CourtListener 10286285•Yue v. Yang CA1/5
Texte intégral
Filed 12/2/24 Yue v. Yang CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
DONGXIAO YUE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A168295
v.
WENBIN YANG, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Respondent. Super. Ct. No. MSC1601118)
Plaintiff Dongxiao Yue appeals from a judgment entered against him
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.81 on his complaint for unfair
competition and defamation against defendant Wenbin Yang. Yue argues the
trial court erred by failing to impose terminating sanctions against defendant
Yang, excluding certain evidence, and entering judgment against Yue. He
also argues the bench trial violated his due process rights and the equal
protection clauses of the California and United States Constitutions. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 13, 2016, Yue filed a complaint against Yang; Trigmax
Solutions, LLC (Trigmax); Yeyeclub.com (Yeyeclub); and Muye Liu. The
1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise stated.
1
complaint alleged causes of action for unfair competition and defamation. It
alleged that Yue established a Chinese language online community Web site
called Zhen Zhu Bay (ZZB). Trigmax and Liu allegedly owned and operated a
competing Chinese language Web site whose successor is Yeyeclub. Yang, a
resident of Toronto, Canada, allegedly used the online identity “iMan” and
others on Yeyeclub and ZZB. In September and October 2015, Yang, using
various online identities, allegedly posted messages on Yeyeclub stating that
Yue violated a court order and used an “ ‘Internet Virus Technique during the
process service.’ ” Yang also posted a blog article titled “ ‘[Plaintiff’s] Trojans
Virus and Burglary Felony,’ ” stating, “ ‘Since [Plaintiff] was able to use
Trojan horse virus to send summons to Y’s computer, then he can send
anything to X’s computer. Only if he need! For example, he can send a
hidden monitor, just like underground special agent’s secret radio, steal all
the data in your computer,’ ” and Yue’s “ ‘summons Trojan horse’ ‘stole the
information of your computer’s operating system.’ ” (Sic.)
On March 27, 2023, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by
Liu and Trigmax.2 Yue filed a separate appeal regarding the dismissal order,
which we decided in Yue v. Trigmax Solutions, LLC, supra, A167577. On
March 27, 2023, Yue proceeded to trial against Yang only. Yue and Yang
each proceeded in pro. per. and appeared remotely for a bench trial.
2 As we noted in our unpublished opinion in Yue v. Trigmax
Solutions, LLC (Aug. 29, 2024, A167577), the trial court’s order granting the
motion to dismiss states that the motion was also brought on behalf of
Yeyeclub. We noted that the record in appeal No. A167577 was unclear and
inconsistent regarding whether Yeyeclub moved for dismissal based on the
five-year rule, whether a default judgment was entered as to Yeyeclub, and
whether the trial court’s reference to Yeyeclub in its dismissal order was a
clerical error, and we left it to the parties on remand to determine the status
of Yeyeclub. Yeyeclub, Trigmax, and Liu are not parties to this appeal.
2
There is no court reporter’s transcript of the first day of trial. The
minute order states that Yue and Yang each gave brief opening statements
and then Yue testified. The minute order does not summarize Yue’s
testimony other than stating: “The court informs Mr. Yue his testimony thus
far is hearsay and not evidence. [¶] The court strikes testimony regarding
users being local California residents as it lacks foundation and calls for
hearsay and speculation.” (Capitalization omitted.) The minute order also
states that Yang objected to exhibits Yue offered into evidence. The trial
court admitted certain exhibits and excluded others. Some exhibits were
excluded because they were not translated into English. Yue called Yang and
examined him briefly before the court recessed. The minute order does not
summarize Yang’s testimony.
The second day of the bench trial was transcribed by a court reporter.
Yang’s testimony continued through an interpreter. When asked if he made
posts on Yeyeclub, Yang first stated that he was “not very clear on this
because [it was] many years ago” and then denied he posted on Yeyeclub.
Upon Yue’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of a June 29, 2022,
minute order finding that Yang failed to respond to certain of Yue’s requests
for admission, which were then deemed admitted. The trial court explained
that the deemed admissions were that Yang used the identity of iMan on
ZZB, Yeyeclub, and XYS3 and that he also used the identities of VOA and
CH3CH2OH on Yeyeclub. The trial court admitted additional exhibits into
evidence based on the admissions regarding Yang’s various identities. Yue
questioned Yang about whether he wrote a message stated on one of the
exhibits, and Yang stated he did not remember. Yue then stated he had no
further questions for Yang. Yue then offered exhibit 72, which he stated was
3 XYS is not identified in the reporter’s transcript.
3
“a summary of statistics of [ZZB’s] blog account, blog view account, and
et cetera.” Yang did not object to its admission, and the trial court admitted
the exhibit but also noted a lack of proper foundation. Yue rested.
