CourtListener 10125073•People v. Gutierrez CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 9/25/24 P. v. Gutierrez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087170
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. DF009589A)
v.
SALVADOR FERNANDO GUTIERREZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Elizabet
Rodriguez, Judge.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, appellant and defendant Salvador Fernando Gutierrez (appellant) was
convicted of attempted murder and other offenses with firearm enhancements, one prior
strike conviction, and two prior prison term enhancements. He was sentenced to the
second strike determinate term of 26 years eight months, plus a consecutive
indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
In 2023, the trial court recalled appellant’s sentence to dismiss the now-invalid
prior prison term enhancements pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75, and conducted
a full resentencing hearing. The court granted appellant’s motion to dismiss one of the
firearm enhancements, but denied his motions to dismiss the prior strike conviction, to
dismiss or reduce the second firearm enhancement, or impose midterms. The court
resentenced appellant to 21 years eight months plus 25 years to life.
On appeal from the court’s resentencing order, appellate counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, which summarized the facts and
procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to
independently review the record. Appellant filed a letter brief and argued the trial court
failed to conduct a full resentencing hearing, failed to understand the scope of its
discretion to resentence him, and the matter should be remanded for the court to impose a
lesser sentence. We affirm.
FACTS2
“On October 29, 2009, police received a report of a shooting at 2210 San Felice
Way in Delano, the home of Brenda Cadiz and her husband Melecio Cadiz. Brenda’s
1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 After notice to the parties, and without objection, this court takes judicial notice of
the records before this court in appellant’s direct appeal, People v. Gutierrez (Jan. 8,
2013, F062544) [nonpub. opn.] (Gutierrez I), from which the following facts are taken.
2.
brother, Joejo Raquinio, lived with her. Officers found Brenda lying in a neighboring
driveway with one gunshot wound to the head and three to the left arm. She and
Raquinio told the officers that a man had come to the house saying he was seeking a job
with Melecio. When he was told there were no jobs, he forced his way into the house,
produced a gun, and shot Brenda repeatedly.…” (Gutierrez I, supra, F062544, at p. 2.)
The man rushed toward Raquinio, they struggled, and the man pointed the gun at
Raquinio’s head. The man fired three shots at Raquinio and the shots missed him. When
the man ran out of bullets, he hit Raquinio in the head with the gun. Raquinio hit the man
over the head with a vase. The man fled on foot. He had once worked for the family.
Raquinio and Brenda knew him as Fernando.
“Following a trail of drops of blood, the officers tracked [appellant] to 2222
Ruffion Court, a block away, where they found him hiding in a shed, bleeding, in the
back yard. With him in the shed were some pieces of jewelry and a glass smoking pipe.
Brenda and her daughter, Kaelah Cadiz, identified [appellant] as the man who had been at
the house.
“The officers took a set of car keys from [appellant]. They found his car, which
was parked a short distance from Brenda’s house, and searched it pursuant to a warrant.
Inside was a gym bag containing 100 to 150 pieces of jewelry and some baseball
memorabilia. Some of the jewelry and the baseball memorabilia had been reported stolen
from a home in Visalia. On the roof of the house at 2214 Ruffion Court, two houses
south of the shed where [appellant] was hiding, the officers found a .32-caliber revolver
with four spent shell casings in the cylinder. [¶] … [¶]
“[Appellant] testified at trial, contradicting the account given by the victims. In
his version, he was a methamphetamine dealer and Melecio Cadiz was his supplier. In
the past, Melecio had accepted payment for methamphetamine in the form of jewelry and
electronic devices. Sometimes Brenda chose the pieces.
3.
“[Appellant] came to the Cadizes’ house on October 29, 2009, to show Brenda
jewelry. They sat in her car and smoked some methamphetamine, and then went in the
house to look at the jewelry. [Appellant] set out some pieces on a coffee table in the
living room while Brenda talked on the phone in the kitchen. Raquinio came into the
living room and looked at the jewelry. He offered [appellant] $250 for some rings,
including a Kansas City Royals American League Championship ring, but [appellant]
wanted $500. Raquinio became angry and pulled out a pistol.
