People v. White CA2/2

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Filed 11/20/24 P. v. White CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B327099

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA468434)
v.

MALCOLM OMARI AKKIL
WHITE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael D. Carter, Judge. Affirmed.

Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Malcolm Omari Akkil White (defendant) appeals from a
judgment entered after he was convicted by jury of one count of
pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a))1 involving Symone H.
Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to
exclude sex advertisements of Symone, which were offered by the
prosecution after Symone denied being involved in the
commercial sex industry. We find no error and affirm.

BACKGROUND
In an information filed by the District Attorney of Los
Angeles County, defendant was charged with human trafficking
of a minor for a commercial sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1); counts 1,
4, 6 & 12), human trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act
by force, fear, fraud, or threat of injury (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(2);
counts 2 & 5), pimping (§ 266h, subd. (a); count 3), and
dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1);
count 14). Defendant pled not guilty.
Codefendant Barrington Maxwell Williams was charged
with seven counts of trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex
act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)) and one count of trafficking of a minor
for a commercial sex act by force, fear, fraud, or threat of injury
(§ 236.1, subd. (c)(2)).2
The matter went to trial by jury. The jury found defendant
guilty of pimping Symone H. (count 3). The jury was unable to
reach verdicts on the remaining seven counts.3

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Codefendant Williams is not a party to this appeal.
3 The court declared a mistrial as to those counts.

2
The court sentenced defendant to the middle term of four
years in state prison. He was ordered to pay a $300 fine
pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and a $300 parole
revocation fine, which was imposed or suspended, pursuant to
section 1202.45. The court also imposed a $40 court security fee
pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), and a $30 criminal
conviction assessment pursuant to Government Code section
70373. Defendant was awarded 2,014 days of actual credit and
2,012 days of good time/work time credits.
Defendant appealed from the trial court judgment. Finding
no error, we affirm.

TRIAL EVIDENCE
Symone H. was born in July 1999. She met defendant
when she was 17 years old and knew defendant for three years.
She had one daughter and denied defendant was the father.
Symone denied having sex with defendant, although she had
feelings for him and wanted a sexual relationship with him.
Defendant told detectives he had known Symone for two years
and had a child with her.
Defendant used the name “Greedy Dollas.” Defendant’s
codefendant went by the name “Sir Maxwell.” Symone denied
using the name “Winter Dollas,” but defendant told law
enforcement Symone had used that name. Symone had the
tattoo “Greedy” above her left eyebrow with a “crown” above that.
The “crown” represents a sex worker’s pimp. Jordan C. testified
if she were to work for defendant, she would “have to get a tattoo
of his name to let it be known . . . that’s who [she] was working
for.” Jordan testified she was familiar with branding, and that
meant having your pimp’s moniker displayed somewhere

3
prominently on your person. T.C. testified the image on
Symone’s forehead was “the biggest brand you can get right on
your face.”
Symone denied working in the commercial sex industry.
However, she later clarified she was moving away from
commercial sex work. Symone had a Facebook account with the
handle “Winter Dollas.” Defendant used the handle “Greedy
Dollas” on Facebook.
A.B. was born in February 1999. She used the name “Asia
Dollas.” A.B. had “Malcolm” tattooed above her eyebrow and
“Dollas” on her cheek. A.B. was the “bottom bitch.” The “bottom
bitch” is the pimp’s girlfriend. A.B. described her relationship
with defendant as a “boyfriend and girlfriend relationship.”
Symone initially testified she never knew anyone named A.B. or
Asia Dollas. However, she eventually started identifying photos
of herself and A.B. Symone acknowledged A.B. referred to
Symone as “wife” in a social media post. Symone also referred to
A.B. as “wifey” in a social media post. Symone acknowledged the
term “wife” or “wifey” is used to refer to two commercial sex
workers who share the same pimp.
A.B. admitted working as a prostitute in the commercial
sex industry, but denied defendant was her pimp and denied
giving any of her earnings to defendant. A.B. acknowledged she
worked with Symone, who A.B. considered her girlfriend and her
best friend. A.B. denied Symone was her “wifey.” A.B. identified
herself in a photo with Symone in which they both displayed
their tattoos associated with defendant along with the words
“Free Dollas” and a crown symbol. The post was made after
defendant was arrested. A.B. testified Symone did not become
pregnant by defendant. At some point, A.B. and Symone stopped

