CourtListener 10278436•People v. J.R. CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 11/20/24 P. v. J.R. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330066
(Super. Ct. No. EL0082)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
J.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
J.R. appeals orders of the juvenile court sustaining the
allegations in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602
petition, declaring him a ward of the court, placing him in the
custody of the probation officer, and ordering him suitably placed
in an open facility.1 We conclude that sufficient evidence
supports the finding that J.R. committed felony hit-and-run
driving that resulted in injury to another person. (Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) We also conclude that any error in
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
failing to consider J.R. eligible for deferred entry of judgment
(DEJ) is harmless.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior Petitions
On May 27, 2022, and December 2, 2022, J.R. admitted
allegations in two section 602 petitions. The first petition
concerned the receipt of stolen property and the second petition
concerned the possession of a handgun. On January 20, 2023,
the juvenile court ordered J.R. placed in the Community
Detention Program (CDP). It also ordered him to attend
substance abuse treatment and submit to drug testing.
Present Petition Filed February 23, 2023
On November 5, 2022, J.R. drove a vehicle that was
involved in a collision. Autumn S. sat in the back passenger seat
on the right side. Three other girls were passengers in the
vehicle. Autumn S. was injured during the collision and suffered
a blunt head force injury. She was hospitalized for five days and
now suffers from dizziness and headaches. Autumn S. has no
memory of the collision.
Law Enforcement Response
At approximately 12:44 p.m., Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Deputy Cortes and Deputy Vega responded to the accident scene
on Chico Avenue in South El Monte. Cortes had received an
automated 911 call from J.R.’s cell phone and heard a male voice
screaming for help.
When Cortes arrived, she saw a white four-door sedan in
the middle of the roadway. No one was inside the sedan. Three
females, including Autumn S., were seated by a parking lot.
Autumn S. had a laceration on her forehead and the other two
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females had scrapes and bruises. J.R. and a fourth female were
not at the scene of the collision.
Vega found and arrested J.R. at 2400 Chico Avenue,
approximately 250 to 300 feet away from the collision. He drove
J.R. to the hospital.
Cortes investigated the collision and determined that it was
caused by excessive speed. The sedan driven by J.R. hit a sports
utility vehicle with substantial force, causing it to jump the curb
and strike another vehicle.
J.R.’s Testimony
J.R. testified at the adjudication hearing. He stated that he
was driving his mother’s vehicle when he was involved in the
accident. Initially, he was unconscious from the impact, but
regained consciousness and realized his passengers were injured.
He testified that he left the vehicle and “made sure everybody
was okay.” J.R. stated that he removed the passengers from the
vehicle.
J.R. also testified that he carried one of the passengers (his
girlfriend) to a nearby business and asked employees for help.
The employees, except for a woman who gave J.R. and his
girlfriend water, refused to help. The two sat down until a police
officer arrived and took him to the hospital. J.R. stated that he
was “feeling dizzy and . . . going in and out of consciousness.” He
testified that he left the accident scene only to seek immediate
help.
Adjudication and Disposition
With the consent of the parties, the juvenile court judge
viewed the accident scene with the prosecutor and defense
counsel. Based upon his view, the judge later stated that the
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area of the collision was a light industrial area, but a gasoline
station was nearby.
Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court sustained
the felony allegations of hit-and-run driving that resulted in
injury to another person. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subds. (a) &
(b)(1).) In ruling, the court commented that it did not think J.R.
intended to hurt his passengers, but he panicked after the
collision.
On September 12, 2023, the juvenile court held a
disposition hearing, declared J.R. a ward of the court pursuant to
section 602, and placed him in the custody of the probation
officer. The court ordered that J.R. be suitably placed in an open
facility for a maximum confinement of three years. J.R. received
predisposition credit of 226 days and was ordered to obey the
terms and conditions of probation.
J.R. appeals and contends that: 1) insufficient evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding that he committed hit-and-
run driving, and 2) the court failed to consider his suitability for
DEJ.
