Rodriguez v. KS Industries CA5

CourtListener 10272624Calctapp12 nov. 2024

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Filed 11/12/24 Rodriguez v. KS Industries CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MANUEL RODRIGUEZ,
F085605
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-15-101757)
v.

KS INDUSTRIES, LP., et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Thomas S.
Clark, Judge.
Law Office of Kenneth J. Melrose and Kenneth J. Melrose for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Clifford & Brown, Arnold Anchordoquy and John R. Szewczyk, for Defendants
and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
Manuel Rodriguez was a supervisor at AC Pipe Company (AC Pipe). When an
AC Pipe vehicle became disabled on the two-lane Lerdo Highway, Rodriguez responded
to its location. While he and a colleague attempted to refuel that disabled vehicle, he was
hit by a Ken Small Industries (KSI) truck driven by Danny Willis. Rodriguez then sued
Willis and KSI for negligence causing injury.
During the trial, numerous experts testified about Rodriguez’s injuries from the
accident, his prior injuries predating the accident, whether his injuries were caused by
Willis, whether any medical procedures were necessary, and whether Rodriguez or AC
Pipe could and should have done more to prevent the accident. The judge ultimately
instructed the jury to consider whether Rodriguez and AC Pipe were comparatively at
fault for the collision.1
The jury found Willis, and by extension KSI,2 negligent and responsible for
injuring Rodriguez. It also found Rodriguez and AC Pipe were equally at fault for the
accident.
On appeal, Rodriguez argues the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings and
claims comparative-fault instructions were not appropriate. We disagree and affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
An AC Pipe employee was driving a company truck on Lerdo Highway when it
became disabled. He pulled the vehicle over onto the paved shoulder and Rodriguez, a
supervisor at AC Pipe, traveled to the scene.
After arriving, Rodriguez and a colleague stood on the paved shoulder and tried to
refuel the disabled vehicle. They admitted to informally planning to watch for “traffic”
as they stood on the paved shoulder. Moments later, Rodriguez was struck by Willis who
was driving a KSI truck.

1 Throughout the opinion, we interchangeably use the terms accident and collision.

2 Counsel stipulated KSI “will be responsible for any negligence of … Willis.”
There was not a separate finding regarding KSI.

2.
After the collision, Rodriguez underwent surgery on his “right shoulder,” “left
arm,” “teeth” and “jaw,” and “lower back ….” He also suffered psychological trauma.3
Several experts testified about Rodriguez’s injuries, their cause, and the collision
itself. Some experts pointed out the AC Pipe employees, Rodriguez included, failed to
utilize cones and hazard lights to prevent a collision.
The jury found Willis responsible for Rodriguez’s injuries, but found Rodriguez
and AC Pipe at fault, too. The jury awarded $850,000 in damages and apportioned fault
at 50 percent to Willis, 30 percent to AC Pipe, and 20 percent to Rodriguez.
DISCUSSION
There are several issues raised but they fall into two categories: evidentiary rulings
and jury instructions. Rodriguez contends the trial court erred “in sustaining objections
that excluded the causation and future damages opinions” from his treating physicians
“based on the fact that they were non-retained” experts. He also believes the trial court
impermissibly admitted “case-specific hearsay ….”
As for the jury instructions, Rodriguez asserts the comparative-fault instructions
were all improper. Finding no error in either category, we affirm the judgment.
I. Evidentiary Issues
Rodriguez raises two distinct evidentiary claims. First, did the trial court
improperly limit the treating physicians from offering opinions on causation solely
because they were nonretained experts? Second, did the court wrongly admit case-
specific hearsay into evidence?
Willis argues the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were correct. Specifically, he
contends the trial court limited treating physicians from offering opinions because they

3 For example, Rodriguez testified he is not “[m]entally” fit to work because he
does not “trust [him]self” and “ha[s] issues with forgetfulness and decision making.”

