CourtListener 10286286•Vanier v. Alexander CA4/3
Texte intégral
Filed 12/2/24 Vanier v. Alexander CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ERIC VANIER et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G063395
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-
01049560)
CHERYL ALEXANDER, as Trustee,
etc. OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Seni Linnebur, Temporary Judge (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21).
Reversed. Respondent’s request for judicial notice. Granted in part and
denied in part.
The Walker Law Firm and Joseph A. Walker for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Feig Law Firm, Scott Feig; Coast Litigation and Evan Cote for
Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
In March 2023, appellants Jason Vanier and Eric Vanier
(collectively, the Vaniers) filed a petition (Petition) concerning the Redman
Family Trust dated April 30, 1992 (the Trust). The Vaniers, who claimed they
1
were beneficiaries of the Trust, asserted Cheryl Alexander, the trustee of the
Trust, had failed to provide required accountings and otherwise failed in her
duties as trustee. They sought to remove Cheryl as trustee and have a
successor trustee appointed. They also asked the probate court to determine
if a residual trust had been properly funded.
Cheryl demurred to the Petition. The probate court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend as to all but one claim on the ground the
Vaniers lacked standing and, as to the remaining claim, on the ground of
laches. We find the court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend and reverse the judgment of dismissal.
FACTS
I.
THE TRUST
In April 1992, Harold W. Redman (Harold) and his wife,
Stephanie F. Redman (Stephanie), as settlors, trustors, and trustees, created
the Trust.2 When the Trust was created, Harold and Stephanie had two living
1
Because some of the relevant individuals share a surname, we
refer to some individuals by their first names to avoid confusion.
2
The facts in this section are taken from the Petition and the
exhibits attached thereto.
2
children, Cheryl Ann Russell (Cheryl) and Linda Sue Vanier (Linda). During
the joint lifetimes of Harold and Stephanie, the Trust assets were to be used,
in part, to maintain their accustomed manner of living. Under the terms of
the Trust, upon the death of either Harold or Stephanie, the Trust’s assets
were to be divided into two trusts, the Survivor’s Trust and the Residual
Trust, with the surviving spouse continuing as trustee. The Survivor’s Trust
was to consist of the surviving spouse’s interest in the trustors’ community
property, the surviving spouse’s separate property, and an amount computed
in specified ways to avoid federal estate tax. The Residual Trust was to
consist of the balance of the trust estate and would be irrevocable.
According to the terms of the Trust, when the surviving spouse
died, any remaining assets of the Survivor’s Trust were to be added to the
Residual Trust; specific bequests were to be made; and the remaining trust
estate, if any, was to be divided into “as many equal shares as there are
children of [Harold and Stephanie] then living and children of [Harold and
Stephanie] then deceased leaving issue then living” and equal shares were to
be given “to each living child” and “each group composed of the living issue of
a deceased child.”
Harold passed away in December 1992. Stephanie, the surviving
spouse, did not divide the Trust’s assets into the Survivor’s Trust and the
Residual Trust upon Harold’s death as required by the Trust but waited until
May 2016, when she divided the assets pursuant to a document entitled
Allocation of Assets Agreement (the Allocation).3 The Allocation purported to
divide the Trust assets equitably between the Residual Trust and the
3
Although the document is titled an “agreement,” it is signed
only by Stephanie and does not identify anyone else as a party to it.
3
Survivor’s Trust and read in part: “[i]f it is later finally determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction or otherwise that this allocation is inequitable, then
the trust receiving the greater value shall pay to the trust receiving the lesser
value the amount necessary to correct the inequity.” In May 2016, Stephanie
also amended the Trust to make Cheryl the sole beneficiary of the Survivor’s
Trust upon Stephanie’s death (Trust Amendment).
Stephanie died on August 19, 2018. No later than the date of
Stephanie’s death, Cheryl became trustee of the Trust. The Petition alleges
Linda predeceased Stephanie but does not provide Linda’s date of death.
II.
INITIAL LITIGATION
Following Stephanie’s death, the Vaniers—Linda’s children—
filed suit against Cheryl in the Superior Court of Orange County (the Prior
Probate Proceeding). The Prior Probate Proceeding involved two related
petitions seeking a determination of the validity of the Trust Amendment
under which Cheryl became the sole beneficiary of the Survivor’s Trust.
