Weiss v. Othman CA4/3

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Filed 11/6/24 Weiss v. Othman CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MICHAEL WEISS et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, G062685

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-01003632)

RAJAI A. OTHMAN et al., OPINION

Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Craig L. Griffin, Judge. Affirmed in part. Reversed in part.
Pacific Premier Law Group and Arash Shirdel for Rajai A.
Othman and Amal Othman, Defendants and Appellants.
Siddiqui Law, Omar A. Siddiqui, Ryan A. Gonzales, Imran A.
Kamil and Nicole A. Soma for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
* * *
This appeal stems from a default judgment entered against
defendants Rajai Othman and Amal Othman. They contend the complaint
fails to state any causes of action against them and, even if it did, the default
judgment is void because it exceeds the amount alleged in the complaint. As
we discuss, the complaint fails to allege a cause of action against Amal; the
default judgment entered against her therefore must be vacated. We affirm
the default judgment entered against Rajai because the complaint alleged
several valid causes of action against him, and it put him on notice as to the
amount at issue if he failed to defend himself.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Michael Weiss owns Weistec Engineering, Inc.
(collectively, Weistec), which manufactures car parts and imports luxury
cars. Weistec previously employed defendant Mohammad Othman, who is
Rajai and Amal’s son.1 While working at Weistec, Mohammad allegedly stole
more than $300,000 by generating sales orders from Weistec’s customers and
then directing those customers to make payments to his personal accounts.
Mohammad also created false records in Weistec’s system related to these
payments. Once Weistec shipped the order, Mohammad deleted evidence of
the sales order and payment. Weistec alleged this was part of a conspiracy
between Mohammad and Rajai to misappropriate Weistec’s funds and
property. Weistec alleged Mohammad “diverted [these] funds from [Weistec]

1
As defendants share the same last name, we refer to each by
their first names. No disrespect is intended.

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to his father, [Rajai], and mother, [Amal], in order to conceal his unlawful
conduct.”
Weistec filed a complaint against Mohammad, Rajai, and Amal.
The complaint alleged multiple causes of action including (1) intentional and
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; (2) intentional
interference with contractual relations; (3) civil conspiracy; and (4) unlawful
and unfair business practices. Weistec named Rajai as a defendant in each of
these causes of action, but named Amal only in the civil conspiracy cause of
action. Weistec did not pray for a particular amount of damages, only
“damages according to proof,” punitive damages, fees, and costs. When Rajai
and Amal defaulted, the court entered a default judgment against both in the
amount of $425,342.46, which represented $300,000 in general damages and
prejudgment interest of $125,342.46. The court also ruled Mohammad, Rajai,
and Amal were jointly and severally liable.
Rajai and Amal filed a motion to vacate the default judgment
claiming it was void because the complaint did not place them on notice as to
what specific damages they would owe if they defaulted. The court denied the
motion, finding the complaint’s allegations that Mohammad stole $300,000
and sent this money to Rajai and Amal were sufficient to put them on notice
that they could be liable for that amount as coconspirators.
DISCUSSION
Rajai and Amal argue the court erred in entering the default
judgment against them because the complaint alleged wrongdoing by
Mohammad, not either of them; as a result, the complaint does not state any
cause of action against them. Alternatively, they maintain the default
judgment is void because the complaint does not allege they wrongfully

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received any money, and they were not on notice as a result as to the specific
amount of damages sought.
We find the complaint alleges several sustainable causes of action
against Rajai; the complaint also put him on notice as to his potential
liability as a coconspirator. We therefore affirm the judgment against Rajai.
We further find the complaint fails to state a cause of action as to Amal and
therefore reverse the judgment against her.
I.
FAILURE TO PLEAD FACTS SUFFICIENT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
A defaulting defendant admits all properly pleaded allegations in
the complaint. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267,
281.) If those allegations do not state a cause of action, a trial court cannot
enter a default judgment. (Id. at p. 282.) “[I]t is the duty of the court to act as
gatekeeper, ensuring that only the appropriate claims get through.” (Heidary
v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 868 (Heidary).) A defaulting
defendant can challenge the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint for
the first time on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.80, subd. (a); Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 7, fn. 2.) We review the
sufficiency of a complaint’s factual allegations de novo to determine if they
state a cause of action. (J.W. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New
York, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1162.)
A. The Complaint
The complaint must contain “[a] statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) “[T]he complaint need only allege facts sufficient
to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form

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part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
On review, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
considering its allegations as a whole. (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins.
Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 847.) Nonetheless, conclusory
allegations will not save a complaint which lacks facts to support a
conclusion. (Swain v. California Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)
Where there are multiple defendants, the complaint must identify which
causes of action are alleged as to each defendant. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 2.112, (3) & (4).)
Weistec alleged the following causes of action: (1) intentional and
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; (2) intentional
interference with contractual relations; (3) civil conspiracy; and (4) unlawful
and unfair business practices. Weistec named Amal only in the civil
conspiracy cause of action.
B. Analysis
Weistec alleged Mohammad and Rajai “conspired to
misappropriate the funds and related property of WEISTEC and fraudulently
opened multiple credit card merchant accounts and other fraudulent payment
accounts.” Weistec further alleged Mohammad and Rajai “effectuated the
plan of conspiracy by creating sales orders, indicating a customary
transaction from WEISTEC, and then collecting payments from WEISTEC’s
customers . . . .” Finally, Weistec alleged it was harmed by this conduct.
As to Rajai, Weistec alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of
action for conspiracy to commit the tort of conversion. Conversion is the
unlawful control of another’s property. (Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) A civil conspiracy requires at least two

