CourtListener 10277398•People v. Smith CA4/1
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Filed 11/19/24 P. v. Smith CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082194
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN033462)
ANDREW DEWANE SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David G. Brown, Judge. Affirmed.
Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,
Felicity Senoski and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Andrew Dewane Smith appeals from the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95).
After issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court concluded Smith was not entitled to resentencing relief.
Smith contends the court erroneously failed to exclude from evidence
his statements made at an initial parole suitability hearing, and he was
entitled to resentencing because the People otherwise failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of attempted murder under the current
law. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 1996, Smith pleaded guilty to two counts of premeditated attempted
murder of Ruben G. and Jesus A. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and admitted the
truth of allegations that he personally used a firearm (§12022.5, subdivision
(a)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subdivision (b)).
The parties stipulated that the factual basis for the plea was the preliminary
hearing transcript.2
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Smith does not include a statement of facts surrounding the attempted
murders in his opening brief. As he points out, the preliminary hearing
transcript was not introduced into evidence. The People provide a brief
factual summary taken from the parole hearing transcript. We likewise do
not rely on the preliminary hearing facts in this opinion to determine the
merits of Smith’s section 1172.6 petition. Rather, we summarize Smith’s
statements from the plea bargaining hearing and the parole hearing for
context only.
2
In 1996, the trial court sentenced Smith to two terms of life with the
possibility of parole and a consecutive determinate term of 18 years for the
firearm and great-bodily-injury enhancements.
In April 2022, Smith filed a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6. The court appointed counsel for him and set a briefing schedule.
At the start of the evidentiary hearing, the court acknowledged reading
the parties’ papers, including the parole hearing transcript.
The prosecution argued Smith was ineligible for resentencing, claiming
he directly committed the attempted murders and acted with malice
aforethought. The People submitted a transcript of Smith’s statements at his
In the plea bargaining proceedings, Smith agreed his guilty plea was
given freely and voluntarily. He pleaded guilty to “willfully and unlawfully
attempt[ing] to murder” two individuals, and agreed the offenses were
“willful, deliberate and premeditated” under section 189. He also admitted as
to both crimes that he, “with the intent to inflict . . . injury, personally
inflicted great bodily injury” within the meaning of section 12022.7,
subdivision (b).
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parole hearing. Over Smith’s objections, the court admitted the transcript
into evidence.3
The People argued against resentencing: “[W]e would ask the court to
deny the petition based on both the parole transcript as well as the dismissed
plea admitting the [enhancement allegations]. We’re not going to deny that
the parole transcript is heavily weighing . . . in favor of denying [the petition],
and that is basically our argument, is based upon that given that there
wasn’t an accomplice here and the [section] 245[4] that’s alleged. But given
[ ] Smith’s statement and the parole transcript . . . where he admits to also
being the shooter as well as an intent to kill, which is superfluous once you
find that he is the actual shooter, I think the petition must be denied
pursuant to [People v.] Harden [(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45].”
3 At the parole hearing, Smith was represented by counsel. A
commissioner asked Smith, “Why did you shoot at these guys?” Smith
replied, “Truthfully, the day that happened they threw up a gang sign to me
and at that time me trying to be impressive [sic], . . . so I did turn around we
drove back and I did shoot.” Smith added, “I was the only one in the car with
the gun.” A commissioner asked Smith, “What was your intent?” Smith
admitted, “Oh. I was bound to shoot, to kill them.” Pointing out that Smith
was on parole at the time and therefore ineligible to carry a gun, a
commissioner asked Smith, “Why did you have that gun?” He replied, “To
hurt somebody.” When pressed, “Why?’ Smith replied, “To kill.” A
commissioner again asked, “Why?” Smith answered, “Because I was a gang
member and I was living the life of other gang member [sic] and any time any
situation that would have arose [sic] I would have used the gun. That was
one of the reasons why I had it.” The commissioner asked Smith if he had
used drugs or alcohol before the shooting, and he denied doing so. The
commissioner clarified, asking whether Smith was “stone-cold sober” when he
committed the shootings. Smith replied, “Yes sir.”
4 The prosecutor likely misspoke because the section 245 counts in the
information, dealing with assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to
produce great bodily injury, were dismissed as a part of Smith’s plea bargain.
4
Defense counsel argued: “[E]ssentially the People are relying on a post-
conviction confession alone and have not submitted independent evidence to
corroborate that confession. If any such evidence exists beyond, you know,
the plea and the parole transcript, which are both just my client’s words
alone, that evidence is not before this court. And so the People have not met
their burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that my client could be
convicted of murder [sic].”
The trial court agreed with the People’s arguments and on that basis
denied Smith’s resentencing petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Admissibility of Parole Hearing Transcript
Relying on People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), Smith
contends the court prejudicially erred by failing to exclude his statements
made at the parole hearing “under the judicially devised exclusionary remedy
of Coleman.” He argues Coleman and its progeny extended immunity to
situations where there is a compulsive sanction against the exercise of the
privilege against self-incrimination and where policy considerations favor full
disclosure from the person providing testimony. He further argues that using
an inmate’s parole hearing testimony at a subsequent criminal proceeding
regarding the same crime will either chill the speech required of inmates to
establish suitability for parole or require an inmate to inculpate himself.
