People v. Ramos CA2/5

CourtListener 10286118Calctapp27 nov. 2024

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Filed 11/27/24 P. v. Ramos CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B332668

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA117053)
v.

GAVINO CIRILO RAMOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of the County of Los Angeles, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Reversed
and remanded with instructions.
Linda L. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Irvi and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Gavino Ramos appeals from the trial court’s
denial of his petition to vacate his second degree murder
conviction and resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.6.1
According to defendant, the court’s denial at the prima facie
stage, without first holding an evidentiary hearing, violated
section 1172.6. We reverse the order denying the petition and
remand for further proceedings.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

A. Prosecution’s Case

“Defendant was an active member of a Lynwood gang. On
August 13, 2010, at about 6[:00] p.m., defendant went to a gang
hangout on Blumont Road in South Gate. The house was on the
border of defendant’s gang’s territory. At the time, [Isabel]
Ballesteros operated a gambling machine there. And a rival

1 Defendant filed his petition pursuant to former Penal Code
section 1170.95 which the Legislature renumbered, with no
change in text, as section 1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we refer to that section as
currently numbered throughout this opinion. All further
statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The facts are taken from People v. Ramos (Nov. 22, 2013,
B244221) [nonpub. opn.] (Ramos), the opinion issued in the
appeal from the underlying judgment, and provided solely to lend
context to our discussion of the procedural history of this case
that follows.

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Compton gang member was selling methamphetamine from the
location. Defendant was accompanied by a fellow gang member,
[Andres] Verduzco. Several people were in the garage smoking
methamphetamine when defendant and . . . Verduzco arrived.
Among them were three or four members of the rival Compton
gang. There was an ongoing, years-long feud between the
Lynwood and Compton gangs. Defendant announced himself to
the rival gang members. He then pulled a gun from his
waistband or pocket and said, ‘Everybody get the fuck out.’ As
people scattered, defendant fired his weapon. A rival gang
member, Albert Reyes, was shot and died.” (Ramos, supra,
B244221.)

B. Defendant’s Testimony

“Defendant testified he was unarmed and did not know
there were rival gang members present until [an acquaintance at
the house] told him. . . . Defendant testified: ‘[Reyes] was
withdrawing a gun from his waist with his right hand. I grabbed
his gun with my left hand and then I grabbed the barrel. We
began to struggle. I told him, “Don’t do it. Let it go.”’ Other
people in the room began to yell and run for the door. Defendant
described the continuing struggle with [Reyes]: ‘[A]s I stripped it,
I like snatched it out of his hand. When I seen—he wasn’t going
to stop me, so I just snatched it out. In the process of snatching it
out I jumped back. Jerked it. He went to turn towards the door.
Everybody is already running. Everybody is bolting for the doors.
[¶] So at that time as I jerked, I gripped the gun. As I gripped
and pulled, that’s when it discharged.’ Defendant then fled
through the same door he had used to originally enter the room.

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Defendant took the gun with him when he fled.” (Ramos, supra,
B244221.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Information

In 2011, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
information that charged defendant and Verduzco3 with the
second degree murder of Reyes in violation of section 187,
subdivision (a). The District Attorney alleged, among other
enhancements, that defendant personally and intentionally
discharged a handgun causing great bodily injury and death
within meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d).

B. Trial

A trial, the trial court delivered the following jury
instructions, among others:
CALJIC No. 8.10, which defined murder as a killing “done
with malice aforethought[.]”
CALJIC No. 8.11, which provided that: “The prosecution is
proceeding on a theory of implied malice. [¶] Malice is implied
when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act; [¶]
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human
life; and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with

3 According to the opinion in Ramos, supra, B244221
“Defendant and . . . Verduzco were tried together before the same
jury. [Codefendant] Ballesteros was tried at the same time but
before a separate jury.” (Ibid.)

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knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life. [¶] When it is shown that a killing resulted from the
intentional doing of an act with implied malice, no other mental
state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice
aforethought.”
CALJIC No. 3.02, which advised jurors that “[o]ne who aids
and abets another in the commission of a crime is not only guilty
of that crime, but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a
principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the
crime originally aided and abetted.”4
CALJIC No. 17.19.5, which instructed jurors that they
“must determine whether defendant . . . intentionally and
personally discharged a firearm and caused death to a person in

4 CALJIC No. 3.02 further provided: “In order to find the
defendant guilty of the crime of murder under this theory as
charged you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that:
“1. The crime of attempted assault was committed[;]
“2. That the defendant aided and abetted that crime;
“3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime
of murder; and
“4. The crime of murder was a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of the crime of attempted assault.
“In determining whether a consequence is ‘natural and
probable,’ you must apply an objective test, based not on what the
defendant actually intended, but on what a person of reasonable
and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to occur. The
issue is to be decided in light of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident. A ‘natural’ consequence is one which is
within the normal range of outcomes that may be reasonably
expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. ‘Probable’
means likely to happen.”

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the commission of that felony” and that “defendant himself must
have intentionally discharged [a firearm].”
Following trial, the jury found defendant guilty of second
degree murder and found true, among other allegations,5 the
personal use and discharge of a firearm causing great bodily
injury or death allegation under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
The trial court found defendant had suffered five prior serious or
violent felony convictions within the meaning of sections 667,
subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) though
(d) and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 80 years to life.6

C. Section 1172.6 Petition

On April 27, 2022, defendant filed his section 1172.6
petition, alleging, among other things, that he had been charged
in an accusatory pleading that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and that he could not presently be
convicted of murder because of changes made to sections 188 and
189, effective January 2019.
On May 24, 2023, defendant filed a “merit brief” arguing
that the trial court instructed the jury with a natural and
probable consequences jury instruction on a theory of murder
that is no longer valid and the court should not rely on the facts

5 “The jury further found gang and personal firearm use
allegations true. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subd. (d).)”
(Ramos, supra, B244221.)

