People v. Tran CA1/2

CourtListener 10266542Calctapp7 nov. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 11/7/24 P. v. Tran CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A165297

v. (Contra Costa County
TECH THU TRAN, Super. Ct. No. 05001904556)
Defendant and
Appellant.

Tech Thu Tran was convicted of willful, deliberate, premediated
attempted murder, torture, aggravated mayhem and assault with a firearm.
Sentenced to a prison term of seven years to life on the attempted murder
conviction plus a consecutive 25 years to life on an enhancement for personal
discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury, he contends the trial court
erred in refusing to strike the enhancement under Penal Code section 1385.
We conclude the trial court was not required to strike the enhancement but
erred with respect to some of the factors bearing on its discretionary decision
whether to do so. Accordingly, we will remand for reconsideration of the
sentence.

1
BACKGROUND
I.
Factual Background
A. General Background
Tran and his ex-wife Veronica1 were married for 11 years, divorced in
2020, and have two sons, born in 2012 and 2014. They separated in
March 2018, after Veronica discovered Tran had been unfaithful, with
multiple people, for years. He moved out, at her request, but returned after a
week because their son had a “horrible” week at school. Tran and Veronica
had been sleeping in separate bedrooms since before the separation,2 and
continued to do so. In May 2018, Tran’s mother died, and he moved to her
house in Concord, but he stayed at the couple’s Antioch house part or all of
the weekends to be with the children.
Veronica met Nicholas Collaco in May 2018, when she contacted him to
invite his six-year-old daughter to her son’s birthday party. Collaco was
single and Veronica told him she was separated.3 They continued to
communicate, their texts progressed from casual to flirty, and they got
together one morning in the backyard of Veronica’s house, smoking
marijuana while her children were inside, and another time at Collaco’s

1 We refer to Veronica Tran by her first name to avoid confusion. No
disrespect is intended.
2 Veronica testified that they slept in separate rooms because she was
breastfeeding and taking care of the children; she slept with them in one of
the downstairs bedrooms and Tran slept in the master bedroom upstairs.
She and Tran were still physically intimate during these years.
3 Collaco testified that Veronica told him Tran “didn’t really live at the
house”; she testified she did not tell him where Tran was staying but later
acknowledged having told the police that she told Collaco that Tran was not
living with her during the week.

2
house, where they kissed but did not have sex. In continuing text
communications, they discussed interest in having sex with each other and
exchanged naked photographs of each other. Veronica did not tell Tran about
her relationship with Collaco, and Tran was not aware of it. She deleted text
exchanges with Collaco from her phone because she did not want Tran to
know about him.
B. The Events of July 22 and July 23, 2018
1. July 22 Afternoon and Early Evening
On the afternoon of July 22, 2018, Veronica, Tran and their sons went
to a birthday party. Tran was going to be staying at the Antioch house.
Veronica testified that she and Tran both drank alcohol at the party, but she
drank more, as Tran was the “designated driver.” Tran testified that he had
about ten shots of alcohol and three to four beers at the party.
Veronica and Collaco had discussed possibly getting together that
evening at his house. At 4:49 p.m., Collaco texted Veronica that he would
probably be available late that night. She responded, “I think I’m staying in
tonight” and said she was still at the birthday party. Collaco said she should
text him later and she replied, “Okay. Text me when you’re back and we’ll
see.” Veronica testified that she gave her cell phone to her son to play on and
did not get it back from him before the family left the party at around 8 p.m.
When they got home, Veronica went to the bathroom to throw up from the
alcohol she had been drinking. She was in the bathroom alone for “a while,”
possibly more than an hour, then went to bed in the room she shared with
her sons. She did not have her cell phone with her in the bathroom or
bedroom. Tran knew the passcode to her phone.
Veronica testified that she woke up to the police pounding on the
garage door. She did not remember Tran waking her up but acknowledged

3
that a transcript of her interview with the police showed she told them Tran
woke her up, angry, saying he wanted a divorce and knew she had been
cheating on him.
2. The Text Exchange
Collaco was questioned in detail about texts between his cell phone and
Veronica’s on the night of July 22 to 23 that were documented in trial
exhibit 3. At 8:56 p.m., he received a message saying “ ‘Hmm what you all
about? How’s your night?’ ” He replied that he was heading home and asked
if she was good at giving massages because he had a bad migraine and would
love to have her rub his back and shoulders. Once home, he asked if she was
still at her party, and she replied that she was. He texted, “ ‘Come over.’ ”
The next text Collaco received asked, “ ‘You sure?’ ” He said, “ ‘You can
come now if you want,’ ” and she responded, “ ‘For what?’ and a smily [sic]
face or a wink emoji.” He replied with a photograph of himself, shirtless. She
texted that her husband was home, Collaco asked if that was a problem and
she said “ ‘[y]es.’ ” Collaco asked why and she responded that her kids were
tired and she could not get away. He asked, “ ‘I thought you were free
tonight?’ ” She responded, “ ‘Maybe I can sext you.’ ” Collaco did not recall
her having used the term “sext” before and Veronica testified that she had
never used it in texts with him. He said “ ‘[y]ea,’ ” she said, “ ‘[t]ell me what
you miss about me’ ” and he said, “ ‘Girl, you should bring that sexy ass
here.’ ”
Veronica next texted, “ ‘What was your address again? Maybe I can
sneak away. I wanna hella smoke with you.’ ” Collaco thought this was “[a]
little bit odd” because she already had his address and had been at his house
recently. He texted, “ ‘I want your sexy ass naked in my bed while I smoke
this joint,’ ” sent his address and said, “ ‘Stop playing. Come over.’ ” They

4
exchanged a few sexually explicit messages, then she texted, “ ‘How many
times have we fucked now . . . you probably don’t even know or remember. So
I bet you want more then.’ ” This was “odd,” because they had not had sex,
and Collaco became concerned that “maybe it wasn’t Veronica.” He
responded, “ ‘Umm we haven’t.’ ”
Shortly after that, at about 11:10 p.m., he called Veronica’s phone but
there was no answer. He then received a message saying, “ ‘Sorry, I can’t
talk right now,’ ” with “a kiss emoji.” The next message said, “ ‘Sorry. You
are so hot and I want to too. But I can’t,’ ” and he thought “it could possibly
be Veronica.” He texted, “ ‘So I take it I won’t see you tonight then?’ ” and
she replied “ ‘you can probably get another night’ ” and sent a nude
photograph that he recognized as one she had sent a week or so before.
Collaco became concerned again, wondering why she would send the same
photograph she had already sent, then received a text saying, “ ‘Just have
this for now. If you can tell me how we met . . . that might turn me on.’ ” He
thought this was “another red flag” and was suspicious it was not Veronica
texting, but he texted, “ ‘I want you. Right now.’ ” Her next text said, “ ‘I
might just come over.’ ” Still trying to figure out whether he was talking to
Veronica, Collaco texted, “ ‘Shouldn’t you know how we met . . . WTF,’ what
the fuck.” He then said, “ ‘It sound like your ex has your phone.’ ”
The response was another naked photograph of Veronica that he had
received before, then “ ‘Trust me I want you.’ ” Collaco responded,
“ ‘Anyways, come by or just hit me later,’ ” and received, “ ‘Goodnight, Nic.’ ”
He did not think she had referred to him by name in prior conversations, but
if she did, she spelled it “Nick,” not “Nic.” He said goodnight, received “ ‘So
are you’ ” and a kiss emoji, responded “ ‘Your lame,’ ” and a kiss emoji, then
texted, “ ‘Really sound like your ex got your phone. And if it is, no disrespect

5
hommie. I been in your position too, so nothing personal to you man. This
just some adult stuff we all gotta deal with, ya feel me?’ ” The response was
“ ‘Goodnight sweetie. You are trippin’ too much,’ and a kiss emoji.” Back to
thinking “maybe it was just her,” Collaco texted, “ ‘Okay maybe I am LOL,’ ”
said he would be up late if she still wanted to come over and “ ‘I keep
thinking of your perfect ass all on me.’ ” He received, “ ‘All that trippin’ . . .
you still textin’,’ and a kiss—a kiss emoji and a laughing face—laughing
emoji.” Collaco was unsure whether it was Veronica responding but texted,
“ ‘Umm yea I want that sexy ass’ ” and the reply was, “ ‘It just turns me on
more when a [sic] actually pays attention and listens . . . I know I am weird.’ ”
Collaco thought this was “most likely Veronica.”
At this point, Collaco had left his house and gone to a Jack in the Box
about 10 to 15 minutes from Veronica’s house. He texted, “ ‘I can come to you
and just smoke in my car. I’m at Jack in the Box right now.’ ” He received,
“ ‘Too far for you to come. Plus kids are sleeping. And my neighbors . . . are
hella nosey.’ ” He thought it was odd that she said it was too far because “it
was actually fairly close.” He then received, “ ‘You don’t even know where I
live,’ ” After saying it was “ ‘definitely not too far,’ ” and wanting to test
whether he was communicating with Veronica, Collaco texted, “ ‘I only slept
over like 20 times LOL, remember I was hella faded the other day.’ ” He had
never slept at Veronica’s house. The response was, “ ‘Sure. . . stupid. . .’ ” and
Collaco wrote, “ ‘LOL.’ ” He received, “ ‘Okay come. But you have to promise
. . . me that we’ll only smoke.’ ” After he said “ ‘Okay,’ ” she said to come to

6
the back yard because her neighbors were nosey, and he said he would be
there in about five minutes.4
3. The Attack
Collaco testified that he arrived at Veronica’s house and, at 12:32 a.m.,
texted that he was there. The reply told him she had unlocked the side gate
and he should come through it, wait in the back yard, “ ‘[h]ave the smoke
ready’ ” and she would be right down, with a kiss emoji. Collaco found the
side gate closed and texted, asking where she was and saying he felt “ ‘weird
just waiting in the back yard.’ ” She said her son had started crying,
apologized and asked him to wait and be patient and quiet, sent a kiss and
said “ ‘It’s open.’ ” He texted that it was locked and asked if he should push
it. He did not receive a reply and pushed the gate, which felt “a little stuck”
but opened slowly.
There was no light coming from the house or a streetlight, but Collaco’s
phone was open in his hand. He did not see anyone, said “ ‘Veronica?’ ” and
took one step through the gate with his right leg. As he did so, he saw a male
figure, identified at trial as Tran, coming around the corner of the house,
about 15 feet away, with what appeared to be a gun pointed at Collaco.
“[A]lmost instantly,” Collaco was shot in the hip and legs. No words had been
exchanged. Collaco’s legs gave out and he fell on his back. Tran immediately
ran toward Collaco with the gun pointed at Collaco’s face, kicked the gate
closed behind Collaco, screamed something like, “ ‘You think you can fuck my

4 Veronica testified that she had not sent the texts that Collaco found
suspicious: For example, she never used the word “sext” when texting with
Collaco; she already had his address, she would not have asked about times
they had had sex because she had never slept with him, she did not send him
the photos that night that she had previously sent him, and she did not refer
to him as “Nic” or “sweetie.”