The trial court invited Yang to make a motion for judgment under
section 631.8. The trial court explained that a motion for judgment is a
motion at the close of plaintiff’s case for failure to provide sufficient evidence
to support the case, and the trial court asked, “Mr. Yang, is that your
motion?” to which Yang stated, “Yes, it is.” The trial court offered Yue the
opportunity to reopen his case to present additional evidence and stated that
the court had reviewed the exhibits and found a lack of proof of defamation or
damages. Yue did not offer additional evidence. However, he responded that
he believed the evidence provided in trial exhibits 37 to 45 and 47 proved
defamation and that damages are presumed. He further stated that trial
exhibit 72 showed a drop in users on ZZB.
The trial court asked Yue to clarify the theory of defamation on which
he based his complaint. Yue stated his position was that the defamation
involved a private figure and private concern. The trial court then asked Yue
to specifically identify which statements he believed were defamatory, and
Yue referred to statements in trial exhibits 37, 39, 42, 43 and 44, including,
“ ‘You have violated court order. The whole family was almost driven to the
streets’ ”; a blog post titled “Trojan Virus and Burglary Felony of Yue”; and
another document titled “Legal Illiterate and Shyster Yue The Fruit of
Poisonous Tree Delivering Summons With Online Virus.” Yue further argued
that Yang’s statement in exhibit 41 that Yang had “ ‘[n]ot seen anything
which indicates that Yue might really conduct such kind of illegal attack
except your claim’ ” was evidence that Yang admitted his statement
regarding Yue’s use of a Trojan horse was untrue. Yue rested again.
4
The trial court granted the motion for judgment and orally noted some
deficiencies in Yue’s case, stating: “For almost all of Mr. Yue’s testimony, he
failed to testify or demonstrate to the court that any of these statements were
untrue. Many of the statements pointed to by Mr. Yue are statements of
opinion, which are permissible. They’re also insults, which are permissible
under the First Amendment. [¶] Mr. Yue also failed to show any damages.
He didn’t testify about damages. He didn’t explain the chart. He didn’t
provide any nexus between the reduction and these postings. He even failed
to demonstrate that these postings were public. There was some intimation
perhaps they were, but there was no evidence of it. [¶] When he states that
Mr. Yang admitted that the Trojan horse virus was untrue, that is not the
evidence that I heard yesterday. Mr. Yue’s testimony was deficient to
establish any of the elements that I’m looking at California Jury Instruction
1704. [¶] I do have the fact that Mr. Yang made these statements. I don’t
have any proof that he reasonably understood that these were not true or he
failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the
statements. [¶] There were no actual damages. And with regard to assumed
damages, I will note that if there is—Plaintiff has proved the harm to hurt
feelings or shame or reputation or mortification, that Mr. Yue provided no
testimony about that either. I understand that he brought the case, but no
testimony was provided.”
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Yue’s
pretrial requests for terminating sanctions.
Yue argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion for
terminating sanctions against Yang based on his discovery violations. On
January 4, 2022, Yue filed a motion to compel further discovery responses
from Yang. The motion also requested monetary sanctions of $125 but not
5
terminating sanctions. On March 9, 2022, the trial court granted Yue’s
motion in part and ordered Yang to provide verified responses to certain
discovery requests, including requests for admission related to several online
identities used by Yang.
On May 27, 2022, Yue filed a motion to deem the first set of requests
for admission propounded on Yang admitted because Yang failed to comply
with the March 9, 2022, discovery order. Yue’s motion also requested
terminating sanctions. On June 29, 2022, the trial court granted Yue’s
motion to deem the requests for admission admitted but denied Yue’s request
for terminating sanctions.
Yue moved again for terminating sanctions on August 25, 2022, based
on Yang’s supplemental discovery responses and violation of prior discovery
orders. On October 19, 2022, the trial court denied Yue’s motion for
terminating sanctions. On January 19, 2023, Yue filed a motion to compel
Yang to answer deposition questions which he had refused to answer. In the
motion, Yue also requested monetary sanctions of $1,771.62, but he did not
request terminating sanctions. On March 15, 2023, the trial court granted
Yue’s motion in part but denied monetary sanctions.
