People v. Lopez CA4/2

CourtListener 10284114Calctapp26 nov. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 11/26/24 P. v. Lopez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E081569

v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV1101402)

MARIA LOPEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Katrina West,

Judge. Affirmed.

Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, and Laura

Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Maria Lopez is a citizen of Mexico who has been living

in the United States for over 45 years. In 2013, she pled no contest to attempted second
1
degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and admitted the personal use of a

firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) allegation. In exchange for her plea, the remaining

allegations were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to a stipulated term of 13 years

in state prison.

In 2022, as she was facing deportation proceedings, defendant filed a motion to

withdraw her plea and vacate her conviction pursuant to section 1473.7 on the grounds

that her conviction was legally invalid and not knowingly and intelligently made because

her trial counsel failed to advise her about the immigration consequences of her guilty

plea, she did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of her

plea, and she was prejudiced. The trial court denied the motion.

Defendant appeals, contending her plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of

counsel. Specifically, she faults her counsel for failing to advise her of the specific

immigration consequences of her plea. She also argues that she did not have a

meaningful understanding of the immigration consequences of her plea and that the errors

prejudicially effected the outcome. We find no error and affirm the order.

1
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2
II.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The victim and defendant were married but were separated at the time of the

offense. They shared a six-year-old daughter. The victim reported their relationship

“was extremely volatile,” and that defendant had threatened to kill him in 2009.

On May 23, 2011, as the victim pulled up to his home in his vehicle, he noticed a

figure wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and a ski mask pointing a gun at him from

outside the vehicle. The victim observed the person pull the trigger several times, but the

gun never fired. Panicked, the victim opened his car door, hit the assailant with his car,

and ran for help to a nearby residence. When the victim turned around, he saw the

assailant flee the scene.

The victim believed defendant was involved and notified law enforcement. Prior

to the incident, a witness saw a female parked near her home acting suspiciously while

she sat in a vehicle with a company insignia on the doors. The witness later identified

defendant in an infield lineup as the person parked near her home right before the attempt

on the victim’s life.

Officers subsequently contacted defendant and searched her company vehicle,

which she had taken rather than her personal vehicle. A search of defendant’s company

2
A summary of the factual background is taken from the probation officer’s
report.

3
car revealed a gun, taser, ski mask, black or blue beanie, folding knife, disposable vinyl

gloves, black duct tape, ammunition, black gloves, and lighter fluid.

Officers also located a man who stated defendant had offered him $800 to “‘f—k

up’” the victim. The cohort stated that, on an occasion prior to May 23, he arrived at the

victim’s home with a knife with the intent to surprise the victim and attack him.

However, the victim was already inside the home at the time, and the plan was aborted.

Defendant denied any involvement in the incident but described how the victim had made

her life “full of problems” after she demanded child support. Defendant also reported

that there was a current case where her teenage daughter had accused the victim of

molesting her and that the case was still pending.

On January 13, 2012, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed an

amended information charging defendant with premeditated and deliberate attempted

murder (§§ 664/187 subd. (a); count 1), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count

2), and two counts of conspiracy to commit a crime (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); counts 3 & 4).

The amended information further alleged that defendant personally used a firearm in the

commission of count the attempted murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).

On August 2, 2013, defendant pled no contest to attempted second degree murder

and admitted that she had personally used a firearm. In return, the remaining allegations

were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to a stipulated term of 13 years in prison.

4
On June 7, 2022, this court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s section
3
1203.4b petition, and remanded the matter for the trial court to exercise its discretion.

(People v. Lopez (June 7, 2022, E077749) [nonpub. opn.] (Lopez I).)

On July 22, 2022, following the remittitur in Lopez I, the trial court granted

defendant’s section 1203.4b petition, terminated her sentence, and set aside her

conviction.