7
wife,’ ” and “started smashing [Collaco] on the head with the barrel.” Collaco
pleaded, “ ‘I have a little girl. Don’t kill me.’ ” Tran said, “ ‘I want to beat
your face,’ or, ‘I’m gonna bash your face in now.’ ” Collaco believed Tran
struck his head and face at least 20 times.
As Tran continued to strike him with the gun, Collaco managed to lift
himself up enough to grab the gate and pull it open, then just outside the
gate his legs gave out again and he crawled toward the street as fast as he
could, using his arms and core and dragging his legs behind him. Tran was
striking Collaco with the gun “nonstop.” Collaco rolled onto his back, partly
due to a “really hard blow” and also because he was unable to crawl any
further, felt the blows to the back of his head were going to be fatal, and
thought his best chance of survival was to see the blows coming and dodge
them as much as he could, which he did by moving his shoulders and head in
an alternating fashion. Tran continued to hit him repeatedly. Some of the
blows landed on his neck, front and back, and Collaco sustained burns on his
arms, shoulders and chest because the barrel of the gun was still hot.
Another person came out and exchanged words with Tran, who hit Collaco on
the head at least two more times and then stopped and left the area. Unable
to move, Collaco was still on his back when the police arrived. He no longer
had his cell phone and did not know where it was. Collaco told a police officer
who arrived, “ ‘I think I’ve been set up. Someone messaged me to come here
and to murder me.’ ”
Michael Mandy, who lived across the street from Tran’s house, testified
that around 12:40 a.m. on July 23, 2018, he heard “loud banging, popping
noises” outside that sounded very close. He looked out the window and saw
two people in the street, one standing and one on the ground shouting
something like, “ ‘Don’t take my life. Look at my phone.’ ” Mandy opened his

8
front door, heard the person on the ground screaming and called 911. A
recording of the call was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
Mandy did not see the standing person assault the person on the ground.
4. Police Response and Investigation
Antioch police officer Matthew Davis arrived at Tran’s address at about
12:51 a.m. on July 23, 2018. Collaco was “lying about five feet into the street
kind of in a seated position.” Davis saw a laceration on Collaco’s forehead
and what appeared to be bird shot wounds in his upper thighs. He was
bleeding from his head and from the bird shot wounds. Collaco was panicked,
in shock and appeared to be in severe pain. He spontaneously said that Tran
beat him, tried to kill him, and texted him from his wife’s phone to come over.
Davis searched Collaco and found no weapons, then asked dispatch to
tell Tran to come outside.5 The officer asked Tran where the firearm was and
Tran directed him to the left side of the house. The gate was torn off the
hinges with some of its wood broken, leaning against the house at an angle so
that Davis had to step over it to get through. There was blood on the gate,
the ground next to it and the wall of the house. Davis saw a live shotgun
shell on the ground. He found the firearm on top of the air conditioning unit
at the corner of the house. It contained no live rounds and there was blood
residue on it, including along the barrel. The gun was registered to Tran.
Davis found two cell phones in one pocket of Tran’s shorts and three live
shotgun shells in another pocket. Tran said one of the phones was his and
the other was his wife’s. The shells were consistent with the firearm, as was
the shell Davis found on the ground. Tran was “relatively calm” and “[v]ery
cooperative.”

5 The police initially believed Collaco was a suspect.

9
Officer Ryan Duff was the second officer on scene. Collaco was lying in
the street, alone, bleeding from his head, and appeared to have been shot in
the leg with a shotgun. He was moaning, in pain and in distress. Collaco
said “something to the effect of, Don’t let him get away with this.” When Duff
asked what he meant, Collaco said he came to the house to meet a female
friend, her husband shot him with a shotgun and he thought the husband
had been using the friend’s phone “to get him to come over.” Collaco, frantic,
told Duff, “You have to find my phone because the text messages are on
there.” The police found the phone in the backyard of the house directly to
the south of Tran’s. The phone’s screen was cracked and there appeared to be
blood on it. Duff opened it with Collaco’s passcode, and the text messages
seemed to corroborate what Collaco had said.
Police officer Price Kendall located a shotgun case on the floor in the
upstairs bedroom of Tran’s house and shotgun shells on the floor next to the
case. In the side yard, the officer found blood on the side wall of the house
and fence, one live shotgun shell and one spent shotgun shell and a trail of
blood from the gate to where Collaco was found. Kendall observed two areas
of pooling blood, one on the ground by the broken gate and one where Collaco
was found on the street.
Kendall contacted Veronica, who appeared to be intoxicated and not
cognizant of what had happened. A recording of the interview was played at
trial. Veronica said she had asked Tran if he had her phone and he said yes,
and that Tran woke her up and said she was cheating on him and he wanted
a divorce. Kendall asked why Collaco was coming over that night and she
“stated, kind of jokingly, I don’t know maybe to get some.”
Police Detective James Colley interviewed Collaco at the hospital at
about 10:30 a.m. on July 23. Collaco said that when he opened the gate at

10
Tran’s house, he saw a silhouette of what he thought was a man holding a
shotgun. He told Colley that as he was trying to escape from the backyard
after being shot, Tran was “telling him stuff”; that Tran was striking him in
the head with the barrel of the shotgun; and that once he was outside the
gate, Tran also struck him with the butt of the gun.
Colley and Detective Meals spoke with Veronica later that day. She
told them that she did not have her phone after giving it to her child at the
birthday party and that Tran woke her up and said he was aware of her
affair and wanted a divorce. The following day, Colley and Meals showed
Veronica a printout of the text conversation found on Collaco’s phone and she
said the last text she sent him was the one saying “ ‘Text me when you are
back and we will see.’ ”
Data extracted from Tran’s cell phone showed that at 12:17 a.m. he
searched on the internet for “red means dead safety,” then deleted the search.
Tran’s shotgun had a safety feature consisting of a button on the trigger
guard used to switch the weapon in or out of safe mode; the button displays a
red ring when ready to fire that is not visible when the gun is in safety mode.
“[R]ed means dead” is a term for taking off the safety so the gun will shoot
when the trigger is pulled.6 The extracted data showed that Tran called 911
at 12:46:34 a.m. The last outgoing message from Collaco’s phone was at
12:44:03 a.m.
5. Collaco’s Injuries
Collaco spent about two weeks in the hospital. When he first arrived,
his right leg “looked like spaghetti . . . a lot of blood and tissue”; the left was

6 The police detective who performed the cell phone forensic download
and testified as the People’s expert in this area testified that this search drew
his attention. He knew the meaning of the search from “having owned a
shotgun and having a shotgun in my patrol car every day.”

11
“similar,” but the right was worse. The injuries to his right leg required
emergency surgery; he had three surgeries on his right thigh and the leg was
immobilized for almost two weeks. He had significant pain in both legs for a
few months, and still experienced pain in both at the time of trial in
November 2021. He still had approximately 100 shotgun pellets in his right
thigh and about 20 to 30 in the left thigh, a long scar from the surgeries on
his right thigh and smaller scars from the shotgun pellets and scarring on his
left thigh. On his right leg, he still had numbness on the heel and parts of
the calf and thigh, he had pain in both knees when he stood too long, and the
right knee would sometimes get swollen. It was a year after the attack before
he could walk unassisted, and he still walked with a limp at times.
Lacerations on Collaco’s head required a total of 30 staples and he
received three to six stitches on his left eye socket. He had four chipped
teeth, which he did not have repaired due to the cost. At the time of trial,
Collaco had multiple permanent scars on his head, permanent tenderness on
his head that caused migraines, numbness above his right ear, and partial
numbness on the back of his head. He could not read for a few months after
the attack due to blurry vision and it remained difficult to read for a
prolonged time because the effort to focus would cause a headache or
migraine. He had migraines frequently, “almost every other day at times,”
had to wear dark sunglasses to prevent triggering migraines because his eyes
were very sensitive to light and had become sensitive to loud noises, none of
which had been the case before the attack. He also had permanent scarring
on his right shoulder, which still “click[ed]” and became “tight” at times;
permanent scarring and tenderness to the skin on his chest; and pellets in his
scrotum, which remained “[a] little sore.”

12
Prior to the attack, Collaco had been an avid runner, running five miles
a day and engaging in marathons, and played a lot of sports. Strenuous
activity now triggered migraines, and he could not run due to the amount of
muscle loss in his leg. He had not been able to return to work, his ability to
do household tasks had been affected and he sometimes had difficulty with
stairs. He was unable to drive for a few months because sitting was
uncomfortable and prolonged driving still caused numbness or discomfort.
The attack also left him sometimes feeling worried and “a little paranoid” in
public.
C. Defense
1. Tran’s Testimony
Tran testified that on the night of the shooting he was not trying to
murder Collaco, intending to disfigure or cause him extreme pain, or
planning to lure him to the house in order to get revenge for his texts with
Veronica. Tran was not mad at Collaco; he was mad and upset at Veronica,
but it never occurred to him to assault Collaco in order to get back at
Veronica. Tran testified that he regretted shooting Collaco and striking him
with the gun, did not know why he had done so, and had never done anything
like this before.
a. Tran’s Background
Tran was born in Vietnam and moved to San Francisco with his family
when he was three years old, living in the Tenderloin. His parents split up
when he was five, and he and his sister lived with their mother while his
brother went with their father. Starting when Tran was seven years old,
there were several periods when they were homeless, staying in shelters or
sleeping on church pews or on the street in front of stores. His mother had a
severe drinking problem, he did not have enough to eat and there was “a lot

13
of prostitution and drug dealers everywhere.” His grandfather beat him, his
mother and his sister. On multiple occasions when he was seven to ten years
old, his mother’s boyfriends physically and sexually abused her in Tran’s
presence. At age seven, Tran was sexually abused by a priest on about eight
occasions and he was sexually abused by a friend’s older brother for about a
year when he was nine.
Tran and his mother and sister moved to San Jose, where they lived in
an apartment that lacked water and electricity. His mother’s alcohol problem
was getting worse and his sister, at age 16 or 17, became pregnant and
“started partying” with their mother. They moved to Oakland when Tran
was around 13 and lived in an apartment above a Chinese restaurant, getting
electricity by running an extension cord from the laundry room downstairs
and using water the restaurant kept in buckets in the back.
Tran finished high school and was accepted at the University of
California, Berkeley, but when his family was again evicted, he moved with
his mother and his sister’s four children to Southern California. Tran helped
his mother take care of his nieces and nephews, got a couple of jobs and
started taking care of the bills and household responsibilities. While
continuing to work “[n]o less than three jobs,” he enrolled in a community
college and later transferred to Cal State Fullerton and graduated with a
degree in sociology.
Tran and the family, now including his father, moved to Vallejo in
2006. He married Veronica in 2009. His family responsibilities further
increased, as he had to take care of their household as well his parents and
nieces and nephews. While working three jobs, he continued his education in
social work and graduated in 2013. He purchased a home before his 30th
birthday, something he was very proud of. His professional responsibilities

