People v. McBride CA4/3

CourtListener 10285034Calctapp27 nov. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 11/26/24 P. v. McBride CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062470

v. (Super. Ct. No. 20HF1785)

LAMETRA MARCELLA MCBRIDE, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gregg L. Prickett and Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judges. Affirmed.
Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Lametra Marcella McBride appeals from a judgment after a jury
convicted her of possessing methamphetamine while armed, possessing
methamphetamine for personal use, and possessing a methamphetamine
pipe. McBride contends: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence
that she used methamphetamine years earlier, which led to instructional
error; (2) the charge for possessing methamphetamine while armed (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11370.1)1 is unconstitutional; and (3) we should review the
court’s in camera Pitchess hearing (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974)
11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)). We conclude the first contention has merit but that
the evidentiary error, and subsequent instructional error, was harmless. We
further conclude section 11370.1 is constitutional. And after reviewing the
court’s Pitchess proceedings, we find no error. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
I.
THE TRAFFIC STOP AND INFORMATION
McBride slept in a car’s passenger seat when two patrolling
Laguna Beach Police Officers initiated a traffic stop for traffic violations. The
driver, who was McBride’s boyfriend and on parole, responded very slowly to
the emergency lights and drove a half mile before eventually stopping. One
officer spoke with McBride and saw her purse on the passenger seat
floorboard. McBride consented to the officer searching her purse. The purse
was a large mesh tote bag with miscellaneous “junk drawer” type items
inside, along with a half-full bottle of alcohol, a knife, socks, a pack of
cigarettes, and a smaller orange makeup bag. Inside the orange bag, the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Health and

Safety Code.

2
officer found McBride’s California identification card, a small plastic bag of
methamphetamine, a pipe used for ingesting methamphetamine, and a
firearm. The firearm had one round in the chamber and six in the magazine.
The police department later fire-tested the firearm and determined it was
operable. The firearm and ammunition were never tested for DNA.
An information charged McBride with possession of a controlled
substance while armed (§ 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1), carrying a concealed
firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400, subds. (a)(1), (c)(7); count 2),
possession of methamphetamine (§ 11377, subd. (a); count 3), and possession
of a methamphetamine pipe (§ 11364, subd. (a); count 4). McBride pleaded
not guilty, and the case progressed to pretrial motions.
II.
PRETRIAL MOTIONS
McBride first filed a Pitchess motion, requesting the trial court
review both involved officers’ personnel records for discoverable materials.
After reviewing their records, the court determined no records required
disclosure.
Next, McBride filed a demurrer arguing the firearm restrictions
in counts 1 and 2 violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments as
construed under the recent United States Supreme Court case, New York
State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen). The
demurrer alleged both counts were facially devoid because California’s
firearm licensing scheme is unconstitutional under Bruen. The trial court
overruled McBride’s demurrer.

3
During motions in limine, the trial court inquired whether there
were “felony convictions, misdemeanor convictions, or anything that [the
prosecutor was] seeking to impeach [McBride] with.” Referring to McBride’s
simple possession of methamphetamine arrests from 14 years earlier, the
prosecutor advised, “[W]ell, none that I’m seeking to impeach her with in
terms of being moral turpitude to impeach her credibility. However, . . . if
[McBride] says something like, ‘Oh, I’ve’—‘I have no knowledge of this
particular thing,’ and there’s evidence that she does and I think it’s relevant,
I would ask to sidebar first before I ask her about it.” McBride’s counsel
moved to exclude impeachment evidence of McBride’s prior arrests. The court
granted the motion, “with the caveat” they would have the sidebar hearing
before allowing it.
III.
THE TRIAL
At trial, both officers testified about the encounter with McBride.
One officer described the illicit items she found in McBride’s purse. Along
with this officer’s testimony, the prosecutor proffered body worn camera video
evidence depicting the officer searching the purse and photo evidence of the
firearm, the methamphetamine, and the pipe.
After the prosecution’s case-in-chief, McBride moved for a
judgment of acquittal as to both firearm counts, again alleging both charges
were unconstitutional under Bruen. (Pen. Code, § 1118.1; Bruen, supra, 597
U.S. 1.) McBride reasoned the statutes violated the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments because Bruen rendered California’s licensing scheme
unconstitutional and because the prosecutor failed to meet his burden to
prove the statutes were consistent with the nation’s historic traditions of gun
regulation, as required under Bruen. The trial court denied McBride’s motion.