On November 3, 2022, as she was facing deportation proceedings, defendant filed

a motion to withdraw her plea pursuant to section 1473.7 on the grounds that her

conviction was legally invalid and not knowingly and intelligently made because her plea

counsel did not advise her or investigate the immigration consequences of her plea and

failed to negotiate a plea bargain with no adverse immigration consequences. Defendant

alleged she did not understand the immigration consequences of her plea because (1) she

was not advised of such consequences, and (2) even if she had been advised, she would

not have understood these consequences based on years of abuse she suffered at the

hands of the victim (her ex-husband) and her ex-husband’s abuse of her daughter. She

also argued that she was prejudiced by her counsel’s failure to advise her of the

immigration consequences of her plea. She claimed that even if the court did not find her

3
Under Assembly Bill No. 2147, defendants may petition the court to expunge
their conviction. Section 1203.4b gives trial courts the discretion to grant such relief to
certain defendants, such as defendant, who have successfully participated in the
California Conservation Camp Program (fire camp).

5
former counsel rendered ineffective assistance, she did not meaningfully understand the

potential immigration consequences of her plea.

In support of her motion, defendant attached her declaration in which she detailed

her ties to the United States: she arrived in this country when she was four years old, both

of her daughters are United States citizens, her two grandchildren are citizens as well, and

she was currently married to a United States citizen. In this same declaration, defendant

claimed she had been a victim of abuse since she was a child, and her older daughter had

been molested by her ex-husband—the victim in this case. Defendant claimed she

became distraught when she discovered that their daughter was in the custody of her ex-

husband just days before her plea. Prior to her plea, she had been in custody for two

years and was represented by retained counsel. During those two years, however,

defendant claimed her retained counsel never discussed or mentioned immigration

consequences of a possible plea. At the time of her plea, defendant was represented by

new appointed counsel. Defendant declared that new counsel never discussed with her

the immigration consequences of her plea, or the possibility of an immigration-safe

resolution. Given her ties to the United States, defendant asserted that she would have

never pled in this case had she known it would result in deportation from this country.

Following the expungement of her conviction pursuant to section 1203.4b, defendant

stated that she had been placed in removal proceedings.

On February 9, 2023, the People filed an opposition to the motion. The People

responded that defendant’s motion should be denied because counsel provided effective

6
assistance and advised defendant of the immigration consequences of her plea. In

addition, considering defendant had been charged with attempted murder, there was no

“immigration safe” plea. Thus, defendant failed to show prejudicial error because there

was no possibility of a plea that would not result in defendant’s deportation.

Defendant thereafter replied to the People’s opposition, arguing she did not

meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of her plea and that she had

established prejudicial error. Defendant also argued that her declaration was sufficient to

show prejudice, her counsel did not inform her she would be deported if she pled guilty,

and the immigrations advisements by the trial court and the plea form do not satisfy the

advisement requirement.

On April 28, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the section 1473.7 motion. At

that time, defendant and her plea counsel testified. Defendant testified that she obtained a

green card in 2007 and was a legal permanent resident of the United States. Her first

retained counsel, who had represented her for two years, never discussed any

immigration consequences that could result from her plea. She obtained new counsel,

Attorney Gary Ablard, who was appointed to represent her, in January 2013. In August

2013, defendant changed her plea to no contest. During the eight months that Ablard

represented her, defendant testified that he never spoke to her about the immigration

consequences of her plea, and never advised her that she could be deported because of

her plea. From the time she was charged in this case to her plea, defendant never

7
consulted an immigration attorney. Defendant testified that at the time she pled guilty,

“[i]t was highly important” for her to be reunited with her family as soon as possible.

Defendant acknowledged that she read, initialed, and signed her plea form. She is

a fluent English speaker, and can read and write in English. She does not need the aid of

a Spanish language interpreter. Defendant claimed that although she initialed the box

next to the paragraph which stated, “‘I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United

States, deportation, exclusion from admission to [the] United States, or denial of

naturalization will result from a conviction of offenses to which I plead guilty or no

contest,’” she never read that paragraph, and her attorney never went over that section

with her. She claimed that no one went over the plea form with her, including Ablard.

