Milder v. ADR Services CA2/5

CourtListener 10283260Calctapp25 nov. 2024

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Filed 11/25/24 Milder v. ADR Services CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ANDREW MILDER, B320376

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STCV40133)

ADR SERVICES INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.
Nathaniel Maranwe for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kaufman Dolowich, Andrew J. Waxler, Brian D. Peters,
and Cynthia D. Kinney for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff and appellant Andrew Milder (plaintiff) initiated
arbitration against his former attorney and her law firm. As the
proceedings unfolded, plaintiff advised he intended to withdraw
from the arbitration, but the arbitrator held a hearing in his
absence and issued an award in favor of the attorney and law
firm. Plaintiff then sued the arbitrator, retired judge Michael D.
Marcus (Judge Marcus); the arbitration provider, ADR Services,
Inc. (ADR Services); and ADR Services’ chief executive, Lucie
Barron (Barron) (collectively, defendants). In this appeal from
the trial court’s order sustaining defendants’ demurrer and
dismissing the action, we are asked to decide whether the trial
court properly determined plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
doctrine of arbitral immunity.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Allegations of Plaintiff’s Operative Complaint
In his operative second amended complaint, plaintiff
alleges attorney Shawn Holley (Holley) and her law firm,
Kinsella Weitzman Iser Krump & Aldisert (KWIKA) represented
him in a criminal matter. Plaintiff executed a retainer
agreement with a procedure for resolving disputes. As pertinent
here, the retainer agreement required that all disputes be
resolved by submission to binding arbitration, with the prevailing
party to recover attorney fees.
Plaintiff initiated arbitration against Holley and KWIKA
after they moved to be relieved as plaintiff’s counsel in the
criminal matter. The matter was submitted to ADR Services for
arbitration. Before an arbitrator was appointed, plaintiff’s
attorney informed ADR Services and counsel for Holley and
KWIKA “that [he] would be filing a civil action and requested

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ADR Services to stay the arbitration proceedings pending the
outcome of that Superior Court proceeding.” Holley and KWIKA
objected, and “the ADR Services case manager . . . informed all
parties that ‘[ADR Services] cannot make any unilateral
decisions. To move forward, we need agreement from all
parties.’”
Plaintiff subsequently “exercised his legal right to
withdraw from the arbitration proceeding he had commenced” by
filing a complaint against Holley and KWIKA in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court.1
A few weeks after plaintiff filed his lawsuit against Holley
and KWIKA, ADR Services appointed Judge Marcus to serve as
arbitrator of the previously initiated arbitration. Judge Marcus
made disclosures consistent with a “non-consumer arbitration.”
Plaintiff argued the matter should have been classified as a
consumer arbitration under the governing statutes, and a
representative of ADR Services advised the parties that “ADR
Services . . . has no authority to make the determination as to
whether this matter should be designated as a consumer or non-
consumer case. [¶] Therefore, the parties are requested to make

1
In addition to seeking substantive relief against Holley and
KWIKA, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the retainer
agreement’s arbitration provision was void. The trial court held a
hearing on plaintiff’s claim that he was fraudulently induced to
agree to the arbitration provision, entered judgment for Holley
and KWIKA, and granted Holley and KWIKA’s post-judgment
motion for $241,048.50 in attorney fees. This court affirmed the
judgment and attorney fees award. (Milder v. Holley (Dec. 16,
2021, B298984, B303175) [nonpub. opn.].)