Cheryl prevailed in the Prior Probate Proceeding and judgment was entered
in her favor (Probate Judgment).4
The Vaniers also sued Cheryl in the United States District Court
of California, Southern District (the Federal Litigation). The Federal
Litigation involved claims to a specific annuity, which was part of the
Survivor’s Trust. Judgment was entered in Cheryl’s favor in the Federal
4
The Probate Judgment is the only document from the Prior
Probate Proceeding included in the record on appeal. Cheryl’s request that we
take judicial notice of the Probate Judgment, attached as exhibit 1 to Cheryl’s
request for judicial notice, is granted.
4
Litigation (Federal Judgment) when the Vaniers withdrew their claims to the
5
annuity.
III.
THE CURRENT PETITION
On August 21, 2023, the Vaniers filed the Petition alleging: (1)
Stephanie failed to properly fund the Residual Trust following Harold’s death
as required by the Allocation; and (2) Cheryl failed to provide accountings or
distribute the Vaniers’ portion of the Residual Trust. Based on their
assertions, the Vaniers asked the probate court to determine if the Residual
Trust was properly funded, compel distribution of the Residual Trust,
suspend Cheryl’s powers as trustee, remove Cheryl as trustee, and appoint a
successor trustee. The Vaniers also alleged Cheryl violated Probate Code
section 16061.76 by failing to provide them with complete copies of the Trust
and its amendments when she gave statutory notice in September 2018.
Appellants claimed that, despite repeated requests, they did not receive
complete copies of the Trust until February 2020, and they sought damages
under section 16061.9, subdivision (a) (section 16061.9 claim).
Cheryl demurred to the claims in the Petition on various
grounds. The probate court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend
on the ground the Vaniers lacked standing as to every claim in the petition
5
The Federal Judgment and an order denying a motion to amend
judgment are the only documents from the Federal Litigation included in the
record on appeal. Cheryl’s request that we take judicial notice of the Federal
Judgment, attached as exhibit 2 to Cheryl’s request for judicial notice, is
granted. Her request that we take judicial notice of the order denying a
motion to amend judgment in the Federal Litigation (exhibit 3) is denied.
6
All further statutory references are to the Probate Code unless
otherwise indicated.
5
except the section 16061.9 claim. The court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend as to the section 16061.9 claim on the ground of laches.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPEALABILITY
The Vaniers purport to appeal from the minute order sustaining
7
Cheryl’s demurrer without leave to amend. “The general rule is that ‘[a]n
order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable, and
an appeal is proper only after entry of a dismissal on such an order.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] However, ‘when the trial court has sustained a
demurrer [without leave to amend] to all of the complaint’s causes of action,
appellate courts may deem the order to incorporate a judgment of dismissal,
since all that is left to make the order appealable is the formality of the entry
of a dismissal order or judgment.’” (Hamilton v. Green (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
417, 422–423.) We deem the probate court’s minute order sustaining Cheryl’s
demurrer to the Petition without leave to amend to incorporate a judgment of
7
Although entry of a judgment of dismissal normally follows an
order sustaining a demurrer to an entire pleading without leave to amend “as
a matter of course” (Berri v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 856, 860), no
judgment was entered by the court in this case. Appellants blame the lack of
a judgment of dismissal on Cheryl’s failure to file a proposed judgment of
dismissal. Appellants offer no explanation why they did not request
dismissal, as they were entitled to do under Code of Civil Procedure section
581, subdivision (f)(1).
6
dismissal and interpret the Vaniers’ notice of appeal as applying to that
dismissal.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the
operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to
state a cause of action under any legal theory.’ [Citation.] ‘“‘“We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . We also consider
matters which may have been judicially noticed.” . . . Further, we give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context.’”’” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768.) When a
demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend, “‘we decide whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment:
if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse.’” (Loeffler
v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100.) “The burden is on the plaintiff,
however, to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint might be
amended.” (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.)
III.
STANDING
In their Petition, the Vaniers alleged the Residual Trust was to
be distributed to Linda and Cheryl and would be distributed to their issue
only if either or both “predeceased both of the Trustors.” (Italics added.) The
Vaniers alleged their mother, Linda, predeceased Stephanie, but they did not
allege Linda predeceased Harold. Because the Petition failed to allege Linda
predeceased both Harold and Stephanie, the probate court sustained the
7
demurrer without leave to amend on the ground the Vaniers lacked standing
to bring a claim as to the Trust.
The allegation in the Petition that the Vaniers would be
beneficiaries only if Linda predeceased both Harold and Stephanie is directly
contradicted by the Trust, a copy of which was attached to the Petition.
Under the terms of the Trust, the Vaniers were entitled to a share of the
Residual Trust if Linda predeceased only the surviving spouse.