“[Appellant] gathered up the jewelry and tried to leave, but Brenda shut the door
as Raquinio hit [appellant] on the head with a vase. [Appellant] fell and Raquinio
pointed the gun at him. [Appellant] tried to take the gun from Raquinio and, as they
struggled, the gun went off twice and Brenda was shot. Then [appellant] passed out.
When he regained consciousness, Brenda and Raquinio had left the room.
“[Appellant] tried to flee through the back door but encountered Raquinio, who
still had the gun, in the laundry room. [Appellant] tried to take the gun again, succeeding
this time. The gun went off two more times as the two men fought. Raquinio continued
to struggle, so [appellant] hit him on the head with the gun in self-defense. [Appellant]
then fled the house. He threw the gun away because he feared the police would shoot
him if they saw him with it. In the street, people looked at him in a way he felt was
accusatory. He hid in the shed because he was afraid. Then he lost consciousness again.
He was in possession of the property stolen from Visalia because someone gave it to him
to pay for methamphetamine.” (Gutierrez I, supra, at pp. 3−4.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2010, appellant was convicted after a jury trial of count 1, attempted murder of
Brenda (§§ 187, 664) with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a
firearm causing death or great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); count 3, first degree
burglary (§ 460, subd. (a)); count 4, felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021,
subd. (a)(1)); count 5, receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)); and count 6, assault of
4.
Raquinio with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) with an enhancement for personal use of a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The court found he had one prior strike conviction and
two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).3
Sentencing
On May 20, 2011, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate determinate
term of 26 years eight months plus 25 years to life as follows: count 1, attempted
murder, the upper term of nine years, doubled to 18 years as the second strike term, plus
two years for the two prior prison term enhancements, and 25 years to life for the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement; count 5, receiving stolen
property, a consecutive term of eight months (one-third the midterm), doubled to
one year four months; and count 6, assault with a firearm, a consecutive term of one year
(one-third the midterm), doubled to two years, plus three years four months (one-third the
midterm) for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm enhancement. The court
imposed a concurrent sentence for count 3, and stayed the term imposed for count 4
pursuant to section 654. (Gutierrez I, supra, F062544, at pp. 5−6.)
Direct Appeal
On January 8, 2013, this court filed the nonpublished opinion in appellant’s direct
appeal. We reversed the sentence for count 3, burglary, and remanded for resentencing
on that count, ordered correction of errors in the abstract of judgment for the sentences
imposed for counts 5 and 6, and affirmed the judgment as modified. (Gutierrez I, supra,
F062544, at p. 11.)
On July 22, 2013, the trial court corrected appellant’s sentence and stayed the term
for count 3, corrected the abstract of judgment as to counts 5 and 6, and again sentenced
appellant to the aggregate term of 26 years eight months plus 25 years to life.
3 Appellant was also charged with count 2, assault of Brenda with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)). The jury did not return a verdict on this count since it was a lesser offense
of count 1. (Gutierrez I, supra, F062544, at p. 4.)
5.
THE CURRENT PETITION
In 2023, the trial court started proceedings to recall and resentence appellant on
the two prior prison term enhancements pursuant to section 1172.75.
On September 27, 2023, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the two prior prison
term enhancements because they were now invalid under section 1172.75. Appellant also
moved for the trial court to fully resentence him on all aspects of his sentence based on
recent amendments to sentencing provisions, and to dismiss the prior strike conviction,
dismiss or reduce the firearm enhancements, and impose midterms. Appellant argued a
lesser sentence should be imposed based on his positive conduct in prison, supported by
documentary evidence. The People did not file a written opposition.
The Resentencing Hearing
On November 9, 2023, the trial court held the hearing to recall appellant’s
sentence.
Appellant’s attorney stated the underlying offenses were very serious and
shocking, but appellant’s behavior and use of a weapon were inconsistent with his prior
offenses. Counsel stated appellant had changed his life, his conduct in prison had been
exemplary, he was now housed in an “honor dorm,” he took classes to learn about and
improve his behavior, and received positive evaluations, as shown by the supporting
documents.