Yue contends the trial court’s denial of his pretrial requests for
terminating sanctions against Yang should be reversed. We review an order
denying a motion for terminating sanctions for abuse of discretion. (Lopez v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th
566, 604.) The order is presumed correct, and all presumptions are indulged
to support the order on matters as to which the record is silent. It is Yue’s
burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (See Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41
Cal.3d 564, 574.) Discovery sanctions should be “appropriate to the
dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the
6
interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne
(1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793.) “[T]he terminating sanction is a drastic
penalty and should be used sparingly.” (Lopez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at
p. 604.)
Yue has failed to persuade us that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his request for terminating sanctions. The trial court ordered
that Yue’s requests for Yang to admit he used various online identities were
deemed admitted based on Yang’s failure to comply with the court’s prior
discovery order. Yue used these admissions at trial. Yue fails to explain in
any detail the subject of the other discovery he requested and to which Yang
failed to respond. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
opted to deem admitted the requests for admission and denied Yue’s request
for terminating sanctions.
II. Exclusion of Evidence
Yue argues the trial court erroneously excluded certain evidence. First,
he complains that on the first day of trial, the trial court struck his testimony
that some of the users of the ZZB Web site were local California residents
who knew Yue personally. As noted ante, there is no reporter’s transcript of
Yue’s testimony, which occurred on the first day of trial. The trial court’s
minute order states that the court struck testimony regarding users being
local California residents as it lacked foundation and called for hearsay and
speculation. We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. (Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1298, 1317.) Yue claims, without citation to any authority, that his
testimony was not hearsay. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach) [“An appellant must provide . . . legal
authority to support his contentions”].) He does not address the trial court’s
7
additional bases that the testimony lacked foundation and was speculative.
On this record, with only a summary of the testimony in a minute order and
no reporter’s transcript or settled statement, we cannot find that the trial
court abused its discretion by striking Yue’s testimony that some of the users
of the ZZB Web site were California residents who knew Yue personally.
Yue argues that the trial court erroneously excluded exhibit 18, which
he states is a blog post by “iMan” with a photo of Yang’s wife. The exhibit is
almost entirely in a Chinese language. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the exhibit. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(g)
[“Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English
translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter”].)
Finally, Yue argues generally that the trial court erred in excluding
unidentified “trial exhibits involving Yeyeclub and Liu,” which he states the
trial court excluded because Yeyeclub was in default and the other
defendants had been dismissed. He cites only to the minute order stating
which exhibits were admitted and which were not. He provides no discussion
of the exhibits he claims were erroneously excluded or case authority
supporting his claim of error. Yue has failed to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion. (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 [“It is not our place to
construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the
presumption of correctness”].)
III. Entry of Judgment
Yue’s opening brief argues that Yang committed libel per se based upon
statements contained in certain exhibits admitted at trial, that he proved
damages, and that the trial court misapplied the law and disregarded
established facts. We understand Yue’s argument to be that the trial court
erred in granting the motion for judgment under section 631.8.
8
The purpose of section 631.8 “is ‘to enable the court, when it finds at
the completion of plaintiff’s case that the evidence does not justify requiring
the defense to produce evidence, to weigh evidence and make findings of fact.’
[Citation.] Under the statute, a court acting as trier of fact may enter
judgment in favor of the defendant if the court concludes that the plaintiff
failed to sustain his burden of proof. [Citation.] In making the ruling, the
trial court assesses witness credibility and resolves conflicts in evidence.
[Citations.]” (People ex rel. Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Cars 4 Causes (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012.) We review a judgment entered under section
631.8 under the same standards as we review judgments entered after a
completed bench trial. (Pettus v. Cole (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 402, 424–425.)
The substantial evidence rule applies to the trial court’s factual findings, and
we review questions of law independently. (Ibid.) The standard is somewhat
different when, as here, the issue is whether there was a failure of proof at
trial. “ ‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the
question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically,
the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was
(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and
weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.
v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466 (Sonic).)