3.
lacked sufficient foundation and the alleged hearsay testimony was “admissible and …
properly introduced ….” We agree with Willis.
A. Causation Testimony
Two physicians who treated Rodriguez for injuries testified in the case—they were
not retained for purposes of litigation.4 The trial court did not allow these two physicians
to opine Rodriguez’s injuries were caused by the accident in issue. Others, specifically
retained for trial, were allowed to testify the injuries were caused by the accident. We
find no error in the rulings.
i. Additional Background
The first treating physician opined Rodriguez’s shoulder, neck, and back injuries
were caused by trauma. When asked which traumatic event caused the injuries, the trial
court sustained an objection. The court later explained its ruling was due to it believing
the subject was “beyond the scope of a nonretained expert” and, because “the record
indicate[d the] only source of information” for the opinion was “provided by the patient,”
there was “an insufficient foundation ….”
The second treating physician opined Rodriguez’s shoulder injury was caused by
the accident underlying the case.5 He was then asked if an elbow injury was also caused

4 “A treating physician,” or nonretained expert in this case, “is not consulted for
litigation purposes, but rather is qualified to testify about the plaintiff’s injuries and
medical history because of his or her underlying expertise as a physician and his or her
physician-patient relationship with the plaintiff. A retained expert, on the other hand, is
engaged for the purpose of forming and expressing an opinion in anticipation of the
litigation based at least in part on information obtained outside the physician-patient
relationship, for the purpose of the litigation rather than the patient’s treatment.”
(Dozier v. Shapiro (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1520.) A treating physician and a
retained expert are subject to differing disclosure rules. (Id. at pp. 1520-1521.)
5 For clarity, this treating physician at least partially tied Rodriguez’s injuries
directly to the accident. The trial court aptly described the record in this regard as
follows: “Some of the other witnesses got that opinion in sometimes because it was
slipped in quickly, sometimes because there was no objection, but that doesn’t change the

4.
by the accident, he replied, “Yes, I believe it was caused by the injury.” When counsel
attempted to clarify the answer, the trial court sustained an objection. The court
explained it sustained the objection because the subject “exceed[ed] the scope” and the
physician lacked “foundation to render that opinion.”
At least six other witnesses linked, in whole or in part, Rodriguez’s various
injuries to the accident. The parties later revisited the objections, and the trial court
explained it did not exclude the treating physicians from testifying to causation simply
because they were nonretained experts. Rather, the court clarified it believed the treating
experts lacked foundation, i.e., Rodriguez’s statement, in essence, that the “injuries were
caused by a collision with a truck” was not a “sufficient foundation” upon which to
render an opinion.
ii. Analysis
“ ‘We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence “for abuse of
discretion, and [the ruling] will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial
court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a miscarriage of
justice.” ’ ” (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 445; Dart Industries, Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1078.) “An abuse of discretion is
only demonstrated when no reasonable judge could have made the challenged order.” (In
re Marriage of Barth (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 363, 374.) “We may affirm on any correct
ground, regardless of the grounds relied upon by the trial court.” (Boschetti v. Pacific
Bay Investments Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1059, 1065.)
Rodriguez correctly points out “[a] treating physician is a percipient expert, but
that does not mean that his [or her] testimony is limited only to personal observations.
Rather, like any other expert, he [or she] may provide both fact and opinion testimony.”

fact that I have made a determination that [the treating physicians were] not qualified to
give that opinion ….”

