Infinity Insurance Company v. Wright CA2/4

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Filed 11/15/24 Infinity Insurance Company v. Wright CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

INFINITY INSURANCE COMPANY, B325506

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21CHCV00922)
v.

RODNEY DESHONE WRIGHT et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Stephen P. Pfahler, Judge. Reversed.
Law Office of Wayne McClean, Wayne McClean and Marley McClean;
Parris Law Firm and Jason P. Fowler for Defendant and Appellant Rodney
Deshone Wright.
Parris Law Firm and Daniel Eli for Defendants and Appellants Kent
and Sherrill Hubbard.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Charles A. Danaher, Todd E.
Lundell and Theona Zhordania for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Rodney Deshone Wright (Wright) was involved in an
automobile accident that resulted in the deaths of two brothers. The
brothers’ parents, appellants Kent and Sherrill Hubbard (the Hubbards),
filed suit against Wright. At the time of the accident, Wright and his vehicle
were insured by respondent Infinity Insurance Company (Infinity).
This action stems from a dispute between the parties regarding
Infinity’s liability for the multi-million-dollar judgment the Hubbards
obtained against Wright in their lawsuit. Infinity filed an action for
declaratory relief against Wright and the Hubbards, seeking a judicial
determination that it was not obligated to satisfy the Hubbards’ judgment.
Wright and the Hubbards filed cross-complaints against Infinity, alleging
Infinity’s mishandling of Wright’s defense caused it to unreasonably reject
the Hubbards’ settlement proposals. In response, Infinity brought a special
motion to strike identical portions of both cross-complaints under our anti-
SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)1 The trial court granted the
motion, and subsequently awarded Infinity its attorney’s fees and costs
incurred in bringing the motion to strike.
Wright and the Hubbards appeal the orders granting Infinity’s anti-
SLAPP motion and awarding Infinity its attorney’s fees and costs. We hold
the challenged cross-claims do not fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP
statute and reverse both orders.

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise stated.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Infinity’s Complaint
On December 6, 2021, Infinity filed a complaint against Wright and the
Hubbards, alleging a single cause of action for declaratory relief. The
complaint alleged that Infinity issued an automobile policy to Wright that
provided liability coverage with limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per
accident. On January 21, 2027, while the policy was in effect, Wright was
involved in an automobile accident that resulted in the deaths of the
Hubbards’ children as well as injuries to Nikolaos Linaritakis (Linaritakis).
Infinity claimed Wright caused the accident by driving the wrong way on the
interstate while under the influence of alcohol. Infinity received a settlement
demand from the Hubbards after the accident. In response, Infinity tendered
the full $30,000 policy limit to the Hubbards and Linaritakis to settle their
respective claims stemming from the accident with Wright. The Hubbards
and Linaritakis did not agree on how to divide the $30,000 tendered by
Infinity.
The Hubbards and Linaritakis filed separate suits against Wright. At
Wright’s request, Infinity settled Linaritakis’ case for $8,000. The Hubbards’
case went to trial. The Hubbards prevailed at trial, with the jury awarding
$10.6 million in damages against Wright. Infinity claimed that Wright and
the Hubbards took the position that Infinity was required to satisfy the entire
judgment against Wright because it unreasonably rejected the Hubbards’
settlement proposals.
Infinity’s cause of action for declaratory relief sought a judicial
determination that Infinity had no obligation to contribute to the judgment
beyond the remaining $22,000 policy limit. Infinity also sought a declaration

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that it did not act unreasonably or in bad faith in responding to the
Hubbards’ settlement demands.

II. Cross-Complaints
On February 1, 2022, Wright filed a cross-complaint against Infinity
alleging causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Wright alleged the Hubbards repeatedly offered
to settle their claim against him for $24,000. Infinity refused to settle with
the Hubbards unless it was also able to reach a global settlement that
included Linaritakis’ claims. However, Infinity later settled with Linaritakis
individually “without securing a release from the Hubbards.” When the
Hubbards were unable to settle, they filed a complaint against Wright.
During their litigation against Wright, the Hubbards proposed an
agreement under which a stipulated judgment would be entered against
Wright in exchange for an assignment of Wright’s rights against Infinity.
This agreement was conditioned on Infinity’s consent to the entry of the
stipulated judgment against Wright. The parties were ultimately unable to
reach an agreement on the amount of the stipulated judgment. The
Hubbards proposed a stipulated judgment totaling $6 million. Infinity
rejected this proposal, stating that $6 million exceeded even the worst-case
scenario for the jury’s potential verdict.
As the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the stipulated
judgment proposal, the case proceeded to trial. The jury awarded the
Hubbards $10.6 million in compensatory damages. The trial court
subsequently awarded the Hubbards an additional $1.8 million in
prejudgment interest, totaling a judgment of over $12.4 million against
Wright.