She admitted that the court asked her if she went over the plea form with her attorney and

she answered, “‘[y]es.’” Defendant also initially claimed that she did not remember the

court admonishing her that, if she was not a United States citizen, she could be deported.

She believed her possession of a green card gave her “residency” and that being a citizen

did not matter. She subsequently admitted that the court stated that if she was not a

citizen, she could be deported. She claimed that she was not “considering anything but

being away from [her] children” and that she “didn’t consider anything but getting home

to [her] children.” She stated that she first realized there was an immigration issue one

week before her release, as she was notified that immigration had placed her on a hold.

She again claimed she signed the plea deal to return to her family as fast as she could,

considering she had spent two years, eight months in custody, and she never would have

8
agreed to the terms if she knew she was going to be separated from her family.

Defendant explained that had she understood she would be deported, she would have

fought her case and not signed the plea agreement.

Ablard, defendant’s counsel at the time of her plea, testified that he had been a

practicing attorney since 1979, and predominately a criminal defense lawyer since the

mid-1980’s. Ablard recalled representing defendant, but did not have an independent

recollection of her case. Ablard described his standard practice when it came to

immigration consequences of a plea. His standard practice included first, a determination

of the client’s citizenship status, and second, if the client was not a United States citizen,

Ablard would ask the prosecution to keep any plea offers open, continue the matter to

assess the best path forward, and have the client consult an immigration attorney. Ablard

was aware that a resident with a green card is not a citizen, and thus he would have asked

for more time to consider the options. In a case such as defendant’s where attempted

murder was charged, Ablard knew there was no immigration-safe plea possible, and

therefore, he would have advised the client that he or she would be deported. Ablard

would advise the client about the immigration consequences before the hearing on the

plea, or at the time of the hearing. Ablard also testified that he reviews the following

portions of the plea form with this clients: (1) the declaration on the plea form; (2) the

handwritten and preprinted portions; and (3) the paragraph containing the immigration

warning. Ablard had no reason to believe he did not advise defendant of the immigration

consequences in her case.

9
On cross-examination, Ablard admitted that he represented defendant on a

subsequent petition pursuant to section 1203.4, but he did not recall his representation for

the attempted murder charge. Ablard also testified that he was unaware that defendant

was not a United States citizen until recently, because he had no prior recollection of the

case. In his experience, Ablard explained that there were occasions where a client had an

immigration status that would adversely affect him or her, but the client does not disclose

it to him. Ablard had no independent way to check the immigration status of his clients.

Defense counsel argued that defendant did not meaningfully understand the

immigration consequences of her plea, and that resulted in prejudice. Counsel asserted

that a trial court’s advisal on the record during the plea is insufficient to place a defendant

on notice of immigration consequences of his or her plea. Counsel noted that defendant

had never been involved in the criminal justice system before this case, and she testified

that she never received an immigration advisement from her attorney. Counsel explained

that defendant believed she was in the country lawfully, and therefore, she did not

understand that her attempted murder conviction would have an immigration

consequence of deportation. Counsel further argued that Ablard’s practice of advising

his clients who are not United States citizens to consult an immigration attorney was

insufficient for defendant to understand she could be deported as a result of her plea.

Considering her family ties in the United States, counsel argued that defendant would not

have accepted the plea bargain had she known she would be deported.

10
The People responded that defendant lacked credibility since at the time of plea,

she informed the court she had read and understood the plea form, yet at the current

hearing, she testified she did not read the plea form and had no idea what she was

signing. The People argued that defendant either lied when she entered her plea, or lied

to the court during the section 1473.7 hearing. The People further observed that

defendant is a fluent English speaker. And, while defendant claimed to have only spoken

to her attorney once, the People observed that the minute orders indicated Ablard

appeared on defendant’s matter eight separate times. The People added that defendant

did not care about the immigration consequences of her plea because she never consulted

an immigration attorney in the two years and three months she was in custody leading up

to her plea. The People further noted it was not possible to negotiate an “immigration-

safe plea” on a premeditated attempted murder charge, and summarized the evidence,

describing the case against defendant as strong. The trial court took the matter under

submission and continued the matter.