14
increased, and between 2013 and March 2018 he worked no less than 70
hours a week, including working on weekends “[a]ll the time.” He also
continued to help his extended family. Tran felt constant pressure.
Tran thought his marriage was “fine” but “[t]here were things here and
there.” These included Veronica no longer sleeping in the same bed as him,
not wanting to go to functions with him and inhibiting him from seeing the
children by putting them to bed before he got home, even when he came home
at 5 or 6 p.m. He and Veronica continued to spend evenings together, shared
favorite shows and ate dinner together, but did not have sex as much as he
would have liked. He did not think his marriage was in danger.
Tran was unfaithful to Veronica “[o]n and off” throughout their
marriage with some 50 to 100 people, typically anonymous one-night stands.
Veronica found out in March or April 2018, when she found the app Tango on
his phone. He initially denied it, then eventually “fessed up.” Tran testified
that Veronica was “heart broken” and “destroyed”; she had often told him she
hated her father because he cheated on her mother, and “here I am doing the
same thing to her.”
Veronica kicked Tran out of the house briefly. When he returned a
week or so later, she was distant and angry and he was depressed. But he
still had hope for the marriage because Veronica sometimes acted as if
“everything was okay,” they still did routine things together, watched their
TV shows, talked about their days and had sex. In March and April 2018,
Tran was very depressed and wanted to end his life. He talked to his friend
Kevin every day and cut back on work to spend more time at home. In late
May, his mother was placed on life support and he had to make the decision
to take her off. Veronica was not supportive during this time. She told him
to move out the day his mother died, and he moved into his mother’s house

15
with his nephews, spending weekdays there and weekends at the house in
Antioch.
Tran still wanted to be married to Veronica. At the beginning of July
the family took a two-week trip to Portugal that had been planned a year in
advance. He was happy to have time with his sons and thought it would be a
good time to reconnect with Veronica, but that did not really happen. They
returned from the trip on July 19 and Tran stayed at the Antioch house.
b. The Events of July 22-23, 2018
Tran testified that on July 22, they “woke up . . . as a family” and went
to the movies, then did their “regular family routine.” He acknowledged that
he had a couple of shots of hard liquor before going to the movies that
morning. That afternoon, they went to a birthday party with families from
the children’s school.
After arriving at the party about 4:30 p.m., Tran and Veronica did not
spend much time together. Both were drinking alcohol, and Veronica was
smoking marijuana. They left the party around 10:00 p.m. Tran’s son had
had Veronica’s phone at the party and was holding it as Tran put him in the
car. Veronica had told him she was throwing up in the bathroom at the party
and she was helped to the car by friends. At home, Tran helped her to the
bathroom, then put the boys to bed. He took Veronica’s phone from his son’s
lap and put it in his pocket. While Veronica was in the bathroom, she asked
for her phone several times when Tran checked on her, but Tran did not give
it to her.
Tran put the phone on the charger in the bedroom and when he
plugged it in, a message appeared from “Nicholas” saying “Come over.” Tran
testified that he had never heard this name and wanted to know who the
person was and why he was texting Veronica to come over at this hour. He

16
later told the psychiatrist who evaluated him for the defense, “ ‘When my
marriage appeared to be dissolving and I read the texts of “Coming over” I
felt like everything I ever worked hard for went down the drain at that
moment.’ ”
Tran testified that he entered Veronica’s passcode and quickly texted
back “something to the effect of what or are you sure.” After one or two
exchanges, Nicholas texted a “half naked” picture of himself. Tran
acknowledged he was pretending to be Veronica; asked why he didn’t say
“this is her husband, what’s up?” Tran testified that the thought did not cross
his mind and said he did not think he would have gotten any information
that way. Tran was angry and upset at Veronica because “[s]he was raking
me over the coals for months now for cheating on her and here she is doing
the same thing to me.” Tran looked at the call and text history on Veronica’s
phone and did not find anything connected to Nicholas. He found a couple of
naked photographs of Veronica and sent them to Nicholas in his effort to
convince him that Tran was Veronica. While texting, Tran was pacing all
around the house. He took screen shots of the text conversation and sent
them to his phone and then to a friend because he knew he would end up
deleting the messages from Veronica’s phone and “wanted proof so [he] could
address Veronica with it.” His plan was to say, “Hey look, you are calling the
kettle black. Let’s resolve this. Let’s be a family.” He later testified that he
deleted some of the texts on Veronica’s phone after taking screen shots of
them, and deleted more after the shooting, because he did not want Veronica
to see them.
Tran testified that he gave Nicholas “quite a few reasons” for declining
Nicholas’s persistent invitations for Veronica to come to his house, told
Nicholas not to come to Veronica’s and tried to end the conversation. He was

17
then alarmed by the text in which Nicholas said he had been to the house 20
times and referred to being “faded,” because Nicholas was saying he had been
at the house 20 times, “around my kids,” “under the influence.” He told
Nicholas to come over because he wanted to meet him, not because he was
angry at him. With Nicholas on the way, Tran started to feel nervous, not
knowing what to expect. He had no plan, he was just “pacing around the
house not knowing what to do” and “crying a lot.” He tried to call Kevin but
got no answer. At some point, he helped Veronica get from the bathroom to
the downstairs family room, but he did not say anything to her about
Nicholas.
Tran got the shotgun he and Veronica had purchased in 2016 for home
protection, which was kept in the master bedroom closet. Tran had last held
the gun when he bought it and had never fired it. He undid the trigger lock
but had only a vague memory of how the safety worked. He remembered the
salesperson saying “ ‘Red means dead’ ” and looked this up, not to take the
safety off and shoot someone but to “make sure that it was safe so it wouldn’t
go off accidentally.” He acknowledged that he deleted this search from his
phone but denied doing so to keep the police from seeing it when they
arrived.
Tran grabbed a handful of birdshot shells from a dresser drawer, put
one in the gun and the others in his pocket, then went to the backyard and
placed the gun against the deck post.7 Tran did not plan to shoot Collaco,

7 Tran testified that when he purchased the gun and ammunition, he
was not told how many pellets were inside a birdshot shell or shown pictures
of people shot with birdshot. He and Veronica had said they wanted
ammunition that would “just spray and be non-lethal,” to stop an intruder so
they could call emergency services, and his understanding was that this is
what birdshot would do.

18
never thought about hurting him and had no reason to believe he would be
armed. Asked why he got the gun, Tran testified, “I didn’t know who this
person was.· He’s been over to my house.· He knows the layout.· He’s been
intoxicated before.· He’s coming over again.· I didn’t know what would
happen, so I just wanted to be safe.” Tran did not think about getting a knife
or bat, although there were a number of each in the house.
Tran was inside the house when he got the text saying Collaco had
arrived. He went to the backyard and texted Collaco to come there. He
heard the sound of the gate open and shut and saw Collaco come around the
corner from the side yard into the backyard. Tran picked up the gun and
shot Collaco one time, aiming at his right leg. He did not know why he did
this; he testified, “It just all happened. There was not really a decision-
making point.” As Collaco staggered back, Tran went toward him and
started hitting him with the butt and barrel of the gun. Again, he did not
know why; he “really wasn’t thinking.” Collaco back-pedaled and made it to
the gate, where he fell down. On cross examination, shown pictures of the
scene, Tran acknowledged that there was no blood in the place where he said
he shot Collaco or in the alleyway where he said Collaco backpedaled toward
the gate, and that there was a pool of blood just inside the gate, where
Collaco said he was shot.
Tran denied ever saying, “ ‘You think you can fuck with my wife,’ ”
kicking the gate shut or continuing to hit Collaco in the head as he tried to
crawl out of the yard. He thought he only hit Collaco a couple of times but
saw from the evidence that it was more than that. He remembered Collaco
saying, “ ‘Don’t kill me. I have a daughter’ ” and did not strike him after that.
The gate broke as Collaco was going out. Tran did not pursue him. He
testified, “I guess I just snapped out of it and there was no need to.”

19
Tran put the gun on the air conditioning unit, went inside and
confronted Veronica, saying he knew she had been cheating and he wanted a
divorce. He then went outside and called 911. The recorded call was played
at trial. Tran told the dispatcher a burglar had tried to break into his
backyard and house, he had the man “sitting on the floor,” his neighbors were
there, he did not know the man, he had shot the man in the leg, and the gun
was now in the backyard.8 He lied because he was scared, knew he was in
trouble and did not want to get into more trouble. This was not something he
had planned, it was “just in that moment.”
While calling 911, Tran heard Collaco say something like “Get my
phone.” Tran went to his backyard, found Collaco’s phone and threw it into
someone else’s backyard. He did not remember why; he just “didn’t want him
to have his phone.” Tran saw Collaco by the curb in the street and saw his
neighbor, Mr. Cunningham. He approached them but did not try to kick
Collaco. Cunningham got between Tran and Collaco and pushed Tran back,
and Tran lied to Cunningham, saying Collaco had tried to rob his house.
The police arrived shortly after Tran called 911. Tran acknowledged
that he was calmer at this point and that he continued to lie. His recorded
conversation with the first officer who arrived, Officer Davis, was played at
trial. Tran acknowledged that he told the officer he did not know what type
of ammunition he put in the gun, testifying that he “didn’t want to appear to
be . . . a gun guy.” He admitted that he falsely told the officer he thought
Collaco was going to attack him and his family, Collaco swung at him, and
Collaco had a weapon, and that he continued to lie when he was interviewed

8 When the recording was first played, the jury was instructed that
Tran’s statements were not admissible for their truth, only for how they
might bear on his state of mind. Subsequently, the recording was played
during cross examination and admitted for its truth.

20
at the police department a few hours after the shooting and in a third
interview the following day.
2. Expert Testimony
Dr. Mikel Matto testified as an expert in psychiatry and addiction
medicine, with a specialty in trauma related disorders.9 Retained by the
defense to evaluate Tran, he interviewed Tran, reviewed materials related to
this case and administered psychological tests designed to determine whether
a person is malingering—intentionally feigning symptoms for secondary gain
such as avoiding consequences for criminal activity. Dr. Matto determined
that Tran was not malingering. He diagnosed Tran with “other specified
trauma and stressor related disorder” (trauma related disorder), which he
explained was a generalized diagnosis; he ruled out post traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), which is one type of disorder under the umbrella of the more
general diagnosis, because Tran did not have all of the symptoms required by
the specific diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Dr. Matto also diagnosed Tran with
major depressive disorder and alcohol use disorder.
Dr. Matto opined that Tran suffered from trauma related disorder on
July 23, 2018. Individuals with trauma related disorders often have an
exaggerated response to stressors, especially ones related to the trauma.
This can include a more intense form of the “instinctual” fight or flight
reaction that all people share, as well as a lower threshold to trigger the

9 Dr. Matto is an assistant professor of psychiatry at the University of
California, San Francisco, medical school and site director for the Forensic
Fellowship Training Program at the San Francisco “VA” (Veteran Affairs
Medical Center), where he is also the medical director of a drop-in clinic for
veterans seeking care for mental health issues. He also has a part-time
forensic psychiatry practice and, as a major in the California Army National
Guard, is the psychiatrist for the 40th Infantry Division. He had conducted
trainings on the subject of trauma for both defense attorneys and prosecutors.

