Miller v. Ellis CA4/3

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Filed 10/10/24 Miller v. Ellis CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THOMAS MILLER,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063142

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01310106)
DAVID ELLIS et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Glenn R. Salter, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Katz Law Office, Michael I. Katz and Byron H. Ruby for
Defendants and Appellants.
Drooz Legal and Deborah Drooz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Foley Law Office and Thomas R. Foley as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Defendants and Appellants.
Ker Legal Group and Keith E. Rodenhuis as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
* * *
As our Supreme Court has explained, Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute, “‘does not
insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected
rights of petition or speech.”1 Rather, it exists to dispose of meritless claims
arising from protected activity early in a lawsuit. (Monster Energy Co. v.
Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) As such, defamation claims concerning
political advertising can survive an anti-SLAPP motion if the plaintiff can
show his or her claims have minimal merit. Such is the case here.
Plaintiff Thomas Miller ran for Newport Beach City Council.
Defendant Safe Neighborhoods PAC (Safe Neighborhoods) and its principal
officer, defendant David Ellis (collectively, defendants), made several
campaign leaflets and a website opposing his candidacy. After Miller lost the
election, he sued defendants for four counts of defamation based on the
website and three leaflets. Primarily, he claimed these materials falsely
implied he had misappropriated federal Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
loans for personal use. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion in response.
The trial court granted the motion as to the first and fourth causes of action
because they had not been sufficiently pled. But it denied the motion as to the
second and third causes of action, finding these claims met the minimal merit
threshold.
Defendants appealed the court’s ruling as to the second and third
claims, and Miller cross-appealed the ruling as to the first and fourth claims.
Like the lower court, we find some of the claims are barred by the anti-
SLAPP statute and some are not, but we disagree with the court as to which
claims fall into the former category and which fall into the latter. We find the

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

2
third and fourth claims are barred by the anti-SLAPP statute because
Miller’s complaint failed to specifically identify the defamatory statements
underlying these claims. Conversely, we find the first and second claims
survive the anti-SLAPP motion. Unlike the third and fourth claims, these
claims were properly pled. Further, the evidence in the record shows these
claims have minimal merit. In particular, there is circumstantial evidence
from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants made the
allegedly defamatory statements with actual malice.
Based on our findings, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
FACTS
Miller owned two auto detailing businesses: Expert Automotive
Reconditioning, Inc. (Expert Auto) and Dynamic Auto Images, Inc. (Dynamic
Auto). Ellis claims Miller also controlled, but was not a direct owner of, two
other business – Automotive Creations, Inc. (Automotive Creations) and
Prestige Auto Specialists, Inc. (Prestige) – that he used to provide labor to
Expert Auto and Dynamic Auto (we refer to all four businesses collectively as,
the companies).2 Miller’s exact relationship to Automotive Creations and
Prestige is immaterial to our analysis, so we will not examine his links to
them.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the companies all received
Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans from the federal government
totaling about $4.9 million. The record indicates the loans for Expert Auto,
Automotive Creations, and Dynamic Auto were approved in April and May

2 The record indicates Miller sold Dynamic Auto in July 2021 and
retired. It is unclear whether he is still currently involved with any of the
other companies.

3
2020, while Prestige’s loan was approved in February 2021. The loans for
Automotive Creations, Expert Auto, and Dynamic were forgiven, while
Prestige’s loan was apparently “charged off.”
Around this time, Miller purchased four properties in Newport
Beach totaling roughly $11.5 million (collectively, the four properties).
Specifically, he purchased a property in June 2020 for $4.9 million, another
in July 2021 for $2.5 million, another in September 2021 for $1.85 million,
and another in August 2022 for about $2.27 million.
In January 2022, Miller announced he was running for Newport
Beach City Council. Flyers from Miller’s campaign advertised his belief “in
fiscal responsibility.” He also appeared to criticize “big government” in
newspaper interviews, stating that during the COVID-19 pandemic, “he saw
how the government can have total control over his livelihood” and stated
that “[t]hey control my family, my business, they closed my beach.” An article
in The Epoch Times (the Epoch Times article) that ran in September 2022
also described Miller’s business struggles during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The article states that “[a]ccording to Miller, his business struggled during
the pandemic lockdown, when, for several months people stopped traveling
and driving, and he was not able to pay his employees. [¶] However, he found
a run-around. [¶] ‘I said, I can’t afford to pay my people, but I can afford to
feed them,’ he said. [¶] He said he turned two of his service centers into
feeding locations for his employees, and he and his wife rented a U-Haul and
filled it with diapers for their children” (the Epoch Times quote). Portions of
the Epoch Times quote were later used in opposition ads against Miller.
Appellant Safe Neighborhoods, a political action committee,
formed during the 2022 election cycle. Appellant David Ellis is listed as Safe

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Neighborhood’s principal officer in its Statement of Organization filed with
the Secretary of State.
In the weeks leading up to the City Council election, defendants
created a campaign website, https://www.safeneighborhoodspac.com (the
website), and released three leaflets (the leaflets) opposing Miller’s
candidacy. The leaflets are attached to this opinion as Appendices A, B, and
C, and referred to in this opinion as such.3 Generally, the website and leaflets
quoted the portion of the Epoch Times quote in which Miller claimed he could
not “afford to pay [his] people,” highlighted the PPP loans he received, and
questioned what Miller did with the PPP loans. The website and some of the
leaflets also stated that Miller bought four houses in Newport Beach for over
$11.5 million and included photos of the four properties. A more detailed
description of the leaflets and the website is contained in the discussion
below.
Miller lost the election. His opponent receiving 64 percent of the
vote, while he received 36 percent.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After the election, Miller filed a complaint (the complaint) against
defendants asserting four claims of libel per se based on the website and the
leaflets. The first claim was based on the website, the second claim on
Appendix A, the third claim on Appendix B, and the fourth claim on
Appendix C. Copies of each leaflet were attached to the complaint. The
complaint contained no screenshots of the website, nor are there any

3 Each Appendix to this opinion contains two copies of each
leaflet. The first is the copy of the leaflet attached to the complaint. The
second is a higher quality color copy of the leaflet that was in the record.