4
being friends. A.B. told a police detective she held the position of
“bottom bitch,” and Symone was vying for this position. A.B.
informed the detective Symone had supposedly become engaged
to defendant and began spreading rumors about A.B. on
Facebook.
T.C. was born in September 2000. T.C. worked in “the
game,” which was the commercial sex industry. In that industry,
there are two groups, commercial sex workers and pimps. T.C.
used the name “Honey Dollas.” T.C. worked as a sex worker for
defendant. She also had a sexual relationship with defendant.
Defendant was T.C.’s boyfriend and pimp. Defendant described
T.C. as his girlfriend.
Defendant hit T.C. A.B. also hit T.C. On one occasion, T.C.
fought defendant and A.B. Defendant hit her multiple times.
T.C. sustained a black eye and vision loss. Defendant also
physically abused T.C. on other occasions. Prior to her
testimony, defendant called T.C. from jail multiple times. T.C.
said she was going to do what she wanted to do. Symone initially
denied knowing anyone named T.C. or Honey Dollas, but later
acknowledged a conversation with A.B. in which they were
discussing Honey Dollas.
Destiny M. also worked for Greedy Dollas. Destiny went by
the name “Drippy Bitxh.” On at least one occasion, T.C. and
Destiny did a “two girl special” with a customer.
Jordan C. began working as a commercial sex worker when
she was 17 years old. “Do Dirty” was her pimp. When Jordan C.
was walking on “the blade,” defendant approached her.4

4 A “blade” is where sex workers congregate to sell their
services.

5
Defendant asked her if she had a pimp. Defendant told Jordan C.
if she chose to work for him she would have to get his name
tattooed on her. Jordan declined and defendant yelled and hit
her.
Aj.B., who worked in the commercial sex industry, testified
that defendant had two women, Winter Dollas and Asia Dollas.
Aj. had seen Winter Dollas working as a prostitute.
On July 9, 2017, Symone posted a photo of her Greedy
tattoo and wrote, “NO makeup NO filter unlike these other hoes.”
Symone had just turned 18 years old two days earlier. Symone
agreed that the term “hoe” refers to a sex worker in the
commercial sex industry, but she claimed she did not use it that
way. A.B. commented with emojis. Symone responded, “Thank
you, wife.”
On March 30, 2017, Symone had a conversation on
Facebook with Sandra Tarasa. Tarasa referred to Symone as
“Hoe, Hoe.” Symone replied, “Yea.” Tarasa asked Symone if she
was good. Symone responded, “Girl, I got to get out of her [sic]
for the safety of my child. Imma call you when I touch down.”
Tarasa again referred to Symone as “Hoe.” Tarasa asked Symone
if she was “going to back to him” referring to defendant. Symone
said, “of course.”
On or about February 11, 2017, Symone posted a
photograph depicting her making a “kissy face” and being kissed
by A.B. Symone wrote a post to her “wifey” A.B. wishing her a
happy birthday and ending with “Winter Dollas and Asia Dollas
forever.” Symone was 17 years old at the time.
In another Facebook post, Symone told Nakia Moore that
she could not go to her “P’s” house without making some money.
The letter “P” refers to pimp in the commercial sex industry.