21
reaction. These episodes typically do not last long: The adrenal response,
including faster heartbeat, sweating, dilation of pupils and possibly tunnel
vision, lasts as long as the threat is present, but physiologically it cannot
“last forever.” The body “comes down” once the threat is removed (in the
perception of the person experiencing the reaction), but there is a lag before
the person is no longer “revved up.” A person would not have periods of
“normal behavior” while in the midst of a fight or flight response.10
Dr. Matto explained that childhood trauma can affect brain
development and have a “huge” impact throughout life, and neglect can have
as profound an effect as physical abuse. He testified that the childhood
trauma Tran described was “very much related to relationships in the way
he’s experienced some of these in his feelings of lack of self-worth, in his fears
of abandonment.”11 This would make a stressor related to relationships or
abandonment significant in terms of decreasing the threshold for “reaching

10 Dr. Matto’s report stated that Tran “described a reaction with a
dissociative-like state found in individuals with trauma-related disorders in
which he described being ‘in a fog’ until he ‘snapped out of it’ after the
perceived threat was eliminated by the shooting.” At trial, although Dr.
Matto was questioned about what a dissociative state is, he was not asked,
and did not testify, whether Tran was experiencing such a state at the time of
the offenses. He did testify that dissociative states can last “as little as
seconds” and “don’t last more than hours,” and that it would be “very
unusual” for one to last three hours.
11 Dr. Matto testified, “So in Mr. Tran’s case, from my review of the
materials and discussions with him, having these profound sexual assaults,
one lasting, I believe, a year when he was nine, one lasting—shorter interval
when he was six, that plus the physical abuse from his grandfather, the
witness abuse of his mother and his sister, the horrible neglect growing up in
terms of him having very high responsibility in an erratic household, being
around crack in the home, losing electricity, periods of homelessness, all of
these forms of trauma growing early on, left him very susceptible particularly
with relation to relationships.”

22
fight or flight.”12 In the midst of the fight or flight response, an individual
can react to the stressor in ways they would not otherwise intend, such as
reacting as if in a life or death moment to a situation that is not life or
death.13
3. Additional Witnesses
Another of Tran’s neighbors, Michael Cunningham, was awakened by a
noise and heard what sounded like someone moaning. “Five or eight”
minutes later, he went outside and saw a person sitting in the street with his
hands behind him and his right leg extended. No one else was outside.
Cunningham then saw Tran coming toward him. Tran was “seriously upset”
and “kicked at” the person on the ground, and Cunningham got between
them and pushed Tran back. The man on the ground looked like “somebody
roughed him up a little bit.” Cunningham never saw Tran with a shotgun.
Jennifer Khaw worked with Tran for about four and a half years at a
social and mental health services agency and they became friends. Based on
their work together and friendship, Khaw opined that Tran is a “peaceful and
nonviolent person” who could make rational decisions in the heat of the
moment and remain calm in high-stress situations. She testified that Tran
had been able to work with a client who was often physically or verbally

12 Dr. Matto stated in his report that Tran’s trauma related disorder
produced an exaggerated emotional response to “the perceived loss of one of
his few remaining close relationships.”
13 Dr. Matto was not able to determine whether Tran was experiencing
a major depressive episode on July 23 because “so much was going on” that it
was difficult to say whether he was having a depressive episode or “it was the
events that were happening that made him feel bad.” A person with major
depressive disorder has it all the time, but episodes come and go. Alcohol use
disorder is also a chronic condition, but Dr. Matto could not determine
whether Tran’s alcohol consumption at the time was sufficient for acute
alcohol intoxication.

23
aggressive and other social workers had not been able to serve, and she
described several examples of situations in which Tran had been able to de-
escalate potentially dangerous situations. She never saw Tran lose his
temper or have an angry outburst at work and he did not get upset easily.
Knowing what happened on July 23 did not change Khaw’s opinion of Tran’s
character because she believed he was “in a severely traumatized state to do
those things.”
II.
Procedural Background
An amended information filed on August 6, 2019, charged Tran with
attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 664/187,
subd. (a))14 (count 1); aggravated mayhem (§ 205) (count 2); torture (§ 206)
(count 3); and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (count 4). Counts 1,
2 and 3 each alleged an enhancement for personally and intentionally
discharging a firearm, causing great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)
Count 4 alleged an enhancement for personal use of a firearm. (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a).)15 Tran pleaded not guilty and denied the enhancement allegation.
After a jury trial, the jury found Tran guilty on all counts and found the
enhancement allegations true. On May 15, 2022, the trial court sentenced
Tran to seven years to life on count 1, the sentence required by law (§§ 664,
subd. (a), 3046, subd. (a)(1)), plus 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court stayed the same sentence on
counts 2 and 3 (§§ 205, 206.1) pursuant to section 654, as well as middle

14 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
15 Counts 1, 2 and 4 also alleged enhancements rendering Tran
ineligible for probation due to personal use of a firearm (§ 1203.06,
subd. (a)(1)).

24
terms of three years for the assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and four years for the
enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) on count four.
Tran filed a timely notice of appeal on May 18, 2022.
DISCUSSION
Tran asked the trial court to exercise its discretion under section 654 to
impose a determinate sentence by selecting count 4 (assault with a firearm)
as the principal term and staying punishment on the remaining counts,
which carried life terms. Alternatively, if the court imposed a life term, Tran
urged it not to impose punishment on the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement in the interests of justice, pursuant to the amended
section 1385. The trial court denied both requests. This appeal challenges
only the court’s decision not to dismiss the enhancement or reduce it to a
lower term. Tran argues that one of the mitigating circumstances described
in section 1385 required the trial court to dismiss the enhancement and that
the trial court abused its discretion with respect to two other mitigating
circumstances by misapplying the statutory standards.
I.
Section 1385, Subdivision (c)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature added subdivision (c) to
section 1385. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Subdivision (c)(1) of the amended
statute requires the court to dismiss an enhancement “if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so” and subdivision (c)(2) “specif[ies] mitigating
circumstances that the trial court should consider when deciding whether to
strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.”
(People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 16 (Lipscomb).)
Subdivision (c)(2) provides, “In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence

25
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. “Endanger public safety” means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.”
Three of the mitigating circumstances are relevant here: “The
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)), “[t]he current offense is connected to mental illness”
(id., subd. (c)(2)(D), and “[t]he current offense is connected to prior
victimization or childhood trauma” (id., subd. (c)(2)(E)).
II.
Additional Background
Tran’s sentencing memorandum emphasized his difficult life history,
struggles to overcome it and successful career in social work; the alcohol use
and mental health issues he was contending with at the time of the offense;
remorse for the harms he caused; and model behavior while incarcerated. He
presented the sentencing question as, “ ‘Considering Mr. Tran’s lifetime of
service to others and law-abiding behavior, what does a punishment look like
that is proportionate to the harm he caused?’ ” Tran argued that while he
committed violent crimes, he did so in an unusual circumstance unlikely to
recur, his life history showed he was not a violent person, and an
indeterminate sentence was not needed to protect society.
The sentencing memorandum attached Dr. Matto’s report; a video of
Tran discussing the incident; numerous letters from friends and colleagues
attesting in glowing terms to his character, ability to help others, devotion to

26
family and friends, and positive contributions to his community;16 and a
defense investigator’s reports detailing interviews with eight sheriff’s
deputies, as well as a letter from a sheriff’s lieutenant, detailing Tran’s
consistent exemplary behavior in custody, work ethic, trustworthiness,
reliability and caring for others. The deputies viewed Tran as exceptional
among inmates, commented on his acceptance of responsibility for his
offenses and avoidance of potentially volatile situations, and expressed
complete confidence that he would not be a repeat offender.17

16 For example, an attorney who had worked with Tran stated that he
“has an extraordinary ability to give of himself to other in need” and “stands
out” among the social workers and case managers she had worked with over
the past 25 years. A social worker described him as “a reliable colleague who
consistently stood up for marginalized people and demonstrated repeatedly
that he was an asset to our community in which he served”; another
described him as exhibiting “nothing short of the highest levels of
compassion, commitment, and ethics” and “levels of zeal for the underserved
communities we served [that] were quite unparalleled.” A past co-worker
stated that “[a]nyone knowing Tech could not deny his desire, passion and
dedication to serving his community” and believed a “life sentence would be a
travesty for not only Tech’s family and friends, but to the entire community
that benefits from his work.” A long-time friend had “seen him pour his
sweat and soul to provide for his family” and described him as “smart,
dedicated, honest, and loyal.” A common theme of these letters was that it
would be a loss for the community if Tran received a life sentence and that he
would have a strong support network when released.
17 The deputies’ statements were striking for their detailed examples of
interactions with Tran and observations of his conduct in jail, and included
such comments as an officer saying that he would “ ‘do anything’ ” for Tran,
that Tran was “ ‘the only one I’d spoken up for’ ” in his 11 years on the job,
that Tran is the “ ‘only person in custody I’d ever go out on a limb for,’ ” and
that Tran is “ ‘a benefit to society’ ” and the deputy would welcome Tran as a
neighbor and have no qualms about Tran being around his family. The
officers had had considerable opportunity to become familiar with Tran, as he
had been in pretrial custody for over three years by the time they gave their
statements in early 2022.

27
The People sought a sentence of 32 years to life on count 1. The
People’s sentencing brief described Tran as having committed “vicious,
callous and cruel” acts in luring Collaco to his house with carefully planned
texts posing as Veronica, lying in wait and attempting to kill him. The
People maintained that Tran’s “cold, calculated and sophisticated” conduct
and willingness to take a stranger’s life out of jealousy demonstrated such
disregard for human life that he presented an extreme danger to society. The
People also noted that the only evidence Tran had suffered trauma came from
Tran, without corroboration; Tran lied to the 911 dispatcher, the neighbors,
the police and on the witness stand at trial; and the jury’s verdict showed it
did not find credible or compelling the evidence that the offenses were
connected to trauma or mental illness.18
At the sentencing hearing, the People argued that “anything less than
a life sentence would be wholly inappropriate on the facts and would be
disregarding the verdict of the jury in its entirety.” Defense counsel argued
the factors in mitigation were “overwhelming.” The court expressly
acknowledged that it had discretion to impose the determinate term Tran
requested and, if it imposed an indeterminate term, to dismiss the

18 The probation report did not address the question of dismissing the
enhancement under section 1385 or the length of Tran’s sentence, simply
recommending that he receive a prison sentence. The report noted that Tran
was “widely respected in his social services field” and “admired and well liked
in the community,” but stated that his “comportment in his professional life
is in stark contrast to the incredibly cruel and premeditated attempt to take
another person’s life.” Tran’s demonstrated capacity for violence made him a
“possible threat to community safety” and, “while there is an overwhelming
amount of supportive evidence of [his] positive community impact through his
work[,] the heinous nature of the offense is of such magnitude that a
commitment to the California Department of Corrections is the only suitable
sentencing option.”

28
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement altogether or to dismiss that
enhancement and impose a lesser included one. The court explained the
reasoning for its sentencing decisions at great length. While many of its
remarks were directed to Tran’s request for a determinate sentence, they
were also relevant to its decision not to impose the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement.
The court discussed the constraints on its discretion imposed by the
amendments to section 1385, including the requirement to give great weight
to any applicable mitigating circumstances set forth in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) and what it described as the legislative preference for
dismissal of enhancements. The court recognized that it had to overcome the
legislative preference in the present case due to the application of
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C)—the enhancement would result in a
sentence of more than 20 years. It found the other two circumstances Tran
relied on—section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(D) (mental illness) and (c)(2)(E)
(childhood trauma) did not apply because the crimes were committed with a
degree of premeditation and deliberation that was contrary to the defense
theory (based on Dr. Matto’s testimony) that Tran acted with an exaggerated
fight or flight response due to his traumatic stress disorder.
The court also discussed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
set forth in California Rules of Court, rules 4.421 and 4.423, finding the
aggravating circumstances “heavily outweighed” the mitigating ones. The
trial court cited Tran’s minimal prior record as a mitigating factor,19 stated
that it had considered his many “great” character references and

19The only prior offenses listed in the probation report were two
misdemeanor counts of driving under the influence committed in June 2006
and September 2007, the second committed while on probation for the first.
Grants of probation in both cases had “lapsed routinely.”