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individuals who come ““to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common
and unlawful plan, and that one or more of them committed an overt act to
further it.”’ (AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022.) Here, Weistec
alleged Mohammad and Rajai conspired to misappropriate Weistec’s money
by generating sales orders from its customers and then directing those
customers to pay Mohammad directly.
Rajai and Amal argue civil conspiracy is not a separate cause of
action and cannot form the basis for liability since “a civil conspiracy does not
give rise to a cause of action unless an independent civil wrong has been
committed.” We agree. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1062.)
When reviewing a complaint to determine the sufficiency of its allegations,
we look not at the label given to the cause of action, but to the facts alleged to
determine if those facts state a cause of action. (McBride v. Boughton (2004)
123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387.)
Rajai and Amal argue Weistec alleged it was Mohammad who
created the orders and diverted Weistec’s money to his own personal accounts.
Thus, since it was Mohammad who committed the wrongful acts and received
the ill-gotten gains, they cannot be held responsible. We disagree.
The complaint alleges that Mohammad and Rajai conspired “to
misappropriate the funds” which are at issue. Rajai need not personally
commit any overt act to be liable as a coconspirator because a civil conspiracy
holds each participant jointly responsible ‘‘“‘irrespective of whether or not he
was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity.’”” (Wetherton v.
Growers Farm Labor Assn. (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 168, 176, disagreed with on
other grounds in Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 503.) Weistec’s pleading as to Rajai is therefore sufficient to support
the judgment against him.

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Amal is a different story. The only factual allegation Weistec
makes against Amal is that Mohammad, in order to conceal his conduct,
diverted funds to her. Weistec does not allege Amal conspired with
Mohammad and Rajai to misappropriate these funds, or that she knew
Mohammad wrongfully obtained the money. In other words, there is no
allegation that Amal entered into an unlawful agreement, or that she
committed any overt act in furtherance of such an agreement. Accordingly,
Weistec has not alleged a cause of action for conversion, or any other tort,
based on a conspiracy theory of liability against Amal. The court therefore
erred when it entered a default judgment against her.
II.
VOID JUDGMENT
Rajai and Amal contend the default judgment entered against
them is void because the amount of the judgment exceeds the amount
demanded in the complaint. Again, we disagree as to Rajai.
A. Applicable Law
A trial court cannot enter a default judgment for a sum greater
than the amount the plaintiff demanded in the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 580, subd. (a).) A default judgment that awards damages in excess of the
demand is void. (Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 752
(Rodriguez).) The plaintiff need not allege the amount of prejudgment
interest. (Sass v. Cohen (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1040.) To determine the
amount the plaintiff demanded, we review the prayer and the allegations in
the body of the complaint. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 659, 667.)
Where there are multiple defendants, the plaintiff’s allegations
must explain why each defendant is liable, and for what amount. (Heidary,

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supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.) We must “ascertain[] what relief is sought
as against each defaulting party, and to what extent the relief sought in one
cause of action is inconsistent with or duplicative of the relief sought in
another.” (Ibid.) “We review de novo [whether] a default judgment is or is not
void.” (Rodriguez, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.)
B. Analysis
The trial court ordered Mohammad, Rajai, and Amal to jointly
and severally pay Weistec $425,342.46, which represented $300,000 in
damages plus prejudgment interest of $125,342.46. Weistec alleged Rajai
engaged in a civil conspiracy to convert Weistec’s funds. Pursuant to this
conspiracy, Weistec alleged Mohammad stole $300,000.
Civil conspiracy can serve as the basis for joint and several
liability. (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc. (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823.) Because ‘“[e]ach member of the conspiracy [is]
liable for all acts done by others pursuant to the conspiracy, and for all
damages caused thereby’” the allegations in the complaint put Rajai on notice
that, as a member of such a conspiracy, he could be liable for $300,000 in
damages if he defaulted. (Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 189, 206.) The trial court did not err in entering that
judgment.
The same analysis does not apply to Amal. As discussed above,
the complaint fails to allege that she conspired with anyone to
misappropriate funds. The trial court therefore erred when it found she was
jointly and severally liable for the alleged misappropriation of funds and
thereafter entered a default judgment against her.

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III.
ABUSE OF THE COURT’S DISCRETION
Rajai and Amal argue the court abused its discretion in denying
the motion to vacate because the amount of the judgment exceeded the
amount outlined in the complaint. A trial court may set aside a void
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) But as we explained above, the
default judgment entered against Rajai is not void. Therefore, the trial court
“ha[d] no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set [it]
aside . . . . ” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488,
495-496.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment as to Amal. As to Rajai, the judgment is
affirmed. In the interest of justice, all parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

GOODING, J.

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