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screenshots of it in the record because the portions of the website concerning
Miller were taken down after the election.
While no screenshots of the website are in the record, the
complaint described the content underlying the first cause of action: “Under a
tab inscribed with the words ‘Meet Tom “Slick” Miller,’ the Website affixed an
image of a clipping from a newspaper article about Miller (the ‘Clipping
Image’). The Clipping Image contains a partial, decontextualized quote from
Miller: ‘I can’t afford to pay my people.’ To the right of the Clipping Image,
Defendants affixed an image of what appear to be official forms containing
the amounts of PPP loans awarded to four businesses (the ‘PPP’ Images). The
PPP images state: ‘Expert Automotive Reconditioning, Inc. $2.45 million;
Prestige Auto Specialists, Inc. $1 million; Automotive Creations, Inc. $1.3
million; Dynamic Auto Images, Inc. $120,000. The amounts arc circled in red
for emphasis. Beneath the PPP Images, Defendants posted the following
words in bold-faced yellow type: ‘THEN WHAT DID MILLER DO WITH THE
PPP LOANS?’ They then provide a false answer to that question: ‘Miller
bought four houses in Newport for over $11.5 MILLION.’ [¶] Defendants
illustrated the claim that Miller used PPP loans to buy ‘four houses in
Newport’ with four photographs, captioned as follows: 1808 W. Oceanfront 27
Blvd., 4.9 million; 1831 W. Balboa Blvd., $1.8 million; 207 29th Street, $2.6
million; and 520 Iris, $2.5 million.”
The complaint alleged that “[w]hen viewed together, the Clipping
Image, the PPP Image, the question, ‘Then what did Miller do with the PPP
loans?’ followed by the illustrated statement, ‘Miller bought four houses in
Newport for over $11.5 MILION,’ convey the false and defamatory accusation
that Miller took out four PPP loans for his companies because he could not

6
‘afford to pay’ his people, but then converted the loan money to his personal
use and used it to purchase pricy residential property.”
The complaint asserted the above statements constituting the
defamatory accusation were false: (1) Miller never used any portion of the
PPP loans for purposes other than permitted by the PPP loans; (2) the
implication he could not afford to pay his people was false and taken from a
quote that was deliberately decontextualized; and (3) Miller did not obtain
PPP loans for Prestige or Automotive Creations because he did not own or
control those businesses.
The complaint did not describe the leaflets, nor did it specifically
allege the defamatory material in them. Rather, it alleged that “[d]efendants
republished the false accusations set forth above in a series of three paper
campaign advertisements that were mailed to thousands of Newport Beach
voters.” It then explained the three leaflets were attached to the complaint.
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion under section 425.16 to
strike all four claims (the motion). The trial court denied the motion as to the
second and third claims, i.e., the claims based on Appendices A and B. It
explained that “[t]here is evidence Miller used the PPP funds as intended by
the law, to pay his employees. But the juxtaposition of the question and the
statement that Miller bought four houses could be viewed by a reasonable
trier of fact as an attempt to suggest or imply to the average voter that Miller
did not use the funds as intended: He didn’t pay his employees; rather, he
used those PPP funds to buy luxury homes for his own personal use.” Since
Miller was a public figure, the court found actual malice could be inferred by
circumstantial evidence: “Nothing in Ellis’s declaration in support of the anti-
SLAPP motion suggests that he investigated or knew as a fact whether Miller

7
had used the PPP funds to pay his employees, or had used them to buy
luxury homes.”
The court granted the motion as to the first and fourth claims,
i.e., the claims based on the website and Appendix C. It explained the copy of
Appendix C attached to the complaint, “is very hard to read. The complaint
purports to relate what is there but the exhibit is just not clear enough to find
that that cause of action has minimal merit. As for the website . . . , the
complaint alleges it has been taken down and is now a shell. . . . The
complaint purports to state what was there under certain tabs but that is not
enough given there are no allegations as to when it was up and whether it
was ever accessed or read.”
The court also denied a discovery motion filed by Miller to take
Ellis’s deposition prior to ruling on the motion.
On appeal, defendants contend the court erred by denying the
motion as to the second and third claims. Primarily, they argue Miller failed
to specifically identify the defamatory statements underlying these claims
and also failed to provide sufficient evidence of actual malice. Miller filed a
cross-appeal arguing the court erred by granting the anti-SLAPP as to the
first and fourth claims or, in the alternative, by denying his motion to take
Ellis’s deposition. In opposing the cross-appeal, defendants primarily repeat
the arguments from their own appeal. Due to this overlap, we discuss the
claims subject to the appeal and cross-appeal together, where appropriate.
As explained below, we find the third and fourth claims are
barred by the anti-SLAPP statute, while the first and second claims are not.

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DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
This appeal only concerns defamation claims. “The tort of
defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d)
unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes
special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) “Publication
means communication to some third person who understands the defamatory
meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference
is made.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)
As for anti-SLAPP motions, “‘[t]he Legislature enacted section
425.16 to prevent and deter “lawsuits . . . brought primarily to chill the valid
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances.”’” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 288, 298.) Significantly, though, “‘[t]he anti-SLAPP statute does
not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the
protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for
weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.’” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 788.)
“‘Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First,
the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity
protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success. [The Supreme Court has]
described this second step as a “summary-judgment-like procedure.”
[Citation.] The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual
claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally

9
sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain
a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and
evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the
plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] “[C]laims with the requisite
minimal merit may proceed.”’ [Citation.] The grant or denial of an anti-
SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 788.)
Both sides agree Miller’s claims all arise from protected activity
and, accordingly, resolution of the motion depends on the second prong. In
our analysis, we bear in mind “that a plaintiff’s burden at the second anti-
SLAPP step is a low one, requiring only a showing that a cause of action has
at least ‘minimal merit within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.’”
(Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 793, italics added.)
II.
CROSS-APPEAL
We begin with Miller’s cross-appeal, which argues the court erred
by granting the motion as to the first and fourth causes of action. We agree
the court erred by granting the motion as to the first claim but find it
correctly granted the motion as to the fourth claim.
A. The First Claim
The first claim is based on the website. The court found it lacked
minimal merit because the website had been taken down and there were no
screenshots of it in the record. Nor were there any allegations as to when it
was up or whether it was ever accessed or read. Put differently, the court
appears to have found the complaint failed to properly plead publication as to
these claims.

