CourtListener 10266547•In re Marcus P. CA2/7
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Filed 11/7/24 In re Marcus P. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re MARCUS P., a Person B333822
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County Super.
Court Law. Ct. No. 18CCJP04408)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
N.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tamara E. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant Conty Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
N.C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s visitation
order made after the court appointed a legal guardian for eight-
year-old Marcus P. at the selection and implementation hearing
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)1 and terminated dependency
jurisdiction. Mother contends the court abused its discretion by
requiring visitation to be monitored by an unpaid monitor
mutually agreed to by Mother and the legal guardian or a
professional monitor paid for by Mother. She argues the
visitation order is illusory because the legal guardian and Mother
do not get along and she cannot afford a professional monitor.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The 2018 Dependency Petition and Mother’s First Appeal
On July 16, 2018 the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency
petition under section 300, former subdivision (b)(1), on behalf of
then-four-year-old Marcus alleging Mother physically abused him
by forcibly shaking and striking his body. On August 7, 2008 the
juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition; declared
Marcus a dependent of the court; removed him from Mother’s
1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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physical custody; and ordered family reunification services and
monitored visitation for Mother. Mother appealed from the
jurisdiction findings and disposition order, and we affirmed.
(In re Marcus P. (Mar. 20, 2019, B292348) [nonpub. opn.].) On
August 24, 2020 the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and
entered a juvenile custody order granting joint legal custody to
Mother and Mark P. (Father) and physical custody and primary
residence to Mother.
B. The 2020 Dependency Petition and Mother’s Second Appeal
On December 29, 2020 the Department filed another
dependency petition under section 300, former subdivision (b)(1),
on behalf of Marcus. The petition alleged Mother was unable and
unwilling to provide Marcus with ongoing care and supervision
because she requested Marcus’s removal from her home on
December 24, 2020 (stating in her call to the Department’s
hotline that Marcus had pushed her to her limits and she was
concerned she would do something to him and end up in jail). On
April 1, 2021 the Department filed a first amended petition
adding two counts under section 300, former subdivision (b)(1),
based on Mother’s history of physically abusing Marcus, and
Mother and Father’s domestic violence in Marcus’s presence. The
juvenile court sustained the allegations in the amended petition;
declared Marcus a dependent of the court; removed him from
Mother’s physical custody; and ordered family reunification
services and monitored visitation for Mother. Mother timely
appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order, and
we affirmed. (In re Marcus P. (June 10, 2022, B313339) [nonpub
opn.].)
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C. Mother’s Section 388 Petition and Third Appeal
On October 4, 2021 Mother filed a section 388 petition
seeking return of Marcus to her physical custody or unmonitored
or overnight visits. On December 16, 2021, following an
evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied Mother’s petition.
The court found Mother failed to show changed circumstances
and her request was not in Marcus’s best interest. Mother timely
appealed the denial of her section 388 petition. Mother’s
appellate counsel filed an opening brief stating she was unable to
identify any arguable issues and indicating she had advised
Mother that if Mother did not personally submit her contentions
within 30 days, her appeal would be dismissed. (See In re
Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 838, 845.) Mother did not file a
response, and this court dismissed her appeal.
D. The Review Hearings, Selection and Implementation
Hearing, and Mother’s Fourth Appeal
At the March 2, 2022 six-month review hearing (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)), Marcus’s attorney informed the juvenile court that
Marcus’s caregiver, maternal great-aunt Vernessa C., was not
open to hosting Mother’s visits at Vernessa’s home because there
were ongoing disagreements and tension between them. The
court noted Mother was residing in Nevada, and Vernessa and
Marcus were living in Los Angeles County. The court
acknowledged Vernessa was unwilling to monitor Mother’s
visitation at her home because of friction between Vernessa and
Mother. The court ordered the Department to monitor Mother’s
in-person visits with Marcus in Los Angeles County. At the
October 19, 2022 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)),
the court found Mother had made minimal progress with her case
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plan. The court terminated Mother’s family reunification
services over her objection and set a selection and
implementation hearing for February 15, 2023.
At the February 15 selection and implementation hearing
(§ 366.26), Mother told the court that Vernessa was abusing
Marcus and Mother saw a bruise on his face during a visit by
videoconference. Mother requested Marcus’s removal from
Vernessa’s care based on child abuse. The juvenile court
continued the hearing and ordered the Department to investigate
Mother’s allegations.
At the February 21, 2023 continued hearing, the
Department reported that the social worker had interviewed
Marcus and Vernessa about the physical abuse allegations.