We presume the trial court’s judgment is correct. (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To overcome this presumption, Yue must
affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error based an adequate record.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Yue has provided the
reporter’s transcript for the second day of the trial, but there is no reporter’s
9
transcript of the first day of trial. Nor has Yue provided a settled statement,
the “viable alternative to a reporter’s transcript.” (Randall v. Mousseau
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 933; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) As explained
in Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973: “Where no reporter’s transcript
has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing
appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to
all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that the
unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.
[Citation.] The effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment
but supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an
argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 992.) With these
principles in mind, we consider Yue’s claim of error.
Yue argues that Yang, using various online identities, posted messages
on ZZB and Yeyeclub that defamed Yue. He refers to the following four
statements contained in trial exhibits 37, 39, 42 and 44: (1) “ ‘In a society
governed by the rule of law, court orders cannot be disobeyed!’ How well Yue,
DNGXIAO said that. This is a valuable experience gained with so much
blood and tears. Back in the day, Yue savvy disobeyed the court order, and
the family was almost thrown out into the street. I don’t know if everyone
remembers. [Emoji].” (Sic.) (2) Yang’s statement to Yue that he does not
want to communicate with Yue by email because “[a]s you confessed in your
Complaint and Motion, you once tried to serve me by using Internet Virus
Technique (hiding documents in your own website). This is outrageous and
scared me! [¶] . . . [¶] I have not seen anything which indicates that you
might really conducted that kind of illegal service approach except your
claim. In other words, I only know that you tried to serve me by hiding
documents in your website because you said so. I consider it as that you used
10
Internet Virus Technique during the process service. No more, No less.”
(Sic.) (3) “In the (civil) Complaint and in the Motion to email Summons,
shyster YUE openly presented that he used a network virus to send the
Summons as evidence (bury the Summons on the page of his website, and as
soon as you visit his website, his Trojan horse will be in your computer). This
shows how legally illiterate this shyster is! [¶] . . . [¶] Even if the IPS [ISP4]
company or those who share that IP address do not sue Yue for dropping a
virus on them, even if Yang does not counteract Yue slander—Yue
distributed Summons and Complaints to all those who share that IP address,
Yue DONGXIAO himself can’t get rid of the ‘cyber hacking’ crown. People
who have some common sense in the 21st century know that cyber viruses
are illegal and criminal. As a televised legal advisor with a Master’s in
Computer Science, Yue even took this as evidence in court, and put the rope
hanging around his neck in front of the judge and the defendant. This man’s
smart aleck, legal illiteracy and stupidity are really jokes, a state-of-the-art,
breathtaking living specimen.” (Sic.) (4) A document titled “Trojans Virus
and Burglary Felony of Yue Dongxiao,” stating, “If Yue Dongxiao can send
Summons to Y’s computer using Trojans Virus as a method, he can send
anything to X’s computer in the same way. As long as he needs it! For
example, a hidden monitor, like a secret radio station for a sleeper agent,
which can steal all the data from your computer. [¶] A burglar who climbed in
through the window committed Burglary Felony, whether he didn’t steal a
piece of bread or stole a sack of US dollar bills. According to California Penal
Code Section 461(1), the offence to residential theft is first-degree burglary
with a sentence of 2-6 years. If you steal nothing, you will have to go to
prison for at least two years, and if you steal a sack of US dollar bills, you will
4 Internet service provider.
11
spend up to six years in prison. Life is not fair, but law is. [¶] Definition of
Trojans: [¶] Trojans are malicious programs that perform actions that have
not been authorized by the user. [¶] So, does Yue’s Summons with the
Trojans perform action? Of course! And it executed very important actions,
such as display on screen, stealing information of your computer’s operating
system!” (Sic., boldface and capitalization omitted.)
Yue argues that Yang’s statements are libel per se; that they were
false; that Yang knew they were false; that damages are presumed and that
he also proved damages when he presented exhibit 72, a document he
prepared which he claims demonstrates that after Yang’s statement, Yue’s
ZZB Web site lost visitors and bloggers.
Yue claims the trial court erred when it found that Yue failed to prove
Yang’s statements were false because the burden was on Yang to prove truth
as an affirmative defense. However, even assuming it was not Yue’s burden
to prove the falsity of Yang’s statements,5 Yue fails to demonstrate that the
trial court erred in finding that Yue failed to prove the elements of
defamation. The trial court found there was no evidence Yang’s statements
were public. Yue argues that the statements were “evidently public.” He
appears to base his argument on what he claims were user comments
indicating that people believed Yang’s false statements. He also states,
without a record citation, that the fact that he downloaded Yang’s posts
proves they were public. However, he does not cite to any evidence that he
downloaded the posts. He claims he testified that his friends in California
5 “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false,
(c) defamatory, (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure
or causes special damage.’ ” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.)
