CourtListener 10277402•People v. Hunter CA4/1
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Filed 11/19/24 P. v. Hunter CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083529
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN424882)
MARK HUNTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert J. Kearney, Judge. Affirmed.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mark Hunter appeals from a judgment after he was convicted of
forcible sex crimes and sentenced to 50 years to life plus 80 years under the
One Strike law (Pen. Code,1 § 667.61) and the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12). He raises two issues on appeal relating to his
sentencing: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his
counsel’s failure to object to his removal from the courtroom for disruptive
conduct during the sentencing hearing; and (2) the $300 restitution fine
should be stayed because the trial court failed to recognize its discretion not
to impose this fine as a matter of due process based on Hunter’s inability to
pay. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We only briefly summarize the facts because many of the details are
not relevant to the sentencing issues raised on appeal. In February 1999,
Hunter approached 19-year-old Jane Doe at a payphone in Escondido and
asked for directions to a motel. She agreed to help him. Hunter used a ruse
to get her inside his van, then bound her wrists and ankles and covered her
mouth with duct tape. As Hunter was restraining her, he told her, “Don’t
scream. Don’t make me have to strangle you.” He then drove the van to a
remote location while she was lying on the floor in the back. After forcing
Jane Doe to undress, Hunter told her, “What’s going to happen is that I want
you to suck my dick . . . and then you’re going to give me some pussy.”
Hunter removed the duct tape from her mouth and put it over her eyes,
forced her to orally copulate him, then raped and sodomized her. Hunter
eventually drove Jane Doe back to her car and let her go. She reported the
crime immediately, but the investigation went cold. Twenty years later,
Hunter’s DNA was matched to semen collected from Jane Doe’s vagina
during her sexual assault examination.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
Testifying in his own defense, Hunter stated that he had suffered
memory loss after being hit in the head with a baseball bat in 1998. Before
meeting his current girlfriend in 2002 or 2003, he had multiple one-night
stands, but he could not remember all of them. He had no memory of
meeting Jane Doe. Hunter told the police that if his semen was found inside
Jane Doe’s vagina, he must have had sex with her. Hunter denied that he
would have tied Jane Doe up, kidnapped her, or committed forcible sexual
acts against her.
A jury convicted Hunter of two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd.
(a)(2)), one count of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)), three counts of
forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)), and one count of kidnapping for
rape, sodomy, or oral copulation (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found true
One Strike circumstances of kidnapping (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c), (d)) and
tying or binding (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c), (e)). The trial court found true a
prior strike allegation (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i) & 1170.12).
The probation report recommended a sentence of 50 years to life plus a
determinate term of 80 years. It also recommended the following fines and
fees: a restitution fine of $10,000 under Penal Code section 1202.4,
subdivision (b); an additional restitution fine of $10,000 to be stayed unless
Hunter’s parole supervision was revoked under Penal Code section 1202.45; a
court security fee of $320 under Penal Code section 1465.8; a criminal
conviction assessment fee of $210 under Government Code section 70373; a
sex offender registration fee of $300 under Penal Code section 290.3; and
direct restitution to the victim in an amount to be determined under Penal
Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f). According to the probation report,
Hunter received $400 per month in social security benefits and $2,000 per
month in disability from the Navy.
3
Before sentencing, defense counsel submitted a combined sentencing
brief and motion to strike Hunter’s strike prior under People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. In relevant part, the defense asserted
that Hunter had suffered juvenile trauma and mental health issues the court
should consider at sentencing.
Attached to this pleading were multiple supporting exhibits, including
a neuropsychological evaluation by Dr. Cynthia Boyd, a risk assessment by
psychologist Clark R. Clipson, a letter from Hunter’s girlfriend who had lived
with him for over 20 years, and letters from Hunter’s uncle and aunt.
