In re F.D. CA2/4

CourtListener 10275127Calctapp15 nov. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 11/15/24 In re F.D. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re F.D., B330909

a Person Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP00897)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Ekenes, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Mariela A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional
order removing her son, Fabian D. (Fabian) from her custody.1 She
challenges one of the court’s jurisdictional findings, contends the
dispositional order was incomplete and unsupported by the evidence, and
asserts that the Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
has failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) (ICWA) and related state law.2 We conclude mother’s appeal from the
jurisdictional finding is not justiciable, and her appeal of the dispositional
order is forfeited. However, we agree that the Department has failed to
comply with its obligations under ICWA. Therefore, we conditionally affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2023, the Department filed a dependency petition to
establish jurisdiction over Fabian, who was then approximately 16 months
old. The petition alleged that mother and Fabian’s father, Nelson D. (father)
had a history of engaging in violent physical altercations, that mother had
failed to enforce restraining orders against father, and that father had been
previously convicted for injuring mother. The petition also alleged that
mother has a history of substance abuse.

1 We use his first name to preserve confidentiality. We intend no
disrespect. Fabian’s father is not a party to this appeal.

2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for
consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native
American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

2
I. Department Investigation
Before opening the present case, the Department had received a prior
referral related to Fabian.3 In October 2022, the Department received a
report that father had attacked mother at the motel where they were both
staying with Fabian. Father was arrested for, charged with, and convicted of
willful infliction of corporal injury under Penal Code section 273.5,
subdivision (a). He was sentenced to 180 days in jail. The referral was closed
based on the case worker’s determination that mother’s situation had
stabilized.
In January 2023, the Department received a second referral indicating
father had been released from jail in December 2022. Mother had been seen
intoxicated, arguing with father in Fabian’s presence.
Upon receiving the second referral, the Department interviewed the
case worker at the domestic violence shelter where mother was staying, the
staff member at the shelter who had witnessed the incident, and mother.
The case worker reported that father had recently been released from jail. A
man had been seen pushing Fabian around the neighborhood in Fabian’s
stroller, and mother had been seen arguing with him. When asked, mother
told the case worker the man was father. The staff member who saw the
argument reported smelling alcohol on mother’s breath at the time and
observing that mother was intoxicated. There was a restraining order
protecting mother from father.
Mother said the man she had been seen with was not father, but
someone else. She said she previously identified him as father as a test, to

3 Fabian has three half-siblings, all of whom had been subjects of
previous juvenile court proceedings. The half-siblings were placed under the
legal guardianship of their maternal grandmother.

3
see what the shelter staff would do. Mother also said she did not want the
restraining order, but that she had no contact with father.

II. Court
The Department filed its dependency petition in March 2023. Three
days later, the Department interviewed father, who denied seeing either
mother or Fabian after his release from jail.

A. Initial Hearing
The juvenile court held its initial hearing on March 28, 2023. At that
hearing, mother and father gave the court the same mailing address. Mother
and father also denied Indian ancestry. The court ordered Fabian removed
from father and placed in the care of mother, on certain conditions. Those
conditions included that mother refrain from using drugs or consuming
alcohol, that she cooperate with unannounced visits from the Department,
that she keep the Department informed of her address and contact
information, and that she abide by the terms of any existing criminal
protective order.

B. Subsequent Removal
On May 2, 2023, the Department received a report that father and
mother were staying at the same location with a friend of mother’s, that he
and mother were having verbal altercations, that he had tried to take the
child, and the friend could not get father to leave. The report also indicated
mother was contemplating flight to Mexico with Fabian and father. The
reports were confirmed in a subsequent interview.

4
The Department made an unannounced visit to the home. Mother first
denied father had been there, then later admitted he had. She said she was
trying to protect both father and Fabian. Mother then went to stay
elsewhere.
On May 9, 2023, the department applied for an initial order detaining
Fabian from mother, which was granted. On the same day, the Department
placed Fabian with his maternal aunt.
On May 12, 2023, the court heard an ex parte application, brought by
the Department, seeking to have Fabian removed from mother. The court
granted that application, finding father had been present with mother and
Fabian and had also attempted to take Fabian.

C. Jurisdiction/Disposition
On May 16, 2023, the juvenile court made its jurisdictional findings
and dispositional order. It sustained all counts in the petition, removed
Fabian from the custody of both parents, directed that Fabian remain with
his maternal aunt, and ordered reunification services for both parents.
Mother timely appealed.4

DISCUSSION
Mother briefly argues the allegation that she and father “have a history
of engaging in violent physical altercations” should be stricken from the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. However, her central contention is

4 Mother’s request for judicial notice is denied. The records offered,
consisting of a subsequent juvenile court order and notice of appeal from that
order, are not relevant to the determination of this appeal. (See Lockley v.
Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
875, 882.)

5
that the court’s dispositional order removing Fabian from her custody was
based on three errors. First, she suggests the juvenile court improperly failed
to consider whether there were reasonable alternatives to removal. Second,
mother argues the court’s finding that she and father were “continuing to
engage in violent altercations in the presence of the child,” was not supported
by substantial evidence. Third, mother asserts it would be improper to
remove Fabian based solely on violations of the criminal protective order.
Mother also requests that the Department be ordered to make a complete
ICWA inquiry.
We conclude mother’s request to strike a portion of the trial court’s
jurisdictional findings is not justiciable, and that mother has forfeited her
challenges to the juvenile court’s dispositional orders. But we also conclude
further ICWA inquiry is necessary.