10
Miller’s claim should not fail simply because defendants took
down the website before Miller was able to record its contents. Such a rule
would essentially bar a person from bringing a defamation claim against a
defendant fortunate enough to take down a defamatory website before copies
of it could be made. While defendants argue it is impossible to verify whether
Miller’s description of the website is accurate, the complaint described its
defamatory content with specificity. The complaint explained how the
positioning of text and images on the website created the defamatory
statement that Miller misappropriated PPP loans to purchase real property.
A “plaintiff in a SLAPP motion [has] a certain degree of leeway in
establishing a probability of prevailing on its claims due to ‘the early stage at
which the motion is brought and heard [citation] and the limited opportunity
to conduct discovery.’” (Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v. Fitzgibbons
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 515, 530.)
Further, contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, the complaint
alleged when the relevant portion of the website was accessible and that it
was accessed. The complaint alleged defendants created the website,
including the portion with the defamatory material, shortly after Ellis formed
Safe Neighborhoods on August 1, 2022. The complaint further stated that
defendants took down the defamatory material around December 2022, after
“Ellis was alerted to the likelihood of litigation in this matter.” Based on the
complaint’s allegations, the website was up from around August 2022 to
December 2022. This timeframe sufficiently informs the reader as to when
the website was accessible.
As to whether the website was accessed, the complaint alleged it
“reached residents of the City of Newport Beach, California, and beyond.” The
complaint also alleged Newport Beach residents understood the content on

11
the website to be defamatory. Residents could only understand the website’s
contents to be defamatory if they had read it. Thus, these two allegations
combined establish the website was accessed and read. (See Medical
Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 884 (Medical
Marijuana) [“Publication occurs when a defamatory statement is made to at
least one third person”].)
Defendants assert that even if the complaint properly pled
publication, Miller failed to present sufficient evidence that the website
actually published the defamatory material alleged in the complaint or that
any third person read such material. We disagree. Miller submitted a
declaration that stated he was the target “of false and disparaging campaign
advertisements published online.” He explained, these advertisements
“stated and/or implied that I used [PPP] loan proceeds for purposes not
permitted by the PPP. Most disturbing was the [advertisements] assertion
that I used PPP loan proceeds to purchase four expensive homes in Newport
Beach.” He also declared that “[a]lmost immediately after” the
advertisements were posted online, he was harassed by strangers at his home
and in public. Likewise, Miller’s counsel submitted a declaration that stated

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copies of the leaflets were posted on the website, providing further evidence of
the website’s contents.4
At this stage of the proceeding, we accept Miller’s evidence as
true. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 788.) The
declaration from Miller and his counsel is sufficient to establish the website’s
content. Miller lacks access to the relevant portions of the website, and we do
not expect him to have a photographic memory of its contents. Miller’s
declaration that he faced harassment after the website was published is
enough to show the website was accessed. It would be unfair to expect Miller
to have detailed information regarding the website’s visitors since he did not
operate the website and has not been allowed full discovery in this case. In
reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that “a plaintiff’s burden at the
second anti-SLAPP step is a low one, requiring only a showing that a cause of
action has at least ‘minimal merit within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP
statute.’” (Id. at p. 793, italics added; Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v.

4 Defendants argue Miller’s evidence shows the only content on
the website was copies of the leaflets. In other words, the website simply
republished the leaflets and contained no unique defamatory content.
Consequently, they assert Miller’s claim based on the website violates the
single-publication rule. This “rule provides ‘that, for any single edition of a
newspaper or book, there [is] but a single potential action for a defamatory
statement contained in the newspaper or book, no matter how many copies of
the newspaper or the book were distributed.’” (Hebrew Academy of San
Francisco v. Goldman (2007) 42 Cal.4th 883, 890; Civ. Code, § 3425.3.) Even
if the website only contained copies of the leaflets, Miller’s defamation claim
based on the website would not be barred by the single-publication rule. The
rule does not apply “when the original defamer repeats or recirculates his or
her original remarks to a new audience.” (Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1230, 1243.) The record shows the leaflets were mailed to persons in
Newport Beach. Publication of the leaflets on the website recirculated the
allegedly defamatory material to a new, broader audience.

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Fitzgibbons, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 530 [a plaintiff is given a degree of
leeway due to the early stage in which an anti-SLAPP motion is filed].)
B. The Fourth Claim
As we explain in the next section, the fourth claim was not pled
with sufficient specificity. Thus, the court properly granted the motion as to
this claim and we will not address the court’s reasoning for striking it. (See
Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“[I]f
a judgment is correct on any theory, the appellate court will affirm it
regardless of the trial court’s reasoning”].)
We next turn to defendants’ arguments on their appeal, which
they also advanced in response to Miller’s cross-appeal.
III.
PLEADING ISSUES
A. Specificity of the Pleadings
“In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim
[citation], a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must ‘“state[] and
substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.”’ [Citations.] Put another way, the
plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Wilson v.
Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.) “If the pleadings are
not adequate to support a cause of action, the plaintiff has failed to carry his
burden in resisting the motion.” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13,
31.)
“‘“The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel
must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.”’”
(Gilbert v. Sykes, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 31.) “[T]he pleading itself

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provides the outer boundaries of the issues that are to be addressed in an
anti-SLAPP motion. [Citation.] Because ‘[t]he general rule is that the words
constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded
verbatim, in the complaint’ [citation], a court need not consider assertions of
defamatory statements that are not alleged in the complaint.” (Medical
Marijuana, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) Pleading the substance of the
defamatory statement is insufficient. The actual statements must be pled.
(Id. at p. 894.)
For libel claims, the specificity rule exists to provide adequate
notice to both the court and the defendant of the exact words or pictures
alleged to be defamatory. (Medical Marijuana, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p.
894; Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 948.) The material must
be specifically identified for the court so it can determine as a matter of law
whether the material is facially defamatory “‘or capable of the defamatory
meaning attributed to it by the innuendo.’” (Comstock, at p. 948.) The
defamatory material must be identified for the defendant so he “‘may have
notice of the particular charge which he is required to answer.’” (Des Granges
v. Crall (1915) 27 Cal.App. 313, 315.)
Defendants contend the complaint failed to specifically identify
the defamatory material for the claims based on the leaflets (the second,
third, and fourth claims). They argue Miller’s theory of libel is dependent on a
certain arrangement of text and images to create a defamatory implication.
As such, Miller was required to allege how the positioning of the text and
images in the different leaflets was defamatory. We agree that Miller did not
sufficiently identify the defamatory implication created by the text and
images in the third and fourth claims (the claims based on Appendices B and