29
acknowledged that the police officers’ vouching for Tran’s character and
conduct in jail was “an extraordinarily unusual thing.” The court found
Tran’s expression of remorse at the sentencing hearing was genuine, but this
mitigating factor had to be balanced against the aggravating circumstances
that until he was found guilty, he attempted to evade responsibility and
showed no remorse. The court stated, “His expressions today of a full
acknowledgment of responsibility are quite different than his expressions
under oath to the jury when it was up in the air about whether he would be
held accountable or not at all for these offenses.”20 The court emphasized the
degree of injury inflicted upon Collaco, which it found “well above” the
minimum necessary to prove great bodily injury, and the cruelness of the
crime and vulnerability of the victim shown by Tran summoning Collaco to
“an enclosed space,” a “darkened area with no protection” or “backup,” by
means of the “fraudulent ruse” of posing as Veronica “over hours of time.”
III.
The Trial Court Was Not Required to Strike or Reduce the
Section 12022.53 Enhancement.
Tran contends that section 1385, subdivision (c)(1)(C) required the trial
court to strike or reduce the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement
because it resulted in a sentence of over 20 years. He maintains the trial
court erred in failing to follow this requirement and asks us to strike or
reduce the enhancement.

20 The court viewed Tran as continuing his attempt to evade
responsibility for the offenses at trial by testifying that he did not know why
he posed as Veronica or summoned Collaco to the house, testimony the jury
necessarily found false by “emphatically reject[ing]” it in finding Tran acted
with premeditation and deliberation. Similarly, the court stated that Tran
was not remorseful at trial “when he denied responsibility and claimed that
he didn’t know why he was doing what he was doing.”

30
“ ‘The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review
de novo.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental
task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and
commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in
the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its
scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If
the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a
literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did
not intend.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215,
227-228 (Gonzalez).) “ ‘ “If, however, the language supports more than one
reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the
ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] ‘In such circumstances, we “ ‘select the construction that comports
most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to
promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and
avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’
[Citation.]” ’ [Citations.]” (Lipscomb, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 18.)
Subparagraph (C) of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides, “The
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In
this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.” (Italics added.) Of the
nine circumstances listed in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(A)–(I), only one
other includes the language italicized above. That provision states, “Multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(B).)

31
Tran argues that the italicized language is mandatory and required the
trial court to dismiss the section 12022.53 enhancement (or reduce it to a
lesser term).21 He acknowledges that “many” courts—ours among them—
have concluded that this language, when read in the context of the statute as
a whole and its legislative history, does not deprive the court of discretion.
(Lipscomb, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 17 [rejecting argument that
mandatory language of provision requires dismissal of enhancement
“notwithstanding the court’s discretion and even if the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety”]; accord, People
v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 444 (Mazur), review granted Feb. 14,
2024, S283229, review dism. Oct. 23, 2024; People v. Cota (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 318, 335 [construing § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)]; People v.
Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1284; People v. Anderson (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 233, 241, review granted April 19, 2023, S278786, review
dism. Oct. 23, 2024; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 291
(Mendoza); People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1098, review granted
April 12, 2023, S278894, review dism. Oct. 23, 2024; People v. Walker (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 386, 396 [§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), affirmed but criticized on
another point in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032-1033
(Walker)].) We are aware of no published case to the contrary.
As we said in Lipscomb, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at page 18, and our
sister courts have recognized, although section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C)
contains what on its face might appear to be a mandatory directive—“[i]n this

21 A trial court is permitted to “strike the
section 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) enhancement found true by the jury and to
impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement [under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b) or (c)] instead.” (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 692.)

32
instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed”—“we cannot read this
sentence in isolation. [Citations.] Instead, we must consider the statute as a
whole, in particular its characterization of the fact that the enhancement
could produce a sentence over 20 years as a ‘mitigating circumstance’ for the
court to consider in the exercise of its ‘discretion’ to strike the enhancement—
consideration which, as noted, does not apply at all where the court finds that
striking the enhancement would endanger public safety.” We noted that this
interpretation did not make the language at issue surplusage, since “[a]bsent
a finding that dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety, the
language could require the trial court to dismiss the enhancement where it
finds that doing so would be ‘in the furtherance of justice’ under
[section 1385,] subdivision (c)(1) . . . .” (Lipscomb, at p. 18.)22 Our review of
the legislative history confirmed the Legislature’s intent that trial courts
“retain the ability to impose an enhancement where failure to do so would
endanger public safety.” (Id. at pp. 18-20.) And we declined to adopt an
interpretation of the statute that would lead to the absurd result of requiring
dismissal of enhancements such as the one in the present case,
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), “in every case in which it is charged . . .
including where, as here, the trial court made an express finding that failing
to [impose it] would endanger public safety.” (Lipscomb, at p. 20.)
Subsequently, Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pages 445-446, held
that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not require dismissal even when
the trial court has not found dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety if the court has found dismissal would not be in furtherance of

22We expressed no opinion on this question because it was not
presented in the case. (Lipscomb, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 18.)

33
justice.23 Mazur explained that under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
“absent a finding that dismissal ‘would endanger public safety,’ the presence
of any ‘one or more’ of the listed mitigating circumstances ‘weighs greatly’ in
favor of dismissal. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Conversely, if the court finds that
dismissal would endanger public safety, then it need not give great weight to
the presence of any mitigating circumstance. In either case, however, the

23 The California Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion
as to the mitigating circumstances listed in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
generally, although the court did not address the “shall be dismissed”
language of subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(C). (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1029.) The court concluded that under the “plain language of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2),” “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public
safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements
provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating
circumstances when they are present. (See [People v.] Ortiz, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.) In other words, if the court does not find that
dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated
mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence
of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great
weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the
enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ (Ibid.)” (Walker, at p. 1029.)
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s holding that
the statutory “ ‘mandate to “afford great weight” to mitigating circumstances
erects a rebuttable presumption that obligates a court to dismiss the
enhancement unless the court finds that dismissal of that
enhancement . . . would endanger public safety.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1028, quoting People v. Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 391.) It
nevertheless affirmed the judgment in Walker because, since “the Court of
Appeal upheld the trial court’s refusal to dismiss defendant’s prior serious
felony enhancement under a presumption in favor of dismissal that could
only be overcome by a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety,
defendant fails to persuade he is entitled to any relief under our less
restrictive understanding of a trial court’s authority pursuant to section
1385, subdivision (c)(2).” (Walker, at p. 1038.)

34
court must apply the controlling ‘furtherance of justice’ standard. (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1).) By Mazur’s reasoning, we would have to construe the phrase
‘weighs greatly’ to mean ‘weigh[s] dispositively’ for the two mitigating
circumstances listed in subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(C), but not for the
other seven mitigating circumstances. ([People v.] Walker, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 397.) ‘But that is not what the statute says, and we are
not allowed to rewrite the statute.’ (Ibid.)” (Mazur, at pp. 445-446.)
Mazur concluded this interpretation did not render the “shall be
dismissed” language meaningless: “In the case of multiple enhancements
alleged in a single case, the statute specifies that if the trial court finds
dismissal is in furtherance of justice, then ‘all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) This language
clarifies that the trial court must leave one and only one enhancement in
place if it exercises its discretion to dismiss under this provision. And for any
enhancement that could result in a sentence over 20 years, the statute states
that ‘the enhancement shall be dismissed.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).) This
language clarifies that the court must dismiss the charged enhancement if it
exercises its discretion to do so, and it cannot simply strike the punishment
or the portion of the punishment that would result in a sentence over
20 years.” (Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 446-447.)
Attempting to convince us to adopt a different interpretation
notwithstanding the thus-far unbroken line of cases confirming that the
“shall be imposed” language in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) and
(c)(2)(C) is not mandatory, Tran raises several points that he believes the
decided cases do not refute. For example, Tran takes issue with courts’
reasoning that a literal reading of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), would
constitute an implied repeal of enhancements such as section 12022.53,

35
subdivisions (c) and (d), which would always have to be dismissed because
they necessarily add 20 years or more to a sentence. (E.g., People v. Renteria,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287; Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 296-
297; Lipscomb, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 20-21.) Tran asserts that the
Legislature “meant what it said” by using mandatory language in
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) and suggests its directive can be
harmonized with the enhancement statutes by interpreting
subdivision (c)(2)(C) as allowing imposition of an enhancement of more than
20 years if the sentence for the crime is itself over 20 years. Under Tran’s
interpretation, the enhancement here could be imposed, for example, where
the defendant is sentenced for a crime carrying a sentence of 25 years to life
(e.g., § 190, subd. (a) [first degree murder]; § 288.7, subd. (a) [specified sex
offense with child under age 10]), sentenced in a third strike case (§ 667,
subd. (e)(2) or sentenced on multiple counts to consecutive terms totaling
20 years or more.
Although Tran’s interpretation allows for the trial court’s exercise of
discretion in cases involving sentences of more than 20 years independent of
the enhancement, it eliminates discretion to impose an enhancement where
the crime carries a lesser sentence, even if the trial court finds that dismissal
of the enhancement would endanger public safety or would not further the
interests of justice. For the reasons we and other courts have discussed, we
decline to adopt this construction. “ ‘As the plain text of section 1385
repeatedly emphasizes, its purpose is to grant trial court discretion to dismiss
enhancements. And the purpose of Senate Bill No. 81 [(2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.)], as reflected in the Legislative Digest, is to encourage exercise of that
discretion by making dismissal mandatory if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so.’ ([People v.] Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 397 . . . (second

36
italics added); see Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 81, Stats. 2021, ch. 721
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).) ‘In other words, the dismissal of the enhancement is
conditioned on the court’s finding dismissal is in the interest of justice.’
(Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 239.)” (Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 446.)
Here, the trial court found that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety and would not further the interests of justice.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) did not require the court to dismiss the
enhancement despite these findings.
IV.
Dismissal of the Section 12022.53, Subdivision (d) Enhancement
Based on Evidence of Mental Illness and Childhood Trauma
Tran contends the trial court misconstrued the requirement to give
great weight to evidence of mental illness and childhood trauma in
determining whether to dismiss an enhancement. He argues the court
misunderstood the statutory definition of “connected to,” which in his view
means these mitigating circumstances applied as long as they played even a
minor role in his commission of the offense, and abused its discretion in
finding they did not play at least a minor role. He further challenges the
court’s reasoning for what he sees as contradictions between the court’s
conclusion that his mental disorder and childhood trauma were not connected
to the offense and its stated reasoning for declining to dismiss the section
12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement.
We review a trial court’s decision not to strike sentence enhancements
under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at p. 225; Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “The abuse of
discretion standard is highly deferential. When, ‘ “as here, a discretionary
power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion

37
‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Mendoza, at
p. 298.) “ ‘[A]n abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision
on impermissible factors . . . or on an incorrect legal standard.’ [Citations.]”
(Gonzalez, at p. 225.)
A. The Statutory Meaning of “Connected to the Offense”
Under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), proof that the current offense “is
connected to mental illness” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)) or “is connected to prior
victimization or childhood trauma” (id., subd. (c)(2)(E)) “weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(5) and (c)(6), provide further guidance on
application of these factors. Subdivision (c)(5) defines “mental illness” and
provides that a court “may conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was
connected to the offense” if, after reviewing the evidence, “the court concludes
that the defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the
defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.”24 Section 1385,