6
Symone, then age 17, made a Facebook post on June 24,
2017, where she wrote, “I need a king [emoji] not no lil boy
[emojis].” “King” in the commercial sex industry refers to a pimp.
Symone denied she was using the word in that context. Symone
also posted, “Free Him [emoji] 304 plus 16 equals an unstoppable
movement,” with a high heel and money stack photos next to it.
The number 16 represented the letter “p” which is the 16th letter
of the alphabet. The symbol of the high heel refers to “walking
the blade.” Symone also had defendant’s photograph and several
photographs of herself in this post.
On May 20, 2020, Symone’s photos were posted in a sex
advertisement on the Megapersonals Web site.5 The
advertisement had the heading, “Good Girl with Naughty [emoji]
Habits.” It further read: “Sydney is here and ready for you now
[emoji] Come get a taste of my SWEET personality [emojis] so
sweet you’ll want to come back for more [emoji] . . . Our time
together is never rushed or wasted [emojis] your satisfaction is
always guaranteed when it comes to me [emojis] SERIOUS
INQUIRIES ONLY [emoji] PLEASE BE POLITE WHEN
CONTACTING ME [emoji] BE CLEAN/GOOD HYGIENE IS A
MUST [emoji] NO GFE NO BARE NO AA Hope to see you soon
babe [emojis] incall/Outcall/car fantasy/Fetish Friendly.”
Another sex advertisement posted on or about
December 28, 2021, included photographs of Symone. The
advertisement read, “Sexy Slut [emoji] Ready to Get Fucked
[emojis] SPECIALS ALL Day.” The advertisement also read:
“The rain ain’t the only thing wet [emoji] Outcalls Only [emojis]

5 The Megapersonals Web site advertised the services of
commercial sex workers.

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Warm & Wet Ready For You To Dive In [emojis] Selfie
Verification Required [emoji] No Police [emoji] NO BARE
ANYTHING [emoji] NO PIMPS [emoji] NO LOWBALLERS.
[emoji] Be Real [emoji] Be Respectful. [emoji] Fetish Friendly
[emojis].”
Symone acknowledged that “no bare” presumably meant no
sex without a condom. She acknowledged that “No AA”
presumably meant no African Americans. She testified that an
outcall is when the sex worker travels to the location of the
person purchasing the service, as opposed to an incall in which
the person purchasing the service travels to the location of the
sex worker.
Another advertisement was posted on or about January 25,
2022, including a photograph of Symone and text advertising
commercial sex services. The text of the advertisement read:
“Outcalls Only [emoji] Outcalls Only [emoji] Do not inquire about
my services if you are not ready to meet [emoji] You will be
blocked and reported [emojis] Warm & Wet Ready For You To
Dive In [emojis] Selfie Verification Required [emoji] No Police
[emoji] NO BARE ANYTHING [emoji] NO PIMPS [emoji] NO
LOWBALLERS. [emoji] Be Real [emoji] Be Ready [emoji] Be
Respectful. [emoji] Fetish Friendly [emojis].”

DISCUSSION
I. Relevant proceedings
Symone was called as a witness by the prosecution and
began her testimony on Thursday, November 3, 2022. At the
start of her direct examination, Symone denied working in the

8
commercial sex industry. She also denied she had appeared in an
advertisement for commercial sex workers.
The court was not in session on Friday, November 4, 2022,
and Symone’s testimony resumed on Monday, November 7, 2022.
Prior to the start of her testimony, defendant’s counsel informed
the court he had received additional impeachment evidence for
Symone from the prosecution on Saturday, November 5, 2022.
Defendant’s counsel objected to the evidence as late discovery.
The court inquired of the prosecution as to the nature of the
recently shared discovery. The prosecutor replied it was “some
sex acts not on social media, but on megapersonals and other
commercial sex websites featuring the witness Symone.” The
prosecutor explained, “it’s impeachment because the first
question I asked Miss Symone in her testimony is has she ever
worked in the commercial sex industry. She said, ‘no.’” The
prosecutor explained, “She further doubled down on that
response by claiming she did not know any of the language or any
practices or protocol within the commercial sex industry. She
indicated that she was never in sex acts, et cetera. Essentially,
she denied any connection to the commercial sex industry in any
way, shape or form; and my detective was able to uncover some
sex ads featuring this witness.” The court inquired whether the
evidence was “strictly for the impeachment that she is involved in
the commercial sex industry,” to which the prosecutor replied,
“Correct.” The prosecution clarified the evidence was not part of
any prior discovery, but was “just uncovered by the detective over
the weekend.”
Defense counsel wanted to examine the evidence to see if it
was authentic, to which the court responded, “Isn’t that a
question for the witness?” Defense counsel sought to have the