The prosecutor opposed further reducing appellant’s sentence, and argued he had a
prior burglary conviction just four years before the current convictions, and the prior
offense was similar to the convictions in this case. The prosecutor argued appellant’s
criminal record showed an escalating pattern of conduct that culminated in the attempted
murder and burglary. The prosecutor introduced, without objection, the certified “RAP
sheet” of appellant’s prior convictions.
6.
The Trial Court’s Sentencing Order
The trial court stated it had reviewed appellant’s motion and supporting exhibits
about his rehabilitation efforts and good conduct in prison. The court dismissed the
two prior prison term enhancements and the sentences imposed for them.
The trial court acknowledged that the sentencing laws had been amended, and it
could not impose an upper term unless aggregating circumstances had been pleaded and
proved or appellant admitted them, neither of which occurred. However, the court stated
it could rely on appellant’s certified “RAP sheet” of his prior convictions, which had
been introduced into evidence.
The trial court denied appellant’s request to dismiss the prior strike conviction
pursuant to section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497,
“based upon the fact[s] of this case, [appellant’s] criminal history as outlined in the
original probation report, and now the certified RAP sheet. [¶] [Appellant’s] criminal
history spanned in a range of about five years, with a conviction almost every year in that
period.” He was convicted of burglary in 2007, and committed the current offenses in
2009.
The court reviewed the facts of the instant offenses:
“[Appellant] forced his way into the victim’s home and shot her
multiple times after she told him that she did not have any work for him.
Apparently [appellant] went, knocked on her door, asked if she had any
work for him, she said no, [appellant] got angry, pushed his way in and
started shooting her.
“That first victim was able to run and ask for help despite the fact
that she had been shot and injured.
“And then [appellant] chose to continue on his rampage. Instead of
stopping, he then went and shot the second victim, who was asleep in his
room, who heard the screaming, came out, saw that … the first victim was
bleeding, and then [appellant] turned his gun onto the second victim.
7.
Thankfully, the second victim wasn’t injured. [Appellant] missed despite
shooting at the victim multiple times.
“And for these reasons, the Court will also be imposing the upper
term[s].
“The Court will, however, exercise its discretion under
[section] 1385[, subdivision] (c)(2)([B]) to strike multiple enhancements
based on [appellant’s] extensive rehabilitation efforts. [The] Court will
strike the [section] 12022.5[, subdivision] (a) … [personal use
enhancement] as to Count 6.
“The Court will not exercise its discretion to reduce the
[section] 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) [personal discharge enhancement] as
alleged in Count 1 due to the facts of this case, which I just previously
outlined. The Court finds that to do so would endanger public safety as
[appellant] shot not only one person, but two.”4
The trial court resentenced appellant to the second strike aggregate determinate
term of 21 years four months plus 25 years to life as follows: the upper term of 18 years
for count 1, plus 25 years to life for the personal discharge enhancement; a consecutive
term of one year four months (one-third the midterm) for count 5; a consecutive term of
two years (one-third the midterm) for count 6; and stayed the terms for counts 3 and 4.
After the trial court pronounced the sentence, appellant’s attorney stated that the
second victim was not hit by any bullets.
“THE COURT: That’s right. And I mentioned that.
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I want to make sure.
“THE COURT: Despite [appellant] shooting at him several times, I
said thankfully that second person was not injured.”
Appellant addressed the trial court and stated he had done everything to improve
and rehabilitate himself in prison, and asked about the reduction of his sentence. The
court stated it dismissed the firearm enhancement imposed for count 6, “when you shot at
4 As will be shown below, the court corrected its misstatement that the
second victim had been shot.
8.
[that] man,” but it did not dismiss the personal discharge firearm enhancement for
count 1, attempted murder, when he “actually shot the lady.”
DISCUSSION
I. The Prior Prison Term Enhancement
We begin with the trial court’s statutory authority to recall and resentence
appellant. “Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts
to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the
defendant had served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years. [Citation.] Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136
(2019−2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136) [citation] amended section 667.5 by limiting
the prior prison term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent offenses.
[Citations.] Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other offenses became
legally invalid. [Citation.] The amendment was to be applied retroactively to all cases
not yet final on January 1, 2020.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375,
379−380 (Burgess).)