I. Jurisdictional Findings
The Department argues that mother’s challenge to a single sentence of
the trial court’s jurisdictional findings is not justiciable, as she does not
challenge the remaining findings. Mother did not file a reply brief in
response to this argument. We agree with the Department.
A reviewing court generally need not consider a challenge to a single
jurisdictional finding where other jurisdictional findings are not in question.
(See In re B.H. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 469, 480.) However, “when a parent
has demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that will be
averted upon reversal . . . merits review is required.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 283.) Otherwise, review is discretionary, based on case-specific
factors. (See Id. at pp. 285–287.) No specific legal or practical consequence

6
has been identified here, nor has mother made any argument that
discretionary review is appropriate.
Mother is not challenging any specific count in the petition. She is
instead challenging a single sentence, included in two counts, which says she
and father “have a history of engaging in violent physical altercations.” She
argues there can be no “history” of violent altercations because there was
only one such incident. In this context, the presence of this one sentence has
no legal or practical consequences a reversal would avoid.
The petition, in count a-1, alleges in full that mother and father “have a
history of engaging in violent physical altercations. In October 2022, the
mother and father engaged in a violent physical altercation. On 01/19/2023
and prior occasions, the mother failed to enforce and the father failed to
comply with a restraining order protecting the mother from the father. On
11/01/2022, the father was criminally convicted of 273.5(a) PC Corporal
Injury To Spouse. The violent conduct by the father against the mother
endangers the child’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home
environment, and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage
and danger.”5
The first sentence, which mother seeks to strike, refers directly to the
second sentence, which is unchallenged. The petition tells the court the
parents have a “history,” then it tells the court what that “history” is. Mother
does not dispute that there was a violent altercation in October 2022,6 nor

5 Count b-1 contains the same language, with an additional sentence
alleging that “mother failed to protect the child in that the mother allowed
the father to have unlimited access to the child.”

6 As the Department’s Detention Report describes it, while mother and
father were “out . . . during the evening,” father “grabbed [mother] by the
hair, punching her in the face 3 times, causing profuse bleeding.” The assault

7
does she dispute any of the other jurisdictional findings. In fact, during the
jurisdictional portion of the hearing, mother’s counsel conceded that “there
may be some physical altercations that have occurred between the parents.”
Removing the first sentence would make no substantive change to the
allegations of the petition and remove no basis for the court’s jurisdiction. It
would simply edit the Department’s description of undisputed facts. We
decline to do so.

II. Dispositional Order
The Department argues mother forfeited any challenge to the
dispositional order by submitting to it at the time of the hearing. The
Department is correct.
A party forfeits their right to appeal a juvenile court’s order if the party
expressly submits to the Department’s recommendation, and the court adopts
that recommendation. (In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 170–171.) If
the party only “submits on a particular report or record” the party “preserves
the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular
legal conclusion.” (Id. at p. 170.) In the dispositional phase of this
proceeding, the court first asked if there were objections to the evidence.
There were none. The court then asked if there were any objections to the
Department’s case plan. Mother’s counsel responded, “Your Honor, at this
time we will submit to the case plan.”

continued when mother and father got home: “She told father she felt dizzy
from blood loss. He told her to go take a shower. . . . He then entered the
bathroom while she showered. He punched her once on the side of the head.
She exited the bathroom. He pushed her to a bed. He placed her head faced
down for three minutes. She could barely breathe. He then punched her
three times on the back of the head.” Only the intervention of neighbors
caused the attack to cease.

8
While mother did object to the jurisdictional findings during an earlier
portion of the hearing, Mother may not rely on those objections because they
were not related to the arguments she makes now. (See In re Daniel B.
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672.) As already noted, mother’s jurisdictional
argument conceded there had been multiple violent altercations between the
parents; she focused instead on whether that posed any present danger to
Fabian. When mother conceded the history of violent altercations and
submitted to the case plan, she forfeited her right to challenge the court’s
findings on those subjects.

III. ICWA
ICWA exists “to protect Indian children and to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal
standards that a state court . . . must follow before removing an Indian child
from his or her family.” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881,
disapproved on an unrelated ground by In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112,
1152, fn. 18.) ICWA defines “Indian child” to mean any unmarried person
who is under 18 and is either (a) already a member of an Indian tribe or (b)
both eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and the biological child of a
member of a tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) California law adopts the ICWA
definition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a).)
Both the juvenile court and the Department have an ongoing duty to
inquire whether a child qualifies under that definition. (In re N.F. (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 170, 176.) The Department must inquire of “‘the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have
an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect.’” (Id.
at p. 177, quoting § 224.2, subd. (b).)

9
Mother argues the Department failed to interview any relatives of
either parent. The Department concedes the error. Failure to comply with
ICWA requires this court to remand the case with instructions to do so. (In
re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s findings and order are conditionally affirmed. The
court is to order the Department to complete the required ICWA inquiry,
supported by record documentation. If the court determines ICWA applies, it
shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and related California law.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

MORI, J.

10

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.