However, “[t]he burden of pleading and proving truth is generally on the
defendant.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 646, fn. 5.)
12
saw the blog posts. As discussed ante, Yue argues the trial court erred by
striking his testimony as hearsay. We have concluded that based on the
incomplete record, we are unable to determine that the trial court abused its
discretion in striking Yue’s testimony. Similarly, without a reporter’s
transcript or settled statement regarding Yue’s testimony, we are unable to
find that Yue presented evidence that was of such a character and weight as
to leave no room for the trial court’s determination that there was insufficient
evidence of the publication element of defamation. (Sonic, supra, 196
Cal.App.4th at p. 466; Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) In
other words, Yue provides no basis for us to conclude that the trial court
erred in finding that Yue failed to prove Yang’s statements were published.
In addition, Yue was also required to prove that Yang failed to use
reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of the statements. (CACI
No. 1704.) The trial court also found Yue presented no evidence regarding
this element of defamation. Yue’s opening brief notes the trial court’s finding
regarding this element but not does provide any argument as to why it was
erroneous.6
In sum, based on the record presented, Yue has not carried his burden
to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court erred in finding that Yue failed to
prove all the elements of his claim. (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
6 Yue also attempts to contest the trial court’s finding that some of
Yang’s statements were insults protected under the First Amendment by
stating, without any citations to the record or to case authority, that not all
insults are protected speech and generally stating that combining insults
with defamatory statements does not negate the defamatory nature of the
statement. Yue’s generalized argument without citation to authority is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness we apply to the
judgment. (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 [to overcome the
presumption of correctness, appellant must support contentions with
reasoned argument and citation to authority].)
13
IV. Due Process
Yue complains that the bench trial violated his due process rights in
three ways. First, he contends the trial court advocated on behalf of Yang.
Yue claims the following conduct by the trial court supports his claim: (1) The
trial court improperly interrupted Yue’s testimony on the first day of trial
and asked Yang if he had objections to certain trial exhibits. (2) It interjected
during Yang’s testimony on the second day of trial to state that Yang testified
he did not remember writing a message to Yue, and then, when Yue asked a
follow-up question, the trial court stated it had been asked and answered and
told Yue to move on. (3) When Yue offered a trial exhibit which he describes
as a “summary of the statistics of ZZB,” the trial court admitted it into
evidence but also stated, “ ‘I don’t see proper foundation here.’ ” (4) At the
conclusion of Yue’s case, the trial court invited a motion for judgment.
To the extent Yue’s argument is based on trial testimony from the first
day of trial, the appellate record is incomplete because there is no reporter’s
transcript or settled statement from the first day of trial. On an incomplete
record, we are unable to find error. (Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at
p. 992.) Further, Yue did not raise the issue of a due process violation in the
trial court. Constitutional questions not raised in the trial court are
considered waived. (Geftakys v. State Personnel Board (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d
844, 864.) Even if we were to exercise our discretion to consider the due
process issue, we would find that Yue has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court’s comments during trial testimony, with regard to Yue’s exhibit or its
invitation for Yang to make a motion for judgment, amounted to a due
process violation. Based on the record provided, it appears that the trial
court’s statements were made in an effort to control the litigation and
conserve judicial resources. (Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132
14
Cal.App.4th 687, 701 [“A court’s inherent powers to control litigation and
conserve judicial resources authorize it to conduct hearings and formulate
rules of procedure as justice may require”]; Wegner et al., Cal. Practice
Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 16:31 cmt. [“as a
practical matter, a judge may . . . invite a motion for judgment to short-cut
the proceedings”].)