9
evidence excluded as a discovery violation. The court responded,
“If the witness testified on Thursday to the statement ‘I’m not
involved in the commercial sex industry,’ then the People are left
in a position. At that point they have to prove she was involved
in it.”
The trial court ruled the evidence was not late discovery,
reasoning, “When it’s impeachment evidence, it is by definition
something that is different than what the witness testifies to in
trial; and the only way you are going to know what this witness
testifies to at trial is when the witness testifies.” The court added
the prosecution was justified in looking for the impeachment
evidence and bringing it in and overruled defense counsel’s
objection, stating, “the authentication will come from the
witness.”
The prosecution used the evidence in its examination of
Symone, who denied posting the advertisements and denied
being involved in the commercial sex industry.
II. Standard of review
We review the trial court’s rulings on discovery violations
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Cheek) (2001)
94 Cal.App.4th 980, 987.) “Conclusions of law or of mixed
questions of law and fact, such as the elements of a Brady claim
[citation], are subject to independent review.” (People v. Salazar
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042.) Before there can be reversal of a
criminal conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence,
the appellant must show it is reasonably probable that, in the
absence of the erroneously admitted evidence, a result more
favorable to the defendant would have been reached. (People v.
Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 923, overruled on another
ground in People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 860; see People

10
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see also Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13.)
III. Discovery violation under sections 1054.1 and 1054.7
Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding the
prosecution did not commit a discovery violation under sections
1054.1 and 1054.7.
A. Applicable law
Section 1054.1 requires the prosecution to disclose to the
defendant or his or her attorney certain “materials and
information, if it is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney
or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of
the investigating agencies.” The information required to be
disclosed includes: “(a) The names and addresses of persons the
prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at trial. [¶] (b)
Statements of all defendants. [¶] (c) All relevant real evidence
seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses
charged. [¶] (d) The existence of a felony conviction of any
material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the
outcome of the trial. [¶] (e) Any exculpatory evidence.” (Ibid.)
Section 1054.7 provides: “The disclosures required under
this chapter shall be made at least 30 days prior to the trial,
unless good cause is shown why a disclosure should be denied,
restricted, or deferred. If the material and information becomes
known to, or comes into the possession of, a party within 30 days
of trial, disclosure shall be made immediately, unless good cause
is shown why a disclosure should be denied, restricted, or
deferred. ‘Good cause’ is limited to threats or possible danger to
the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of
evidence, or possible compromise of other investigations by law
enforcement.”

11
Section 1054.5 lists various sanctions a court may make to
enforce the provisions of the chapter. Such sanctions include, but
are not limited to, “immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings,
delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the
presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or any
other lawful order.” (Id., subd. (b).) Pursuant to section 1054.5,
subdivision (c), the court may “prohibit the testimony of a
witness . . . only if all other sanctions have been exhausted.”
B. The trial court did not err in determining no
discovery violation occurred
Defendant argues the prosecution’s failure to gather and
present the evidence relevant to the prosecution witness’s
testimony until that prosecution witness was in the middle of her
testimony amounted to a discovery violation under section 1054
et seq. Defendant acknowledges section 1054.7 permits
disclosure of discovery less than 30 days before trial as long as
the evidence is disclosed immediately upon receipt. However,
defendant argues, section 1054.7 does not authorize additional
discovery during trial. Accordingly, defendant argues, the
prosecution was prohibited from relying on evidence discovered
during trial.
We disagree that the cited statutes prohibit the admission
of the sex advertisements discovered during trial. The Penal
Code requires certain categories of evidence to be turned over to
the defense at least 30 days before trial, “if it is in the possession
of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows
it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies.”
(§ 1054.1.) The categories of evidence required to be disclosed
include names and addresses of witnesses; statements of the
defendants; and “[a]ll relevant real evidence seized or obtained as