5.
(Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser (1999) 22 Cal.4th 31, 35.) Nonetheless, an expert’s opinion
must still “assist the trier of fact ….” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)
Here, the trial court excluded the two treating physicians from testifying the
collision caused Rodriguez’s injuries. The ruling was correct. To the extent the trial
court believed those opinions were insufficiently founded upon Rodriguez’s statements
alone, it did not abuse its discretion.
The opinions at issue would have simply related Rodriguez’s own conclusions,
conclusions he himself was free to testify to. “[A]n expert opinion is worth no more than
the reasons and facts on which it is based.” (Bushling v. Fremont Medical Center (2004)
117 Cal.App.4th 493, 510.)
At bottom, a trial court is vested with the discretion to determine whether a
patient’s statements alone are sufficient foundation for an expert to opine about causation
in a direct, as opposed to hypothetical, form.6 (Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health
Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117 [“Exclusion of expert opinions that rest
on guess, surmise or conjecture [citation] is an inherent corollary to the foundational
predicate for admission of the expert testimony: will the testimony assist the trier of fact
to evaluate the issues it must decide?”]; Belfiore-Braman v. Rotenberg (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 234, 247 [a “court [is] required to assure that the foundational predicates
for admission of any expert testimony were met, such that it would assist the trier of fact
in evaluating the issues to be decided.”].) A direct opinion tying the collision to the
injuries does not necessarily assist the jury. Arguably, it simply informs the jury on how
to decide a key element in dispute. We cannot conclude no reasonable judge would
similarly rule.

6 Aside from eliciting testimony from the treating physicians that Rodriguez’s
injuries were consistent with trauma, Rodriguez did not elicit a separate opinion from
these witnesses that the injuries were consistent with a hypothetical collision involving a
motor vehicle.

6.
In sum, contrary to Rodriguez’s claim, the trial court here did not exclude
causation testimony simply because the treating physicians were not retained experts. In
any event, several experts testified to direct causation between the collision and
Rodriguez’s injuries. There was no error, let alone any prejudice.7 (Grail
Semiconductor, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 786, 799 [appellant bears burden to establish prejudicial error].)
B. Hearsay
Rodriguez contends the trial court permitted cross-examination in violation of
People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). Specifically, he argues 1) an expert
witness “was read verbatim the notes of a … physician’s assistant,” 2) the expert “was
cross-examined at length with specific statements [made] by … Rodriguez” and
contained within medical records, and 3) the expert “was cross-examined based on case-
specific hearsay” describing Rodriguez’s prior back injury, even though that witness
“never testified.” Willis contends there was no error, and we agree.
i. Additional Background
Rodriguez retained a physician to testify at trial. This retained physician testified
Rodriguez’s neck, shoulder, and back injuries were caused by the accident when Willis
hit Rodriguez on the highway. On cross-examination, the physician acknowledged
Rodriguez suffered a prior back injury. Indeed, he had read and considered another
physician’s report on that injury, personally noting the prior diagnosis—a herniated
disk—in his own report prepared for this trial.
Rodriguez objected to the testimony, i.e., a separate physician’s report describing
a prior back injury. The objection was overruled, with the trial court noting “[i]t’s an

7 Rodriguez asserts he was “grossly prejudiced” because “his treating surgeons”
were “the least-biased, most objective medical witnesses in the case ….” His assertion
invites far too much speculation.

7.
exception to the hearsay rule because it’s something the doctor relied upon” and offered
to instruct the jury accordingly.8
Moments later, the physician was read a note describing Rodriguez’s statements
relating “significant improvement” and “no neck pain ….” Because the note’s author
was not testifying, Rodriguez objected. The objection was overruled.
Much later, another physician retained to testify at trial explained Rodriguez’s
“psychiatric problems” were “caused” by the collision in issue. He was cross-examined
via numerous other medical records in which Rodriguez allegedly denied any psychiatric
issues. Rodriguez, again, objected.
Ultimately, the trial court held a hearing on the entire matter. The court concluded
statements allegedly made by Rodriguez were admissible, subject to a motion to strike,
because it believed “those statements” were, one way or another, “going to come in[to]”
evidence. The court subsequently “den[ied] the motion without prejudice” to its renewal.
Eventually, Rodriguez testified he injured his back many years prior to the
accident in this case. He sought treatment for it and believed, based on that treatment, he
“had two crushed disks” in his lower back. The physician who treated Rodriguez for his
prior back injury also testified in the case.
ii. Analysis
“When any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court statements, and
treats the content of those statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion,
the statements are hearsay.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.) “There is a
distinction to be made between allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the
matter relied upon as opposed to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not
otherwise fall under a statutory exception. [¶] What an expert cannot do is relate as true
case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven

8 Rodriguez declined the special instruction.

8.
by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (Ibid.) Additionally, if
challenged, “an expert must establish that the basis for his or her opinion is sufficiently
reliable such that it ‘reasonably may be relied upon’ by experts testifying on the same
subject.” (People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 32 (Veamatahau).)
“Although Sanchez was a criminal case, its intention was to ‘clarify the proper
application of Evidence Code sections 801 and 802, relating to the scope of expert
testimony.’ [Citation.] Thus, the Sanchez rule concerning state evidentiary rules for
expert testimony applies in civil cases.” (In re Marriage of Lietz (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
664, 673.)
Notwithstanding Sanchez, “ ‘[i]t is common practice to challenge an expert by
inquiring in good faith about relevant information, including hearsay, which he [or she]
may have overlooked or ignored.’ ” (People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 56
(Townsel).) “The Sanchez rule barring an expert from relating case-specific hearsay
should not be understood to bar cross-examination which seeks to undermine an expert’s
opinion by showing that facts relied upon are suspect or that facts inconsistent with the
opinion were ignored.” (Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual (2023) § 4.31, p. 373.)
The trial court’s rulings in this case were consistent with the law. Although its
stated reasons were arguably imperfect, the rulings were not in error. The questions and
answers at issue here were clearly designed to undermine the respective expert opinions.
For example, questions were asked to ensure physicians offering opinions favorable to
Rodriguez had first properly considered Rodriguez’s prior back injury. Although a case-
specific fact, Rodriguez himself admitted he previously suffered a prior back injury,
sought treatment, and believed he suffered “two crushed disks” in his lower back.
Moreover, the physicians who treated Rodriguez’s prior back injury and ordered and
reviewed the test results during his treatment also testified at the trial, albeit not the
physician performing or reporting the rest.

9.
As for statements allegedly made or omitted by Rodriguez, and documented in
medical records, pertaining to pain, improvement, or psychology, Rodriguez was
available to confirm, deny, or explain the evidence. Ultimately, the trial court believed
the evidence underlying that cross-examination would enter the record and allowed
Rodriguez to later move to strike the relevant testimony. He did not. The fact he chose
not to move again to strike the testimony does not convert the trial court’s evidentiary
ruling into error.
In conclusion, the cross-examination objected to in this case did not violate
Sanchez. Instead, it was appropriate because it was designed to, and did, test the
reliability of the opinions offered at trial. (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 26
[“the credibility of an expert witness may be challenged based on the sources of
information the expert relied on to form his or her opinion.”]; Veamatahau, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 32; Townsel, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 56.) Rodriguez has not proven the
court erred in its evidentiary rulings.
II. Jury Instruction Issues
The trial court instructed the jury with various comparative fault principles.
Rodriguez asserts neither the evidence nor the law supported these instructions. We
believe the instructions were properly supported by fact and law.
A. Additional Background
Multiple experts testified about their conclusions in reconstructing the accident
and what could have been done to avoid it. One expert believed Rodriguez was nearly “a
foot or a little less than a foot” “from the fog line” when he was hit by Willis. He also
believed “flashers,” or hazard lights, were important to activate in this situation, and
stated Rodriguez should have activated them when he arrived on scene. He expressed
similar opinions about using cones, and noted AC Pipe had “no protocol … to follow
when company vehicles became disabled.” He concluded it was unsafe to be “so close to
the fog line” unless “you have blinkers on, if you have your cones out.” Another expert