On May 19, 2023, the trial court requested defense counsel provide documentation

that showed removal proceedings were pending.

On June 5, 2023, via a written order, the trial court denied defendant’s motion.

The court found defendant had not proven prejudicial error for multiple reasons. First,

the court found defendant had not shown there had been attorney error, finding Ablard to

be credible in his testimony that he correctly advised defendant that she would be

deported. The court noted that defendant had neither offered a declaration from her first

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attorney nor state her first attorney was unavailable to testify. The court relied on the

transcript of the plea colloquy, which indicates Ablard spoke with defendant about her

case, that he went over the plea form with defendant, and that defendant understood

everything on the plea form. The court also pointed out that at the time defendant pled

guilty, the trial court had advised defendant she may be deported as an immigration

consequence of her plea in open court and defendant had stated that she understood

everything on the plea form. The court found defendant had failed to show by a

preponderance of evidence that she was not advised of the adverse immigration

consequences she faced as a result of her plea. The court found defendant to be credible

“when she testified that all she cared about when she pled was returning to her children as

quickly as possible.”

The court also concluded defendant was not too distraught to understand the

adverse immigration advisements because she failed to offer objective supporting

evidence of her emotional state and inability to understand any aspect of her plea.

Moreover, the court noted that defendant’s unsubstantiated claim was contradicted by the

record. Defendant had initialed and signed her plea form in the appropriate places, and

she seemed under no distress during her colloquy with the court at the change of plea

hearing. The court pointed out that defendant had answered in the negative to the plea

court’s query of whether she was “‘under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or anything

that would interfere with [her] ability to understand what [she was] doing.’” Defendant

also replied in the negative to the court’s question of whether anyone had threatened her

12
or used any violence against her to force her to change her plea. In addition, defendant

stated “yes,” in response to the court’s question of whether she understood all the

penalties and punishments for her crime, any potential defenses she may have had to the

charges and the future consequences of her plea. Defendant also replied “yes” to the

court’s questions of whether she had enough time to talk with Ablard and whether she

was satisfied with the advice he had given her. The court explained, “When [defendant]

was asked if she was under the influence of anything that would interfere with her ability

to understand what was happening in her case that was a perfect opportunity for her to

inform the court she was too distressed to enter the plea, but she did not.” The court

further noted that defendant’s “emotional state did not cause the court to pause, or

continue the matter,” rather the court found defendant read and understood the plea form,

that defendant understood the future consequences of her plea, and that defendant

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered her plea. The court concluded defendant

“failed to show she was prejudice because she was too distraught to understand the

adverse immigration consequences of her plea.”

In addition, the court found that defendant did not objectively prove she

mistakenly believed because she had lawful permanent resident status the immigration

consequences did not apply to her. The court noted that defendant was a fluent English

speaker and appeared to have no issue understanding or communicating in English. The

court explained that defendant was 35 years old when she pled guilty, she had been in the

United States since she was four years old, had held many white-collar jobs, and had

13
purchased two houses. The court additionally noted that the plea form’s advisal and the

court’s oral advisal concerning immigration consequences did not provide for an

exception for someone with lawful permanent status. The court further concluded that

defendant would have entered a plea even if she understood the immigration

consequences, observing that although defendant claimed at the section 1473.7 hearing

that her first priority was to remain in the country, she also testified that at the time of her

plea, she was not considering anything but being away from her children and wanted to

get back to them. The court further relied on defendant’s failure to prove an

immigration-safe plea was available because any crime that carried a sentence of a year

or more is an aggravated felony, and an aggravated felony is a deportable offense. The

court noted that defendant had “failed to offer any related alternative plea she could have

entered that would have carried a sentence of less than [one] year because none existed.”