15
C), but we find he properly pled the second claim (the claim based on
Appendix A).
1. The Second Claim
It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words, so we advise
readers to review Appendices A, B, and C before reading the descriptions
below.
Appendix A is a leaflet folded in half. One side of the outside
portion, which appears designed for the reader to view first, contains the
Epoch Times masthead followed by the Epoch Times quote: “‘According to
Miller, his business[es] struggled during the pandemic lockdown, when, for
several months, people stopped traveling and driving, and he was no able to
pay his employees. [¶] However, he found a run-around. [¶] ‘I said, I can’t
afford to pay my people, but I can afford to feed them,’ he said. He said he
turned two of his service centers into feeding locations for his employees, and
he and his wife rented a U-Haul and filled it with diapers for their children
. . . .’” Underneath, a portion of the Epoch Times quote is excerpted and
repeated in enlarged text: “‘. . . I CAN’T AFFORD TO PAY MY PEOPLE . . .’”
Based on the size and location of this excerpt, it is reasonable to assume the
reader’s eye would be drawn to it prior to reading the smaller and longer text
of the Epoch Times quote (if they read the full quote at all).
On the other side of the closed portion of Appendix A, which the
reader would encounter next, there are screenshots of what appears to be an
official source showing four PPP loans received by each of the companies. The
amounts of the loans are circled. Next to each PPP loan screenshot is a
caption repeating the name of each company and the amount of the PPP loan
it purportedly received: Expert Auto received $2.45 million, Prestige received
$1 million, Automotive Creations received $1.3 million, and Dynamic Auto

16
received $120,000. Underneath these screenshots and captions is large,
capitalized text asking, “THEN WHAT DID MILLER DO WITH THE PPP
LOANS?”
When opened, the inside portion of Appendix A contains a single-
page horizontal layout. The top of the page states in large text, “Since His
$4.9 MILLION PPP Loans Were Forgiven, Tom ‘Slick’ Miller. . . .” Below this
text, on the left side of the page, are pictures of four houses. Each picture
contains a caption listing an address and dollar amount showing the price of
each property. The reported prices for the four properties are $4.9 million,
$2.5 million, $1.8 million, and $2.5 million. Below the four pictures and their
respective captions is large text stating, “Miller bought four houses in
Newport for over $11.5 MILLION.” Given that the English language is
generally read from left to right, it is reasonable to assume readers would
view these pictures and text first before moving their eyes to the right.
On the right side of the page, there appears to be a screenshot of
a tax form. Some of boxes on the form are circled. Below one of the circles is
large text stating, “$525,000!” Below that text, is a box with smaller text
claiming, “Miller loaned $525,000 to his city council campaign for a job that
pays $1,166 per month.”
Below the image of the tax form is another box containing a
picture with a man and woman in the forefront. Next to this picture is text
stating, “Tom ‘Slick’ Miller Has Teamed Up With Councilwoman Joy Brenner
to Run Newport Beach.” Given this text, we presume the man in the picture
is Miller and the woman is Joy Brenner. Below the picture and this text,
Appendix A states, “WE CAN DO BETTER.” Below that is large text stating,
“STOP Team Tom Slick.”

17
The very bottom of this page contains smaller text. On the left,
there is text directing readers to the website for more information. On the
right, there is a small text box indicating the ad was paid for by Safe
Neighborhoods.
The arrangement of the text and images in Appendix A largely
appears to resemble Miller’s description of the website. On Appendix A, the
reader first sees large text stating, “. . . I CAN’T AFFORD TO PAY MY
PEOPLE . . . .” The reader would flip Appendix A over and see Miller’s
companies received millions of dollars in PPP loans. The reader would then
be asked, “THEN WHAT DID MILLER DO WITH THE PPP LOANS?” The
reader would then open Appendix A and see that since Miller’s $4.9 million in
PPP loans were forgiven, he had bought the four properties for over $11.5
million.
The arrangement of the above elements in Appendix A appears to
match the arrangement of the text and images on the alleged website. A jury
could conclude the combination of these elements on the website and
Appendix A create the impression that Miller misappropriated PPP loan
money to purchase real estate. The sequence of images and text create a
narrative. Readers are given Miller’s quote that he could not “afford to pay
[his] people.” (Capitalization & ellipses omitted.) They are then told Miller’s
companies received millions of dollars in PPP loans and shown official
looking images of the loan amounts. Appendix A then asks in large text,
“THEN WHAT DID MILLER DO WITH THE PPP LOANS?” With this
question fresh in their minds, readers open Appendix A and see text stating
that since Miller’s loans were forgiven, “Miller bought four houses in Newport
for over $11.5 MILLION.” Simply put, based on the order and proximity of
the above elements, a jury could conclude that the question asking what

18
Miller did with the PPP loans is answered when the reader opens
Appendix A: he bought four houses for over $11.5 million.
Since the organization of the text and images on the alleged
website largely appears to resemble Appendix A, it was sufficient for
defendants to generally allege that the false accusations contained on the
website were republished in Appendix A. The reader can review the
complaint’s description of the website and Appendix A together and
reasonably infer how the sequence of text and images in both create the
defamatory implication that Miller misappropriated PPP loans to purchase
the four properties.
2. The Third and Fourth Claims
The third and fourth claims are based on Appendices B and C,
respectively, which we describe below.
Appendix B is folded in half. Thus, like Appendix A, the reader
would likely see the outside portions first before opening the leaflet to view
the inside. On one side of the outside portion, there is text stating, “MEET
TEAM TOM ‘SLICK’ MILLER.” Below that header are two pictures. The
picture on the left shows a man (apparently Miller) embracing a woman from
behind. Below that picture is a caption stating, “Tom ‘Slick’ Miller $4.9
million reasons to be happy.” The picture on the right appears to be the same
picture from Appendix A showing Miller with Joy Brenner. Below the picture
is a caption stating, “Councilwoman Joy ‘Clyda’ Brenner.” Below these
pictures and captions is more text stating, “Tom ‘Slick’ Miller has teamed up
with Councilwoman Joy Brenner to run Newport Beach. We can do better.”
(Italics added.) This is followed by “STOP Team Tom Slick.” At the very
bottom is a message directing readers to learn more at the website followed
by a box indicating the ad was paid for by Safe Neighborhoods.