24 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(5), provides in full: “For the purposes
of subparagraph (D) of paragraph (2), a mental illness is a mental disorder as
identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, including, but not limited to, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder but
excluding antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and
pedophilia. A court may conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was
connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible
evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing
transcripts, witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health
treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by qualified medical
experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with

38
subdivision (c)(2)(6) similarly provides that the court may conclude a
defendant’s childhood trauma or prior victimization “was connected to the
offense” if it finds the childhood trauma or prior victimization “substantially
contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.”
“ ‘Childhood trauma’ means that as a minor the person experienced physical,
emotional, or sexual abuse, physical or emotional neglect.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(6)(A).) “ ‘Prior victimization’ means the person was a victim of
intimate partner violence, sexual violence, or human trafficking, or the
person has experienced psychological or physical trauma, including, but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(6)(B).)25

the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense, the court
concludes that the defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the
defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.”
25 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(6), provides in full:
“For the purposes of this subdivision, the following terms have the
following meanings:
“(A) ‘Childhood trauma’ means that as a minor the person experienced
physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, physical or emotional neglect. A court
may conclude that a defendant’s childhood trauma was connected to the
offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but
not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness
statements, medical records, or records or reports by qualified medical
experts, the court concludes that the defendant’s childhood trauma
substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of
the offense.
“(B) ‘Prior victimization’ means the person was a victim of intimate
partner violence, sexual violence, or human trafficking, or the person has
experienced psychological or physical trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. A court may conclude that a
defendant’s prior victimization was connected to the offense if, after
reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to,

39
Section 1385 does not define the phrase “substantially contributed to”
used in subdivision (c) to define whether a circumstance is “connected to” the
offense. Tran argues the phrase should be understood as referring to the
“ ‘substantial factor’ test of causation” used in both criminal and civil cases.
(E.g., In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 716; People v. Caldwell (1984)
36 Cal.3d 210, 220; Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953,
968.) “ ‘ “The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring
only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or
theoretical.” [Citation.] Thus, “a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal’ or
‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial
factor” [citation], but a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial
factor [citation].’ ” (South Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 298, quoting Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999)
21 Cal.4th 71, 79.)
The Legislature did not use “substantial factor” to describe the
connection required for application of the mitigating circumstances described
in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(D) and (c)(2)(E); it used the phrase
“substantially contributed to.” In common usage, the terms “substantially”
and “substantial” indicate something more than a non-theoretical or “minor”
force. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “substantially” as “[f]ully,
amply; to a great extent or degree; considerably, significantly, much.”
(<https://www.oed.com/search/advanced/Meanings?textTermText0=substanti
ally&textTermOpt0=WordPhrase> [as of Nov. 7, 2024].) Dictionary

police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, medical
records, or records or reports by qualified medical experts, the court
concludes that the defendant’s prior victimization substantially contributed
to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.”

40
definitions of “substantial” include “[o]f ample or considerable amount or size;
sizeable” (Oxford English Dict.
<https://www.oed.com/search/advanced/Meanings?textTermText0=substantia
l&textTermOpt0=WordPhrase> [as of Nov. 7, 2024]) and “considerable in
amount, value, or worth” (Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged
<https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/substantial> [as of
Nov. 7, 2024].) Tran points to no authority for his assumption that the
Legislature intended “substantially contributed to” to have the meaning of
the legal term of art “substantial factor” rather than the meaning the words
would normally convey. Nor does he suggest why, if that was the
Legislature’s intent, it did not simply use “substantial factor” in the statutory
definition of “connected to.” “ ‘ “[W]hen the Legislature uses a term of art, a
court construing that use must assume that the Legislature was aware of the
ramifications of its choice of language.” ’ ” (People v. Gonzales (2017)
2 Cal.5th 858, 871.) Conversely, we may assume that, if the Legislature
intends a statute to have the meaning and effect of a legal term of art, it will
use that term of art in the text of the statute.
As a leading treatise explains, the Legislature likely intended the term
to impose a fairly demanding standard. (Couzens, et al., Sentencing
California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2023) § 12:11.) “The use of the phrase
‘substantially contributed’ is unclear. Likely it is the intent of the
Legislature that the factor plays some significant role in the commission of
the crime or the defendant’s involvement. In other circumstances, the
Legislature used the phrase ‘a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense.’ (See, e.g., § 1170, subd. (b)(6) [Factor affecting imposition of the low
term of imprisonment].) While ‘contributing factor’ suggests the court must
find the factor to have some connection, however slight, [to] the commission

41
or circumstances of the crime, the phrase ‘substantially contributed’ clearly
implies a factor more significant in weight from that of ‘contributing factor.’ ”
(Id., F. (4), (5).) As Couzens notes, the same Legislature enacted both the
amendment adding the “substantially contributed” test to section 1385 and
the amendment adding the “contributing factor” test to section 1170. (Ibid.)
That circumstance strengthens the inference that it intended “substantially
contributed” to mean something more than “contributing factor.” (Ibid.)
In short, we are not persuaded that the Legislature intended the
phrase “substantially contributed” in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(D) and
(c)(2)(E), to impose the “substantial factor” standard.
B. The Trial Court’s Exercise of Discretion
As the court described the defense theory, based on Dr. Matto’s
testimony, “because of his PTSD, because of his personal life experiences, and
this unspecified diagnosis of mental illness or disorder,” when presented with
“certain life triggers,” Tran’s fight or flight impulse “would occur faster than
someone who hadn’t suffered from the PTSD, hadn’t been inflicted with the
same life trauma, and that his reaction would not only be faster but it would
be more intense.”26 The trial court concluded the statutory mitigating
circumstances relating to mental illness and childhood trauma were
inapplicable because the jury’s findings of premeditation, deliberation and
intent to kill, torture and commit aggravated mayhem showed it rejected the
defense theory and the trial court found the theory incompatible with the
overwhelming evidence of deliberation and premeditation.

26 As described earlier, Dr. Matto testified that Tran did not meet the
diagnostic criteria for PTSD but instead suffered from “other specified
trauma and stressor related disorder.” We assume the trial court’s reference
to “PTSD” was, in effect, a shorthand for Tran’s trauma related disorder.

42
The court described at length the evidence showing that Tran “didn’t
act in the spur of the moment, but acted with extraordinary amounts of
deliberation and planning both before and after and during this crime.”27
After detailing the evidence, the court continued, “This is all premeditated,
deliberative behavior.·. . . [T]his action was not an exaggerated response in
the heat of the moment or a quickened fight or flight response—fight or flight
response to an immediate trigger. [¶] He saw these things on the cell phone

27 Elaborating on this point, the court stated that the evidence showed
“[t]hat he, himself, texted Mr. Collaco and acted repeatedly for hours under a
ruse that he was Ms. Tran, not himself.· That when Mr. Collaco began to
doubt that it was Ms. Tran on the other end of the call or the text that Mr.
Tran was able to dissuade him of that by texting nude photographs or sexy
photographs, intimate photographs of Ms. Tran to Mr. Collaco to convince
him that it was still Ms. Tran on the other end of that phone.· This happened
over a period of hours.· Mr. Tran invited him over.· Mr. Tran was given
constant opportunities to back off his plan to harm or to meet with Mr.
Collaco.· He turned down every one. . . .
“Mr. Tran loaded a gun.· He had extra shells in his pocket.· He was
able to turn off any lights that were there. He knew that his wife was asleep
or otherwise incapacitated by intoxicating alcohol.· He immediately shot Mr.
Collaco as soon as he opened that gate.· He ran up.· He pushed the door shut
so he wouldn’t escape.· And he repeatedly, at one point there were estimates
by Mr. Collaco that he lost count, estimates of several dozen blows to the
head by Mr. Tran.·. . . [I]t was sufficient blows to the head to cause 31 staples
and continuing ongoing great bodily injury to this day . . . .
“After this was committed and only with full intent to torture and to
commit aggravated mayhem, and to kill in premeditating fashion . . . it was
only interrupted and intervened by Mr. Collaco being able to get out of the
closed gate, and by virtue of the neighbor coming over and stopping Mr. Tran
from approaching Mr. Collaco and finishing the job, for lack of a better
word. . . .
“But there was premeditation even after this crime. There was the
tossing of the cell phone, of Mr. Collaco’s cell phone over the fence hoping to
dispose of it, and . . . there’s the deleting of the text messages on his wife’s
phone, which he kept on his pocket.· There’s the calling and reporting of this
as an intruder break-in.”

43
and that was [the] point where he could be triggered and angry.· He chose
then to invite Mr. Collaco over through this elaborate ruse which
demonstrates great planning and not someone who’s acting under the
influence of some PTSD or under the influence of poor judgment in the heat
of the moment. [¶] He had choices for hours to back off, and he didn’t. And
that is the product of choice, not PTSD, and not some unspecified mental
health disorder.
The court applied the same analysis in finding the offense was not
connected to childhood trauma. In addition, the court noted and agreed with
the prosecutor’s argument at trial that Collaco was “not connected to” or
“responsible for” Tran’s childhood trauma and stated, “[t]his was adult
trauma related to his failing marriage,” which “was failing in large part due
to Mr. Tran’s own actions and infidelity, repeated infidelity over a period of
time. . . . [T]o the extent he was triggered by Mr. Collaco wanting to get with
his wife on that day, Mr. Collaco was not the one who committed the prior
infidelity to put Mr. Tran in that position to be triggered.· His failures within
his marriage were his own and cannot be attributed to either his childhood
trauma or to any actions of Mr. Collaco.”
Tran argues the court contradicted its finding that his mental illness
was not connected to the offense when it later focused on his mental health in
finding dismissal of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement would
endanger public safety because Tran had not received mental health
treatment. He maintains this contradiction shows the court failed to apply
the proper standard of proof or draw reasonable inferences from the evidence
of mental illness and childhood trauma.
We disagree. The court’s remarks about Tran’s mental health in the
context of considering whether dismissal of the enhancement would endanger

44
public safety were presented as a hypothetical: The court stated that “even
if” it was to find mental illness was a contributing factor, there was no
evidence Tran had received any treatment that would prevent him from
reacting to a future trigger in a similarly harmful way. In the course of
several reiterations of this point, the court emphasized it was not finding any
mental illness was a contributing factor.28 As we understand the court’s
remarks, it was reinforcing its conclusion that a lengthy prison sentence was
necessary by pointing out that “even if” mental illness played a role in Tran’s
conduct, this did not reduce the danger he presented.
Tran further argues that while the court had earlier “exhibited an
understanding of how the mental health and childhood trauma factors were
connected to the offense, as outlined in the cases cited above, without serving
as a complete defense,” it contradicted that understanding at sentencing by
concluding that Tran’s offenses were not connected to mental illness and
childhood trauma because the jury rejected these factors as having “excused”
the crime. Tran contends the trial court abused its discretion because the

28 The court stated, “Even if the jury had found [the claim of mental
illness] compelling or the Court, . . . there’s no evidence on this record that
the defendant has received treatment . . . such that, if he was to be let out of
custody he wouldn’t engage in a fight or flight response that involved an
intensely and suddenly attacking and harming other people with a similar
degree of violence”; “to the extent that he might be suffering from mental
illness, even if the Court were to accept that, there is no plan before the Court
to address that”; “even if the Court were to find that—as I’m not doing—but
even if I were to find that the mental illness was a contributing factor, either
to the crimes themselves or to his likelihood to re-offend in the future, the
problem is . . . that this type of crime[,] its deliberation, its intense violence,
there’s nothing secure before the Court or presented to the Court that any
underlying issues have been dealt with or treated in a way to prevent this
from happening again.” (Italics added.)