Finally, the court determined that defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that she would have rejected the stipulated term of 13 years in prison and

gone to trial if she had fully understood the immigration consequences. The court noted

that defendant was facing the possibility of a determinate term of 19 years, followed by a

life term in state prison. The court detailed the evidence supporting defendant’s charges

and concluded the People had a strong case against her. The court concluded, “Given the

strong evidence against [defendant], the likely conviction if she went to trial, that the plea

allowed her to avoid a likely life term with the possibility of parole after 19 years, and her

failure to discuss the risks of rejecting the plea, [defendant] failed to prove by a

14
preponderance of the evidence, that she would have rejected the plea if she had fully

understood the immigration consequences.” Defendant timely appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues her motion to vacate her conviction should have been granted

because she showed (1) her plea counsel failed to properly advise her of the immigration

consequences of her plea, (2) she did not meaningfully understand the immigration

consequences of her plea, and (3) she would not have accepted the plea had she properly

understood those consequences. We conclude the court properly denied the motion.

A. Section 1473.7 Generally

Section 1473.7 authorizes a person who is no longer in criminal custody to move

to vacate a conviction or sentence where the “conviction or sentence is legally invalid due

to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand,

defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration

consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1) ; see People v. Vivar

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 523, (Vivar); People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319;

People v. Coca (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 451, 457, 31.)

“Ineffective assistance of counsel that damages a defendant’s ability to

meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential

adverse immigration consequences of a guilty plea . . . is the type of error that entitles the

defendant to relief under section 1473.7.” (People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th

15
67, 75.) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and the

defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. (Strickland v. Washington

(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.)

In 2019, the Legislature amended section 1473.7 to clarify that a “finding of legal

invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, a person seeking relief pursuant to section 1473.7 need

only demonstrate prejudice that he or she would not have entered the plea had he or she

known about the immigration consequences. (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th

998, 1010-1011.)

“[S]howing prejudicial error under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) means

demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if

the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.

When courts assess whether a petitioner has shown that reasonable probability, they

consider the totality of the circumstances. [Citation.] Factors particularly relevant to this

inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant

placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and

whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated

disposition was possible.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 529-530.)

A defendant seeking to withdraw his plea based on inadequate advisement of

immigration consequences must “corroborate such assertions with objective evidence.”

16
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530, internal quotation marks omitted.) “Objective

evidence includes facts provided by declaration, contemporaneous documentation of the

defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the

charges the defendant faced.” (People v. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) “[N]o

specific kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief,” but “[t]he more robust and inclusive

a record, the greater the opportunity for effective persuasion and meaningful judicial

review.” (Id. at p. 325.)

The court must grant the motion to vacate the conviction “if the moving party

establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of any of the grounds for

relief specified in subdivision (a).” (§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).) In ruling on a section 1473.7

motion, the trial court must also specify the basis for its decision. (§ 1473.7, subd.

(e)(4).) An order granting or denying the motion is appealable. (§ 1473.7, subd. (f).)

B. Standard of Review

We apply an independent standard of review to rulings on section 1473.7 motions.

(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 524-528.) Under independent review, an appellate court

exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.

(Id. at p. 527.) When courts engage in independent review, they should be mindful that

independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review. An appellate court may not

simply second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations.

(Ibid.) Factual determinations that are based on the credibility of witnesses the trial court

heard and observed are entitled to particular deference, even though courts reviewing

17
such claims generally may reach a different conclusion from the trial court on an

independent examination of the evidence even where the evidence is conflicting. (Ibid.)

In section 1473.7 motion proceedings, appellate courts should similarly give particular

deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s personal observations of witnesses.

(Vivar, supra, at pp. 527-528.) “Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based

on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under section 1473.7.”

(Id. at p. 528; see Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 319-320; People v. Coca, supra, 96

Cal.App.5th at p. 458; People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173 (Curiel).)