6 On April 17, 2012, following remittitur from the Court of
Appeal, the trial court resentenced defendant to 75 years to life.

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in the opinion in Ramos, supra, B244221 or otherwise engage in
factfinding at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
On July 11, 2023, the District Attorney filed a response to
the petition, arguing that the jury was not instructed on the
theory of felony murder and although the jury had been
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
“that theory only applied to [co]defendant Ballesteros and the
[prosecution] did not argue natural and probable consequences to
[defendant’s] jury. [Defendant] was prosecuted as a principal
who committed this crime with actual malice and he testified at
trial he shot the victim, but it was an accident. Therefore, he
cannot avail himself of the relief offered pursuant to . . . [s]ection
1172.6.”
On July 17, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on
defendant’s petition. The court explained:
“It appears that the [defendant] was an active member of a
Lynwood gang which feuded with a Compton gang.
“[Defendant] went to a gang hangout in the City of
Southgate where a Compton gang member was selling drugs.
“[Defendant] was accompanied by a fellow member of his
gang.
“[Defendant] confronted some three to four other Compton
gang members.
“[Defendant] pulled out a gun; it was either a Smith and
Wesson or a Glock semiautomatic handgun.
“He pulled it out of his waistband or pocket and said to the
group, ‘Everyone get the fuck out.’
“Apparently [defendant] was upset that people were selling
narcotics at that location.

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“[Defendant] fired the weapon at the victim, . . . Reyes, who
later died; there were multiple witnesses to the incident.
“Following the shooting a witness—a female witness began
screaming.
“[Defendant] told her, ‘shut the fuck up, bitch, or I’ll kill
you.’
“It appears based, upon my reading of the transcript, the
appellate court decision[’]s findings that [defendant] is the actual
shooter and actual killer.
“He was subsequently convicted of second degree murder
with a personal use of a firearm.
“I also want to note that [defendant] testified at the trial,
and he did testify that he snatched the weapon from the victim
and supposedly discharged the weapon when he gripped the gun.
And it was either a self-defense claim or an accident claim; either
way, the jury rejected that argument.
“And so for all of those reasons the court makes the
following ruling: [¶] [Defendant] has failed to make a prima
facie case showing that he is entitled to sentencing relief
pursuant to . . . section 1172.6. [¶] He is ineligible for relief for
at least two reasons: Number one, he is not a person convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
the crime. [¶] Secondly, he could still be convicted of murder
after the changes made to sections 188 and 189 effective January
[1,] 2019. [¶] Under section 189 as it currently exists, one who
murders is still liable for murder if they were the actual killer.”
Defendant filed a timely appeal from the order denying his
section 1172.6 petition.

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IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to issue
an order to show cause and denying his petition at the prima
facie stage of the proceedings. We agree.

A. Legal Principles

Under section 1172.6, “person[s] convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime” may file a
petition to have that conviction vacated under certain
circumstances. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) “After the parties have had
an opportunity to submit briefing[ ], the court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
“A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,
that . . . the petitioner was the actual killer . . . .” (People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) In determining whether a petition
makes a prima facie case for relief, the court may review the
record of conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971–
972 & fn.6 (Lewis).)
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of

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discretion.’ [Citation.] . . . [T]he ‘prima facie bar was
intentionally and correctly set very low.’” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 972.) “At the prima facie stage, a court must accept
as true a petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not currently
be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the allegation
is refuted by the record. [Citation.] And this allegation is not
refuted by the record unless the record conclusively establishes
every element of the offense.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 463.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of
eligibility, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
We review de novo the trial court’s determination of
whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing. (People
v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

B. Analysis

In ruling on the petition, the trial court concluded that
defendant had failed to establish eligibility for resentencing
under section 1172.6 because he failed to demonstrate that he
could have been convicted under an invalid theory of murder. As
the court read the record jury instructions, although the jury was
instructed under the now invalid natural and probable
consequences theory, that theory was limited to codefendants
Verduzco and Ballesteros. When it delivered the instruction on
natural and probable consequences, CALJIC No. 3.02, the court
did not explain to the jurors that it did not apply to defendant or
otherwise limit their use of it to the facts of the codefendants’
participation in the shooting. Thus, at this stage of the

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proceedings, we cannot reject, as a matter of law, defendant’s
allegation that he was convicted under an invalid theory of
murder without a finding of malice.
Further, by concluding that defendant was convicted under
a valid theory of murder that included a finding of implied
malice, the trial court necessarily found that he acted with
knowledge of the danger to, and conscious disregard for, human
life. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on both the
appellate opinion affirming the judgment of conviction and the
transcript of the trial testimony, finding, among other things,
that defendant arrived at the house armed with a handgun,
brandished it in the garage while shouting at those present, and
“fired the weapon at the victim, . . . Reyes, who later died; there
were multiple witnesses to the incident.” At the prima facie
stage, however, the trial court’s inquiry is limited to the readily
ascertainable facts from the record and cannot involve
factfinding, that is, weighing evidence, drawing inferences, or
making credibility determinations. (See People v. Drayton (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 965, 968, 982.)
Finally, the jury’s finding that defendant personally used a
firearm also did not establish defendant’s ineligibility for relief as
a matter of law. (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598.)
Because the record of conviction does not conclusively
establish that defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law,
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s petition at the prima
facie stage.

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V. DISPOSITION

The order denying the section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is reversed and remanded to the trial court with
directions to issue an order to show cause and to thereafter
proceed as required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

D. KIM, J.

We concur:

MOOR, P. J.

DAVIS, J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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