12
a part of the investigation of the offenses charged.” (§ 1054.1,
subd. (c).) The evidence in question was not seized or obtained as
part of the investigation of the offenses charged. Instead, it was
sought, and obtained, only after Symone denied involvement in
the commercial sex trade. It was impeachment evidence,
gathered immediately following Symone’s direct testimony, in
order to discredit such testimony. Because it was gathered
during trial as impeachment evidence, it was not in the
possession of the prosecution prior to trial. Thus, it was not
among the categories of evidence required to be disclosed pretrial.
In interpreting section 1054 et seq., courts have
acknowledged that “during the trial process, things change and
the best laid strategies and expectations may quickly become
inappropriate: witnesses who have been interviewed vacillate or
change their statements; events that did not loom large
prospectively may become a focal point in reality. Thus, there
must be some flexibility.” (People v. Hammond (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 1611, 1624 (Hammond).) In Hammond, the Court of
Appeal found no discovery violation where the prosecution
presented a previously undisclosed witness as a rebuttal witness
to a defense witness. (Id. at pp. 1617–1618, 1623–1624.) The
Hammond court indicated “there is no general obligation to
gather evidence,” and “there was no requirement that the district
attorney find a rebuttal witness to [certain] testimony.” (Id. at
p. 1624.)
Similarly, in People v. Tillis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 284, 288–289
(Tillis), the Supreme Court considered a situation in which the
prosecution cross-examined a defense expert witness regarding
the witness’s previous arrest for drugs. During the recess,
defense counsel complained he had not been given notice that the

13
prosecution intended to ask the witness about his arrest. (Id. at
p. 289.) The Supreme Court reasoned, “because the record does
not demonstrate the prosecutor failed to disclose any discoverable
material, and the undisclosed impeachment information fell
outside the scope of the discovery statute, no discovery violation
appears . . . .” (Id. at pp. 290–291.) The high court noted that
section 1054, subdivision (e) “precludes us from broadening the
scope of discovery beyond that provided in the chapter or other
express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the federal
Constitution. Thus, if none of those authorities requires
disclosure of a particular item of evidence, we are not at liberty to
create a rule imposing such a duty.” (Tillis, at p. 294.)
Hammond and Tillis suggest impeachment evidence, such
as the sex advertisements at issue gathered after Symone’s
denial of involvement in commercial sex work, falls outside the
requirements of section 1054 et seq. The sex advertisements
were not “in the possession of the prosecuting attorney” or known
“to be in the possession of the investigating agencies” prior to
trial. (§ 1054.1.) Nor was it “seized or obtained as a part of the
investigation” of the case. (§ 1054.1, subd. (c).) It was obtained
only after trial started and was discovered only after Symone
denied involvement in commercial sex work.
Defendant attempts to distinguish the above cases. First,
he argues the evidence at issue was real evidence that directly
supported an element of the charged offense. Further, the
evidence was used for impeachment of a prosecution witness, not
a defense witness. Based on these distinctions, defendant argues
the prosecution’s failure to gather and present the evidence until
the prosecution witness was in the middle of her testimony
amounted to a discovery violation. The distinctions defendant