C. Analysis

Defendant claims her counsel failed to inform her that, as a result of her plea to

attempted second degree murder, the immigration consequences were mandatory

deportation and that her counsel should have known her status as a legal permanent

resident would not exempt her from deportation. She also contends that her counsel’s

prejudicial failure to properly advise her on the consequences of pleading guilty added to

her inability to meaningfully understand the effects of her actions. Defendant claims she

was prejudiced since she would not have pled guilty if she had understood she was

subject to mandatory deportation and would be unable to return to the United States,

thereby separating her from her family, job, and country.

Defendant failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the

evidence any prejudicial error on plea counsel’s part that damaged her ability to

understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the immigration consequences of her

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plea. (§ 1473.7, subds. (a)(1), (e)(1).) We note the ease with which a defendant may

claim his counsel erred. (See In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 938.) However, “[a]n

allegation that trial counsel failed to properly advise a defendant is meaningless unless

there is objective corroborating evidence supporting appellant’s claimed failures.”

(People v. Cruz-Lopez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 212, 223-224.) Thus, defendant’s claims

require “corroboration and objective evidence because a declaration by defendant is

suspect by itself.” (Id. at p. 224.) “Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post

hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his [or her]

attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to

substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.” (Lee v. United States (2017) --- U.S. -

-- [137 S.Ct. 1958, 1967]; see People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 872 [“[i]n a

postconviction setting, courts should not simply accept a defendant’s statement of regret

regarding the plea, courts should also ‘look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate

a defendant’s expressed preferences.’”].)

Defendant has presented no such objective, corroborating evidence here. The only

relevant evidence she offers is her self-serving declaration and testimony concerning her
4
plea. Generally, self-serving declarations and testimonies lack trustworthiness. (People

v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 611.) In other words, we are not bound to give full

credence to the statements in defendant’s declaration and testimony because of her

4
Defendant also attached a declaration from her older daughter regarding the
sexual abuse allegation against the victim. The declaration makes no reference
concerning defendant’s plea of guilty.

19
obvious interest in the outcome of the proceeding. (See People v. Beck (1961) 188

Cal.App.2d 549, 553.) Moreover, the trial court found Ablard’s testimony credible and

defendant’s testimony not credible concerning the immigration advisal given by Ablard.

Furthermore, we find defendant’s statements in her declaration that she pled guilty

not knowing she would be deported not credible in light of the signed plea agreement and

the court’s own taking of her plea. Defendant initialed the box next to the statement in

the plea agreement stating: “I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States,

deportation, exclusion from the admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization

will result from a conviction of the offense(s) to which I plead guilty/no contest.”

Defendant initialed the boxes verifying that her attorney explained everything in the

agreement to her, and she fully understood everything. She also initialed the boxes

verifying that she understood she had the right to a trial and that she had sufficient time to

consult with her attorney. The record also shows that when the court was taking her

guilty plea, it specifically told defendant that her conviction may result in deportation.

The court said, “If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the

offense for which you are pleading may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion

from admission to the United States or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the

United States; do you understand all of that?” Defendant responded, “Yes, sir.”

Although the court stated “may,” the court confirmed with plea counsel that he

went over the form with defendant, and defendant understood everything on it. The court

found that defendant read and understood the form, understood the charge to which she

20
was pleading and the consequences for the charge, and was freely and knowingly

entering the plea. Indeed, an examination of the entire colloquy between defendant and

the court demonstrates that defendant meaningfully understood the immigration

consequences of her plea. The plea form contradicts defendant’s declaration and

testimony that she did not understand the immigration consequences of her guilty plea.

Defendant grew up in the United States since she was four years old and attended her

local schools and colleges. She was fluent in English and did not require a translator or

interpreter at any point during the proceedings.