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Wright alleged that Infinity unreasonably refused to accept the
Hubbards’ settlement demands or stipulated judgment proposal. Wright also
claimed that Infinity was aware that the value of the Hubbards’ claim
against Wright exceeded $6 million and that its retained counsel
undervalued the Hubbards’ claim.
Wright’s cross-complaint alleged Infinity breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in numerous ways. As relevant here,
Wright alleged Infinity breached the covenant by rejecting the stipulated
judgment proposal, misevaluating the value of the Hubbards’ case, and
relying on the recommendations of incompetent counsel. Wright’s cause of
action for breach of contract alleged Infinity breached the terms of his policy
by rejecting a reasonable settlement demand within the policy limits and by
retaining incompetent counsel to defend him in the Hubbards’ lawsuit.
On February 2, 2022, the Hubbards filed their own cross-complaint
against Infinity asserting a single cause of action for declaratory relief. The
allegations of the Hubbards’ cross-complaint were nearly identical to those
asserted in Wright’s cross-complaint. The Hubbards’ cross-complaint sought
a judicial declaration that Infinity breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that it owed to Wright and was therefore liable to pay
the judgment entered against Wright in the Hubbards’ prior lawsuit against
him. The Hubbards’ alleged breaches mirror those alleged in Wright’s cross-
complaint.

III. Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike
In response, Infinity filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike identical
allegations in both cross-complaints concerning Infinity’s rejection of the
Hubbards’ stipulated judgment proposal. Specifically, Infinity sought to

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strike paragraphs 23 through 28, 33, and 39(d) through 39(f) in their
entirety, along with portions of paragraphs 31, 32, and 39(g) from both cross-
complaints.
Infinity’s motion did not seek to strike any claims relating to the
Hubbards’ initial settlement demands within the policy limits. Instead,
Infinity only challenged the claim that it breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in connection with the proposed stipulated
judgment. Infinity argued the claims relating to the stipulated judgment
arose from protected activity, namely settlement discussions it had with
Wright and the Hubbards in the underlying action. Infinity claimed the
Hubbards and Wright were “suing Infinity because it exercised its right to
litigate the issue of damages rather than terminate the litigation by
stipulating to a consent judgment [for] $6 million.” Infinity argued Wright
and the Hubbards could not establish a probability of success on their claims
because an insurer has no obligation to accept a settlement offer over the
policy limits.
The Hubbards and Wright filed a joint opposition to Infinity’s motion.
They argued Infinity had not shown the challenged cross-claims arose from
protected activity and claimed they could establish a probability of success on
the merits of their challenged cross-claims.
On November 4, 2022, the trial court granted Infinity’s motion. The
trial court noted that it was obligated to draw a careful distinction between
claims based squarely on protected communications and claims based on an
underlying course of conduct evidenced by such communications. Turning to
the specific allegations of the cross-complaints, the trial court determined
that Infinity’s asserted protected activity during settlement negotiations
“constitute[d] the means for demonstrating the allegedly wrongful conduct.”

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However, the trial court concluded the protected settlement discussions were
“inseparable” from the other factual allegations underpinning the challenged
cross-claims. The court deemed Infinity had therefore satisfied its burden
under prong one. Proceeding to the second prong, the trial court found
Wright and the Hubbards could not establish a probability of success as no
legal authority allowed the court to “extend[] bad faith liability against an
insurer for refusing to pay [more than] the policy limit.”

IV. Infinity’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
After it prevailed on the anti-SLAPP motion, Infinity filed a motion to
recover its attorney’s fees and costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c). The
trial court granted the order on May 8, 2023, awarding Infinity $79,250 in
attorney’s fees and costs it incurred in connection with the special motion to
strike.

V. Appeal
Wright and the Hubbards timely appealed the trial court’s orders
granting Infinity’s anti-SLAPP motion and awarding Infinity attorney’s fees
and costs. The appeals were consolidated by order of this court on May 8,
2024.

DISCUSSION
I. Anti-SLAPP Procedure
The “anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).) A “cause of action against a person

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arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special
motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, courts conduct a two-
step analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant has met its
“burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’
protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).)
Second, if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold showing, the court
decides if the plaintiff “has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
We review the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion de
novo, applying the same two-step analysis. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v.
Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) We independently review whether a
moving party has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of
action arises from protected activity. (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 977, 988.)