10.
testified the disabled vehicle was “[t]wo and a half feet” from the “[s]houlder line” or
“white line ….”
An AC Pipe employee testified the disabled vehicle should have had its
“emergency flashers” engaged. He also believed cones, which were actually available in
the vehicle, should have been placed on the road. He specifically noted Rodriguez, as a
supervisor, should have directed using lights and cones but, again, there was no company
protocol dealing with disabled vehicles.
Regarding the accident, Willis testified he observed the disabled vehicle with
people standing around it from approximately “five blocks away[.]” As he approached
the disabled vehicle and was about to pass it, Rodriguez “stepped out” into his “line of
fire” and “[he] assumed [he] was going to hit him.” Willis “veered from [his] thinking
[he] was going to hit [Rodriguez,] [b]ut when [he] veered, there was a [large] truck
coming [his] way ….” Due to the oncoming truck, Willis “jerked back to the right” and
he hit Rodriguez, acknowledging he “[o]bviously” left the travel lane to some extent.
Later, as the parties discussed jury instructions, Rodriguez objected to comparative
fault because, “even if there [was] comparative fault found,” it was “going to be very
minor compared to the fault of [] Willis.” The trial court responded, “[T]hat’s an
argument best directed to the jury.” Rodriguez also objected to another comparative fault
instruction, arguing there was “no causal nexus between anything that [he] did that day
and any of the harm that resulted.” For example, he argued “[t]here [was] no evidence …
that the failure to place cones and flashers caused [] Willis to leave his lane,” especially
because Willis saw people and the disabled “vehicle, clear as day, five blocks away.”
The parties also clashed over negligence per se instructions. Willis sought to
prove Rodriguez was negligent per se because he violated laws by standing in the
roadway without a crosswalk (Veh. Code,9 § 21954, subd. (a)) and failing to activate

9 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

11.
hazard lights on the disabled vehicle to serve as a “warning” (§ 25251, subd. (b)). He
also sought to prove the driver of the disabled vehicle—an AC Pipe employee—was
negligent per se and caused harm to Rodriguez because he failed to engage the hazard
lights and to place “warning devices” as required by federal law. (49 C.F.R. § 392.22,
subd. (a).)
The trial court ultimately did instruct the jury with each challenged comparative-
fault instruction. The instructions essentially informed the jury Rodriguez, or the AC
Pipe employee, was partially responsible for Rodriguez’s injuries if either was negligent,
and that negligence was a “substantial factor in causing … harm.” The court also
instructed the jury “the failure to use extreme caution” in “dangerous activities” “is
negligence.” As noted, the jury did find Rodriguez and AC Pipe were jointly 50 percent
at fault for the accident.
B. Analysis
On appeal, Rodriguez restates his trial court arguments. He claims the evidence
did not support comparative fault because it was not “reasonably foreseeable” Willis
would “veer out of his lane” and strike him, and it was not a dangerous situation. He also
argues the instructions based on statutory violations were not supported by law because
he was not standing on the “roadway,” as defined in the Vehicle Code, cones and hazard
lights were immaterial to the accident, and the hazard lights were not engaged because
the vehicle’s disability also disabled those lights.
“Upon request, a party in a civil case is entitled to correct, non-argumentative jury
instructions on every theory of the case that is supported by substantial evidence.”
(Maureen K. v. Tuschka (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 519, 526.) “We review de novo the
question of whether the trial court's instructions to the jury were correct.” (Ibid.) Here,
we conclude the general comparative fault and negligence per se instructions were all
proper.

12.
i. General Comparative Fault
Rodriguez claims comparative fault instructions were improper because it was
“unforeseeable” “that Willis would suddenly depart his lane, drive several feet over the
white shoulder line, and strike him.” We disagree.
“That drivers may lose control of their vehicles and leave a freeway for the
shoulder area, where they may collide with any obstacle placed there, is not categorically
unforeseeable.” (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 768.) “[T]hat a
vehicle parked by the side of a freeway may be struck by another vehicle leaving the
freeway, resulting in injury to either vehicle’s occupants, is clearly foreseeable. Drivers
are supposed to control their vehicles and keep them on the traveled roadway, but
common experience shows they do not always do so. Freeway drivers may be
intoxicated, distracted, blinded by the weather or sun, sleepy or sick, and for any of these
reasons or others may drive off the roadway. Mechanical problems with their vehicles
can also force motorists to suddenly leave the freeway. If they do so at freeway speeds
and collide with another vehicle parked alongside the road, they are likely to be injured or
injure other occupants of the vehicles, or both. This general foreseeability is reflected in
the Official Reports, in that numerous decisions have involved collisions between
vehicles leaving a highway and vehicles or other obstacles on the roadside.” (Id. at
p. 775.)
This case is no exception. Rodriguez stood nearly one foot from the line and
himself admitted it was necessary to watch for oncoming traffic.
As for whether the facts in this case involved a dangerous activity or item relative
to the extreme caution instruction, Rodriguez only argues “driving a vehicle is not so
inherently dangerous as to always require extreme caution.” But this case does not
involve driving a vehicle. Rather, it involves attempting to fuel a vehicle while standing
one foot away from highway traffic. Put simply, the evidence justified the instruction
and the jury was entitled to consider it.