“Later, in 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) …. This bill sought to make the changes implemented by Senate Bill 136
retroactive. [Citation.] It took effect on January 1, 2022, and added former section
1171.1, now section 1172.75 ….” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)
Section 1172.75 establishes a mechanism to provide affected defendants a remedy
for those legally invalid enhancements. (People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318,
330−331.) If the trial court determines the current judgment includes a now-invalid
sentencing enhancement, the court shall recall and resentence the defendant. (Burgess,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)
II. The Court’s Discretion to Resentence Under Section 1172.75
In this case, the trial court recalled appellant’s sentence and conducted the
resentencing hearing to dismiss the now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. In
9.
doing so, the court clearly recognized that it was required to conduct “a full resentencing,
not merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v.
Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 (Monroe); §1172.75, subd. (c).)
At the resentencing hearing, section 1172.75 required the court to “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “The court may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk
for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the
original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) “vests the superior court with broad discretion
based on an inherently factual inquiry” in resentencing a defendant, and we review the
resentencing order for an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Garcia (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 848, 856−857.) “Under an abuse of discretion standard, ‘ “we ask whether
the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings
of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary
nor capricious.” ’ [Citations.] Ultimately, the superior court’s risk finding will be upheld
‘if it falls within “the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.” ’ ”
(Garcia, at p. 857.)
10.
Analysis
The trial court herein was well-aware that when it recalled appellant’s sentence to
dismiss the prior prison term enhancements, it was required to conduct a new sentencing
hearing. It was also aware that it was required to exercise its discretion as to each
element of his aggregate term in accordance with statutory amendments enacted after
appellant’s original sentencing hearing. (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
As recounted above, the court dismissed the two prior prison term enhancements,
and made extensive findings explaining why it was declining to exercise its discretion to
dismiss or reduce the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) personal discharge enhancement,
dismiss the prior strike conviction, and again impose upper terms. As further indicative
that the court was aware of the scope of its discretion, it decided to dismiss the
section 12022.5, subdivision (a) personal use firearm enhancement attached to count 6
and, combined with dismissing the prior prison term enhancements, reduced appellant’s
aggregate determinate term from 28 years eight months to 21 years four months, while
retaining the consecutive term of 25 years to life for the personal discharge enhancement.
Based on the record and the trial court’s findings, we cannot say the court abused
its discretion in denying appellant’s request to further reduce his aggregate sentence.
III. Appellant’s Contentions
In his letter brief, appellant argues the matter should be remanded because the trial
court failed to conduct a “full and fair” resentencing hearing and further reduce his
sentence as required by section 1172.75. As explained above, the court was aware and
complied with section 1172.75’s requirement to conduct a full resentencing hearing and
apply all applicable sentencing provisions that were subsequently enacted after
appellant’s original sentencing hearing. (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
Appellant further argues his attorney erroneously failed to object when the trial
court imposed the upper terms based on his prior record. !(Appellant’s Letter Brief at
p. 5.)! “Senate Bill [No.] 567 [(2021−2022 Reg. Sess.; Senate Bill 567)] amended
11.
section 1170, subdivision (b) to specify that, when a sentencing court chooses a term
from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term, unless the facts
supporting the aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the defendant’s
stipulation to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived) beyond a
reasonable doubt, or (3) based on evidenced by a certified record of conviction.” (People
v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 44.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) states:
“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) [of section 1170, subdivision (b)], the court may
consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified
record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” The prosecution
introduced the certified record of appellant’s prior convictions, and his attorney did not
object. Any objection from appellant’s attorney to the court’s consideration of the
certified record of appellant’s prior convictions would have been futile. (People v.
Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732.)
Appellant asserts his prior strike conviction should have been dismissed because it
resulted from a plea agreement, and it was not a serious or violent offense. At appellant’s
trial, the court found true the allegation in the information, that he had a prior strike
conviction that occurred in Kern County Superior Court case No. DF007837A in 2007,
for a violation of section 460, subdivision (a), first degree residential burglary. This
offense has long been defined as a serious felony and a strike. (People v. Maestas (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 247, 252; § 1192.7, subd. (c)(18); § 667, subd. (c).)