4
McBride testified in her defense, claiming she did not know how
the methamphetamine, pipe, or firearm ended up in her orange bag inside
her purse. She stated she and the driver were coming from a party where she
left her purse unattended in another room for the duration of the party and
did not notice anything unusual about her bag upon leaving. She said she
consented to the officer searching her bag because she had nothing to hide.
Counsel asked, “Had you used methamphetamine that evening” or “in the
past day?” McBride answered “No” to both questions. She testified she did not
know the driver to use methamphetamine or to have guns and had no reason
to suspect as much.
Before cross-examination, the prosecutor requested a sidebar
conversation. At sidebar, the prosecutor advised he intended to ask McBride
about her prior methamphetamine use. Counsel objected on relevance
grounds and argued the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value
under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court overruled counsel’s
objections. The prosecutor inquired as follows:
“[Prosecutor:] So, . . . McBride, [counsel] asked you if you had
used . . . methamphetamine that day, and your
answer was no; correct?
“[McBride:] Correct.
“[Prosecutor:] And he also asked if you had used methamphetamine
the past day, and your answer was no; correct?
“[McBride:] Correct.
“[Prosecutor:] But you have used methamphetamine before; isn’t
that true?
“[Counsel:] Objection. Relevance.
“The [c]ourt: Overruled.

5
“[McBride:] Like years and years ago. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Prosecutor:] And so it’s fair to say that you know what
methamphetamine looks like; correct?
“[McBride:] Yes. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Prosecutor:] Is it fair to say that you also know what a
methamphetamine pipe looks like?
“[McBride:] Yes. We just saw one.
“[Prosecutor:] But prior to this incident, you knew?
“[McBride:] Yes.”
After both parties rested, the trial court discussed a limiting
instruction about how the jury may consider the evidence of McBride’s past
methamphetamine use. The court explained it allowed the evidence for
“credibility impeachment” and not for any other purpose. The court asserted
it was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), and
added: “[T]he only reason that question would be admissible is impeachment
to putting in context what [counsel] offered. [¶] [Counsel] offered a portrayal
of . . . McBride as someone who did not use methamphetamine, and the jury
could then extrapolate from that she doesn’t use methamphetamine; she has
used it in the past. . . . [Y]ou don’t need to believe her that this just appeared
in her orange bag; she’s used methamphetamine in the past. That’s fair.” The
court emphasized, “[The jury] can reject her testimony and determine that
she knew what it was or that she knew she had it there. [¶] . . . [¶] Admitting
to use of methamphetamine in the past is admitting to committing a crime in
the past. [¶] . . . [¶] In a case in which we’re talking about methamphetamine
it is relevant.”

6
As finalized, CALCRIM No. 303 read, in relevant part: “You
heard evidence that defendant may have used methamphetamine in the
past. . . . You may use this evidence in deciding whether the defendant had
knowledge of the nature and character of the methamphetamine and
methamphetamine pipe. You may also use this testimony to judge the
witness’s credibility.”2
During closing arguments, McBride’s defense was that the driver,
who was her boyfriend and on parole, could have placed the items in her bag
during the party or while he was being pulled over because she was asleep.
The prosecution argued the gun, pipe, and methamphetamine belonged to
McBride, and the only reasonable conclusion was that McBride knew they
were in her purse, next to her identification card.
The jury found McBride not guilty of carrying a concealed firearm
in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400; count 2) and guilty on all remaining charges.
The trial court sentenced McBride to two years formal probation and stayed
the probationary term pending appeal. McBride timely appealed.