We recognize that generic form statements and warnings on plea forms are not

necessarily dispositive. (See People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 895-897; People

v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 716.) “Even where the form says that the defendant

‘will’ be deported, it does not substitute for the advice of counsel, and it is not a

categorical bar to relief.” (People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 906; see

also Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1175.) But in those cases, other objective

evidence—such as attorney notes, oral testimony, or affirmative actions taken by

defendants after their convictions—substantiated the defendant’s version of events. (See

People v. Manzanilla, supra, at p. 910 [rejecting claim that a defendant’s initials and

signature on a plea form conclusively showed he subjectively understood he would be

deported and stating that this “has been rejected by numerous courts where there is

contemporaneous evidence to the contrary . . . .”].)

21
In Curiel, a case heavily relied upon by defendant, for example, the Court of

Appeal found corroborating evidence sufficient to overcome a defendant’s signed

acknowledgement that her plea would mandate deportation. (Curiel, supra, 92

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1177-1178.) There, the defendant had signed a plea form stating, “I

understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States, I must expect my plea of guilty

or no contest will result in my deportation . . . .” (Id. at p. 1165.) The defendant’s

section 1473.7 motion relied heavily on her own declaration to support her claim that she

did not properly understand those immigration consequences. (Curiel, supra, at p. 1167.)

She alleged that she had relied on her defense counsel’s representations that if she

avoided jail time, she could avoid deportation. (Ibid.)

However, other objective evidence corroborated the defendant’s statements.

(Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1177-1178.) The trial court held an evidentiary

hearing on her petition, at which both the defendant and her original defense counsel

testified. (Id. at pp. 1168-1171, 1176-1177.) On appeal, the court found that the

testimony of the defendant’s defense counsel “corroborated the statements in Curiel’s

declaration” and confirmed that the advice she received regarding the immigration

consequences of her plea “was inadequate and incomplete.” (Id. at p. 1177)

Here, defendant put forth no comparable evidence corroborating the claims made

in her declaration. The plea form, the record in open court of defendant’s plea, and

Ablard’s testimony, which the trial court found credible, all demonstrate that she did

meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of her plea.

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Defendant claims the court should have relied on her post-plea conduct, which

showed her desire to return to her children, to determine whether she meaningfully

understood the adverse immigration consequences. Her post-plea conduct does not aide

defendant as her desire to plead guilty was the same: to return to her children as soon as

possible. At the section 1473.7 hearing, defendant repeatedly testified that all she cared

about when she pled was returning to her children as quickly as possible. This does not

demonstrate she did not understand the adverse immigration consequences, rather it

shows her motivation for pleading guilty. Defendant was facing a determinate term of 19

years, plus an indeterminate term of life. By pleading guilty, she received 13 years,

thereby being free from custody much sooner.

Defendant also contends that she was too distraught due to the victim’s abuse of

her daughter, their daughter returning to the victim’s care before she pled guilty, and her

own abuse as a child to meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences.

However, this claim is belied by the record. Moreover, as the trial court found, defendant

has failed to offer objective supporting evidence of her emotional state and inability to

understand the consequences of her plea or the plea in general. Defendant was not so

distraught as to request a continuance. She was able to initial and sign the plea form in

the appropriate places. She did not appear in distress when appropriately and respectfully

responding to the court’s questions. She did not provide a family law order showing a

change in custody of her daughter. When the court inquired whether she was under the

influence of drugs or alcohol or anything that would interfere with her ability to

23
understand, defendant responded, “No. Sir.” At this time, defendant could have alerted

the court that she was too distraught to enter the plea, but she did not. Defendant has

failed to show she did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration

consequences of her plea because she was too distraught.

Even assuming her plea counsel did err in her representation, defendant has failed

to establish that she was prejudiced. She argues that she would not have taken the plea

deal if she had known the consequence of eventually being deported because of her two

daughters, two grandchildren, her family and friends, her home, and her life in the United

States. Defendant’s declaration contains the only direct evidence presented as to whether

she would have taken the plea had she been aware of the immigration consequences.