For purposes of a demurrer, “[w]e . . . ‘accept as true both facts
alleged in the text of the complaint and facts appearing in exhibits attached
to it. If the facts appearing in the attached exhibit contradict those expressly
pleaded, those in the exhibit are given precedence.’” (Sarale v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 225, 245.) The Petition alleges Linda
predeceased Stephanie, which would make the Vaniers beneficiaries under
the terms of the Trust and give them standing to bring the Petition.8
On appeal, Cheryl raises a new standing argument, i.e., that the
Trust Amendment removed the Vaniers as beneficiaries. The Trust
Amendment made Cheryl the sole beneficiary of the Survivor’s Trust, but it
8
The court also found there was no reasonable possibility of
curing the standing defect. The petition, however, did not contain any
allegation of the date of Linda’s death or any admission that Linda outlived
Harold. Accordingly, even if the Trust had included a requirement that Linda
predecease both Harold and Stephanie, amendment was possible. “‘[G]reat
liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his
complaint, and it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a
demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the
defect can be cured by amendment. [Citations.]’ . . . Moreover, abuse of
discretion in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is reviewable on
appeal even in the absence of a request for leave to amend.” (Scott v. City of
Indian Wells (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, 549–550.)
8
made no change to the beneficiaries of the Residual Trust. It therefore has no
effect on the Vaniers’ standing to sue as beneficiaries of the Residual Trust.
The probate court erred in sustaining Cheryl’s demurrer without
leave to amend on the ground of standing.
IV.
CLAIMS SEEKING TO SUSPEND, REMOVE, AND REPLACE CHERYL AS TRUSTEE
Cheryl demurred to the Petition on the ground that the Vaniers’
requests to suspend, remove, and replace her were decided in the Prior
Probate Proceeding and are therefore barred by the doctrine of claim
preclusion.9 “Claim preclusion ‘prevents relitigation of the same cause of
action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with
them.’ [Citation.] Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the
same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment
on the merits in the first suit. [Citations.] If claim preclusion is established, it
operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether.” (DKN Holdings LLC v.
Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.)
The appellate record does not include either of the petitions
underlying the Prior Probate Proceeding and the only record before us of
what was addressed in that proceeding is the Probate Judgment. Cheryl
points to a sentence in the Probate Judgment identifying “[w]hether Cheryl
breached her fiduciary duties as trustee of the Residual Trust and should be
removed” as a disputed factual issue. Although it is identified as an issue, the
Probate Judgment did not address that issue and made no finding regarding
Cheryl’s duties as trustee of Residual Trust. The only issues decided in the
9
Cheryl’s demurrer and appellate briefs refer to “res judicata”
and claim preclusion interchangeably. For clarity, we refer to the doctrine as
claim preclusion throughout.
9
Probate Judgment were whether: (1) Stephanie had sufficient capacity to
enter into the May 2016 Trust Amendment and Allocation of Assets
Agreement; and (2) Cheryl exercised undue influence over Stephanie in
connection with those documents. In fact, at one point in the Probate
Judgment, the court specifically states it is “not making findings at this time
on the issues relating to the failure to allocate or fund the residual trust”—
the issues raised in the current Petition.
Based on the record before us, we conclude the issues raised by
the Vaniers’ current Petition relating to funding of the Residual Trust were
not determined in the Prior Probate Proceeding and are not barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion.
V.
CLAIM REGARDING FUNDING OF THE RESIDUAL TRUST
Cheryl demurred to the Vaniers’ claim regarding funding of the
Residual Trust (the funding claim) on the grounds it was time-barred and
failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.
A. Statute of Limitations
Cheryl argues Linda was the only party with standing to bring
the funding claim and that she had to do so within three years of Harold’s
death (for claims regarding internal affairs of the Trust) or four years (for
breach of fiduciary duty). Cheryl cites sections 16460, subdivision (a)(2) and
17200, subdivision (a) in support of the alleged three-year statute of
limitations. Section 17200, subdivision (a) allows a trustee or a beneficiary to
petition the court concerning the internal affairs of the trust, but it does not
provide any time limit within which to do so. Section 16460, subdivision (a)(2)
provides that a claim against a trustee for breach of trust is barred “unless a
proceeding to assert the claim is commenced within three years after the
10
beneficiary discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the subject of
the claim.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Cheryl cites Code of Civil Procedure section 343 in support of her
argument that a breach of fiduciary duty claim must have been brought
within four years of Harold’s death. The four-year statute of limitations on a
breach of fiduciary duty claim also does not arise until the claimant
“‘discovers or should have discovered all facts essential to his cause of
action.’” (April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 826–
827.) So, none of the potentially applicable statutes of limitation began to run
until the Vaniers knew or should have known of the alleged failure to
properly fund the Residual Trust.