19
On the other side of the outside portion of Appendix B, the top
shows the Epoch Times masthead followed by author, date, and headline of
the Epoch Times article. The headline is followed by a portion of the Epoch
Times quote, which generally appears to mirror the quote used in Appendix
A. There is large text underneath the Epoch Times quote stating, “SEEMS
LIKE A DECENT GUY . . . BUT THERE’S MORE.”
Appendix B opens up to expose a single page vertical layout,
which the reader would view from the top down. At the top of the page is
small text stating, “MILLER SAID HE COULDN’T PAY HIS EMPLOYEES,
SO WHAT DID HE DO WITH $4.9 MILLION IN PAYCHECK
PROTECTION (PPP) MONEY?” Beneath is smaller text providing more
information about the loans received by the companies. The majority of the
layout is occupied by the same screenshots of the PPP loans that were used in
Appendix A. Like Appendix A, the amount of each loan is circled. Next to
each screenshot is a box with text stating the name of each company and the
amount of the PPP loan it received. There is also text in the middle right of
the page stating that “[t]he purpose of these loans was to pay employees
during the government-imposed COVID shutdowns. All of Miller’s PPP loans
were forgiven by the U.S. Small Business Administration.”
Near the very bottom of the page, the leaflet asks, “He said he
couldn’t pay his employees, what did he do with the money?” After this, the
very bottom of Appendix B states, “Vote NO on Tom ‘Slick’ Miller.”
As for Appendix C, the trial court found the copy attached to the
complaint was “very hard to read” and was “not clear enough to find that [the
fourth claim] has minimal merit.” Given the court’s ruling, we describe the
Appendix C attached to the complaint. We note any illegible information in
this copy of Appendix C and identify where we have added material

20
information from higher quality copies of Appendix C contained in the record
(we will not include illegible information that is immaterial to our analysis).
Like the other leaflets, Appendix C is folded in half. On the
outside, on the portion of the folded leaflet containing the return address and
the recipient’s address, there is large text stating, “Vetted [¶] [vet-id] [¶]
adjective.” Below this, the page states, “Def: investigate (someone)
thoroughly, especially to ensure that they are suitable for a job requiring
loyalty or trustworthiness.”
When the folded Appendix C is turned over, the portion on the
other side of the fold states, “Since His $4.9 million PPP [illegible] Were
Forgiven, Tom ‘Slick Miller’ [illegible].” Below this header is a row containing
text and five pictures. The first picture from the left is illegible. Above it is
text stating, “Miller [illegible] four [illegible] Newport [illegible] $11.5
million.” To the right of this picture and text are four other pictures arranged
horizontally. Starting from the left, the first picture is illegible. The next
three pictures are of the houses that were also used in Appendix A. The three
legible pictures have captions. Most of the text is illegible, but one says “$1.6
million,” and another says “$2.5 million.” From the higher quality Appendix
in the record, this portion of Appendix C mirrors the portion of Appendix A
showing pictures of the four properties Miller bought along with captions
showing each property’s address and purchase price.
Beneath the pictures of the houses and accompanying captions
are more pictures and text and screenshots that are mostly illegible. There is
large text stating, “$525,000” on the bottom left side, “WE CAN DO
BETTER” on the bottom right side, and “STOP Team Tom Slick” at the very
bottom of the page. A higher quality copy of Appendix C shows the illegible
portion mirrors the portion of Appendix A concerning (1) the $525,000 Miller

21
allegedly loaned his city council campaign, and (2) Miller’s relationship with
councilwoman Joy Brenner.
Appendix C opens into a single-page vertical layout, designed to
be read from the top down. The text at the top states in large letters, “Tom
‘Slick’ Miller’” followed by “Who Vetted This Guy?” To the right of this text is
a picture of a man, who we assume is Miller, embracing a woman from
behind. Below this row of text is a banner stating, “Millions In State &
Federal Tax Liens.” Underneath the banner is text stating, “Over the past 22
years, has accumulated millions in state and federal tax [illegible].” Beneath
are pictures of what appear to be official documents. On top of each picture is
text indicating a sum of money followed by “IRS,” which we assume is meant
to indicate the amount of each alleged tax lien. Under these documents is
large text stating, “CAN WE TRUST MILLER WITH THE CITY’S TAX
DOLLARS?”
The section following this question is illegible. Higher quality
copies of Appendix C show what appears to be a copy of a letter to Miller from
the Department of Justice. To the left of this letter is text explaining,
“Miller’s company fined $159,000 U.S. Department of Justice – Employee
Discrimination.”
This illegible section is followed by a picture of the Epoch Times
masthead. Underneath the masthead is a quote from Miller, which begins, “‘I
said,’” but the remainder of the quote illegible. Higher quality copies of
Appendix C show the full quote states, “‘I said, I can’t afford to pay my
people, but I can afford to feed them.’” Finally, underneath this quote, is large
text asking, “WHAT DID MILLER DO WITH ALMOST $5 MILLION IN PPP
LOANS?” This question is followed by screenshots of the PPP loans with the
amount of each loan circled.

22
Here, both the third and fourth claims lack minimal merit
because Miller did not specifically identify the defamatory material in
Appendices B and C underlying these claims. As set forth above, the
complaint did not make any effort to describe the content of the leaflets.
Rather, it only detailed how the arrangement of text and images on the
website created a defamatory implication that Miller misappropriated PPP
loans. The complaint then generally alleged the same defamatory statements
were republished in the leaflets, and it attached copies of the leaflets for the
readers to view.
The contents of Appendices B and C are materially different from
the alleged website. As described in the complaint, the website contained four
juxtaposed elements that created the defamatory implication that Miller
misappropriated PPP loans: (1) the portion of the Epoch Times quote in
which Miller said, “‘I can’t afford to pay my people’”; (2) next to this quote
were images and text emphasizing the amounts of the PPP loans given to the
companies; (3) beneath these PPP loan images and text was a question in
large text, “‘THEN WHAT DID MILLER DO WITH THE PPP LOANS?’”; and
(4) this question was followed by pictures of the four properties with captions
showing the address and purchase price of each property and the statement,
“‘Miller bought four houses in Newport for over $11.5 MILLION.”’
Significantly, the complaint alleged that “[w]hen viewed together,
the [portion of the Epoch Times quote], the PPP Image[s], the question, ‘Then
what did Miller do with the PPP loans?’ followed by the illustrated statement,
‘Miller bought four houses in Newport for over $11.5 MILION,’ convey the
false and defamatory accusation that Miller took out four PPP loans for his
companies because he could not ‘afford to pay’ his people, but then converted
the loan money to his personal use and used it to purchase pricy residential

23
property.” (Italics added.) Put differently, the specific sequence of these four
elements on the website can be read to create the defamatory implication
that Miller misappropriated PPP loan money to buy the four properties.
The combination of text and images in Appendices B and C are
distinctly different than those described on the website. Significantly,
Appendix B does not mention Miller’s purchase of the four properties, which
is a key component of the defamation claim based on the website. The
complaint did not explain how the arrangement of text and images in
Appendix B created a defamatory implication. Nor did the complaint identify
the specific defamatory implication made by Appendix B. And, given the
differences between the alleged website and Appendix B, the complaint’s
description of the defamatory material on the website does not fill these gaps.
Similarly, while Appendix C references the four properties, it
does so on the outside page of the closed leaflet. Thus, the reader would likely
see this reference prior to being asked what Miller did with the PPP loans,
which is on the inside of the leaflet. On the website, the order of these items
was reversed. The complaint alleged the reader was asked what Miller did
with the PPP loans prior to being told he purchased the four properties for
over $11.5 million.
Further, unlike the website or Appendix A, Appendix C
references (1) the vetting process for Miller, (2) Miller’s alleged tax liens, and
(3) a fine apparently imposed on one of Miller’s companies by the Department
of Justice. These references interrupt the statements concerning Miller’s real
estate purchases, the PPP loans, and the question asking what Miller did
with the PPP loans. As such, their placement creates a different tone and
context that was not present on the website or Appendix A. Given this
additional information, the complaint needed to identify the defamatory