It is well settled that a defendant’s testimony at a parole hearing falls
within the ambit of “ ‘new or additional evidence.’ ” (People v. Mitchell (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 575, 586, (Mitchell); People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
688, 703 (Myles).) Claims about the erroneous admission of evidence are
usually reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Duran (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 920, 927-928 (Duran).) However, whether use immunity exists
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and whether a statement is involuntary within the meaning of due process
are questions of law we review de novo. (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010)
50 Cal.4th 372, 383, fn. 8 [questions of law on undisputed facts]; People v.
McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1086 [involuntariness].)
We agree with the other Courts of Appeal that have addressed this
issue and conclude that Coleman use immunity should not be extended to bar
the use of a defendant’s testimony at a parole hearing in a later evidentiary
hearing held under section 1172.6. (Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 930-
932; Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 586-590; People v. Anderson
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81, 93 (Anderson); Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp.
705-706.)
In Coleman, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant’s
testimony at a probation revocation proceeding was inadmissible against him
at a later trial to prove guilt on the related criminal charges. (Coleman,
supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 889-890.) The court reasoned that a defendant should
not be forced to choose between the privilege against self-incrimination at
trial and the right to be heard at a probation revocation hearing. (Id. at p.
878.) Coleman expressed its holding in terms of a judicially created
exclusionary rule. (Id. at p. 889.) However, later cases have treated Coleman
as creating a limited species of use immunity grounded in California's
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. (See Ramona R. v.
Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808-809.) In either case, the basis for
the decisions remains the same two policies that underlie the privilege
against self-incrimination: first, the policy that requires the state to carry its
burden of proving guilt without the defendant’s compelled personal
assistance; and second, the policy against subjecting a defendant to the
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“ ‘cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.’ ” (Coleman, at p.
878; see also id. at pp. 875-876.)
The rule established in Coleman supra, 13 Cal.3d 867 has been
extended to contexts other than probation hearings, to preclude the
prosecution’s use of a defendant’s statements as substantive evidence of guilt
when one constitutional right is pitted against another. (See, e.g., People v.
Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 694 [privileged disclosures in habeas corpus
proceeding based on ineffective assistance of counsel did not waive attorney-
client privilege for purpose of retrial]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37
Cal.3d at pp. 810-811 [statements made by a minor to a probation officer and
during a fitness hearing are inadmissible as substantive evidence against
minor at subsequent trial]; Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
478, 502-503 [statements made during a court-compelled mental examination
cannot be used in a subsequent trial].) The reasoning underlying cases
expanding Coleman use immunity to those additional contexts remains
“limited to situations where a defendant’s prior statements might be later
used against him in a manner that offends the privilege against self-
incrimination.” (Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 929; see also, People v.
Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 692, 694-695 [Coleman and its progeny are
cases in which the courts have granted use immunity when “it would be
unfair to require the defendant to choose between maintaining a privilege
and asserting other important rights”].) Smith makes no claim of privilege
other than his privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, the authorities on
which he relies require he demonstrate he had a constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination in his section 1172.6 resentencing hearing in order
to be entitled to Coleman use immunity. (Anderson, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 93.) As we explain, he has not met this burden.
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“The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects
persons from being compelled by ‘ “governmental coercion” ’ to serve as
witnesses against themselves in ‘ “any criminal case.” ’ ” (Myles, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 705.) “By its plain text, the privilege applies only during a
‘criminal case’ or ‘cause.’ [Citations.] Once a defendant’s ‘sentence has been
fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final,’ the ‘general rule’ is
that ‘there can be no further incrimination’ and hence ‘no basis for the
assertion of the privilege.’ ” (Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 930;
Anderson, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 93.)
The section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing is not a criminal prosecution,
subsequent retrial, or a new sentencing. (Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 588.) Rather, it is a postconviction proceeding based on an act of lenity by
the Legislature. (Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 705-706.) “Because a
sentence modification under section [1172.6] is an act of lenity and not a
criminal trial, the wrongful admission of evidence does not implicate
defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.” (Id. at p.
706.) Further, during the hearing, the final judgment of conviction remains
intact. (Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 931.) “This is no doubt why the
panoply of rights that attach at trial do not apply during a section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing, such as the right to a jury trial or the protection against
double jeopardy. [Citation.] As a result, use of a defendant’s prior
statements during such an evidentiary hearing does not implicate the
privilege against self-incrimination, and Coleman’s core rationale—and hence
its holding—is not implicated.” (Duran, at p. 931; contra, Mitchell, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 604-605 (dis. opn. of Stratton, J.).)
Smith also asserts that parole hearings are coercive in nature,
therefore his testimony at the parole hearing was involuntary. He claims
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that because an inmate’s insight into his commitment offense is such an
important factor in determining his suitability for release, it is unfair to
penalize an inmate’s exercise of his right to be heard at the parole hearing by
allowing the prosecution to use those statements at a subsequent criminal
proceeding focused on establishing the inmate’s criminal liability for that
same crime. Otherwise, he claims, the inmate is forced to choose between his
right to be free from self-incrimination and the possibility of release on
parole.