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a motion to the court to make the determination. ADR
Services . . . will abide by the [c]ourt’s decision.”
Judge Marcus directed Barron, “the Chief Executive Officer
and majority shareholder of ADR Services,” to schedule a status
conference in the arbitration. The arbitration proceeded in
plaintiff’s absence and concluded with an award of $79,598.48 in
fees and costs to Holley and KWIKA.
Among other things, plaintiff alleges defendants had no
“jurisdiction or legal authority to unilaterally initiate an
arbitration proceeding” after plaintiff communicated his intention
to withdraw from the arbitration. Plaintiff’s complaint also
asserts “the [California] Arbitration Act [(Code Civ. Proc.,2 § 1280
et seq.)] prohibits a private arbitration company . . . or a private
arbitrator . . . from administering a consumer arbitration when
the arbitration provision includes a fee-shifting provision in the
retainer agreement . . . .”
The specific causes of action asserted against defendants in
plaintiff’s operative complaint are: violation of the Unfair
Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), violation of
the False Advertising Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.),
violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750
et seq.), and deprivation of property without due process of law in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Defendants’ Demurrer
Defendants demurred to plaintiff’s complaint and
contended each cause of action is barred by the common law

2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

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doctrine of arbitral immunity. In opposition to the demurrer,
plaintiff argued arbitral immunity does not apply because
defendants “acted in excess of arbitral jurisdiction by
recommencing a binding arbitration after plaintiff lawfully
withdrew from the arbitration.”
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without
leave to amend. The court determined the doctrine of arbitral
immunity applies and emphasized the lack of authority for the
proposition that “commencement of arbitration followed by a
party’s attempt to withdraw from the arbitration means the
arbitrator acted in the absence of jurisdiction . . . .”
Shortly after the trial court issued its order sustaining the
demurrer, this court issued an opinion in Milder v. Holley (Dec.
16, 2021, B299122) [nonpub. opn.] reversing a judgment
confirming the arbitration award and remanding the matter “for
the trial court to enter a new and different order correcting the
arbitration award by striking the award of attorney fees and
costs and, so modified, confirming the arbitration award.” This
court held Judge Marcus lacked authority to order plaintiff to pay
Holley and KWIKA’s fees and costs when he lost in the
arbitration because certain provisions of section 1284.3 governing
consumer arbitrations applied.
Plaintiff subsequently moved for a new trial in this case,
arguing that this court’s determination that the arbitration was a
consumer arbitration implies defendants acted without
jurisdiction. The trial court declined to set a hearing on the new
trial motion because such a motion is permitted only after a trial
and decision by a jury, court, or referee. After the trial court
entered a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff filed another motion for

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a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, again concluding
that arbitral immunity applies.

II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends defendants are not entitled to arbitral
immunity because they “‘acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction’” (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843,
851) in resolving his dispute with Holley and KWIKA. He argues
this case falls within this “clear absence of all jurisdiction”
exception to immunity because he withdrew from the arbitration
and because the retainer agreement included an illegal fee-
shifting provision. Neither argument has merit. There is no
clear law establishing a party who commenced arbitration may
unilaterally withdraw, and a fee-shifting provision does not
impact the arbitrator’s fundamental jurisdiction.

A. Overview of Arbitral Immunity
“Arbitrators have been extended the protection of judicial
immunity, because they perform ‘“the function of resolving
disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating
private rights.”’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7
Cal.4th 896, 909; accord Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634,
650 [“[the] rule—immunizing arbitrators in private contractual
arbitration proceedings from tort liability—is well established in
California”]; see also Stasz v. Schwab (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th
420, 431 [“‘Arbitral immunity, like judicial immunity, promotes
fearless and independent decision making’”].) This immunity
also extends to organizations that sponsor arbitrations. (Stasz,
supra, at 433.)

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“The concept of judicial immunity is long-standing and
absolute, with its roots in English common law. It bars civil
actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their
judicial functions and it applies to all judicial determinations,
including those rendered in excess of the judge’s jurisdiction, no
matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be.
[Citations.] The judge is immune unless ‘he has acted in the
clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at 851, fn. omitted.)
An arbitrator acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction
“only if the record before the arbitrator is ‘so deficient on [its] face
as to signal a “clear absence” of jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (Stasz,
supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at 442.) The wrongful exercise of
jurisdiction does not alone suffice to trigger this exception to
arbitral immunity. (Ibid.; accord Greene v. Zank (1984) 158
Cal.App.3d 497, 507; Frazier v. Moffatt (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d
379, 386 [“the question of judicial immunity must be determined
on the basis of whether the act in question was within the
general scope of the officer’s judicial powers and whether he acted
in an honest belief that he was legally warranted in doing it”].)
In most cases of arbitrator misconduct, the remedy is a civil
action seeking to vacate the award as opposed to a complaint
against the arbitrator. (Stasz, supra, at 442; La Serena
Properties, LLC v. Weisbach (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 893, 907.)

