CourtListener 10276052•Ramirez v. Ramirez CA2/6
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Filed 11/18/24 Ramirez v. Ramirez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
JEANETTE RAMIREZ, 2d Civ. No. B336369
Individually and as Trustee, (Super. Ct. No.
etc., 202200562703PRTR)
(Ventura County)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
NICHOLAS D. RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas D. Ramirez (Nicholas) appeals an order granting
counsel for plaintiff Jeanette Ramirez (Jeanette) $7,500 in
attorney fees as sanctions.1 (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5.2) Jeanette
filed a probate court petition challenging the validity of a deed
she conveyed to Nicholas. Nicholas moved to disqualify
1 We refer to the parties by their first names for clarity, not
from disrespect.
2 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Jeanette’s attorney. The court denied the motion and imposed
monetary sanctions on Nicholas.
We conclude, among other things, that the trial court erred
by granting sanctions because: 1) Nicholas was not served with a
separate notice of motion for sanctions; 2) Jeanette did not
comply with the 21-day sanctions safe harbor provision; and 3)
the trial court did not make the required statutory findings to
impose sanctions. We reverse.
FACTS
Jeanette is the trustee of the Pedro O. Ramirez and
Jeanette Ramirez Living Trust, dated June 1, 2000. Jeanette
conveyed her home to her grandson Nicholas. Jeanette
subsequently filed a petition claiming the deed was void because
of her incapacity and because she was subject to undue influence
in making the conveyance.
Nicholas filed a motion to disqualify attorney Robert
Baskin who represents Jeanette. He claimed Baskin represents
both Jeanette and her son Timothy. Timothy and Jeanette have
a conflict of interest, and Baskin cannot represent Jeanette and
Timothy because of this conflict.
In his opposition, Baskin claimed the motion had no “legal
basis” and it was filed as a “litigation tactic.” In the last page of
his opposition, he wrote, ”The motion should be denied and
sanctions should be awarded against [Nicholas].” (Italics added.)
Baskin did not file a separate motion for sanctions.
The trial court issued a tentative decision denying the
motion to disqualify Baskin. It found Nicholas did not have
standing to bring the motion because he did not have an
“attorney-client relationship with Attorney Baskin.” After a
Zoom hearing, the court issued a written order denying the
2
motion to disqualify Baskin because Nicholas lacked standing to
bring the motion. It then ruled, “The Court grants fees to
Attorney Baskin in the amount of $7,500.00 which are awarded
against Nicholas Ramirez.”
In a notice of ruling, filed and prepared by Jeanette’s
counsel, her attorney wrote, “The court awarded monetary
sanctions for attorney’s fees incurred by Robert M. Baskin in the
sum of $7,500.00 . . . .”3
DISCUSSION
Section 128.5 sets forth the procedure for an award of
sanctions. Section 128.5, subdivision (f) provides, “Sanctions
ordered pursuant to this section shall be ordered pursuant to the
following conditions and procedures.” (Italics added.) Section
128.5, subdivision (f)(1)(A) then provides, “A motion for sanctions
under this section shall be made separately from other motions or
requests and shall describe the specific alleged action or tactic,
made in bad faith, that is frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay.” (Italics added.) The mandatory legislative
intent “is indicated by the Legislature’s use of the word ‘shall.’ ”
(West Shield Investigations & Security Consultants v. Superior
Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 935, 949.)
However appropriate the trial court thought that sanctions
were warranted, strict compliance with section 128.5’s procedures
is the prerequisite to make such an award. (Zarate v. McDaniel
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 484, 489; Transcon Financial, Inc. v. Reid
& Hellyer, APC. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 547, 550; CPF Vaseo
Associates, LLC v. Gray (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 997, 1007;
Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. Southern SARMs, Inc. (2018) 20
3 Jeanette’s request for judicial notice, filed September 3,
2024, is granted.
3
Cal.App.5th 117, 124 [“a motion for sanctions must be made
separately from any other motion”]; In re Marriage of Corona
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1225, fn. 7 [award of sanctions
based on a motion that was not “ ‘made separately from other
motions’ ” must be reversed]; Goodstone v. Southwest Airlines Co.
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 406, 420 [a request for “sanctions must be
made as a separate motion, i.e., not simply included as an
additional prayer for relief contained in another motion”].)
