating the “ ‘Final Date for Payment’ ” was October 29 and “ ‘Your invoice will
follow.’ ” (Id. at p. 974.) Two days later, on July 21, it sent the defendant an invoice that
specified payment was “ ‘due upon receipt.’ ” Payment was made on September 17.
(Ibid.) The plaintiff argued the statutory payment deadline was 30 days after the July 21
invoice (i.e., August 20), and payment was thus untimely. The trial court disagreed,
finding the defendant paid prior to the October 29 due date specified in the provider’s
July 19 e-mail, and the appellate court affirmed. It noted the relevant events occurred in
2021, before section 1281.98 was amended to provide, “ ‘absent an express provision in
the arbitration agreement stating the number of days in which the parties to the arbitration
must pay any required fees or costs, the arbitration provider shall issue all invoices to the
parties as due upon receipt.’ ” (Reynosa, at p. 982; see id. at p. 984.) It then explained,
“Section 1281.98 as it then existed . . . did not prescribe how to establish and/or modify
the ‘due date’ from which the 30-day grace period begins to run. Thus, October 29 . . .
appears to be the appropriate due date, whether this date was amenable to both parties,
amenable to only one party, or decided upon exclusively by [the provider].” (Id. at
p. 984.) The payment made on September 17 was thus timely.9 (Reynosa, at p. 984.)
Although the Reynosa court did not find the different due dates created uncertainty and

9 The Reynosa court also found the payment was $250 short, and the defendant was
thus in material breach of the arbitration agreement because it failed to pay “ ‘the full
amount due by the expiration of the statutory grace period.’ ” (Reynosa v. Superior
Court, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 985, italics added.)

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ambiguity about the defendant’s payment obligation, it certainly could have, and that
would have been an alternative basis for its holding that the payment was timely.
This case is similar. AAA sent a letter on June 9 stating payment was due by
June 23, and it also sent an invoice on June 26 stating the due date was July 24. As in
Reynosa, when these events occurred in 2020, section 1281.97 “did not prescribe how to
establish and/or modify the ‘due date’ from which the 30-day grace period begins to run,”
the trial court deemed July 24 “to be the appropriate due date” based on the June 26
invoice, and the payment made on July 27 was thus timely. (Reynosa v. Superior Court,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.)
We find two other cases — Cvejic v. Skyview Capital, LLC, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th
1073, and Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 1319, review granted —
are also relevant. Both involved actions taken by the arbitration provider to extend the
payment deadline, but both are distinguishable in ways we find instructive. In Cvejic,
several days after the statutory payment deadline had passed, the plaintiff asked the
arbitrator if fees had been paid, and the arbitrator confirmed they had not. The day after
that, the arbitrator held a conference call to discuss the situation, and during that call, it
set a new payment deadline, and the defendant paid the fees by that new deadline.
(Cvejic, at p. 1075.) The trial court found the payment was late and the appellate court
affirmed, holding, “The statute does not empower an arbitrator to cure a party’s missed
payment. There is no escape hatch for companies that may have an arbitrator’s favor.
Nor is there a hatch for an arbitrator eager to keep hold of a matter. As the trial court
observed, ‘If . . . the drafting party were permitted numerous continuances for failure to
pay arbitration fees, therefore delaying the proceedings, . . . section 1281.98 would have
no meaning, force, or effect.’ ” (Id. at p. 1078.)
Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 1319, review granted, is
similar. There, the arbitration provider sent the employer invoices on July 29 and
August 29, and “both invoices provid[ed] that payment [was] ‘due upon receipt,’ ” which

19
would make the statutory payment deadline August 28 and September 28, respectively.
(Id. at p. 1322.) On September 30, the arbitration provider sent the parties a letter stating,
“ ‘Pursuant to our fee and cancellation policy, all fees must be paid in full by October
28.’ ” (Ibid.) The employer paid all fees by October 5 (i.e., after the statutory payment
deadlines, but before the deadline specified in the provider’s September 30 letter). (Id. at
p. 1323.) The court held the arbitration provider was not empowered to cure the late
payment, and the employer thus materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing
to pay the fees by the statutory payment deadline. (Id. at p. 1325.)
We have no quarrel with the holdings in Cvejic or Hohenshelt, but the facts here
are very different. This not a case where the arbitration provider tried to cure a late
payment or gave a party a continuance after the statutory payment deadline had passed.
Instead, this is a case where the arbitration provider made a series of clerical errors that
created confusion and ambiguity about the due date and thus the statutory payment
deadline. There is no suggestion AAA’s June 26 invoice specifying a July 24 due date
was an attempt to cure a late payment or extend the statutory payment deadline after it
had already passed. Indeed, at the time the invoice was sent, and unlike in Cvejic and
Hohenshelt, the statutory payment deadline (i.e., based on the June 23 due date specified
in the June 9 letter) had not yet passed and was still almost a month away. As the trial
court found, AAA’s various invoices, letters, and e-mails were inconsistent and created
ambiguities about Apro’s payment obligations. Did Apro owe $1,900 (as stated in one of
the June 9 letters and the July 24 e-mail), or did it owe $2,200 (as stated in the second
June 9 letter, the June 25 e-mail, and the June 26 invoice)? Did payment have to be made
by using the secured paylink (as stated in the June 9 letter and the June 25 and July 24 e-
mails), or could it be made by mailing a check (as stated in the June 26 invoice)? And
most importantly, was the due date June 23 (as stated in the June 9 letter), or was it
July 24 (as stated in the June 26 invoice)? Given the unique facts of this case, we find
nothing in section 1281.97 or the case law interpreting it required the trial court to deem

20
the earlier of the two dates (i.e., June 23) was the due date. Instead, the trial court was
fully justified in deeming the due date to be the later of the two dates (i.e., July 24),
which means Apro’s payment was timely. To quote Cvejic, “It is that simple.” (Cvejic v.
Skyview Capital, LLC, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078.)
Because the trial court’s initial factual finding that Apro’s payment was timely is
supported by the evidence and it does not appear the trial court altered that finding in its
ruling on the motion for reconsideration, and because it made no legal error in so finding,
“ ‘the proper course’ ” was “to reaffirm the earlier ruling.” (Randy’s Trucking, Inc. v.
Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 844.) We thus reverse the order granting
Smith’s motion for reconsideration and direct the trial court to reaffirm the order denying
his initial fee motion.
DISPOSITION
The order granting Smith’s motion for reconsideration and awarding him
$19,942.50 in attorney fees is reversed. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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