According to these exhibits, Hunter was emotionally and physically abused
by his stepfather from a young age and was exposed to domestic violence
between his mother and stepfather. When Hunter was only four years old,
his stepfather burned his fingers on the stove. Later, his stepfather beat him
with belts, sticks, whips, and a gun holster. Hunter’s mother never
intervened. As a result, Hunter started drinking at a young age and became
dependent on alcohol. Hunter also reported a history of psychiatric
treatment for posttraumatic stress, depression, and anger issues.
The defense exhibits included additional evidence that Hunter had
been hit in the head with a metal bat in January 1999, the month before the
charged crimes. According to the medical records, he sustained a large scalp
laceration and skull fracture, resulting in moderate traumatic brain injury
and post-concussive symptoms, including memory problems.
At sentencing, the court confirmed that it had read Hunter’s sentencing
brief and Romero motion and all attachments. With Hunter present in court,
defense counsel then made her sentencing argument and asked the court to
strike the strike prior and the One Strike allegations. Among other things,
defense counsel argued that Hunter had “been the victim of substantial abuse
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in his childhood, which has been corroborated by his aunt and uncle” and he
had suffered “a traumatic brain injury near the time where this incident
occurred” and “post-concussive symptoms ongoing after that incident
occurred.”
After defense counsel completed her sentencing argument, the
prosecutor read a letter from the victim, then stated that the People would be
seeking a sentence of 50 years to life plus a determinate term of 80 years. At
that point, Hunter interjected and began yelling in the courtroom. He said:
“My god. I didn’t do this. You’re a liar. . . . This woman has been . . . for a
year and a half.” The trial court repeatedly attempted to stop Hunter by
saying: “Mr. Hunter. . . . Mr. Hunter. . . . Stop. Mr. Hunter, listen. Stop.
Do you want to leave?” Hunter responded: “No, I don’t want to, but I’m sick
of her lies.” The court warned: “Okay. You’re going to leave if you can’t be
quiet. One more outburst.” Hunter replied: “I can’t help it. I’m innocent.”
The court responded: “Okay. You’re leaving. Go ahead and take him out.”
Hunter continued: “Okay. Good. I am innocent of this crime. I didn’t do this.
She lied and changed the discovery. She changed everything. She’s a
freaking liar.”
Hunter was removed from the courtroom for the rest of the hearing.
Defense counsel did not object to his removal. The court later explained: “For
the record here today, he was yelling. He was yelling over the Court for a
while. He was personally attacking the prosecutor. Even after me warning
him, he continued to go forward, and that’s why I had him removed.”
After the prosecutor completed her sentencing argument, defense
counsel asked for and received permission to make some additional
comments. In these comments, she again noted that “we have also provided
evidence that Mr. Hunter was the victim of trauma and suffers from
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posttraumatic stress.” Defense counsel also asked the court to stay any fines,
fees, and costs based on Hunter’s inability to pay, and stated that Hunter had
been disabled for a substantial period of time and did not have the ability to
pay.
The trial court denied the Romero motion to strike the strike prior,
declined to strike the One Strike allegations, and imposed a sentence of 50
years to life for one of the forcible rape counts, plus full, consecutive
determinate terms totaling 80 years for the rest of the counts under section
667.6, subdivision (c). In ruling on the Romero motion, the court observed
that “basically you have a teenager who was overpowered, kidnapped, taped,
transported to an unknown location, had her life threatened, was raped
multiple times in multiple ways.” The court also noted that this was the
defendant’s “third felony case” and he “had been to prison twice before.” The
court found that Hunter did not fall outside the Three Strikes sentencing
scheme because “the People of California were concerned with exactly this
type of violent conduct from people who had multiple convictions.”
The court ordered Hunter to pay “the minimum restitution fine in the
amount of $300” and an “additional minimum restitution fine of $300 to be
stayed and remain so unless his supervision is revoked.” The court reserved
jurisdiction over direct victim restitution. However, the court struck the
court security fee, criminal conviction assessment fee, and sex offender
registration fee.
DISCUSSION
I
Hunter first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
due to his attorney’s failure to object to his removal from the courtroom
during sentencing. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
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must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s
deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to
the defendant. (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211 (Scott);
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688 (Strickland).)