Generally, when faced with a claim of involuntary incriminating
statements, a reviewing court “ ‘ “ ‘must examine the uncontradicted facts
surrounding the making of the statements to determine independently
whether the prosecution met its burden and proved that the statements were
voluntarily given without previous inducement, intimidation or threat.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346.) In doing so, we “ ‘ “ ‘accept
[the] version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent
that it is supported by the record.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
At a parole hearing, “[t]he [Parole] Board shall not require an
admission of guilt to any crime for which the prisoner was committed. A
prisoner may refuse to discuss the facts of the crime in which instance a
decision shall be made based on the other information available and the
refusal shall not be held against the prisoner.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,
§ 2236; see § 5011, subd. (b).) Nor can parole “be conditioned on admission of
guilt to a certain version of the crime.” (Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p.
706; § 5011, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2236.)
In light of the above law, we conclude Smith has not shown that his
parole hearing testimony was involuntary. Smith does not point to any
evidence showing his testimony at the parole hearing was compelled, and the
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record does not support such a claim. As stated, counsel represented him at
that hearing. That he might have had an incentive to admit to the offenses of
conviction does not suggest his will was overborne by official coercion, such
that his testimony was involuntary. In sum, we conclude that Coleman’s use
immunity did not extend to exclude Smith’s testimony at the parole hearing
from the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Petition
Smith argues his guilty plea is not evidence he had the necessary
intent for an attempted murder conviction under current law; his admissions
to the enhancements do not preclude section 1172.6 relief; and the
prosecution did not submit to the court an appellate opinion setting out the
facts of this case or a preliminary hearing transcript. Based on these claims,
Smith contends: “The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that [he] was guilty of murder under the amended law. Therefore, the
attempted murder charges should be vacated and [he] should be resentenced
on the remaining charges pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).”
(Bolding omitted.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015). It substantially changed the law governing “murder liability for those
who were neither the actual killers nor intended to kill anyone, including
certain individuals formerly subject to punishment on a felony-murder
theory.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707.) In part, it “imposed a
new requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a
crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).) ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-
449.) The statute also created “a procedural mechanism for those convicted
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of murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief.” (People v. Wilson (2023)
14 Cal.5th 839, 869; see Curiel, at p. 449; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature clarified that Senate Bill No.
1437’s changes and procedure for relief applied to individuals convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a); People v. Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
583, 588; People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 931; People
v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 747.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) now
reads in part: “A person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s . . . attempted murder . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts.”
A petition under this procedure must contain a declaration that all
requirements for section 1172.6 eligibility are met (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)),
including that: “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of . . .
attempted murder because of changes to . . . Section 188 . . . made effective
January 1, 2019.” (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The trial
court must then determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing
that he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c); accord, Strong, at
p. 708.) “ ‘ “[T]he court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and
makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be
entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971;
see People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.)
If the court issues an order to show cause, within 60 days the court
must then hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
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murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At this
hearing, either party may present new evidence and the prosecution bears
the burden of proving the petitioner could still be convicted beyond a
reasonable doubt. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
On appeal from an order denying a petition under section 1172.6, we
review the superior court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (People
v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066; People v. Montanez (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 245, 270.) In so doing, we “ ‘ “ ‘ “examine the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the
necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ . . . While the trial judge must
review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings
beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400,
414; see Montanez, at pp. 270-271.) “ ‘ “ ‘Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339; see People v.
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57; Montanez, at p. 271.)
We conclude Smith’s admissions in his plea bargaining proceedings and
his testimony at the parole hearing provided sufficient basis for the court to
deny his section 1172.6 petition for resentencing relief. Neither the charges
against him nor his plea referenced a natural and probable consequences
theory. His ineligibility is based on his plea to attempted murder combined
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with his admission to the firearm and personal injury enhancements. Where
he pleaded guilty under oath that he “personally inflicted great bodily injury”
within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (b), his plea was to being
the person who actually inflicted the injuries to the victims, making him
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (Accord, Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 56 & fn. 9.) “The natural meaning of ‘personally inflicted’ is
that the defendant [himself] inflicted the injury.” (Id. at p. 55.)
Further, as summarized above, Smith stated at his parole suitability
hearing that he was sober when he, the only passenger in the vehicle who
carried a gun, personally shot at the victims because they flashed a rival
gang’s signs. Smith admitted he harbored an intent to kill them. Combined,
Smith’s own parole hearing testimony and plea admissions refute his
petition’s allegations, and he is not entitled to section 1172.6 relief as these
admissions leave no room for a theory of natural and probable cause basis for
his attempted murders. (Accord, Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 711 [“the
natural and probable consequences doctrine presupposes that defendant
aided and abetted another principal in the commission of a target crime.
[Citation.] Defendant does not identify a target offense on which a natural
and probable consequences theory could have been based. Relief is available
under section [1172.6] only when the conditions enumerated in the statute
apply . . . . Defendant does not explain how the prosecution could have relied
on a natural and probable consequences theory without any evidence showing
defendant aided and abetted the perpetration of a target offense”].)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
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