II. Prong One: Arising from Protected Activity
At the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the moving party must
establish both (1) that its act constituted protected activity; and (2) the
opposing party’s cause of action arose from that protected activity.” (Colyear
v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 119, 130; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887.) “At this stage, the

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question is only whether a defendant has made out a prima facie case that
activity underlying a plaintiff’s claims is statutorily protected.” (Wilson, at p.
888.) We begin our analysis with a determination of whether Infinity has
satisfied this two-part burden under prong one.

A. Protected Activity
1. Legal Standards
By statute, the anti-SLAPP procedure protects “any act” taken by a
defendant “in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (e) provides a four-part definition of what
constitutes an “act” under subdivision (b)(1). To satisfy the initial showing on
prong one, the moving party must establish its actions fall within one of the
four categories enumerated in subdivision (e). (Equilon Enterprises v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66 (Equilon).) Infinity alleges it
has met this burden because the challenged portions of the cross-complaints
fall within the first two clauses of section 425.16, subdivision (e). The clauses
define protected activity to include “(1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding, or . . . (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a . . . judicial body . . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
“[C]ourts have adopted ‘a fairly expansive view of what constitutes
litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.’ [Citation.]
‘“Under the plain language of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (2), as
well as the case law interpreting those provisions, all communicative acts
performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial
proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning
activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.”’ [Citation.]” (Optional Capital, Inc. v.

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Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 113
(Optional).) “[B]ecause settlement negotiations are regarded as an exercise of
the right to petition, communications during such negotiations are regarded
as having been made in connection with the underlying lawsuit for purposes
of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).” (Id. at p. 114.) “The protection of the
anti-SLAPP statute applies ‘even against allegations of fraudulent promises
made during the settlement process.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

2. Allegations of Protected Activity
At the first step of the prong one analysis, Infinity only has to show the
challenged cross-claims contain allegations of protected activity. The
allegations concerning the stipulated judgment proposal describe Infinity’s
actions and statements during settlement negotiations with Wright and the
Hubbards. Communications made during settlement negotiations constitute
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). (Optional, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 114.)
There does not appear to be any dispute that the challenged cross-
claims include allegations of protected activity. Wright and the Hubbards
argue that the cross-claims stem from Infinity’s non-protected mishandling of
Wright’s defense and not any protected statements made during settlement
negotiations. However, this argument is simply another way of saying that
Infinity cannot show the challenged claims “arise from” protected conduct
under the second part of the prong one analysis. Wright and the Hubbards
acknowledge the challenged claims contain allegations regarding Infinity’s
settlement communications. This is protected activity. Having determined
that the challenged cross-claims contain allegations of protected conduct, we

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turn to the determination of whether those claims arise from Infinity’s
protected activity.

B. The “Arising From” Requirement
1. Legal Standards
Infinity also bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
claims arise from its protected activity. “A claim arises from protected
activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) “[A] claim is not subject to a motion to strike
simply because it contests an action or decision that was arrived at following
speech or petitioning activity, or that was thereafter communicated by means
of speech or petitioning activity. Rather, a claim may be struck only if the
speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just
evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability
is asserted.” (Id. at p. 1060; accord Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
“As courts applying the anti-SLAPP statute have recognized, the
‘arising from’ requirement is not always easily met. [Citations.]” (Equilon,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 66.) “In determining whether a cause of action is
based on protected activity, we ‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of
a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute
applies.’ [Citation.]” (Optional, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 110–111.) At
the same time, “courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim
and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently
form the basis for liability.’” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884; Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action [or claim] was filed
after protected activity took place does not mean the action [or claim] arose
from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, supra,

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2 Cal.5th at p. 1063; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th
610, 621 (Rand).)

2. The Cross-Claims Do Not “Arise From” Protected Activity
Infinity’s anti-SLAPP motion sought to strike the cross-claims
asserting that Infinity breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by rejecting the Hubbards’ stipulated judgment proposal. We must
determine whether the gravamen of the cross-claims arises from Infinity’s
protected activity. We begin by examining the elements of a claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
“The law implies in every contract, including insurance policies, a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ‘The implied promise requires each
contracting party to refrain from doing anything to injure the right of the
other to receive the agreement’s benefits. To fulfill its implied obligation, an
insurer must give at least as much consideration to the interests of the
insured as it gives to its own interests. When the insurer unreasonably and
in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to
liability in tort.’” (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720.)
“While an insurance company has no obligation under the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing to pay every claim its insured makes, the
insurer cannot deny the claim ‘without fully investigating the grounds for its
denial.’” (Ibid.) “‘A trier of fact may find that an insurer acted unreasonably
if the insurer ignores evidence available to it which supports the claim. The
insurer may not just focus on those facts which justify denial of the claim.’”
(Id. at p. 721.) “An insurer’s good or bad faith must be evaluated in light of
the totality of the circumstances surrounding its actions.” (Id. at p. 723.)