Hunter cannot prevail on either of these prongs. First, as to deficient
performance, the appellate record is silent as to why defense counsel did not
object to Hunter’s removal from the courtroom. It is “particularly difficult to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, where we are
limited to evaluating the appellate record. If the record does not shed light
on why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must
reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and failed to provide
a satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no satisfactory
explanation.” (Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1212; see also People v. Bradford
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1052 [reviewing court will find ineffective assistance
of counsel “only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission” (internal quotation
marks omitted)]; People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 188 [“tactical
choices presented . . . on a silent record . . . are better evaluated by way of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, and on direct appeal we reject them”].)
On this record, we cannot conclude that there is no rational explanation
for defense counsel’s failure to object to Hunter’s removal from the courtroom.
Even assuming there was an arguable legal basis for objection, defense
counsel may well have concluded that Hunter’s disruptions were doing him
more harm than good, that he would be unable to control himself if allowed to
remain in the courtroom (especially given his own statement that “I can’t
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help it”), and that the defense stood a better chance of having the court
exercise leniency in his absence. This would have been a rational tactical
reason for not objecting to Hunter’s removal. Thus, Hunter cannot establish
deficient performance based on the appellate record.
Second, Hunter cannot establish prejudice under the Strickland
standard either. His only argument on prejudice is that he might have
provided some assistance to his counsel in arguing for leniency based on his
juvenile trauma, mental health issues, and traumatic brain injury. But
defense counsel had already argued these issues to the court in her
sentencing argument before Hunter was removed from the courtroom, when
he was still present to assist her. She had also presented evidence on these
matters in the exhibits to her sentencing brief and Romero motion, which the
trial court read before the sentencing hearing. There is no reason to believe
that Hunter would have provided additional useful information to his counsel
on these subjects beyond what the defense had already submitted and argued
before he was removed from the courtroom. “Prejudice must be a
demonstrable reality established based on facts in the record, not simply
speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel.” (People v.
Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778.) “It is not enough for the defendant to
show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that
test . . . .” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 693.)
We therefore conclude that Hunter has not established ineffective
assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to object to his removal
from the courtroom for disruptive conduct at sentencing.
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II
Hunter next argues that the $300 restitution fine should be stayed
because the trial court failed to recognize its discretion not to impose this fine
as a matter of due process based on Hunter’s inability to pay under People v.
Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas).2 He bases this argument
solely on the trial court’s statement that it was ordering “the minimum
restitution fine in the amount of $300,” but striking the court security fee,
criminal conviction assessment fee, and sex offender registration fee.
According to Hunter, the trial court’s reference to the $300 “minimum
restitution fine” demonstrates that it believed the fee was mandatory and it
had to impose it regardless of Hunter’s inability to pay.
We disagree. By its terms, the statute requires imposition of a
restitution fine that “shall not be less than three hundred dollars ($300) and
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).” (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Thus,
the trial court accurately described $300 as the “minimum” required by the
statute. But it does not necessarily follow that the trial court believed due
process permitted the imposition of this fee even if Hunter lacked the ability
to pay it. Because defense counsel never specifically objected on due process
grounds, the trial court had no opportunity to rule one way or the other on
this constitutional issue.
In any event, Hunter cannot establish prejudicial error because the
record affirmatively establishes that he had the ability to pay a $300 fine.
According to the probation report, Hunter was receiving $400 per month in
social security benefits and $2,000 per month in disability from the Navy.
Hunter has never contested the accuracy of this information. Accordingly,
2 Other California courts have disagreed with the holding of Dueñas, and
the issue is currently pending before our Supreme Court. (People v. Kopp
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)
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even assuming any due process violation under Dueñas, it would be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24)
because Hunter had the ability to pay a $300 fine. (People v. Johnson (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139–140 [Dueñas error harmless under Chapman
because defendant had ability to pay $370 fine]; People v. Jones (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 1028, 1035 [Dueñas error harmless under Chapman because
defendant had ability to pay $300 restitution fine and $70 assessments].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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