The Petition is devoid of any allegation asserting or even
suggesting when Linda or the Vaniers discovered, or reasonably should have
discovered, the alleged failure to equitably fund the Residual Trust.
According to the allegations of the Petition, the Residual Trust was not even
funded until May 2016—24 years after Harold’s death—and the claim of
inequitable funding could not have arisen before then.
“‘“[A] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie
where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order
for the bar . . . to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and
affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the
complaint shows that the action may be barred. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] Accordingly, it may be difficult for a ‘demurrer[] based on the
statute of limitations to succeed because (1) trial and appellate courts treat
the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded and (2)
resolution of the statute of limitations issue can involve questions of fact.
Furthermore, when the relevant facts are not clear such that the cause of
11
action might be, but is not necessarily, time-barred, the demurrer will be
overruled.’” (Citizens for a Responsible Caltrans Decision v. Department of
Transportation (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1117.) The Petition does not
10
show that the funding claim is necessarily time-barred.
Cheryl also argues the funding claim could only have been
brought against Stephanie—the trustee responsible for dividing the trust
property into the Survivor’s Trust and the Residual Trust—and pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2, subdivision (a) such a claim was
required to be filed within one year of Stephanie’s death. The unsupported
assertion that Stephanie is the only party against whom the funding claim
could have been brought is incorrect. Pursuant to section 16403, subdivisions
(b)(1) and (b)(3), “[a] successor trustee is liable to the beneficiaries for a
predecessor trustee’s breach of trust if the successor unreasonably allows the
breach to continue or does not take reasonable steps to redress it. [Citation.]
The Probate Code thus imposes a duty on a successor trustee, on pain of
personal liability for neglect, to make reasonable inquiry into the predecessor
trustee’s administration of the trust and remedy any breaches, in order
thereby to preserve the trust estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”
(Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1137–1138, fn. omitted.)
The Vaniers’ funding claim can be stated against Cheryl, the successor
10
Cheryl alternatively argues that Appellants waited five years
from Linda’s death to file the Petition. The Petition does not allege the date of
Linda’s death and Cheryl does not ask us to take judicial notice of any
document establishing the date of death, so even if the statute of limitations
ran from Linda’s death, the assertion of five years’ delay beyond that time
cannot be considered on this appeal. (See Tran v. Nguyen (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 523, 528 [in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, “we do not
consider factual contentions not contained in the complaint, unless they are
matters subject to judicial notice”].)
12
trustee, and is not time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2,
subdivision (a).
B. Failure to State a Claim
Cheryl argues the funding claim fails to allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action because it “is devoid of any allegation how the
residual trust was not properly funded.” “To survive a demurrer, the
complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each
evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need
not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.) The Petition alleges the Residual Trust was not properly
funded, identifies the assets allegedly placed in the two trusts, and identifies
steps that allegedly should have been taken to properly fund the Residual
Trust. The allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action.
VI.
CLAIM FOR DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESIDUAL TRUST
Cheryl demurred to the Vaniers’ claim for distribution of the
residual trust (the distribution claim) on the ground it is barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion. In the Probate Judgment, the probate court
found the Residual Trust did not have any assets at the time of Stephanie’s
death. Cheryl argues this finding bars the distribution claim because there is
nothing to distribute.11 Her argument puts the proverbial cart before the
horse. The Petition alleges the Residual Trust was not funded upon Harold’s
11
Cheryl also contends the Petition fails to state sufficient facts
on this claim. She does not support this argument with “‘“cogent legal
argument or citation to authority”’” and the argument is therefore forfeited.
(Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 927, 939.)
13
death—at which time the Residual Trust was supposed to have become
irrevocable—and still had not been equitably funded in May 2016, when
Stephanie finally divided the assets into the two trusts. If the Vaniers’
allegations are true, the inequitable funding of the Residual Trust might well
explain why it had no assets at the time of Stephanie’s death. On demurrer,
we must take the allegations of the complaint as true (Duncan v. The
McCaffrey Group, Inc., supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 360) and the claim is not,
12
at this pleading stage, barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
VII.
CLAIM TO COMPEL AN ACCOUNTING
Cheryl maintains the Vaniers’ claim for an accounting (the
accounting claim) fails to state sufficient facts and is barred by the doctrines
of claim preclusion and laches. She argues the accounting claim fails to state
sufficient facts because the Residual Trust had no assets as of the date of
Stephanie’s death. As set forth above, the argument ignores the allegation
that the Residual Trust was inequitably funded in May 2016—a fact that, if
true, could explain the Residual Trust’s empty coffers at the time of
Stephanie’s death.