2 The modified version of CALCRIM No. 303 read: “You heard

evidence that defendant may have used methamphetamine in the past. You
may not use this evidence to conclude that the defendant possessed
methamphetamine or a methamphetamine pipe on November 8, 2020 based
on that testimony alone. You may use this evidence in deciding whether the
defendant had knowledge of the nature and character of the
methamphetamine and methamphetamine pipe. You may also use this
testimony to judge the witness’s credibility. You may use that testimony for
these purposes only and are not to consider it for any other purpose.”

7
DISCUSSION
McBride raises three arguments: (1) the trial court improperly
allowed testimony of McBride’s previous methamphetamine use to be
admitted as character evidence, which lead to instructional error; (2) section
11370.1 is unconstitutional under Bruen; and (3) we should review the court’s
in camera Pitchess proceedings. As discussed below, we conclude the court
admitted the evidence under an incorrect theory of admissibility, but it was
nevertheless admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
The court’s subsequent instructional error was harmless. We hold section
11370.1 survives Bruen. Finally, we conclude there was no legal error in the
court’s Pitchess proceedings.
I.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
McBride contends the evidence that she used methamphetamine
“years and years ago” was improperly admitted as character evidence and
was exceedingly prejudicial. McBride asserts the limiting instruction did not
cure the error. We find any error was harmless.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s “discretion in admitting or excluding evidence” is
reviewable for abuse of discretion “and will not be disturbed except on a
showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
[Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.) “State evidentiary
law error in admitting uncharged act evidence is reviewed under the [People
v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818] standard” where “‘“a defendant must show
it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained

8
absent the error.”’” (People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 968, quoting
People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955.)
B. Evidence Code Sections 780 and 1101
While a prior conviction may be admissible to impeach a
witness’s veracity where the prior act involves moral turpitude or disproves
any fact the witness testified to (Evid. Code, § 780), neither impeachment
theory is applicable here. Simple drug possession does not involve moral
turpitude, and McBride testified that she did not use methamphetamine that
day or the day prior—not that she had never used methamphetamine. The
trial court erred in concluding the evidence was admissible as impeachment
because the evidence does not contradict McBride’s testimony. However, the
misstated legal basis was inconsequential because the evidence was plainly
admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
Generally, evidence that a criminal defendant previously
committed uncharged crimes is inadmissible “when offered to prove his or her
conduct on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) But such
evidence may be admissible “when relevant to prove some fact . . . other than
his or her disposition to commit such an act,” such as knowledge. (Id., subd.
(b).)
To prove a defendant guilty of possessing methamphetamine for
personal use under section 11377, the prosecutor must prove, in relevant
part, that “[t]he defendant knew of the substance’s nature or character as a
controlled substance.” (CALCRIM No. 2304.) Pleading not guilty places the
charged offense’s elements in dispute. (People v. Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th
at p. 959.) Accordingly, evidence tending to prove the knowledge element is
at-issue and highly relevant. (Evid. Code, § 210.) Indeed, “[i]n prosecutions
for drug offenses, evidence of prior drug use . . . is generally admissible under

9
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) . . . to prove knowledge of the
narcotic nature of the drugs. [Citations.]” (People v. Williams (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 587, 607.)
Although evidence that McBride used methamphetamine years
ago was inadmissible to impeach her character or veracity, it was still
admissible for the limited purpose of showing McBride’s knowledge that the
substance was a narcotic since this is an element of count 3, simple
methamphetamine possession under section 11377, subdivision (a). The trial
court’s mistaken basis for admission, if cured, would result in the same
outcome; the evidence was admissible.
C. Evidence Code Section 352
McBride also contends the trial court should have barred the
evidence under Evidence Code section 352. This argument fails.
The trial court “in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) Evidence showing a defendant
committed the same offense on a separate occasion is inherently prejudicial.
But undue prejudice does not simply mean evidence that harms the
defendant’s case. (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513, 532.) “‘“‘“[T]he
prejudice which exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is
designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally
flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.”’”’” (Ibid., quoting People v.
Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 205.)