However, “‘a defendant’s self-serving statement—after trial, conviction, and sentence—

that with competent advice he or she would have accepted [or rejected] a proffered plea

bargain, is insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to

prejudice, and must be corroborated independently by objective evidence.’” (People v.

Bravo (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1161, 1171, overruled in part on other grounds, as stated in

Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 526.) We note defendant did not state in her declaration

that she told her plea counsel her priority was to remain in the United States with her

family and life, in order for her counsel to try to mitigate the consequences of the plea.

Defendant did state in her declaration that she would not have accepted the plea deal if

she knew she was going to be deported, and she “would have asked [her] attorney to

defend the case in every way possible,” “would have asked [her] attorney to attempt to

24
have the charge changed,” “would have even offered to spend time in custody,” or

“would have taken the case to trial.” First, defendant did know that she would be

deported because her counsel, the plea form, and the court expressly told her so. Second,

defendant’s statement lacks credibility. Defendant was charged with premeditated and

deliberate attempted murder (§§ 664/187 subd. (a)), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd.

(a)(2)), and two counts of conspiracy to commit a crime (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). It was also

alleged that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the attempted

murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). Thus, as previously noted, she would have been facing a

maximum sentence of life. She would not have been eligible for parole for 19 years. The

evidence against her was strong. As the trial court noted, “[t]here was evidence

suggesting that over the course of 3 weeks [defendant] hired someone to physically harm

[the victim], she set [the victim] up to be arrested, hired someone to kill him and then

tried to kill [the victim] herself.” Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to

attempted second degree murder and admitted the firearm allegation, in exchange for a

term of only 13 years in state prison and the dismissal of the remaining counts and

allegations.

Further, based on the charges and the strong evidence against defendant, an

immigration-safe plea was not possible. Any crime that carries a possible sentence of

one year or more is an aggravated felony. (8 U.S.C. § 1227, subd. (a)(2)(A)(iii).) All of

the crimes charged against defendant are deportable offenses because they are aggravated

felonies. As concluded by the trial court, defendant has not offered any alternative plea

25
“she could have entered that would have carried a sentence of less than [one] year

because none exist.”

“Additionally, neither in the opening brief nor in h[er] declaration does defendant

discuss how the costs of rejecting the plea—the potential sentence [s]he faced, h[er]

ability or lack thereof to make alternative arrangements for h[er] family, and so on—

would have factored into h[is] analysis. [Sh]e simply makes a conclusory claim that

[s]he would have taken the alternative route without consideration as to the opportunity

cost of doing so. Yet, to determine the reasonable probability that defendant would have

rejected a plea offer, a court would need to consider not only defendant’s ties to the

United States and h[er] family situation, but to consider them in light of the consequences

of h[er] rejecting the plea and proceeding to trial. Without evidence of the probability of

an alternate disposition, and without evidence of both the negative and positive

consequences of the plea and how the defendant would have weighed them, a defendant

cannot support a showing that it is reasonably probable that, if properly advised, [s]he

would have rejected the . . . plea offer ‘in the hope or expectation that he or she might

thereby negotiate a different bargain or, failing in that, go to trial.’” (People v. Bravo

(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1076-1077, quoting People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th

555, 567.)

Moreover, given the nature of the charges and the multiple attempts to physically

harm or kill the victim, it was extremely unlikely the People would have accepted an

26
immigration-safe plea. As the trial court stated, “[a]fter all, [defendant’s codefendant]

was sentenced to [four] years in state prison for his less egregious actions.”

Under these circumstances, although it is possible, it is not likely she would have

risked going to trial, being convicted of all counts, and facing a life sentence as well as

the same immigration consequences.

We conclude that defendant failed to meet her burden of establishing by a

preponderance of the evidence that her plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance, or

that she did not understand the immigration consequences of the plea, that she would not

have taken the plea deal if she had known the adverse consequences of her plea. Because

defendant failed to meet her burden of proof, the trial court properly denied the section

1473.7 motion.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s section 1473.7 motion is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

MILLER
J.

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