45
Legislature did not intend for the mitigating circumstances in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) to apply only if they defeated liability for the charged
offenses.
First, as indicated by Tran’s reference to the cases “outlined . . . above,”
his argument assumes that section 1385 calls for analysis pursuant to the
“substantial factor” test. In his view, as earlier discussed, Dr. Matto’s
testimony established that Tran’s unspecified trauma disorder, caused by his
childhood trauma, was “at the very least a ‘minor factor’ that caused the
harm.” As we have explained, we disagree that the minimal contribution
required under the substantial factor test is the proper measure of “connected
to” and “substantially contributed to” for purposes of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2).
Second, we disagree with Tran’s interpretation of the discussion he sees
as reflecting the court’s understanding that mental illness and childhood
trauma could be connected to the offense without constituting a complete
defense. The discussion concerned the defense request for an instruction
directing the jury that it could consider evidence of a mental impairment only
for the limited purpose of determining whether Tran acted with the specific
intent required for counts 1, 2 and 3. Over the prosecutor’s objection that
there was insufficient evidence Tran’s trauma disorder impaired his ability to
form the necessary intent, the court decided to give the instruction because,
while the evidence would allow the jury to reasonably conclude that Tran
acted with the required specific intent even if it believed Dr. Matto’s
testimony that he suffered from trauma related disorders, the jury could also
find Tran “acted without having the required intent precisely because he had
those disorders.· There is enough here for them to make that determination.”
Nothing in this discussion addressed the question whether mental illness or

46
childhood trauma could be connected to the offense within the meaning of
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), if the jury found Tran acted with
premeditation and deliberation.
As for whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the
crimes were not connected to mental illness and childhood trauma, Tran is
certainly correct, as a general principle, that circumstances insufficient to
constitute a complete defense may still influence determination of the
appropriate sentence. Were it otherwise, there would be no point to
section 1385, subdivision (c) because the existence of the mitigating
circumstance would mean the defendant could not be convicted in the first
place.
That said, in the present case the trial court did not act arbitrarily in
describing the tension between the jury’s finding that Tran attempted to kill
Collaco with premeditation and deliberation, on the one hand, and the
theory, as described by Dr. Matto, that Tran’s childhood abuse and mental
illness substantially contributed to the offense. Dr. Matto testified that
individuals with the trauma related disorder he diagnosed in Tran may have
an exaggerated response to stressors, including having a lower threshold for,
and more intense form of, the “instinctual” fight or flight reaction. He also
testified that individuals with trauma related disorder may experience a
dissociative episode in which they have “an altered relationship with what is
happening around them.”
The jury found Tran acted willfully, with deliberation and
premeditation. The court instructed the jury that to reach that verdict, it had
to find he “intended to kill when he acted,” “carefully weighed the
considerations for and against his choice and knowing the consequences
decided to kill” and “decided to kill before completing the act of attempted

47
murder.” It was further instructed that although “a cold calculated decision
to kill can be reached quickly,” “[a] decision to kill made rashly, impulsively
or without careful consideration of the choice and its consequences is not
deliberate and premeditated,” and the “test is the extent of the reflection not
the length of time.” The jury’s verdict indicates it did not find that Tran
acted rashly or impulsively in attempting to kill Collaco and that it did find
he formed the intent to kill before committing the acts, having weighed the
pros and cons and considered the consequences.
It is not an overstatement to view Dr. Matto’s description of a person
acting in the midst of an exaggerated fight or flight reaction caused by
trauma related disorder as hard to reconcile with the jury’s premeditation
findings. According to Dr. Matto, the fight or flight response is “instinctual,”
which is generally the opposite of intentional, conscious and deliberate.29
Still, the trial court’s remarks explaining its finding of no substantial
connection are ambiguous and in some respects incorrect. At one point, the
court indicated it was finding the offenses were not connected to mental

29 “Instinctual” is defined as “happening naturally, as a result of
instinct, rather than being thought about, planned, or developed by training.”
(Cambridge Dict.
<dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/English/instinctual> [as of Nov. 7,
2024].) Synonyms of instinctual include terms such as automatic,
spontaneous and reflex; antonyms include conscious, intentional and
deliberate. (Merriam-Webster Thesaurus <merriam-
webster.com/thesaurus/instinctual> [as of Nov. 7, 2024].) (See People v.
Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517-518 & fn. 8 [defendant’s act of reloading
gun “hardly involves the sort of involuntary, instinctive, or unlearned
response that may properly be called a reflex” and instead, together with
other facts, “strongly suggests premeditation”], italics added; People v. Cortez
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 873, 893 [describing psychiatrist’s report stating
defendant “was acting more instinctually than with reason, judgment,
premeditation or contemplation”], italics added.)

48
illness or childhood trauma because the jury found this evidence did not
“excuse[]” the offenses. (Italics added.) In other comments, the court
appeared to understand the difference between the “connection” requirement
for sentencing and the specific intent requirement for liability: “Indeed, the
contention that it was connected in any way to mental illness is not
corroborated by any other testimony, other than the defendant’s own supplied
to Dr. Matto.” (Italics added.) But one of the court’s stated reasons for
finding the offense was not connected to childhood trauma reflects a
misunderstanding of the requirement: The prosecutor argued there was no
connection because Collaco was not responsible for Tran’s childhood trauma,
and the trial court agreed. This reasoning is erroneous in two respects.
First, whether the victim was responsible for the defendant’s childhood
trauma is not relevant to the question whether that trauma contributed to
the defendant’s offense. If the childhood trauma factor only applied when the
victim caused the childhood trauma, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(D) would
apply only to a very narrow class of crimes, such as those involving violence
against abusive parents or guardians or child molesters who molested a
defendant. Nothing in the statute supports such a narrow interpretation.
Second, the point of the childhood trauma evidence was that it can affect the
manner in which a person responds to triggering events later in life. The
deterioration of Tran’s marriage was the immediate stressor that triggered
Tran’s violent response to Collaco’s sexual relationship with his wife, but
according to Dr. Matto, the trauma disorder affecting his marriage in turn
resulted from trauma in Tran’s family of origin, suffered long before he knew
either his wife or Collaco.

49
Given the ambiguity and errors in the trial court’s explanation of its
rejection of the connection requirement which may have affected its analysis,
we will remand this issue for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
V.
The Trial Court’s Decision to Impose the Maximum Enhancement
Based on Public Safety and the Interests of Justice Must Be
Reconsidered.
Tran contends the trial court erred in declining to dismiss or reduce the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement based on the danger to public
safety the court believed Tran posed at the time of sentencing rather than
whether, if the enhancement was dismissed or reduced, he would pose a
danger at the time he would be eligible for release.
A. The Issue Was Not Forfeited
The People contend that Tran forfeited this argument because he
“never asked the trial court to focus on whether he would present a danger at
the time he was eligible for parole at some future date.” The People are
incorrect. Defense counsel argued at sentencing that if the court used count
1, 2 or 3 as the base term, it was “necessarily going to sentence Mr. Tran to
seven years to life in prison. [¶]·In considering whether the dismissal of the
[section] 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) enhancement would endanger public
safety, the Court would have to believe that a sentence of seven years to life
would be insufficient to ensure public safety and that the additional sentence
of 25 to life on top of that would be required in order to protect the public.·
That’s clearly not the case here.” This argument clearly asked the court to
consider the sentence Tran would receive if the enhancement was dismissed
or reduced and whether he would present a danger at the end of that
sentence.

50
The People also argue Tran’s contention is not “ripe” for review because
it requires the court to “speculate what type of danger [Tran] would be at the
time he is eligible for his first parole hearing had it dismissed the firearm
enhancement.” This argument appears to assume the trial court was limited
to evaluating Tran’s dangerousness at the time of the sentencing hearing;
indeed, the People argue that Tran “speculates when he claims that the trial
court has to consider his dangerousness to public safety as if the
enhancement was dismissed.” Again, the People are incorrect. Section 1385
provides that “ ‘[e]ndanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” As will be discussed further below, the plain language of
the statute requires the trial court to do exactly what Tran asked it to do:
Consider whether, if it dismissed the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement, Tran’s release at the end of the sentence otherwise imposed
would endanger public safety. (See Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 228.)
B. Analysis
The argument Tran advances here was recently accepted in Gonzalez,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at page 230, which held the trial court abused its
discretion in considering “only whether Gonzalez currently posed a danger to
the public when assessing if a dismissal of the firearm enhancement would
‘endanger public safety.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) In light of Gonzalez’s sentence
of 50 years to life for the murder conviction, the trial court also should have
considered the date on which Gonzalez could be released if the firearm
enhancement was dismissed and the fact that the release would be subject to
a review by the Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor.” (Gonzalez, at
pp. 230-231.) We agree with the Gonzalez court’s conclusion that

51
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) requires consideration of a defendant’s
dangerousness at the time the defendant would be released if the
enhancement was dismissed.
The defendant in Gonzalez was sentenced to a term of 50 years to life
for first degree murder, plus 25 years to life for a section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement. (Gonzalez, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 220-221.)
The trial court declined to strike the enhancement based on finding the
defendant “ ‘presently . . . does represent a danger to society,’ ” rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the court should consider the facts that he was
going to serve a minimum of 25 years to life even if the enhancement was
dismissed and his release would be subject to review by the parole board and
governor. (Id. at pp. 223-224.)
Reversing, Gonzalez explained: “The plain words of the statute do not
support the trial court’s singular focus on whether the defendant currently
poses a danger. Notably, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) focuses on the
danger associated with the dismissal of an enhancement, phrasing the
inquiry as whether ‘dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety,’ and whether ‘there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.’ (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Although the current dangerousness of the
defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on
whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial
part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the
length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently dangerous defendant who
will be released from prison within a short time frame might be found by the
trial court to pose a greater danger to the public than a defendant who is
currently dangerous but who has no prospect of release from prison until he

52
is elderly. (See Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299, 304 Cal.Rptr.3d
624 [affirming the trial court’s finding of a danger to the public under § 1385,
subd. (c)(2) where ‘dismissal of the enhancement would result in a sentence of
less than six years in prison, which would require [the defendant’s]
immediate release’].) Further, an inquiry into whether public safety will be
endangered by the dismissal of an enhancement for a defendant serving a
lengthy indeterminate sentence should also take into account that the
defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of
Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have
the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time.
(§§ 3041, 3041.2; Cal. Const., art. V, § 8.) That future review will act as a
safety valve against a release that would endanger the public and is relevant
to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of an enhancement
imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will endanger
public safety.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)
The present case differs from Gonzalez in that the trial court in
Gonzalez expressly limited its decision to current dangerousness and declined
to consider whether the defendant would remain dangerous at the end of the
sentence the defendant would serve without the enhancement. Here, the
court accurately stated that because one of the mitigating factors had been
proven (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)), it was required to weigh this factor “greatly
in favor of striking the enhancement” unless it found that “dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety, which is defined as a likelihood
that dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or serious
danger to others.” It then stated that “[o]nly with the sufficient amount of
time and due reflection and . . . an intense and lengthy period of reflection on
Mr. Tran’s part does the Court have any hope that he would not do this