Consequently, “if one is attempting to obtain attorney’s fees
under section 128.5, then one should use the procedures of
subdivision (f).” (Changsha Metro Group Co. Ltd. v. Xufeng
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1, 18 (Changsha).)
Jeanette did not file a separate motion for sanctions. She
notes that in Changsha the court ruled that “attorney’s fees may
be awarded as expenses, and expenses may be requested in a
party’s responding papers.” (Changsha, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p. 8.) But the court there held that procedure had to be used in
anti-SLAPP cases because of the unique short time limits
required by the anti-SLAPP statute. This is not an anti-SLAPP
case. It is not subject to those requirements. Therefore, the
separate motion procedure should have been used here because
that is “the Legislature’s intent.” (Changsha, at p. 18.)
At the end of Jeanette’s response to Nicholas’s motion to
disqualify counsel, her counsel Baskin wrote, “The motion should
be denied and sanctions should be awarded against [Nicholas].”
(Italics added.) Nicholas claims that the request for sanctions
“was not a ‘notice of expenses’ – it was a throw away line added to
punctuate [Baskin’s] opposition to the motion.”
That request in Jeanette’s response to Nicholas’s motion is
not a formal notice of motion. It does not contain a 21-day
4
hearing date, a declaration, a brief, and evidence supporting a
specific dollar amount as attorney fees. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 3.1112 & 3.1113.) “A formal noticed motion is
required . . . .” (Galleria Plus, Inc. v. Hanmi Bank (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 535, 538.) Merely claiming “sanctions should be
awarded” is not a substitute for complying with the rules of court
involving motions (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1112 & 3.1113) or
the statutorily mandated notice and procedural requirements of
the sanctions statute. (CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC v. Gray,
supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007.) Informal substitutes for these
procedures will not suffice. (Ibid.)
“ ‘Strict compliance with the statute’s notice provisions
serves its remedial purpose and underscores the seriousness of a
motion for sanctions.’ ” (CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC v. Gray,
supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007.) Jeanette’s request for
sanctions in her response is simply an “additional prayer for
relief contained in another motion,” which is insufficient for
sanctions. (Goodstone v. Southwest Airlines Co., supra, 63
Cal.App.4th at p. 420.)
The Legislature imposed the separate motion requirement
so that parties would not be subject to surprise sanctions traps.
There are additional reasons why Nicholas could reasonably
believe that the hearing on his motion would not involve the issue
of sanctions.
The 21-Day “Safe Harbor” Rule
Nicholas was entitled to receive “a 21-day safe harbor
notice” that would allow him to avoid sanctions. (Changsha,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 8.) Jeanette did not give that notice,
and that failure bars her claim for sanctions.
5
To obtain sanctions under section 128.5, a party must “first
serve a motion for sanctions.” (Zarate v. McDaniel, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) “Service of the motion triggers the 21-day
safe harbor period during which the moving party may not file
the motion.” (Ibid.) “During that 21-day period, the offending
party may avoid sanctions by withdrawing or correcting the
challenged action.” (Ibid.) “If the offending party does not
withdraw or correct the challenged action, the moving party may
file the sanctions motion.” (Ibid.) “Courts strictly apply section
128.5, subdivision (f)’s safe harbor provision.” (Ibid., italics
added.) “If a moving party fails to comply with it, the sanctions
motion must be denied.” (Ibid., italics added.) Here Nicholas did
not have a 21-day period before the hearing to exercise his safe
harbor rights.
The Tentative Ruling
The trial court issued a tentative ruling on Nicholas’s
motion. The tentative ruling provides notice to the parties about
the issues the court deems relevant for the hearing. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1).) In three paragraphs the court
explained why Nicholas’s motion was denied. But it did not give
notice to counsel that sanctions would be an issue at the hearing
or issue an order to show cause regarding sanctions. It did not
mention section 128.5, attorney fees, sanctions, or cite to any
improper conduct by Nicholas or his counsel. At the end of the
tentative, the court indicated what it intended to do at the
hearing by writing, “Accordingly, the Court intends to deny the
motion.” (Italics added.)