B. The Arbitrator Did Not Act in the Clear Absence of All
Jurisdiction by Proceeding After Plaintiff’s Purported
Withdrawal
Plaintiff contends defendants lacked jurisdiction to proceed
with the arbitration following his purported withdrawal because

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a court order is required to compel a party to participate in
arbitration and no such order was entered in this litigation.
Plaintiff claims section 1282.2, subdivision (e), supports his view.
The statute provides that “[i]f a court has ordered a person to
arbitrate a controversy, the arbitrators may hear and determine
the controversy upon the evidence produced notwithstanding the
failure of a party ordered to arbitrate, who has been duly notified,
to appear.”
Contrary to plaintiff’s view, section 1282.2, subdivision (e)
does not establish a court order is necessary to proceed in the
absence of a party that initiated arbitration. Rather, it sets forth
one of the consequences of a court order compelling arbitration.
Holley and KWIKA did not seek such an order because plaintiff is
the one who initiated the arbitration, and nothing in section
1282.2 suggests Holley and KWIKA were required to obtain an
order compelling plaintiff to do what he had already done.
Moreover, plaintiff’s reading of section 1282.2 also conflicts with
established case law rejecting the idea that a unilateral right to
withdraw from arbitration exists.3 (See, e.g., Gerard v. Salter

3
Plaintiff incorrectly believes Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951 holds a party may
withdraw from arbitration at any time. Engalla did not address
the plaintiffs’ right to withdraw from an arbitration; the opinion
for the court addressed claims that an agreement to arbitrate was
fraudulently induced, the defendant waived its right to compel
arbitration, and that the agreement was unconscionable. (Id. at
973, 982, 984.) Plaintiff’s reliance on Baar v. Tigerman (1983)
140 Cal.App.3d 979 is likewise misplaced. Plaintiff quotes
another opinion’s summary of Baar for the proposition that a
party may divest an arbitrator of jurisdiction by filing an
objection to the arbitrator making an award. (Morgan Phillips,
Inc. v. JAMS/Endispute, LLC (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 795, 801.)

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(1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 840, 844 [“Once a controversy is submitted
to arbitration, it remains before the arbitrators until they have
completed their determination of the matter, unless the parties
mutually agree to withdraw it”]; Arrieta v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 322, 329-330 [same];
Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 716, 726 [rejecting the argument “that [a party] can
unilaterally withdraw its consent and nullify the arbitration”].)
Lacking any legal authority to support his contention that
defendants acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, plaintiff
suggests defendants conceded they had no authority to proceed
following his purported withdrawal. Plaintiff emphasizes the
ADR Services case manager’s message indicating ADR Services
could not “move forward” without “agreement from all parties.”
This suggestion, too, is incorrect. Even confining our evaluation
of that statement to the limited context provided in the operative
complaint, the statement does not refer to a lack of jurisdiction to
proceed with the arbitration. Rather, the statement explains
that defendants could not stay the arbitration as plaintiff
requested without the agreement of all parties.

As explained in Baar, however, the objection was effective
because the arbitrator’s delay in rendering an award violated the
arbitration contract and a related statutory deadline. (Baar,
supra, at 427.)