DISCUSSION
I.2
J.R. argues that he was denied due process of law pursuant
to the federal and California constitutions because insufficient
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that he committed
felony hit-and-run driving.
Section 20001, subdivision (a) requires the driver of a
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to stop
the vehicle at the scene and fulfill the requirements of section
2 All statutory references in I., post, are to the Vehicle
Code.
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20003. Among other things, section 20003, subdivision (a)
requires the driver to render reasonable assistance to any person
injured in the accident. The gravamen of the violation of the
offense of hit-and-run is not the initial injury of the victim, but
leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering
aid. (People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1509.) “The
legislative purpose of sections 20001 and 20003 is to prevent the
driver of a vehicle involved in an injury-causing accident from
leaving injured persons in distress and danger for want of
medical care and from attempting to avoid possible civil or
criminal liability for the accident by failing to identify
oneself. . . .” (Id. at p. 1510.)
The same standard of review governs the sufficiency of
evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile cases; we review the
entire record and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
judgment to determine whether substantial evidence supports
the conviction. (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653.) We
do not redetermine the weight of the evidence or issues of witness
credibility. (In re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177, 1185.)
Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence is the
exclusive province of the trier of fact. (Ibid.) “If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
Here sufficient evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom support the juvenile court’s finding that J.R.
committed felony hit-and-run driving. Following the collision,
J.R. left with his girlfriend and walked approximately 250 to 300
feet away. J.R. left the other three girls, including seriously
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injured Autumn S., at the accident scene. Although J.R.’s cell
phone automatically called 911 due to the collision, he did not
make a further call for assistance. J.R. and his girlfriend ended
up sitting behind a parked truck until he was located and
arrested. Moreover, J.R.’s duty to render assistance was not
satisfied by the happenstance that bystanders or witnesses were
present. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1028-1029
[“The fortuitous fulfillment of the driver’s duty to render
reasonable assistance to the injured victim or victims by Good
Samaritans cannot operate to exonerate the driver and nullify
the fact such duty was breached by the driver”].) Although J.R.
offers alternative explanations for his behavior, we do not
substitute our reasonable inferences for those drawn by the trier
of fact. (People v. Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
II.
J.R. asserts that the prosecutor did not notify him that he
was eligible for DEJ and the juvenile court did not consider his
suitability, in violation of his right to due process of law pursuant
to the federal and California constitutions. (In re D.L. (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 1240, 1245 [failure to provide minor of a DEJ
hearing constitutes a denial of due process].)
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court discussed
J.R.’s prior section 602 petitions and his failed performance on
informal probation and CDP. The court also noted that J.R. had
11 positive cannabis tests at his present drug treatment program
and failed to complete a prior drug treatment program.
The DEJ provisions of section 790 et seq. provide for a
deferred entry of judgment to permit a minor to successfully
complete a term of probation. (In re C.W. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th
654, 659-660 [discussion of DEJ procedures, eligibility, and
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suitability requirements].) If a minor denies the allegations of
the petition and requests a contested hearing, however, the
juvenile court is not required to hold a DEJ suitability hearing.
(In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 976-980.)
Here the juvenile court was not required to hold a DEJ
suitability hearing because J.R. denied the allegations of the
petition and requested a contested hearing. (In re Usef S. (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 276, 286, fn. 3.)
Moreover, given the juvenile court’s statements, any error
is harmless pursuant to any standard of review. The court
stated: “The Court does not believe of course at this time, and no
one is arguing on behalf of, home on probation. He has already
been tried functionally home on probation under [section] 725
and with C.D.P. and both of those failed. . . . So home on
probation is not viable.” Remanding for consideration of DEJ
would be an idle act. (In re Jose R. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 55, 61
[failure to expressly find that youth authority would probably
benefit minor is error of statutory dimension only and harmless
in view of minor's record].)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J. CODY, J.
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Benjamin R. Campos, Temporary Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Susan S. Kim and David
Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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