53
again, whether provoked justifiably or not.” In stating the court’s view that
Tran would remain a danger to public safety if released without serving a
“lengthy” sentence, this remark implicitly addressed the question whether
Tran would endanger the public if released at a given time in the future,.
Yet many of the court’s comments reflected a focus on the danger Tran
posed at the time of the hearing. The court stated that “[a]s it exists now, as it
stands now, he does remain a serious danger, if not to Mr. Collaco, to society
in general”; that he “does currently pose an extreme public safety risk to Mr.
Collaco directly and to the public in general”; and that “he demonstrates an
extreme risk to public safety and to Mr. Collaco” and “he definitely presents a
public safety risk going forward.” (Italics added.) The court stated that it
was optimistic Tran would become suitable for release in time but did not
believe “that’s the case now” and in fact believed that “if presented with a
similar trigger, if released in the near future on a determinate term, he
poses a great danger to the public.” (Italics added.) This last remark
referenced Tran’s request to be sentenced to a determinate term on count 4
rather than a life term: The court concluded a determinate term of 14 years30
would be inappropriate and disproportionate to his offenses, and that it
would not be in the interest of justice for him to be entitled to release without
having to “engage in the hard work” to demonstrate his readiness to a parole
board and the parole board “weighing in on his performance and continued
exercise of remorse and good behavior.” The court stated it was “electing not

30 The parties had indicated the maximum term for count 4 would be
14 years, but the court pointed out that because no aggravating
circumstances were proven to the jury, sentence on this count would be
limited to middle terms unless Tran stipulated to the existence of
aggravating factors. (§ 1170, subd. (b).) Defense counsel stated that if the
court chose to sentence on count 4, Tran would so stipulate.

54
to strike the enhancements if I impose one of the life terms” because, “while
the law creates a presumption that I should strike the enhancement, I believe
that that presumption is overcome by the great risk to public safety that he
presents and to the victim’s safety that he presents today.” (Italics added.)
Overall, we cannot escape the conclusion that the court focused
primarily on Tran’s dangerousness at the time of sentencing rather than the
danger he would pose at the time he becomes eligible for release, at least with
respect to the court’s discretion to impose an enhancement pursuant to
subdivisions (b) or (c) of section 12022.53 rather than the maximum
enhancement pursuant to subdivision (d). This is the aspect of the court’s
decision that we find problematic.
The court made clear that it believed a 14-year determinate sentence,
without further review prior to release, would not be sufficient to ensure Tran
did not remain a danger to the public. As we have noted, Tran has not
challenged this part of the court’s ruling. Further, in declining to dismiss the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement altogether, the court made
clear its view that seven years (the minimum term for a life sentence for
attempted murder) would be an insufficient sentence even with review by the
parole board prior to release. Given the seriousness of the crimes in this
case, this decision was not so arbitrary that we could find the court abused its
discretion in declining to dismiss the enhancement altogether.
The court expressly recognized, however, that it had discretion to
reduce the length of the enhancement by dismissing the 25 years to life
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and replacing it with an
enhancement of 20 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (c) or
10 years to life under subdivision (b). The court explained its decision to
reject either of these alternatives without offering any reason for concluding

55
Tran would remain a danger to the public after serving a minimum sentence
of 17 years (10-year enhancement) or 27 years (20-year enhancement), at the
end of which the parole board would evaluate whether he remained a danger.
Instead, the court referred to the “great danger that is posed,” stated that
Tran would have “a good chance” to be released by the parole board in his
late 60s with the 25-year enhancement and at that point “would have a lot of
life ahead of him,” and stated that imposing the 10- or 20-year enhancement
would not “do justice to the crime.” (Italics added.)
While current dangerousness is an appropriate factor to consider
(Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228), the question whether “dismissal
of the enhancement would endanger public safety” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)) can
only be answered by comparing the danger of releasing the defendant at the
end of the sentence including the enhancement with the danger of release at
the end of the sentence that would remain if the enhancement was not
imposed. The role of the dangerousness finding is critical to implementation
of the legislative preferences embodied in section 1385, since a finding that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety means the
subdivision (c)(2) mitigating circumstances need not be given “great weight.”
(Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.)
Here, if dismissal of a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) 25-year
enhancement, would not endanger public safety, the fact that it would result
in a sentence of well over 20 years (minimum parole eligibility of 32 years)
would “weigh[] greatly in favor of dismissing” it. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
This would be the case if Tran could be released without endangering public
safety after serving 17 years (10-year enhancement) or 27 years (20-year
enhancement). But these determinations each depended on evaluation of the
danger Tran would pose at the time of release, not at sentencing. The court

56
could not properly conclude dismissal of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement would endanger the public unless it determined that a
minimum term of 17 or 27 years, with release only upon a parole board’s
determination of suitability, would be insufficient to protect the public.
The court’s failure to meaningfully consider dangerousness at the
relevant points in the future when Tran would become eligible for release is
troubling for additional reasons. Our Legislature has recognized that
“[r]esearch shows that criminal involvement diminishes dramatically after an
individual reaches 40 years of age and even more after 50 years of age.”
(Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 1(d)(4) [§ 1170].) Tran was 37 years old when he
committed these offenses and 41 at sentencing, already at an age when
criminal conduct would be expected to diminish. The trial court’s only
comment about Tran’s age was that, with the 25-year enhancement, he would
be eligible for release in his late 60s, with “a lot of life ahead of him.”
Actually, with the sentence of 32 years to life, Tran would not become eligible
for release until age 73; with the lesser 10- or 20-year enhancements, he
would become eligible at 58 or 68 years of age. Under any of these
alternatives, Tran would be well into a stage of life with significantly
diminished expectation of criminality before he could even be considered for
parole. The trial court’s comment about Tran having “a lot of life ahead of
him” if released after 32 years says nothing about whether he would be a
danger at the time of potential release if a lesser enhancement was imposed.
Moreover, the trial court multiple times expressed its optimism that
Tran would be able to earn release when he became eligible. The court
stated, “for the benefit of a parole board down the road—that there is much
positive to say about Mr. Tran and I do believe that he can overcome his
demons to the point where at some point he would be suitable for release,”

57
although the court did not “believe that that’s the case now.” The court
stated that Tran had “a strong chance of getting out of custody given his
performance in custody to date, the great character reference letters offered
by the jailers,” that the court had “great optimism that he would because of
his excellent behavior in . . . jail custody up to this point,” and the court had
“a strong view” that Tran would “convince a parole board to cut him loose as
soon as he is eligible.”31 These expressions of optimism are difficult to square
with the court’s conclusion that a minimum sentence of 32 years was
required and minimum sentences of 17 years or 27 years would be
insufficient even though Tran would not actually be released if the parole
board found he still presented a risk to public safety. (See Gonzalez, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228; § 3041.) To be sure, the court emphasized its view
that a “lengthy” minimum sentence was necessary—but any of these
alternative sentences would fit that definition. The court gave no indication
that it considered whether Tran would be a danger to the public if released
after serving a minimum of 17 years or 27 years upon a parole board’s
determination that he was no longer dangerous.
The court’s decision not to dismiss or reduce the enhancement was not
based solely on its view of Tran’s dangerousness. As indicated above, it
emphasized the seriousness of the crimes and explained its view that the

31 The court’s stated optimism that Tran would be able to earn release
on parole was based on the “excellent” behavior in prison attested to by the
police officers’ character statements (recognized by the court as being
“extraordinarily unusual”) and the fact that there was “much positive to say”
about Tran. The latter, presumably, referred to the many letters from Tran’s
friends and colleagues describing his dedication to helping others and
positive impact in personal relationships and on the community. The record
suggests Tran’s violent crimes were a singular departure from his usual
character and conduct, but the court gave this circumstance little weight in
its sentencing decision.

58
maximum sentence was appropriate for purposes of deterrence, both for Tran
and as a message to others who might commit such crimes. Noting that the
objectives of sentencing include deterrence as well as rehabilitation and
punishment, the court stated that “this sentence isn’t just about Mr. Collaco
or Mr. Tran” or their family members but “about others looking to this Court
and to this sentence for justice and looking to whether or not they should
commit this crime and knowing that it won’t be tolerated” and “the Court is
prepared to lock them up for an extremely lengthy time.”
As the trial court stated, the California Rules of Court provide that
deterrence is one of the objectives of sentencing. (California Rules of Court,
rule 4.410, subd. (a)(3) & (a)(4) [“General objectives of sentencing include . . .
deterring [defendant] from future offenses [and] [d]eterring others from
criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences”].) At the same time, in
adopting sentencing reforms in recent years, the Legislature has recognized
research showing that lengthy sentences “have diminishing returns in
reducing crime rates,” with “almost no evidence that long sentences deter the
crimes they are intended to deter.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 1(d)(3), (4)
[legislative findings and declarations]; Nazir v. Superior Court (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 478, 496 [quoting Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen.
Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 28, 2017, p. 3 [mandatory sentence
enhancements have “ ‘no material deterrent effect’ ”].) The amendments to
section 1385 are in keeping with this legislative recognition, but the trial
court does not appear to have considered it.
The court’s sentencing decisions were heavily influenced by the
seriousness of Tran’s offenses. The premeditation and deliberation reflected
in Tran’s conduct, extreme injury inflicted on Collaco and evidence indicating
Tran could well have killed him if not stopped by the intervention of his

59
neighbor all led the court to believe a maximum sentence was appropriate.
As we have said, even without a determination that Tran would pose a
danger to the public if the court did not impose the maximum enhancement,
the court had discretion to impose that enhancement if it concluded
imposition of a lesser enhancement would not serve the interests of justice.
(Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029; Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 445-446; § 1385, subd. (a).)
But the court in fact did base its decision in large part on its view of
Tran’s dangerousness. The court emphasized the danger Tran posed to
Collaco and the public at the time of sentencing and did not provide any
reason to conclude that only a minimum term of 32 years could ensure public
safety even though, regardless of the length of the minimum term, Tran
would not be released absent a parole board’s determination that he did not
pose a danger. To the extent the court’s decision was based on the danger
Tran posed at the time of sentencing without consideration of danger at the
alternative potential dates of release, the court erred. Reliance on an
incorrect legal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. (Gonzalez, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.)
We cannot find this error harmless. The court’s view of the nature of
the crime and need for deterrence was intertwined with its focus on Tran’s
current dangerousness, and the court expressed considerable optimism about
Tran’s future based on his positive character references and conduct in
custody. Given the totality of the court’s remarks, we cannot be confident its
decision would be the same upon consideration of the facts under the
standards we have discussed. In reaching this conclusion, however, we do
not intend to dictate the court’s decision on remand. The ultimate decision—
whether dismissal or reduction of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)

60
enhancement is in furtherance of justice—is a matter for the trial court’s
discretion, guided by statutory standards.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing in
accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. In all other respects the
judgment is affirmed.

61
STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

MILLER, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

People v. Tran (A165297)

62

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.