14
creates do not exist in the statute, nor are they mandated by case
law. As the Tillis court required, we may not “broaden[] the
scope” of the statute beyond what is expressly provided in its
provisions. (Tillis, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 294.)
Further, the record does not reveal that defendant’s counsel
showed a discovery violation as required under section 1054.5.
Section 1054.5, subdivision (b) provides, “Before a party may seek
court enforcement of any of the disclosures required by this
chapter, the party shall make an informal request of opposing
counsel for the desired materials and information. If within 15
days the opposing counsel fails to provide the materials and
information requested, the party may seek a court order. Upon a
showing that a party has not complied with Section 1054.1 or
1054.3 and upon a showing that the moving party complied with
the informal discovery procedure provided in this subdivision, a
court may make any order necessary to enforce the provisions of
this chapter, including, but not limited to, immediate disclosure,
contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a
witness or the presentation of real evidence, continuance of the
matter, or any other lawful order. Further, the court may advise
the jury of any failure or refusal to disclose and of any untimely
disclosure.”
Pursuant to section 1054.5, subdivision (c), “[t]he court may
prohibit the testimony of a witness pursuant to subdivision (b)
only if all other sanctions have been exhausted.”
Defendant did not show noncompliance with section 1054.1
or 1054.3. Further, defendant did not seek a continuance, delay
of the witness, or any other lesser sanction than exclusion of the
evidence. Because defendant failed to seek a lesser sanction,

15
exclusion of the evidence was inappropriate under the statutory
scheme.6
The evidence was not in possession of the prosecution prior
to trial, and was not gathered as part of the prosecution’s
investigation of the offenses charged but as evidence to impeach a
witness. Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding no
discovery violation warranting exclusion of evidence occurred.
IV. Federal due process claim
Defendant forfeited his federal due process claim by failing
to object to the admission of the sex advertisements on this
ground. A party “may not argue that the court should have
excluded the evidence for a reason different from his trial
objection.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435
(Partida).) Thus, “[t]o the extent defendant argues that
admission of the . . . evidence violated his federal constitutional
rights to due process, . . . we find [that issue was] not preserved
for appeal because defendant did not object at trial on those
specific grounds.” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424.)7

6 While the record reveals that defense counsel articulated a
need to examine the evidence to see if it was authentic, there is
no record of a formal request for continuance, nor did the trial
court interpret counsel’s comments as such. Instead, counsel
argued the evidence should be excluded.
7 The Partida court articulated a “very narrow” exception to
this rule. (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435.) Under this
exception, a defendant “may argue that the asserted error in
admitting the evidence . . . had the additional legal consequence
of violating due process.” (Ibid.) However, the Partida court
clarified that “the admission of evidence, even if error under state
law, violates due process only if it makes the trial fundamentally
unfair.” (Id. at p. 436.) Because defense counsel received the

16
Further, defendant has failed to show a federal due process
violation. Defendant cites Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83,
87 (Brady), as support for his argument that due process requires
the prosecution to disclose “evidence . . . material either to guilt
or to punishment” to the defense upon request. “Under Brady,
supra, 373 U.S. 83, and its progeny, the prosecution has a
constitutional duty to disclose to the defense material exculpatory
evidence, including potential impeaching evidence.” (People v.
Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 709.) For Brady
purposes, evidence is material if it is reasonably probable its
disclosure would alter the outcome of trial. (People v. Lucas
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 274, disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53, fn. 19.) “[A]
true Brady violation occurs only when three conditions are met:
‘The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully
or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” (People v.
Lucas, supra, at p. 274.)
The evidence at issue was not suppressed by the
prosecution. The prosecution provided the evidence in question
to defendant immediately upon its discovery. The exchange of
evidence occurred during trial, before the direct examination of
Symone had concluded and before defendant’s cross-examination
of Symone had begun. “Brady does not necessarily require that
the prosecution turn over exculpatory material before trial. To

evidence prior to the cross-examination of Symone, and had the
opportunity to cross-examine Symone regarding such evidence,
the admission of the evidence did not render the trial
fundamentally unfair.