Vernessa admitted she and a male cousin, Tony, had last
spanked Marcus approximately two years prior. Vernessa
acknowledged no corporal punishment should be used to
discipline Marcus, and she was now using time outs and taking
away privileges from him. The juvenile court found, based on the
social worker’s interviews with Vernessa, Tony, and Marcus, that
Vernessa and Tony stopped using corporal punishment in 2022.
The court appointed Vernessa as Marcus’s legal guardian over
Mother’s objection. As part of the legal guardianship order, the
court ordered, “Monitored visits and monitored phone contact,
with a professional monitor paid 100% by the Mother.” The court
terminated dependency jurisdiction with Kin-GAP funding in
place.2
2 “The Kin-GAP program is a state program that provides
ongoing funding for children who exit the dependency system to
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Mother timely appealed from the orders appointing
Vernessa as legal guardian and terminating dependency
jurisdiction over Marcus. Pursuant to a joint stipulation by
Mother and the Department, on September 21, 2023 this court
conditionally affirmed the legal guardianship order, reversed the
order terminating jurisdiction, and remanded the matter “for the
sole purpose of the juvenile court holding a noticed hearing with
counsel for all parties reappointed to make a visitation order that
specifies the frequency and duration of monitored visits” between
Mother and Marcus.
E. The November 2023 Report and Hearing on Visitation
On November 22, 2023 the Department filed a last minute
information for the court regarding Mother’s visitation with
Marcus. In a November 17 telephone interview with the social
worker, Mother stated, “I’m in Vegas. The caregiver won’t let me
see him. I can’t call him.” The social worker reminded Mother
that the juvenile court had ordered Mother to pay for a
professional monitor to monitor the in-person visits and
telephone calls. Mother responded, “No, all [Vernessa] has to do
is work with me. I am homeless, I don’t have money for that, this
is all your fault. I am going to sue the county for this, you and
the other workers and supervisors.” The social worker
live with relative legal guardians. In order to receive funding
under the program the county welfare agency must enter into a
written binding agreement with the relative guardian and
dependency jurisdiction must be terminated. (§§ 11386, 11387.)”
(In re Priscilla D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1211, fn. 2.)
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terminated the call because Mother refused to speak
appropriately with him.
The social worker also spoke with Vernessa on
November 17, who reported Mother had called on Marcus’s
birthday in July and again in early November. On each occasion
Vernessa asked Marcus to speak with Mother by phone, but he
refused. When asked if Mother had visited Marcus in person,
Vernessa responded, “When I became the Legal Guardian, the
documents indicate[d] that she needs to be monitored, and pay
for the monitor. She won’t do that, and I am not going to violate
that order.” Vernessa added, “Last week she was driving up and
down the street multiple times. She came up to my porch yelling
that I was keeping her away from her son. I brought Marcus to
the door, he said Hi and then ran back to his room.” Vernessa
recounted, “Like she does when she comes around, she calls Law
Enforcement and they check on him and they ask me if she has
mental illness. It’s always a mess.” Vernessa was not willing to
be the visitation monitor. She explained, “I did that in the past
and that didn’t go well. She accused me of hurting the child and
after that I would not do it again.” Vernessa added, “I have no
problem letting her see her son, but she needs to have the
monitor, it is a Court order.”
In his interview with the social worker, Marcus reported
that Mother visited him twice in the prior year. Marcus added,
“She did call but I didn’t want to talk to her. I don’t want to see
her anymore.” When Marcus was asked why he did not want to
see Mother anymore, he did not respond. Instead, he began
talking about his favorite video games.
On November 29, 2023 the juvenile court held a hearing on
the visitation order. Mother was not present at the hearing or
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connected by telephone, but her attorney indicated Mother had
given her directions. Mother’s attorney requested unmonitored
visits for Mother, adding, “If the court does deny Mother’s request
for unmonitored visits, Mother was informed that she needed to
have a paid monitor 100 percent paid by her. She’s not able to
pay for a monitor. She’s currently unemployed and unhoused
and is living in her vehicle. She’s not able to provide any funds to
have a monitor. So by having Mother only be able to have a
professional paid monitor would, essentially, be stating that she
cannot have any visits with her child. So she would request that
either the legal guardian select and name an individual that
would monitor visits, not necessarily legal guardian but an
individual selected by legal guardian, and that person be listed in
the legal guardianship paperwork to be the monitor. Or that
legal guardian share in any costs for a professional monitor,
because, at this time, Mother is unable to have any visits based
on financial reasons. So with that said, she would request
unmonitored or for the monitor not to be a professionally paid
monitor.”