24
implication made by Appendix C and allege how it was created by the
combination of images and text in this leaflet.
To the extent Miller argues Appendices B and C suggest he
improperly used PPP loans and/or lied in the Epoch Times article about not
being able to pay his employees, the complaint did not specifically allege
these Appendices contained such defamatory implications. Nor does it allege
how the text and images in these leaflets created such implications.5
In short, the complaint failed to identify the specific defamatory
statements made in Appendices B and C. It is insufficient for Miller to rely on
the allegations concerning the website since its arrangement of text and
images differs from those on Appendices B and C. The complaint unfairly
asks the court and defendants to analyze these Appendices themselves and
construct their defamatory meaning for him.
Finally, we note that Miller did not argue he could amend these
claims to make them viable. And even if he had, generally, “[w]hen a cause of
action is dismissed pursuant to section 425.16, the plaintiff has no right to
amend the claim.” (Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1293;
Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073.)
Since we have found Miller’s third and fourth claims lack merit,
the remainder of this opinion will address defendants’ arguments in the
context of the first claim (the website) and the second claim (Appendix A).

5 Though Miller has attempted to explain the defamatory
significance of the text and images in Appendices B and C on appeal, we
disregard such contentions. Miller was required to make such allegations in
the complaint, not on appeal. (Medical Marijuana, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
p. 893.)

25
B. Defamation by Implication
“A statement is defamatory when it tends ‘directly to injure [a
person] in respect to his office, profession, trade or business . . . .’ [Citation.]
Statements that contain such a charge directly, and without the need for
explanatory matter, are libelous per se. [Citation.] A statement can also be
libelous per se if it contains a charge by implication from the language
employed by the speaker and a listener could understand the defamatory
meaning without the necessity of knowing extrinsic explanatory matter.”
(McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112.)
Because Miller’s remaining claims rely on the juxtaposition of
certain text and images to create meaning rather than direct statements,
defendants contend they rely on a theory of defamation by implication. Citing
Issa v. Applegate (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 689 (Issa), defendants argue a
complaint must allege the following to establish a claim for defamation by
implication: “(1) [the plaintiff’s] interpretation of the statement is reasonable;
(2) the implication or implications to be drawn convey defamatory facts, not
opinions; (3) the challenged implications are not ‘“substantially true”’; and
(4) the identified reasonable implications could also be reasonably deemed
defamatory.” (Id. at p. 707.)
However, Issa does not state a plaintiff must allege the above
elements in the complaint to properly plead a claim for defamation by
implication. Rather, Issa states that “the plaintiff must demonstrate” these
elements “to maintain an action for defamation by implication.” (Issa, supra,
31 Cal.App.5th at p. 707, italics added.) Thus, it appears these elements must
be shown at trial, but they do not need to be pled in the complaint.
Besides, even if such elements must be pled, Miller has
sufficiently alleged them for the first and second claims. As set forth above,

26
the complaint explained how the images and text on the website and
Appendix A imply that Miller misappropriated PPP loans to purchase the
four properties (the second element). The complaint stated Miller did not use
PPP loans for personal use (the third element). This implication was
allegedly defamatory because it falsely accused Miller of unlawful and
unethical conduct (the fourth element). Finally, the complaint alleged people
reasonably understood the combination of text and images on the website and
Appendix A to mean Miller misused PPP loans to purchase the four
properties (the first element).
C. False Assertion of Fact
Opinions are not actionable. But “a statement that suggests or
implies a false assertion of fact is actionable. [Citations.] The ‘dispositive
question’ in such a case is ‘whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude
the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.’
[Citation.] This is ordinarily a question of law for the court, ‘unless the
statement is susceptible of both an innocent and a libelous meaning, in which
case the jury must decide how the statement was understood.’” (Edward v.
Ellis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 780, 790.)
“In determining whether the disputed statement communicates
or implies a provably false assertion of fact, we look at the totality of the
circumstances, looking first to the language of the statement and whether it
was understood in a defamatory sense, and then considering the context in
which the statement was made. [Citation.] We focus not on the literal truth
or falsity of each word in a statement, but rather on ‘“‘whether the “gist or
sting” of the statement is true or false, benign or defamatory, in substance.’”’
[Citations.] We also consider ‘whether the reasonable or “average” reader
would so interpret the material. [Citations.] The “average reader” is a

27
reasonable member of the audience to which the material was originally
addressed.’” (Edward v. Ellis, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 790–791.)
Defendants argue the website and Appendix A contain no false
assertion of fact and that Miller’s interpretation of these materials is facially
unreasonable. They begin by pointing out that Appendix A states Miller’s
PPP loans were forgiven. In the trial court, Miller argued defendants knew
he had not misappropriated PPP loans because (1) they knew the PPP loans
were forgiven, and (2) one of their sources for the PPP loans, a website called
FederalPay, explains PPP loans are only forgiven if the borrower shows they
were used for permitted purposes. On appeal, defendants reference Miller’s
argument from the trial court and turn it against him. Defendants contend
that if they knew PPP loans were only forgiven if used for permitted
purposes, then they had no intent to defame Miller because they stated his
loans were forgiven on Appendix A. In other words, stating the PPP loans
were forgiven on Appendix A told the reader that Miller had not misused the
loans.
Defendants then spend several pages explaining that the
website and leaflets were meant to convey a message that Miller was a
hypocrite and untrustworthy. He was a multimillionaire, campaigning on a
small government ticket, who criticized the government’s COVID-19 response
but took PPP loans from the government. They contend the material
concerning Miller’s purchase of the four properties was meant to show how
the PPP loans indirectly made him wealthier. Specifically, the PPP loans paid
for the operating costs of his companies. This allowed his companies to save
on costs, increasing their profitability, which financially benefitted Miller.
Defendants proposed reading of the website and Appendix A is
reasonable. But we agree with Miller that based on the arrangement of