IV. Appellant’s Reliance on Other Legislative Enactments
Also in his letter brief, appellant argues the matter must be remanded because the
trial court failed to consider his rights under section 1385, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021−2022
Reg. Sess.; Senate Bill 81), Senate Bill 567, Senate Bill No. 620 (2017−2018 Reg. Sess.;
Senate Bill 620), Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.; Assembly Bill 518) and
Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023−2024 Reg. Sess.; Assembly Bill 600). We have already
12.
addressed section 1385 and Senate Bill 567, and turn to appellant’s reliance on other
legislative enactments.
A. Senate Bill 81
Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385, subdivision (c), effective January 1, 2022, to
require a trial court to dismiss an enhancement if it is in furtherance of justice to do so,
affording “great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove” that specified
mitigating circumstances are present, unless the court finds that dismissal would
endanger public safety. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1), (2); People v. Coleman (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 709, 723−724; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) These
mitigating circumstances include when multiple enhancements are imposed in a single
case, the current offense is connected to mental illness, prior victimization, or childhood
trauma, or the defendant was a juvenile. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(B), (D), (E), (G).)
Appellant argues the trial court failed to fully consider postconviction factors as
required by section 1385, consisting of his good behavior and rehabilitative efforts in
prison. To the contrary, the court acknowledged it had discretion to dismiss multiple
enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), and stated it was relying on
appellant’s evidence about his good behavior in prison as the reason it dismissed the
five-year term for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) personal use firearm enhancement.
Appellant asserts the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement because it erroneously stated he
shot two people and he was a danger to public safety. “[T]he plain language of section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) contemplates that a trial court will exercise its sentencing
discretion” such that “if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public
safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible
evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight
13.
of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029.)
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss or reduce the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement because it found “to do so would
endanger public safety as [appellant] shot not only one person, but two.” As explained
above, appellate counsel objected and reminded the court that appellant did not shoot the
second victim. The court corrected its error and stated that appellant shot at the
second victim but that person was not wounded. In response to appellant’s personal
request to further reduce his sentence, the court stated it had dismissed the personal use
firearm enhancement imposed for count 6, “when you shot at that man,” but it did not
dismiss the personal discharge firearm enhancement for count 1, attempted murder, when
he “actually shot the lady.” The court’s findings are supported by the record and it did
not abuse its discretion.
B. Senate Bill 620
At the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing, the imposition of a firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) was previously mandatory and
could not be stricken in the interests of justice pursuant to section 1385 or any other
provision of law. Effective January 1, 2018, section 12022.53 was amended by Senate
Bill 620 to give discretion to the trial court to strike firearm enhancements. (People v.
Baltazar (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 334, 337; People v. Zamora (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 200,
208.) The court also has discretion to impose a lesser uncharged enhancement under
subdivision (b) or subdivision (c) of section 12022.53. (People v. Tirado (2022) 12
Cal.5th 688, 692.)
The trial court was aware of its discretion to reduce or dismiss the personal
discharge enhancement. It did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion
because it found he shot the first victim multiple times.
14.
C. Assembly Bill 518
Also at the time of appellant’s sentencing hearing, “the sentencing court was
required to impose the sentence that ‘provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment’ and stay execution of the other term.” (People v. Mani (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 343, 379.) Assembly Bill 518 amended section 654 to provide the trial court
with discretion “to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in
the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer
sentence.” (Mani, at p. 379.) The court stayed the sentences imposed for counts 3 and 4.
The court did not make any findings, and appellant has not shown, that the other counts
were subject to section 654.
D. Assembly Bill 600
Assembly Bill 600 became effective on January 1, 2024, and amended
section 1172.1 to allow a trial court, on its own motion, to recall and resentence a
defendant “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing
are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law .…” (§ 1172.1
subd. (a)(1); People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 983−985, 986−987.) The
trial court already recalled appellant’s sentence to dismiss the now-invalid prior prison
term enhancements, and it conducted a full resentencing hearing.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s resentencing order of November 9, 2023, is affirmed.
15.
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