Cheryl’s assertion that the accounting claim is barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion is based on an alleged finding by the probate
court that Cheryl did not breach her fiduciary duty. As stated above,
12
Cheryl also argues the Federal Judgment determined the
issues raised by the Petition. The Federal Judgment did not address funding
of the Residual Trust. Rather, it determined distribution of a Delaware Life
annuity, found Cheryl had been receiving payments from the annuity since
Stephanie’s death, and found she was entitled to 100 percent of the
remaining benefits under the annuity. Curiously, the annuity, which had
been paid and will be paid to Cheryl, was designated as the primary asset of
the Residual Trust by the Allocation.
14
however, the probate court specifically declined to make any finding in
connection with the funding of the Residual Trust, so the issue has not been
decided.
Cheryl also argues the accounting claim is barred by the doctrine
of laches. “Laches is ‘a failure on the part of a plaintiff to assert his rights in
a timely fashion accompanied by a period of delay with consequent results
prejudicial to the defendant.’” (Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v. Philadelphia
Television Network, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894, 913.) Cheryl contends she
was prejudiced because she “administered the trust” between the date of the
Probate Judgment and the time the Petition was filed. Even assuming the
administration of the trust could constitute prejudice to Cheryl, the claimed
administration of the trust is not alleged in the Petition and is not put before
us by any document of which we can take judicial notice. It is, therefore,
outside what can be considered on appeal. (See Tran v. Nguyen, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 528 [“we do not consider factual contentions not contained
in the complaint, unless they are matters subject to judicial notice”].)
VIII.
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 16061.9
In September 2018, Cheryl sent the Vaniers notice regarding the
trust. Such notice is required by section 16061.7, which requires a trustee to
give notice to beneficiaries upon the occasion of certain specified events,
including a change in trustee. (§ 16061.7, subds. (a) & (b).) A beneficiary who
has received such notice is entitled to receive a copy of the full trust terms
upon request. (§ 16060.7.) The Petition alleges the Vaniers repeatedly
15
requested a complete copy of the trust terms, but Cheryl did not provide one
until February 2020—almost two and a half years after she sent the notice.
In the Petition, the Vaniers seek damages incurred because of
Cheryl’s delay in providing the complete terms of the trust. (§ 16061.9.)
Cheryl demurred to the section 16061.9 claim on the ground of laches and
claim preclusion. The probate court sustained the demurrer to the section
16061.9 claim without leave to amend on the ground of laches, finding the
three-year delay between February 2020 (when the Vaniers received
complete copies of the Trust) and March 2023 (when they filed the Petition)
“unreasonable.” The court further found the Vaniers could have raised the
issue in the Prior Probate Proceeding, so requiring Cheryl to litigate the issue
now is “prejudicial.”
“Laches may be raised by demurrer, but only if the complaint
shows on its face unreasonable delay plus prejudice or acquiescence.” (Conti
v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1969) 1 Cal.3d 351, 362.) “Prejudice
is never presumed; rather it must be affirmatively demonstrated by the
defendant . . . .” (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614,
624.) Further, “the existence of laches is a question of fact to be determined
by the trial court in light of all of the applicable circumstances . . . .” (Ibid.)
The Petition does not establish prejudice on its face and Cheryl
did not affirmatively demonstrate prejudice by any document offered for
judicial notice.13 The probate court erred in resolving the factual issue of
13
In connection with the demurrer, Cheryl asked the probate
court to take judicial notice of four documents: (1) the Probate Judgment; (2)
the Federal Judgment; (3) an order denying a motion to dismiss in the
Federal Litigation; and (4) a motion for leave to amend in the Prior Probate
Proceeding. None of the documents mentions the September 2018 notice or
sections 16061.7 or 16061.9.
16
laches at the pleading stage and the demurrer should not have been
14
sustained on that ground.
DISPOSITION
Respondent’s request for judicial notice is granted as to exhibits 1
and 2 and denied as to exhibit 3, which is irrelevant to our disposition of this
appeal. The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to
the probate court with instructions to enter an order overruling the demurrer
and ordering Cheryl to answer the Petition. The Vaniers are to recover their
costs on appeal.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
14
Cheryl argues the entire Petition is barred by the doctrine of
laches because it was filed 226 days after the Probate Judgment was issued.
That argument fails for the same reasons, i.e., laches is a question of fact and
must be affirmatively demonstrated by the party seeking its protection.
17
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