28
images and text in these materials, they can also be reasonably interpreted to
imply that Miller misappropriated the PPP loans to purchase the four
properties. As described above, this implication is created by the sequence of
(1) Miller’s statement that “‘I CAN’T AFFORD TO PAY MY PEOPLE’”, (2)
the screenshots of the PPP loan amounts, (3) the question asking, “THEN
WHAT DID MILLER DO WITH THE PPP LOANS?”, and (4) the text stating,
“Miller bought four houses in Newport for over $11.5 MILLION” along with
the photos, addresses, and prices of each house. This implication is a factual
statement, not an opinion. Likewise, we disagree with defendants’ assertion
that the website and Appendix A simply ask an open-ended question about
what Miller did with the PPP loans. A factfinder could reasonably conclude
the question is not open ended but is answered on the website and in
Appendix A: Miller used the loans to purchase the four properties.
Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. (9th Cir. 2016) 830 F.3d
881 (Manzari) is instructive. In Manzari, the defendant was a newspaper
that published a story about the shutdown of the pornography industry in
Los Angeles after a female performer tested positive for HIV. “The headline
read: ‘PORN INDUSTRY SHUTS DOWN WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT
AFTER ‘FEMALE PERFORMER’ TESTS POSITIVE FOR HIV.’ After a few
lines of text, the article contained a picture of [the plaintiff] lying
suggestively across a bed with ‘In Bed With Danni’ [(the plaintiff’s performer
name was Danni Ashe)] written in neon lights behind her. Under her
photograph was the caption: ‘Moratorium: The porn industry in California
was shocked on Wednesday by the announcement that a performer had
tested HIV positive.’ The article stated that the actress was ‘new to the
industry’ and that ‘the performer was not immediately identified.’ Later in

29
the article were two other photographs, but not of [the plaintiff].” (Id. at p.
884.)
The plaintiff sued defendant for defamation on grounds “the
juxtaposition of her image with the explosive headline and caption conveyed
the [false] impression that she is the performer who tested positive for HIV.”
(Manzari, supra, 830 F.3d at pp. 885–886.) The defendant filed an anti-
SLAPP motion in response. (Id. at p. 886.) Among other things, it claimed the
identity of the performer who had tested positive was unknown. It had simply
selected stock photographs to illustrate the story. The defendant “included
the [plaintiff’s picture] because it was a ‘good, non-obscene photograph to
illustrate an article about the pornographic film industry.’” (Id. at p. 886.)
The defendant also claimed the text of the article explained the performer
“was new to the industry and had not been identified” which was “logically
inconsistent with the inference that the actress in question was [the
plaintiff].” (Id. at p. 890.)
Applying California law, the Ninth Circuit rejected these
arguments. Although the article “did not affirmatively state that [the
plaintiff] was the performer with HIV, . . . the implication and the conclusion
were neither subtle nor difficult to divine. The bold headline and its content,
juxtaposed with her photograph and yet another caption under her picture
that said the industry was ‘shocked’ that a ‘performer had tested HIV
positive,’ was sufficient for a reasonable reader to infer that [the plaintiff]
was the performer who had tested positive for HIV.” (Manzari, supra, 830
F.3d at p. 889.) The court reasoned, “a photograph itself can convey both an
implicit and an explicit message and . . . the headline, caption and
photograph taken together are also a statement.” (Id. at pp. 890.) Even
though the article stated the performer had not been identified, “[a] passing

30
reference buried in the article can hardly cure the obvious message conveyed
by the headline, photo and caption.” (Id. at p. 891.)
Like Manzari, the arrangement of the pictures and the text on
the website and Appendix A create a reasonable implication that Miller
misappropriated PPP loans to purchase the four properties. Even though the
website and Appendix A stated the PPP loans were forgiven, this information
was insufficient to cure the defamatory implication.6 First, this argument
assumes the average reader would understand the requirements for PPP loan
forgiveness. But it is unclear whether the average reader would have such
knowledge or would try to obtain it after viewing the website or Appendix A.
Second, even if the average reader knew the PPP loan forgiveness
requirements, he or she might still believe Miller had misappropriated the
PPP loans and defrauded the government given the strong implication
created by the text and pictures. We cannot say as a matter of law that
Miller’s interpretation of the website and Appendix A is unreasonable. A jury
must answer this question. (Edward v. Ellis, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p.
790.)
Defendants also argue that many of the statements on the
website and Appendix A are true. The amounts of the PPP loans given to the
companies is largely uncontested (save for the dispute as to whether Miller
controlled Prestige and Automotive Creations). The quote about Miller being
unable to pay his employees is from the Epoch Times article. It is also
undisputed that Miller purchased the four properties. “But even if a

6 Though the complaint did not allege that the website stated the
loans had been forgiven, we can determine this through the record. The
record shows the website contained copies of the leaflets. Some of the leaflets
said the loans had been forgiven. Thus, there was information on the website
that the loans had been forgiven.

31
statement is literally accurate, defamation may be proven if it has a false
implication.” (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 293.) “‘If the
defendant juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection
between them, or otherwise creates a defamatory implication, he may be held
responsible for the defamatory implication, even though the particular facts
are correct.’” (Price v. Stossel (9th Cir. 2010) 620 F.3d 992, 1003.) Even if the
text and pictures on the website and Appendix A are individually true, they
are arranged in a manner that can be reasonably read to falsely imply that
Miller misused PPP loans to purchase the four properties.
IV.
ACTUAL MALICE
A. Evidence Concerning Defendants
When a plaintiff is a limited public figure, he or she must prove
by clear and convincing evidence the defendant made the allegedly
defamatory statement with actual malice. (Edward v. Ellis, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at pp. 790, 793.) Actual malice means the defendant made the
statement “‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.’” (Id. at p. 793.) There is no dispute the actual
malice standard applies here.
Defendants assert the “‘minimal merit’” standard typically
applied in prong two of anti-SLAPP analysis does not apply to actual malice.
Similarly, while courts typically accept the plaintiff’s evidence as true in
prong two, defendants claim independent review is required for evidence
concerning actual malice. But as this division recently explained when
analyzing actual malice, the “burden on prong two is ‘not high,’ and we are
required to ‘accept as true all evidence favorable to’ [the plaintiff]. [Citation.]
Under that low standard, [the plaintiff must meet] his burden of showing his