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C. The Arbitrator Did Not Act in the Clear Absence of All
Jurisdiction by Conducting a Consumer Arbitration
Pursuant to an Agreement that Included a Fee-
Shifting Provision
Section 1284.3, subdivision (a) provides that “[n]o neutral
arbitrator or private arbitration company shall administer a
consumer arbitration under any agreement or rule requiring that
a consumer who is a party to the arbitration pay the fees and
costs incurred by an opposing party if the consumer does not
prevail in the arbitration, including, but not limited to, the fees
and costs of the arbitrator, provider organization, attorney, or
witnesses.” Plaintiff alleges the retainer agreement’s fee-shifting
provision violated this statute and defendants were therefore
barred from administering an arbitration pursuant to the
agreement.
As a general matter, “if a party believes the entire
contractual agreement or a provision for arbitration is illegal, it
must oppose arbitration on this basis before participating in the
process or forfeit the claim.” (Cummings v. Future Nissan (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 321, 328.) The fact that such objections are
subject to forfeiture and waiver indicates they do not undermine
the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892,
911 [“A claim of fundamental jurisdictional defect is not subject
to forfeiture or waiver”]; People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216,
224-225 [explaining the difference between “[a] lack of
jurisdiction in its fundamental or strict sense,” which “‘cannot be
conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent,’” and acts in excess of
jurisdiction, which are valid until set aside, and objections to
which are subject to forfeiture and waiver].) In other words,
because a party may forfeit or waive an objection based on section

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1284.3, subdivision (a), an arbitrator who conducts an arbitration
pursuant to an offending agreement does not act in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction. (Greene, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at 507
[“A judge is not deprived of immunity because the action he took
was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority”], emphasis added.)
Plaintiff, however, contends section 1284.3, subdivision
(a)’s prohibition against administering a consumer arbitration
pursuant to an agreement that includes a fee-shifting provision is
not subject to forfeiture or waiver. Plaintiff relies on Civil Code
section 3513, which provides that “[a]ny one may waive the
advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law
established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a
private agreement.” However, “[a]s our state Supreme Court
pointed out, a literal construction of this statute would be
unreasonable, for ‘it is difficult to conceive of a statutory right
enacted solely for the benefit of private individuals that does not
also have an incidental public benefit.’ [Citation.]” (Azteca
Construction, Inc. v. ADR Consulting, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th
1156, 1166.) As a result, courts have construed Civil Code section
3513 to “prohibit[ ] a waiver of statutory rights where the ‘public
benefit [of the statute] is one of its primary purposes.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.) Nothing in section 1284.3, subdivision (a) indicates that a
party may not forfeit or waive an objection to arbitrability
pursuant to an offending agreement.4
In addition, and apart from the jurisdictional conclusions
we have drawn by recognizing the protections of section 1284.3,

4
This issue is distinct from whether a party may forfeit or
waive an objection to an award of fees and costs.

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subdivision (a) can be forfeited, legislative history materials for
the statute confirm it was not intended to invalidate offending
agreements in their entirety. (Assem. Judiciary Com., Analysis
of Assem. Bill No. 2915 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7, 2002, p. 6.)
Rather, section 1284.3, subdivision (a) was intended to address
the possibility that a fee-shifting provision “may be so daunting
as to deter the consumer from pursuing his or her case.” (Ibid.;
see also Civ. Code, § 1599 [“Where a contract has several distinct
objects, of which one at least is lawful, and one at least is
unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void as to the latter
and valid as to the rest”]; Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 123-124.)
A construction of section 1284.3 according to which a party
is entitled to initiate arbitration and later sue the arbitrator who
took up the dispute would not advance this purpose. An
arbitrator who awards a prevailing party fees and costs in
violation of section 1284.3, subdivision (a) acts in excess of his or
her authority, but not in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. In
these circumstances, the losing party may seek to vacate the
award—as plaintiff did—but the arbitrator is immune from civil
liability for actions taken during the arbitration process. (Stasz,
supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at 442; La Serena Properties, supra, 186
Cal.App.4th at 907.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded costs
on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

DAVIS, J.*

*
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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