CourtListener 10278434•People v. Knight CA1/1
Texte intégral
Filed 11/20/24 P. v. Knight CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168726
v. (Alameda County
JEVANNI KNIGHT, Super Ct. No. 19CR011428)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jevanni Knight appeals from the trial court’s imposition of
an upper term sentence following his convictions for voluntary manslaughter
and possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 192, subd. (a), 29800,
subd. (a)(1).) The Attorney General concedes that remand for resentencing is
appropriate. We reverse and remand for a full resentencing hearing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2019, when defendant was 22 years old, he was crossing the street
with his friend D.H. Michael Sadberry drove his car near D.H. in the
crosswalk, and D.H. yelled that Sadberry almost hit him. Sadberry exited his
car and began punching D.H. D.H. fought back and yelled for help. As the
fight continued and Sadberry held D.H.’s sweatshirt, defendant fired a shot
at Sadberry. The shot hit Sadberry in the neck, killing him.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The Alameda County District Attorney filed an information charging
defendant with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and unlawful possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The information further alleged as to the
murder charge that defendant had personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death. (§ 12022.53, subds. (a), (b), (c),
(d).) The prosecution dismissed this enhancement prior to trial. The
information alleged defendant was ineligible for probation because he
committed the offenses while on felony probation. (§ 1203, subd. (k).) The
information identified a February 2016 conviction under section 25850 as the
felony supporting the section 1203, subdivision (k) allegation. The
prosecution did not allege aggravating factors at any point during the
proceedings. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
During trial, the parties stipulated that defendant had a prior “felony
conviction,” but the stipulation did not specify the charge or the probationary
sentence. Defendant testified that he shot Sadberry because he was afraid
Sadberry would keep hurting D.H. Defendant asserted that he grew up in an
unsafe area where gun violence was common and knew friends and family
who were killed. The jury acquitted defendant of murder, finding him guilty
of voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (a).) The jury also convicted
defendant of unlawful firearm possession. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).)
At sentencing, the prosecution sought an upper term sentence of 11
years for voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive sentence of 8 months for
unlawful firearm possession. The defense argued for a presumptive low term
sentence based on defendant’s youth and history of trauma witnessing gun
violence as a youth. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The defense further argued that
the prosecution’s proposed sentence violated section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)
because defendant’s prior conviction was not pled or proven to a jury and the
2
trial stipulation did not include the “facts underlying” the aggravating
circumstances argued by the prosecutor.
The trial court took judicial notice of defendant’s 2016 conviction for
carrying a loaded firearm in public (§ 25850), specifying the year and the
offense. The court did not state it was taking judicial notice of the sentence
associated with the conviction or of any postconviction proceedings affecting
the length of probation. Based on the prior conviction, the court found two
aggravating circumstances: defendant’s “crimes are of increasing . . .
seriousness” and defendant “was still on probation for [the 2016] offense at
the time of this offense,” showing “he was not successful on that probation.”
The court acknowledged defendant’s youth but did not find it “a significant
factor . . . and certainly not enough to overcome the aggravating
circumstances.” The court observed that defendant’s claim of trauma was
based on his trial testimony and defendant had admitted being untruthful on
the witness stand. The court noted defendant did not claim trauma in his
probation interview, where he described having “a very good childhood” and
denied experiencing any mental, physical, or sexual abuse. The court thus
found the aggravating circumstances “outweigh[ed] this factor as well.”
The trial court sentenced defendant to 11 years 8 months, consisting of
an upper term for voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive midterm for
unlawful firearm possession.
II. DISCUSSION
We accept the Attorney General’s concession2 that remand for
resentencing is appropriate. The record is inadequate to support the trial
2 The Attorney General’s concession is based on Erlinger v. United
States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834, which applied Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence requiring that “[v]irtually ‘any fact’ that ‘ “increase[s] the
3
court’s determination that defendant remained on probation at the time of
the present offenses.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) authorizes a sentence exceeding the
middle term only when circumstances in aggravation are present and the
facts underlying those circumstances were stipulated to by the defendant or
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, with “trial on the
circumstances in aggravation . . . bifurcated from the trial of the charges and
enhancements.” As an exception, section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) allows the
court to consider the defendant’s prior convictions “based on a certified record
of conviction.”
Here, the aggravating circumstances were not tried to the jury.
Defendant’s trial stipulation did not include the “facts underlying” the
aggravating circumstances (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)), specifically, the nature of
the offense, the duration of the probation sentence, and any postconviction
adjudications of probation violations affecting the term of probation. And the
People introduced no certified conviction, relying on a request for judicial
notice. This is not authorized by the statute. (See People v. Wiley, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 700, review granted [§ 1170, subd. (b)(3) “limits the class
of materials on which a trial court may rely in finding aggravating factors
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed” ’ ” be
determined by a jury. Recent decisions by this division and by our colleagues
in Division Four recognize an exception for the determinations at issue
here—whether convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether
previous performance on probation was poor—insofar as the relevant facts
are established by the record of conviction. (See People v. Morgan (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 488, 516–518, review granted Oct. 2, 2024, S286493; People
v. Wiley (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 676, 685–688, review granted Mar. 12, 2024,
S283326). We concur with these authorities and limit our acceptance of the
Attorney General’s concession to the conceded result, not its reasoning.
4
based on prior convictions,” noting authority holding a probation report is not
a certified record of conviction under the statute].)
Even authorities upholding an upper term sentence based on a certified
record of conviction without a jury finding have required that the facts
demonstrating the unsatisfactory probation performance appear in the record
of conviction. (See People v. Wiley, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 687–688,
review granted; People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 82.) In taking judicial
notice of defendant’s 2016 conviction, the trial court did not specify the record
it relied on, the term of probation, or the basis to conclude that defendant
remained on probation in 2019—particularly considering the intervening
passage and potential retroactive application of Assembly Bill No. 1950
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 328), which limits the probation term
for a violation of section 25850 to two years. (§ 1203.1, subd. (a); see People v.
Faial (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 738, 745–747, review granted May 18, 2022,
S273840; People v. Canedos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 469, 476–480, review
granted June 29, 2022, S274244.)
Our Supreme Court has held that “a Sixth Amendment violation occurs
when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper
term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been
properly established.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768.) “The
violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating
facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that
those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current
statutory requirements.” (Ibid.) Otherwise, “applying the Chapman[3]
3 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
5
standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.”
(Lynch, at p. 768.)
Here, regardless of whether defendant was entitled to a jury finding on
his alleged unsatisfactory performance on probation, the underlying facts
were not proved in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b)(3). The trial
court erred in relying on the unproven allegation to impose an upper term
sentence, and that error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We remand for a full resentencing. Given the scope of the remand, it is
not necessary for us to reach the merits of the parties’ dispute regarding the
trial court’s finding that section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)’s presumption either
did not apply to defendant or was overcome. (See People v. Jones (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45–46 [on remand for resentencing, the trial court is
entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for the trial court
to hold a new sentencing hearing consistent with section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), (3), and (6).
HILL, J.*
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
BANKE, J.
* Judge of the San Mateo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
6
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.