17
escape the Brady sanction, disclosure ‘must be made at a time
when disclosure would be of value to the accused.’” (U.S. v.
Gordon (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 1397, 1403.) Here, because
defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Symone
regarding the new evidence, the disclosure came at a time when
the evidence could be of value to defendant.
Another aspect of suppression is that the evidence “is not
suppressed unless the defendant was actually unaware of it and
could not have discovered it ‘“by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.”’” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1049.)
Thus, “if the material evidence is in a defendant’s possession or is
available to a defendant through the exercise of due diligence,
then, at least as far as evidence is concerned, the defendant has
all that is necessary to ensure a fair trial, even if the prosecution
is not the source of the evidence.” (Ibid.) Symone’s sex
advertisements on public Web sites were equally available to the
defense. Thus, defendant’s only reason for not obtaining them
was his lack of interest or due diligence. (See, e.g., People v.
Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 715 [“the prosecutor had no
constitutional duty to conduct defendant’s investigation for
him”].)
Even if defendant had not forfeited his federal due process
claim, for the reasons set forth above we would have concluded no
Brady violation occurred.8
V. Ineffective assistance of counsel
To the extent this court finds any of defendant’s arguments
forfeited, defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of

8 Because we have found defendant forfeited his federal due
process claim and failed to show suppression, we decline to
address the party’s competing arguments regarding prejudice.

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counsel under both the federal and state Constitutions. Because
we have concluded defendant forfeited his federal due process
claim, we address the ineffective assistance of counsel argument.
A. Applicable law
“Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California
Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance
of counsel.” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215.) This
right entitles the defendant to effective assistance. (Ibid.) To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must show two prongs. First, the defendant must
show counsel’s performance was deficient. “This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687 (Strickland).) Second, the defendant must show
prejudice as a result of the deficient performance. “This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Ibid.)
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.) Thus, we
“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Ibid.)
When a claim of ineffective assistance is made on direct appeal,
and the record does not show the reason for counsel’s challenged
act or omission, the conviction must be affirmed unless there
could be no satisfactory explanation. (People v. Mai (2013) 57
Cal.4th 986, 1009.)

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B. Analysis
Defendant claims counsel’s failure to argue the admission
of the sex advertisements violated his due process rights and
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He adds the
argument was meritorious, and there was no reasonable strategy
for counsel’s failure to present the argument in light of counsel’s
desire to exclude the evidence. Defendant cites People v. Roberts
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1131, where the court found “since
defendant’s trial counsel did in fact object to the introduction of
the statements, albeit on nonmeritorious grounds, this fact
underscores our conclusion that there could have been no tactical
reason for counsel’s failure to make a meritorious objection to the
same evidence.” Defendant also argues the admission of the
evidence was prejudicial.
We decline to find ineffective assistance of counsel on the
record before us. Defense counsel objected to the advertisements
in question on the ground that the late discovery constituted a
discovery violation. Defense counsel did not object on the ground
that the admission of the evidence constituted a federal due
process violation. The record does not reveal why defense counsel
declined to make a due process objection. Because the record
does not reveal counsel’s rationale, we must assume counsel had
a tactical reason for failing to make a due process objection. “If
the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to
act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was
asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless
there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must
be rejected on appeal.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1068–1069.)

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There is a satisfactory explanation as to why defendant’s
counsel chose not to object to the admission of the sex
advertisements on federal due process grounds. As set forth in
detail above in part IV, even if such an objection had been made,
it would not have had merit. A Brady violation occurs only when
the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence is
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice has ensued. (People v. Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at
p. 274.) Defendant failed to show the prosecution suppressed the
sex advertisements because the prosecution handed the
advertisements over upon their discovery. Further, the
advertisements were public record and could have been found by
the defense with reasonable diligence. We decline to find defense
counsel ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection.9

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

___________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________ ___________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. HOFFSTADT, J.

9 Because we have found defense counsel’s performance was
not deficient, we decline to address the element of prejudice.

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