10
Because knowledge of the narcotic was an element of count 3,
evidence showing McBride is familiar with methamphetamine is highly
probative. The prejudicial effect the evidence has on the jury “naturally
flows” from the relevant evidence. (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
513, 532.) The probative value is more significant than any prejudicial effect
given she testified she used methamphetamine “years and years ago” as
opposed to recently. Indeed, the remoteness in time actually dampens the
prejudicial effect in this context. The jury had already heard evidence
McBride possessed methamphetamine on the occasion at issue, minimizing
any salacious or shocking effect the evidence may have had on the jury. The
trial court correctly found the evidence is not barred by Evidence Code
section 352.
D. Limiting Instruction
McBride only asserts that the limiting instruction did not cure
the error of admitting the prior use evidence, but we will address the issue as
a general claim of instructional error and find the trial court’s error harmless.
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581.) As discussed above, the evidence was
only admissible to show McBride’s knowledge, not to judge her credibility. As
such, the trial court erred when it included in its limiting instruction, “You
may also use this testimony to judge the witness’s credibility.” While the rest
of CALCRIM No. 303 correctly instructed the jury it may use the evidence to
show McBride’s knowledge that the substance she possessed was
methamphetamine, this sentence improperly permitted the jury to use the
evidence to judge McBride’s credibility.
This error was harmless considering the sufficient evidence
supporting McBride’s guilt for possessing methamphetamine. McBride’s

11
purse was at her feet in the car. The officer found the methamphetamine
inside the small makeup bag inside her purse, right next to her California
identification card. Her only defense was that her boyfriend had two
opportunities to put the methamphetamine in her bag, despite her testimony
that she had no reason to suspect him to use methamphetamine. It is not
reasonably probable the jury would have returned a not guilty verdict if that
sentence had been omitted from the instruction. McBride was not prejudiced.
II.
SECOND AMENDMENT
McBride asserts section 11370.1 violates the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments. She has two separate claims of unconstitutionality
under Bruen: (1) California’s concealed carry licensing scheme was deemed
unconstitutional by Bruen, so section 11370.1 is also unconstitutional; and (2)
section 11370.1 fails under Bruen’s clarified Second Amendment analysis.
Neither claim has merit.
A. Standard of review
A reviewing court applies a de novo standard of review when
interpreting a statute and determining its constitutionality because these are
questions of law. (People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 474.) We
consider the statute’s text alone, not its application to particular facts. (Ibid.)
B. Background on Second Amendment Jurisprudence
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in relevant part, “[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”
In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller), the
United States Supreme Court made clear that the Second Amendment
protects the “right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,”

12
(Heller, at p. 592), including “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to
use arms in defense of hearth and home” (id. at p. 635). The court held the
District of Columbia’s law prohibiting handgun possession in the home
violated the Second Amendment. Yet the court underscored the “individual
right to keep and bear arms” (Heller, at p. 595) is not unlimited, noting it is
“not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose” (id. at p. 626). The court assured that
nothing in its opinion impinged “longstanding prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”
(Id. at pp. 626–627.) The court noted the list of “presumptively lawful
regulatory measures” was not exhaustive. (Id. at p. 627, fn. 26.)
The individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second
Amendment was made applicable to the states in McDonald v. Chicago
(2010) 561 U.S. 742 (McDonald) under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (McDonald, at p. 750.) The court in McDonald
similarly noted the incorporation “does not imperil every law regulating
firearms.” (Id. at p. 786)
Lower courts began applying a two-step test to analyze Second
Amendment challenges, referred to as the post-Heller test. The test asked
whether the challenged law prohibited conduct that fell within the scope of
the Second Amendment and, if so, the court balanced the statute’s objectives
against the means employed. (People v. Gonzalez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 907,
912 (Gonzalez).)
The United States Supreme Court in Bruen, adopted the first step
and rejected the second step in the post-Heller framework, finding means-end