32
libel claim against [the defendant] has ‘minimal merit.’” (Edward v. Ellis,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 794; Collins v. Waters (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 70,
80-81, 84.) In prong two, “defamation plaintiffs need not establish malice by
clear and convincing evidence. Rather, they must meet their minimal burden
by introducing sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of actual malice.
In other words, they must establish a reasonable probability they can
produce clear and convincing evidence showing that the statements were
made with actual malice.” (Collins, at p. 80.)
“‘“[A]ctual malice can be proved by circumstantial evidence.”
[Citation.] Considerations such as “anger and hostility toward the plaintiff,”
“reliance upon sources known to be unreliable [citations] or known to be
biased against the plaintiff,” and “failure to investigate” may, “in an
appropriate case, indicate that the publisher himself had serious doubts
regarding the truth of his publication.” [Citation.] Such evidence is relevant
“to the extent that it reflects on the subjective attitude of the publisher.”’
[Citation.] However, ‘failure to investigate, without more, generally is
insufficient’ to show malice. [Citation.] And ‘we will not infer actual malice
solely from evidence of ill will, personal spite or bad motive.’” (Edward v.
Ellis, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 793.)
In their appellate briefs, defendants concede they had no reason
to believe Miller misused PPP loans to buy the four properties. To the extent
a defamatory implication was made on the website and Appendix A, they
maintain it was unintentional and based on a misreading of these
publications. They contend these publications were intended to communicate
that the PPP loans paid the costs of Miller’s companies, which boosted their
profit margins and, in turn, made Miller wealthier so he could buy the four
properties. We are unpersuaded. The record contains enough evidence to

33
establish a reasonable probability that Miller can prove actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence at trial.
The record shows Ellis has been a political consultant for three
decades. There is also evidence he has a history of making leaflets and
websites opposing certain candidates. In doing so, he juxtaposes images,
quotes, and screenshots to create unflattering portraits of his targets. We do
not cite this evidence as proof that Ellis is prone to commit defamation or
that he acted with ill intent. Rather, this evidence suggests Ellis is an
experienced political campaigner. Thus, it can be reasonably inferred he
knows how to frame text and images to convey ideas, and he understands the
suggestive power that certain text and images can have when placed
together. This evidence supports Miller’s claim that the arrangement of text
and images on the website and Appendix A was purposeful, not coincidental,
and was strategically designed to imply that Miller had misused PPP loans to
purchase real estate.
In Manzari, the defendant claimed it did not intend to imply the
plaintiff had HIV but had simply selected a stock photo to illustrate its story.
(Manzari, supra, 830 F.3d at pp. 885–886.) However, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had “raised sufficient factual questions for a jury to conclude
that the [defendant] acted with reckless disregard for the defamatory
implication in its article . . . . [The plaintiff’s] evidence is sufficient to support
her claim that the [defendant] placed her photograph in the article,
juxtaposed with the incendiary headline and caption, ‘[knowing or acting] in
reckless disregard of whether its words would be interpreted by the average
reader as a false statement of fact.’” (Id. at p. 892.) “The undisputed message
that the article is about [the plaintiff]—apparent from the headline,

34
photograph, and caption—supports the conclusion that the [defendant] acted
with reckless disregard.” (Ibid.)
Among other things, the court noted that the defendant had
replaced the original caption from the stock photo with its own caption
stating that a performer had tested positive for HIV. It also failed to include
any explanation next to the plaintiff’s photograph that she was not the
performer that had tested positive. (Manzari, supra, 830 F.3d at p. 892.)
Though the defendant denied it had intended the implication that the
plaintiff had tested positive for HIV, the court cautioned, “the denial must be
read in the context of other evidence. If all a publisher needed to do was to
deny the allegation, all implied defamation suits would be dead on
arrival. . . . [W]illful blindness cannot immunize publishers where they act
with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the implication they are
making.” (Id. at p. 893.)
Here, the positioning of the text and images in Appendix A and
the website was designed by Ellis. It was an editorial choice to juxtapose the
question asking what Miller did with the PPP loans and the statement that
he had purchased millions of dollars in real property accompanied by photos,
addresses, and purchase prices. Given the strong implication created by these
elements and Ellis’s decades of political experience, a reasonable jury could
infer he acted either knowingly or in reckless disregard of “‘whether [his]
words would be interpreted by the average reader as a false statement of
fact.’” (Manzari, supra, 830 F.3d at p. 892.) Further, though Appendix A and
the website stated the PPP loans had been forgiven, it did not explain what
that meant. Defendants may convince a jury that any defamatory implication
was accidental. But, given the record, there is enough evidence at this stage
to find Miller’s first and second claims have minimal merit.

35
B. Evidence Concerning Safe Neighborhoods
Defendants also contend there is no evidence showing Safe
Neighborhoods acted with actual malice. We disagree. There is sufficient
evidence to meet the minimal merit threshold. Ellis is listed as the “Principal
Officer” on the Statement of Organization Recipient Committee filed with the
State. The principal officer of a political action “committee is the individual
primarily responsible for approving the political activity of the committee,”
which includes, “[a]uthorizing the content of the communications made by the
committee.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18402.1, subd. (b)(1).) There is no
dispute Ellis designed Appendix A and the website. Appendix A identifies
itself as an ad paid for by Safe Neighborhoods. Safe Neighborhoods also
concedes it published a website concerning Miller (though it objects to
Miller’s characterization of it). Thus, there is evidence Ellis was acting on
behalf of Safe Neighborhoods when he approved the publication of the
website and Appendix A.
V.
DAMAGES
Defendants claim Miller has not shown Appendix A and the
website damaged his reputation. But the law presumes damages where
statements are libelous per se. (Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986)
181 Cal.App.3d 377, 382.) Defendants argue this presumption should not
apply because Miller consented to reputational damage by entering politics.
While Miller may have consented to garden-variety political mudslinging, he
did not consent to having a political action committee falsely imply he had
misappropriated PPP loans to purchase millions of dollars in real property.
Further, Miller provided a declaration outlining the damage to
his reputation. Miller stated he began experiencing harassment after the

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allegedly defamatory material was published. Among other things, his house
was egged, and people called him a crook and screamed obscenities at him.
This evidence, which we accept as true, shows Miller suffered reputational
harm.
VI.
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
Given our rulings above, we do not address the trial court’s
denial of Miller’s motion to take Ellis’s deposition. To clarify, our opinion does
not prevent Miller from seeking to take Ellis’s deposition in the future.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The court correctly denied the motion as to the second claim and correctly
granted it as to the fourth claim. But it erred by denying the motion as to the
third claim and granting it as to the first claim. On remand, we direct the
court to enter a new order granting the motion as to the third and fourth
claims (the claims based on Appendices B and C) and denying it as to the
first and second claims (the claims based on the website and Appendix A).
Each party shall bear their own costs on this appeal.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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Appendix A

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Appendix B

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Appendix C

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