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The challenged portions of the cross-complaints allege Infinity breached
the implied covenant by: (1) failing to accept the Hubbards’ proposal “on the
basis that the proposed judgment amount was excessive;” (2) rejecting the
opinions of Wright’s personal counsel and the mandatory settlement
conference judge “and instead relying on an evaluation of the potential
verdict value of the HUBBARDS’ claim it knew to be unreasonable, solely for
the purpose of protecting its own interests;” (3) refusing to re-evaluate the
value of the Hubbards’ claims against Wright “despite receiving credible
information casting serious doubt on its own internal evaluation[;]” and
(4) relying on the evaluations and recommendations of the “incompetent
counsel” it retained to defend Wright.
The gravamen of these cross-claims is that Infinity acted unreasonably
in its handling and investigation of the Hubbards’ underlying claims against
Wright. The injury-producing conduct alleged is Infinity’s unreasonable
valuation of the Hubbards’ claims, unreasonable refusal to properly
investigate and consider available evidence, and unreasonable reliance on the
recommendations of incompetent counsel. While Wright alleges he was
harmed by the rejection of the settlement offer, the principal thrust of the
cross-claims is that the process by which Infinity evaluated the Hubbards’
claims and defended Wright was itself unreasonable. The rejection of the
stipulated judgment proposal is principally used as evidence of Infinity’s
allegedly deficient handling of Wright’s defense.
Courts confronted with analogous bad faith claims in the insurance
context have found they fall beyond the protections of the anti-SLAPP
statute. In Miller v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 247, 252
(Miller), plaintiff insureds filed an action against their insurer alleging
causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of

13
good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs had a counterclaim filed against them
in a federal action and tendered the defense of that counterclaim to their
insurer. In their action against the insurer in state court, the plaintiffs
alleged the insurer improperly refused to pay for independent counsel,
refused to conduct a reasonable investigation of the counterclaim, and failed
to timely pay reasonable and necessary defense costs. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs’
allegations contained numerous references to communications between the
insurer and the counsel it retained to defend the plaintiffs in the federal
action. (Id. at pp. 252–255.)
In response, the insurer brought an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the
portions of plaintiffs’ complaint concerning alleged communications between
the insurer and retained counsel in the underlying federal action. (Miller,
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 255.) The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP
motion. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the insurer’s anti-SLAPP
motion. The appellate court concluded the insureds’ claims did not arise from
protected activity and instead were “based on the overarching premise that
[the insurer] did not meet its duty to defend as it failed to provide
independent conflict-free counsel to represent [the insureds] in defending
against [a] counterclaim.” (Id. at p. 257.) “Thus, ‘[w]hat gives rise to liability’
is not the fact of counsel’s communications, but that [the insurer] allegedly
denied the [plaintiffs] the ‘benefit’ of panel counsel’s independent professional
judgment in rendering legal services to them. [Citations.] Consequently, we
reject [the insurer]’s argument that the allegations of counsel’s
communications give rise to its liability for an action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Id. at p. 258.) The Miller court
reasoned that courts must draw a “‘careful distinction between a cause of
action based squarely on a privileged communication, such as an action for

14
defamation, and one based upon an underlying course of conduct evidenced
by the communication.’” (Id. at p. 259.)
In Trilogy Plumbing, Inc. v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 920 (Trilogy) plaintiff sued its insurer, alleging the insurer
mishandled 33 different lawsuits involving plaintiff. (Id. at p. 924.) Plaintiff
alleged its insurer gave improper instructions to the attorney it retained to
defend plaintiff and “wrongfully negotiated settlements” without plaintiff’s
consent. (Ibid.) The Trilogy court affirmed the denial of the insurer’s anti-
SLAPP motion, noting the “anti-SLAPP motion sought to strike allegations
pertaining to [the insurer’s] conduct generally in mishandling the claims
process.” (Id. at p. 932.) Relying on Miller, the Trilogy court reasoned that
“references to settlement and other potentially protected activity in the
allegations challenged by [the insurer] in the anti-SLAPP motion reflect
evidence that provides context for the allegation [the insurer] failed to
perform under the terms of the polices. Such references do not establish that
[plaintiff’s] action arises out of any protected activity.” (Id. at pp. 933–934.)
Other courts have similarly found that bad faith claims against
insurers fall beyond the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Beach v.
Harco National Ins. Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 82, 93–94 [lawsuit against
insurer for bad faith delay was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because
it arose from delay in payment, not from insurer’s protected
communications]; Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. (2002)
102 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1399 [reversing order granting anti-SLAPP motion
because claim did not arise from defendant’s “communicative acts, but rather
for its alleged mistreatment of policyholders and its related violations and
evasions of statutory and regulatory mandates”].