13
balancing is incompatible with Heller. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at pp. 23–24;
People v. Allen (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 573, 581 (Allen).) The court clarified the
legal standard for Second Amendment challenges: “When the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution
presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its
regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the
individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified
command.’” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24, quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar
(1961) 366 U.S. 36, 49, fn. 10.) The Bruen court echoed Heller’s assurances
that the protection exists only for law-abiding citizens. (Bruen, supra, 597
U.S. at p. 29; Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 635.)
Applying this standard, the Bruen court struck down a New York
firearm licensing statute that required individuals to prove “proper cause,” or
a special need for protection, to lawfully carry a concealed firearm outside the
home for self-defense. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 12.) The court concluded
the proper cause requirement violated the Second Amendment because a law-
abiding individual carrying a firearm for self-defense is squarely covered in
the Second Amendment’s plain text, and the government failed to meet its
burden in demonstrating a historical tradition in regulating firearms as such.
(Id. at pp. 31–32.)
C. Analysis—California’s Licensing Scheme
McBride first alleges Bruen made section 11370.1 (prohibiting
possession of a controlled substance while armed with an operable firearm)
unconstitutional on its face because California’s concealed carry statutes
mirrored New York’s. McBride’s interpretation of Bruen is overbroad and her
claim unsupported.

14
McBride is correct that California’s two concealed carry statutes
were deemed unconstitutional by Bruen, but the Legislature promptly
amended the statutes to comport with the Second Amendment. (Former Pen.
Code, §§ 26150, subd. (a)(1)–(2), 26155, subd. (a)(1)–(2); both amended by
Stats. 2023, ch. 249, §§ 10 & 11, respectively.) Further, California appellate
courts have not broadly interpreted Bruen to mean that because the two
statutes were once unconstitutional, California’s entire firearm licensing
scheme and ancillary statutes regulating firearm possession are similarly
unconstitutional. (People v. Mosqueda (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 402
[finding the two unconstitutional statutes severable from California’s
licensing scheme].)
Even assuming arguendo that Bruen invalidated California’s
entire concealed carry scheme, such a ruling would be irrelevant to section
11370.1. In the trial court, McBride had standing to challenge Penal Code
section 25400 before the jury acquitted her of that count because section
25400 is the relevant enforcement mechanism of California’s once-
unconstitutional licensing scheme. A criminal defendant “may demur to the
accusatory pleading” when “the statutory provision alleged in the accusatory
pleading is constitutionally invalid.” (Pen. Code, § 1004, subd. (f).)
Contrasted here, McBride has no standing to contest section
11370.1’s constitutionality because it is unrelated to California’s licensing
scheme. The constitutional claim is misplaced. Indeed, obtaining a concealed
carry license has no bearing on possessing methamphetamine while armed
with a loaded, operable firearm. The legislative intent for enacting section
11370.1 was not to ensure reasonable firearm regulations but was centered
around stopping “‘“‘the growing menace from a very deadly combination—
illegal drugs and firearms.’”’ [Citation].” (In re Ogea (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th

15
974, 984.) The charge exists irrespective of the validity of a defendant’s
license. (In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 165.) McBride was not
aggrieved by the previously unconstitutional statute.
D. Analysis—Bruen’s Second Amendment Framework
Next, McBride asserts section 11370.1 violates the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments under the framework set forth in Bruen, as applied
to McBride. She asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion for a
directed verdict because the prosecutor failed to establish McBride is not a
law-abiding citizen or that the Nation has a historic tradition in regulating
firearms. This contention misses the mark.
California appellate courts have held, and we agree, that section
11370.1 remains constitutional after Bruen because the constitution does not
afford the right to possess methamphetamine while armed. Before Bruen, the
Court of Appeal in Gonzalez rejected the claim that section 11370.1 violated
the Second Amendment. (Gonzalez, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 910.)
Applying the post-Heller test, the Gonzalez court concluded section 11370.1
was constitutional after the first step alone because the law did not burden
constitutionally protected conduct; the Second Amendment does not “protect[]
a right to carry a gun while simultaneously engaging in criminal conduct.”
(Gonzalez, at pp. 912–913.) Because the post-Heller test’s first step and
Bruen’s Second Amendment framework both begin by inquiring whether the
prohibited conduct is covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text,
Gonzalez’s analysis “remains good law after Bruen.” (Allen, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at p. 581.)
Indeed, after Bruen, the Court of Appeal in Allen affirmed
Gonzalez’s holding that section 11370.1 is constitutional at the first step of
the analysis “because the firearm possession prohibition . . . does not affect