An attorney reading that tentative ruling, who has not
received a 21-day safe harbor notice, could reasonably conclude
sanctions were not an issue that could be decided by the court at
6
the hearing. (Zarate v. McDaniel, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 489.) Where a hearing involves one issue, but without proper
notice the case is resolved on another issue to the surprise and
detriment of a party, that unfair procedural change implicates
the due process rights of the party prejudiced by the result. (In re
Ruffalo (1968) 390 U.S. 544, 550-551 [20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122]; Doe
v. University of Southern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221,
242.)
Not Reaching the Merits of the Conflict Issue
Jeanette claims because the trial court denied Nicholas’s
motion for disqualification of her counsel, sanctions were properly
awarded. But the court did not reach the merits of Nicholas’s
motion. It ruled he lacked standing because he did not have an
attorney-client relationship with Jeanette’s counsel. Jeanette
claims the court properly relied on Great Lakes Construction, Inc.
v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1356, 1358 (Great Lakes
Construction), which adopts this rule and shows Nicholas’s
motion lacked merit because he lacked standing. But other cases
have reached a different result on standing. “Case law abounds
with examples of orders disqualifying counsel that have not been
the product of motions by present or former clients.” (Kennedy v.
Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204.)
Jeanette has not shown why Nicholas’s counsel could not
reasonably rely on Kennedy instead of Great Lakes Construction.
(In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650 [counsel
may pursue “arguably correct” positions, even if they are
“extremely unlikely” to prevail].) Noncompliance with Great
Lakes Construction is not a basis for sanctions because Nicholas
followed an “arguably correct” path authorized by other appellate
decisions. (Flaherty, at p. 650.)
7
Moreover, the trial court never found the factual merits of
Nicholas’s motion were untrue. Independent of the standing
issue, the conflict issue remained unresolved but was a relevant
issue for the court to decide. “It makes no sense for a court to
stand idly by and permit conflicted counsel to participate in a
case merely because neither a client nor former client has
brought a motion.” (Kennedy v. Eldrige, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1204.) Where the trial court has information that an
attorney is representing conflicting interests, it has the authority
to consider that issue and to disqualify counsel if a conflict is
shown. (Id. at p. 1205; People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v.
SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1147.)
Sanctions should not be awarded against a party where the
trial court did not reach the merits of his or her motion so as to be
able to find “it indisputably has no merit.” (In re Marriage of
Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 650.) This power should be used
“sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct.” (Id. at
p. 651; Summers v. City of Cathedral City (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d
1047, 1071.) “ ‘[A]n action that is simply without merit is not by
itself sufficient to incur sanctions.’ ” (Bach v. McNelis (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 852, 878.) The “[i]ndiscriminate” award of sanctions
could “deter attorneys from vigorously representing their clients”
(Clarity Co. Consulting, LLC v. Gabriel (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
454, 466), penalize creative advocacy, and impair the right of
access to the courts.
The Findings
There is an additional reason why this order must be
reversed. Section 128.5, subdivision (c) provides that the order
awarding sanctions “shall recite in detail the action or tactic or
circumstances justifying the order.” (Italics added.) Making
8
these required findings ensures “ ‘the power conferred by statute
will not be abused.’ ” (In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 124, 143.) The trial court did not reveal
the legal basis for an award of fees, the factual basis, if any, for a
finding of sanctionable conduct, or an explanation of how the
amount of fees was determined. It simply wrote, “The Court
grants fees to Attorney Baskin in the amount of $7,500.00 which
are awarded against Nicholas Ramirez.”
But “[s]uch a summary order violates due process and
precludes this court from determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding sanctions under Code of Civil
Procedure section 128.5.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 997.) The order is insufficient to
sustain an award of sanctions because the trial court “failed to
recite any details of the conduct or circumstances justifying [the
imposition of sanctions].” (Ibid.) “[T]he Legislature intended
that the court determine that an action or tactic was . . . pursued
in subjective bad faith before imposing sanctions . . . .” (Summers
v. City of Cathedral City, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 1071.)
Our ruling is based solely on the procedural posture of this
appeal and not the trial court’s rationale for its decision.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. Costs on appeal are awarded in
favor of the appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J. CODY, J.
9
Roger L. Lund, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
The Alvarez Firm, Justin M. Alvarez and David A.
Shaneyfelt for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office Of Robert M. Baskin and Doria G. Thomas for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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