13.
Similarly, Rodriguez complains cones and hazard lights were immaterial to the
accident because Willis testified he “clearly saw [Rodriguez] at all times for minutes
leading up to the collision ….” The evidence in the record, however, included an opinion
cones and hazard lights were effective notwithstanding an oncoming driver’s clear vision.
Again, the jury was entitled to credit this evidence and to consider an appropriate
instruction.
ii. Negligence Per Se
The negligence per se instructions were based on violating the Vehicle Code and
Federal Regulations. The first instruction recited section 21954, which states “[e]very
pedestrian upon a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within
an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon
the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard.” (§ 21954, subd. (a).) The
Vehicle Code defines “roadway” as “that portion of a highway improved, designed, or
ordinarily used for vehicular travel.”10 (§ 530.)
The second negligence per se instruction related section 25251, which provides
“[t]urn signal lamps shall be flashed as warning lights whenever a vehicle is disabled
upon the roadway … if … the turn signal lamps were not rendered inoperative by the
event which caused the vehicle to be disabled.” (§ 25251, subd. (b).) Finally, Federal
Regulations require “the driver of [a] stopped commercial vehicle,” if “stopped upon the
traveled portion of a highway or the shoulder of a highway,” to “immediately activate the
vehicular hazard warning signal flashers and continue the flashing until the driver places
the warning devices required” by law.11 (49 C.F.R. 392.22, subd. (a).)

10 “Highway” is defined as “a way or place of whatever nature, publicly
maintained and open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” (§ 360.)
11 This instruction applied to the original driver, an AC Pipe employee, so long as
that driver’s failure was a substantial factor in harming Rodriguez.

14.
These instructions are supported by the law. Primarily, Rodriguez asserts the
statutes in issue do not apply because he was not standing in the roadway as defined by
the Vehicle Code. He is incorrect.
Any “portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular
travel” is a roadway. (§ 530.) Contrary to Rodriguez’s contention, there is no doubt the
paved shoulder in this case was “improved” “for vehicular travel.” Indeed, the shoulder
in this case was used exactly as intended, for a disabled vehicle to pull away from traffic,
and similarly for anyone responding to the scene to assist—exactly what Rodriguez did in
this case, i.e., utilize the shoulder to arrive at the scene but not obstruct normal traffic.
There is simply no other tenable argument.
The remaining instructions involving hazard lights were also proper. Rodriguez
again claims the “failure to place cones or activate flashers” did not cause the accident.
He also asserts the hazard lights were rendered inoperable by the vehicle’s disability.
Testimony in the record indicated cones and hazard lights were beneficial, should
have been used, and Rodriguez himself should have directed their usage. This evidence,
if credited by the jury, supported instructions based on failure to follow laws mandating
such usage. As for whether the hazard lights were inoperable, there is no evidence in the
record describing the vehicle-in-question’s actual disability, let alone a conclusive fact
the hazard lights were rendered inoperable by that disability.12
iii. Summary
In sum, the comparative-fault instructions were supported by both fact and law.
There was sufficient evidence in the record justifying each instruction, and there is no
question the laws the instructions were based upon fairly applied to this case.

12 The trial court actually noted, during argument related to instructions, there was
no evidence the lights were inoperative.

15.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

16.

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