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We reach the same result here. The challenged cross-claims allege
Infinity failed to properly investigate or evaluate the Hubbards’ claims
against Wright and retained incompetent counsel to represent Wright,
culminating in the rejection of a reasonable settlement proposal. The cross-
claims attack the process by which Infinity made the decision not to settle
Wright’s case. These claims do not arise from Infinity’s protected
communications during settlement negotiations.
In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 1062, which analyzed the
“arising from” requirement. As Park explained, “[T]he focus is on
determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her
asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or
petitioning.’” (Id. at p.1063.) Courts must “respect the distinction between
activities that form the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the
liability-creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Id.
at p. 1064.) Courts must also “distinguish between the challenged decisions
and the speech that . . . thereafter expresses them.” (Id. at p. 1067.) Under
Park and its progeny, we must distinguish between the process by which
Infinity evaluated the Hubbards’ stipulated judgment proposal and Infinity’s
communication of its decision to reject the proposal.
Here, the cross-claims seek to hold Infinity liable for its internal
handling of Wright’s defense in the underlying litigation and not any
protected settlement communications. Such claims fall beyond the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1068 [“The tenure decision may
have been communicated orally or in writing, but that communication does
not convert Park’s suit to one arising from such speech”]; Rand, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 628 [anti-SLAPP statute not implicated where cause of action

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arose from the decision not to renew a contract rather than the
communication of that decision]; ValueRock TN Properties, LLC v. PK II
Larwin Square SC LP (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1049–1050 [anti-SLAPP
motion properly denied where tenant’s claim arose from landlord’s decision
not to consent to an assignment even though the decision was communicated
in ongoing litigation between the parties].)
The cases cited by Infinity do not compel a different result. In each
action, liability was premised on a communicative act itself and not an
underlying decision evidenced by the communication. (See Navellier v.
Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82 [challenged claim arose from communicative act
of filing a lawsuit]; Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400
[challenged claim arose from defendant’s statements during settlement
negotiations]; Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834
[challenged claim arose from allegedly fraudulent statements made during
settlement negotiations]; Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 118 [challenged claim arose from false representations and
omissions during settlement negotiations]; Optional, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th
95 [claim arose from defendants’ communicative acts of representing another
party in settlement negotiations]; Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
953 [claim arose from attorney’s communicative acts in negotiating a
settlement with third party] GeneThera, Inc. v. Troy & Gould Professional
Corp. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 901, 908 [claim arose from communicative act
of making a settlement offer].)
While Infinity communicated with the Hubbards and Wright as the
parties attempted to settle the Hubbards’ underlying lawsuit, those
communications are not the alleged injury-producing conduct. There is no
doubt that the challenged cross-claims were triggered by protected settlement

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negotiations in the underlying lawsuit, however, “[a] claim does not arise
from constitutionally protected activity simply because it is triggered by such
activity or is filed after it occurs.” (World Financial Group, Inc. v. HBW Ins.
& Financial Services, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1561, 1568.)

C. Conclusion
In sum, Infinity has not carried its burden to establish the challenged
cross-claims arise from its protected activity. As Infinity has not satisfied the
first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we reverse the order granting
Infinity’s special motion to strike. Because Infinity has not satisfied prong
one, we need not determine whether Wright and the Hubbards established a
likelihood of prevailing under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
(Gotterba v. Travolta (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 35, 43–44.) Infinity remains
free to challenge the cross-claims “on other grounds and through other
procedural means” and we express no view on their merits. (Department of
Fair Employment & Housing v. 1105 Alta Loma Road Apartments, LLC
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1288.)

III. Infinity’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Wright and the Hubbards also appeal the trial court’s award of
attorney’s fees and costs to Infinity. The trial court awarded Infinity its fees
and costs under section 425.15, subdivision (c), as the prevailing party on the
special motion to strike. As we have reversed the granting of Infinity’s
motion, the statutory basis for the fee award no longer exists. “Therefore, it
follows that the order awarding fees and costs cannot stand.” (Santa Monica
Rent Control Bd. v. Pearl Street (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1320.) Because

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Infinity is no longer the prevailing party on its anti-SLAPP motion, we
reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs as well.

DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders granting Infinity’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike
and awarding Infinity its attorney’s fees and costs are reversed. The case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed here.
Wright and the Hubbards are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

SIGGINS, J.*

*Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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