Marcus’s attorney requested monitored visitation once a
week for one hour minimum, monitored by a professional monitor
because Mother “does have a history of acting inappropriately
during visits and needing redirection.” Marcus’s attorney
continued, “We understand the financial burden on mom, but she
does have a history of needing direction, making comments that
are hard on the minor. And so we are asking that the visits be
monitored by someone who has history with monitoring.”
Mother’s attorney responded, “The point of having a monitor is
for the exact reasons that minor’s counsel indicated[,] that
doesn’t have to be a professionally-paid monitor. And, again, if
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it’s only professionally paid, then Mother cannot have visits.
That’s asking for a no visitation order, essentially. And I never
requested that legal guardian have to monitor. I requested that
legal guardian name an individual that she’s comfortable with
monitoring visits for Mother if the court doesn’t order
unmonitored visits.” The Department’s attorney objected to
unmonitored visits by Mother, arguing, “As to Mother’s inability
to pay for the monitor, I believe the typical order is that they can
use the monitor that’s agreed upon. At this point, there is no
agreement; so Mother has no choice.”
The juvenile court ruled, “The frequency of the visitations
is a minimum of one time a month, minimum of one hour per
visit. The legal guardian shall not act as monitor. The court
cannot force the legal guardian to sit as monitor when there is [a]
documented history of Mother’s conflict with the legal guardian.
With respect to the legal guardian selecting an individual, the
Mother and the legal guardian can agree upon an individual to
monitor . . . . And if they cannot agree upon a person to monitor,
a person being someone 21 years or older, then the monitor will
have to be a professional monitor paid 100 percent by the Mother.
The request that the legal guardian share in the cost of the
monitor[ed] visitation is denied.”
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“When, as here, the juvenile court orders a legal
guardianship at the permanency planning hearing, it must ‘make
an order for visitation with the parents . . . unless the court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be
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detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child.’
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(C).)” (In re Ethan J. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 654, 661; accord, In re Rebecca S. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313; In re M.R. (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 269, 274 [“the trial court was required to make a
visitation order unless it found that visitation was not in the
children’s best interest”].) “[T]he juvenile court cannot delegate
the decision whether visitation will occur to any third party,
including the child, the social services agency, or the guardian.”
(In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 511, 516; accord, In re T.H.
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123 [“The power to determine the
right and extent of visitation by a noncustodial parent in a
dependency case resides with the court and may not be delegated
to nonjudicial officials or private parties.”].) “The time, place, and
manner of visitation may be left to the legal guardians, but the
guardians shall not have discretion to decide whether visitation
actually occurs.” (In re Grace C. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1470,
1478; accord, In re Rebecca S., at p. 1314 [“leaving the frequency
and duration of visits within the legal guardian’s discretion
allows the guardian to decide whether visitation actually will
occur”]; see In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317 [“the
power to decide whether any visitation occurs belongs to the court
alone.”].) “‘We review applicable legal principles de novo, but
apply a deferential standard of review to the court’s exercise of
discretion and resolution of disputed facts.’” (In re Rebecca S., at
p. 1314.)
As discussed, the juvenile court ordered visitation for
Mother to be monitored by a person mutually agreed upon by
Mother and Vernessa or by a professional monitor paid for by
Mother if they could not reach agreement. Mother contends the
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visitation order impermissibly delegated authority over visitation
to Vernessa because there was discord between Mother and
Vernessa, and it was unreasonable to expect that Vernessa would
cooperate with Mother in mutually agreeing upon a visitation
monitor.
There was no impermissible delegation. The February 21,
2023 order required a professional monitor for Mother’s visits
with Marcus. The parties then stipulated that the matter be
remanded for the juvenile court to specify the frequency and
duration of the monitored visits. The November 29, 2023
visitation order did just that by requiring that Mother have a
minimum of one one-hour visit per month. The fact the revised
order provided an alternative form of monitoring (by a third
party agreed upon by Mother and Vernessa) did not mean there
was impermissible delegation.
Moreover, although Mother and Vernessa did not get along,
there was no evidence Vernessa would refuse to agree to an
unpaid monitor. In her November 17, 2023 interview, Vernessa
indicated Mother had not had visits with Marcus because Mother
refused to pay for a professional monitor, and Vernessa did not
want to violate the court’s order. Vernessa added, “I have no
problem letting her see her son, but she needs to have the
monitor, it is a Court order.” And notwithstanding her
unwillingness to monitor Mother’s visits, Vernessa brought
Marcus to the front door to talk with Mother when Mother drove
to her house in early November 2023, and Vernessa attempted to
have Marcus speak with Mother when Mother called in July and
early November 2023. On these facts, the court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering either an agreed-upon or professional
monitor.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s November 29, 2023 visitation order is
affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
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