Second, Yue contends the trial judge showed prejudice regarding what
Yue describes as “[t]he episode about the RFAs.” Yue states that he
previously informed the trial court that a court commissioner had issued a
discovery order deeming true the requests for admission that Yang had used
various online identifications. On the second day of trial, Yue asked the trial
court to take judicial notice of the prior discovery order. Yue’s opening brief
states that the trial court “reacted by stating that [Yue’s] ‘failing to do this at
the outset is an absurd waste of time’.” However, Yue’s summary of his
exchange with the trial court is misleading and incomplete. The record
shows that the trial court first asked Yue for the date of the discovery order
so that the court could attempt to locate the document in its file. Yue
initially provided an incorrect date, and the court’s clerk could not locate the
document. Yue then provided the correct date, and the trial court stated that
Yue should have included the document as a potential exhibit rather than
have the court and the clerk scroll through years of documents in the court’s
file. When the trial court located the discovery order, it read into the record
the various online identifications Yang used on certain Web sites, based on
the admissions. The trial court then reconsidered a prior ruling on certain
other exhibits offered by Yue and stated, “Based on the newly I’m gonna say
discovered admissions, you failing to do this at the outset is an absurd waste
of time. But based on that, yes, these are admissible, so 42 and 44, although
15
I ruled them previously inadmissible, are now admitted into evidence.” Yue
then apologized and stated he was under the impression that the trial court
knew the requests for admission had been deemed admitted. The trial court
responded that it was Yue’s responsibility to bring his case and that “to state
that the court doesn’t understand what a ruling was previously in a case is
absurd. That’s not the way you handle a trial.” Yue made no objection
during this exchange that his due process rights were violated; nor does he
explain in his briefing why the trial court’s comments amount to a due
process violation. Yue’s claim is waived and meritless.
Third, Yue argues that the trial court exhibited bias against him when
it commented on his legal training. The context of the exchange is as follows.
Yang testified that he did not remember writing a message stated in an
exhibit Yue presented to Yang. Yue then asked a follow-up question, and the
trial court stated: “And you’re presuming that Mr. Yang wrote this
information. And you’re asking him about the substance. He has testified he
does not remember if he wrote this or not.” Yue responded to the court
asking to “have an adversarial proceeding and let Mr. Yang object to
whatever questions Plaintiff is asking?” The trial court agreed that Yang
was an adversarial witness and further stated that Yue was wasting time
and that it was the court’s responsibility to see that proceedings are
conducted in an orderly fashion. It stated that Yue was “not a lawyer trained
in the United States. In fact, you’re not a lawyer. You spent a great deal of
time yesterday on irrelevant and inadmissible material, and you are
attempting to do the same today.” Yue told the trial court that he was a
member of the California State Bar. The trial court then confirmed the
spelling of Yue’s name and corrected itself, stating, “Mr. Yue, I stand
16
corrected; you are a licensed attorney. You’re having trouble though, so I’d
ask that you proceed in an organized fashion, please.”
As with the other alleged due process violations, Yue has forfeited this
claim because he did not argue to the trial court that it was exhibiting bias or
violating his due process rights. (Geftakys v. State Personnel Board, supra,
138 Cal.App.3d at p. 864.) Further, Yue’s opening brief does not explain how
the above exchange violated his due process rights and, instead, simply states
that the trial court’s “apparent bias and prejudice were unwarranted.” (See
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142,
156 [conclusory arguments not supported by pertinent legal authority that
fail to disclose appellant’s reasoning may be disregarded].) While we do not
condone the trial court’s commenting on Yue’s status as a member of the
California State Bar or his legal training, the trial court quickly corrected
itself and the trial proceeded. Although Yue is a licensed attorney, he
represented himself at trial and in his appeal. As an unrepresented party, he
is held to the same standards as other litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247 [unrepresented parties are entitled to no
greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys].) Based on our
consideration of the incomplete record, it appears that the trial court was
attempting to assist the litigants in moving the case forward in an efficient
manner. (Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (2018) 19
Cal.App.5th 525, 539–542 [recognizing trial court’s broad discretion to guide
trial, including directing counsel to ask direct questions and avoid wasting
time].) Even if Yue had not forfeited his due process claim, he has failed to
demonstrate a due process violation.
17
V. Equal Protection
Under a separate heading, Yue argues the same exchange with the
trial court regarding Yue’s status as a lawyer violates the equal protection
clauses of the California and U.S. Constitutions. This issue was also not
raised below and is therefore forfeited. (Geftakys v. State Personnel Board,
supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 864.) Moreover, Yue has not demonstrated that
his trial was conducted in a manner that violated the equal protection
clauses.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Yue’s request for terminating and monetary
sanctions against Yang is denied. Yang shall recover his costs on appeal.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Simons, J.
Chou, J.
A168295/Yue v. Yang
18
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.