16
the individual right of ‘“law-abiding, responsible citizens”’ to possess firearms
[citations].” (Allen, supra, 96 Cal. App. 5th at p. 581.) We find the Allen and
Gonzalez analyses persuasive.
Expounding further, our holding remains irrespective of whether
McBride herself is deemed a law-abiding citizen. This does not mean anyone
with a prior drug possession conviction necessarily loses their Second
Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense purposes. Rather, the
concurrent possession of methamphetamine and a firearm is unlawful per se
and unprotected conduct not contemplated in the plain text of the Second
Amendment. Accordingly, section 11370.1 survives Bruen.
III.
PITCHESS
Finally, McBride asks us to review the Pitchess proceedings in
the trial court to ensure discoverable, nonprivileged records were not
wrongfully withheld. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531.) We find no error.
A. Background
McBride filed a Pitchess motion in the trial court. In support of
McBride’s Pitchess motion, counsel submitted a sealed declaration asserting
the relevant good cause grounds for granting the motion. Counsel for the
police department provided the court the relevant body worn camera video
from the encounter to rebut McBride’s assertions. Before watching the video,
the court issued a tentative ruling to grant the motion and conduct the in
camera hearing to determine whether responsive discovery must be turned
over.
After watching the video, however, the trial court found the
assertions in counsel’s declaration unfounded. Instead of denying the motion,
the court gave the police department’s counsel and custodian of records the

17
option to voluntarily consent to the in camera records review to save time
should a future appellate court conclude the court erred in denying the
motion. The police department’s custodian of records and counsel agreed to
the in camera review. After reviewing both officers’ personnel records, the
court concluded no relevant records required disclosure.
B. Law and Analysis
A criminal defendant may compel disclosure of an arresting
officer’s privileged personnel records through a Pitchess motion if “relevant to
the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge.” (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 40–41.) To
obtain such records, the defendant must file a written motion and notice to
the governmental agency in custody of the records describing “the type of
records or information sought” (Evid. Code, § 1043, subds. (a), (b)(2)) and
include “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure
sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in
the pending litigation” (id., subd. (b)(3)).
The “good cause” showing in the motion’s supporting declaration
under Evidence Code section 1043 must “describe a factual scenario
supporting the claimed officer misconduct” which “may consist of a denial of
the facts asserted in the police report.” (Warrick v. Superior Court. (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1011, 1024–1025.) Though the trial court “does not determine
whether a defendant’s version of events . . . is persuasive,” the version of
events must nevertheless be plausible. (Id., at p. 1026.) The “plausible
scenario of officer misconduct is one that might or could have occurred.”
(Ibid.)

18
The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a
defendant established good cause, and “a reviewing court should reverse the
court’s determinations only on a showing that the court abused this
discretion.” (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086.)
Where the trial court finds the defendant established good cause, the court
then conducts an in camera hearing reviewing the responsive records brought
by the custodian of records and determines whether any records are
nonprivileged and discoverable under Pitchess and its progeny. (Evid. Code,
§ 1045.)
We reviewed McBride’s motion, her counsel’s sealed declaration,
and the sealed reporter’s transcript from the Pitchess motion hearing and
subsequent in camera hearing. McBride confided in her counsel specific facts
about the case, which counsel declared upon information and belief, that
conflicted with the police report. However, each fact McBride asserted was
dispelled by uncontroverted statements in the officer’s body worn camera
video. Absent the few asserted conflicts, McBride had no other allegations of
plausible scenarios of police misconduct to merit an in camera review. While
the trial court and this court are not to determine whether McBride’s
assertions are persuasive, they certainly must be plausible.
Because there was no plausible justification to grant the motion
and conduct an in camera review in the first place, we need not review the
trial court’s findings during the in camera hearing. Accordingly, the court did
not abuse its discretion and correctly concluded there was no plausible
justification to grant the motion.

19
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

20

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.