People v. Montes CA2/8

CourtListener 10123137Calctapp20 sept. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 9/20/24 P. v. Montes CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B332028

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA069209-02)
v.

JORGE LUIS MONTES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas I. Graham for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2008, a jury found appellant Jorge Luis
Montes guilty of two counts of attempted murder in violation of
Penal Code1 sections 187, subdivision (a) and 664 and one count
of mayhem in violation of section 203. The jury also found true
that 1) the attempted murders were committed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation; 2) the offenses were
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the
meaning of section 186.22(b)(1)(C); 3) a principal was armed with
a firearm during the commission of the offense within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d) and (e)(1);
and 4) a principal discharged a firearm proximately causing great
bodily injury to the victims within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). On May 16, 2008, the trial
court sentenced Montes to two consecutive life terms in prison
with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder
convictions, plus a 25-year-to-life term for the firearm
enhancement. On appeal, we affirmed the convictions. (People v.
Montes (Dec. 18, 2009, B208021) [nonpub. opn.].)
On February 25, 2021, Montes filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The
trial court summarily denied the petition on several grounds
which Montes appealed. We reversed and remanded with
directions to the trial court to order the parties to brief the issues
and then to determine whether Montes had established a prima
facie basis for resentencing relief and, if so, to proceed with an
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
1001.)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
On remand the People submitted on whether petitioner
had made out a prima facie case for relief. The trial court agreed
to set an evidentiary hearing as required by section 1172.6,
subdivision (d). The parties stipulated that no witnesses would
be called at the evidentiary hearing and the trial court would
determine whether Montes was entitled to be resentenced based
on the record of conviction and argument of the parties. On
February 22, 2023, the parties argued the matter before the trial
court.
On May 30, 2023, the trial court issued a written order
denying the petition. The court found “beyond a reasonable
doubt that petitioner was a principal and direct aider and abettor
who possessed the specific intent to kill, and is guilty of
attempted murder under a still viable theory of homicide.” This
appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts presented at the evidentiary hearing
were not complex.2 On January 29, 2006, Montes was driving a
car with co-defendants Saul Diaz (Kuete) and “Coco” as
passengers. Kuete and Coco were looking for rival gang members
or information about rival gang members who had severely
beaten up a member of their gang the day before. When Kuete
spotted victims Randy Green and Russell Thompson walking on
the sidewalk, he ordered Montes to pull over near them. After
asking “Where you from?” Kuete and Coco got out of the car and

2 We grant Montes’s request that we take judicial notice of
the record on appeal from the original judgment. At the
evidentiary hearing the trial court considered the transcripts of
the trial.

3
began chasing Green and Thompson, who were running away.
Green recognized Kuete as someone who had jumped him before,
hitting him in the arm with a pipe. As they were running, Green
heard something cock back as if it were a firearm and Thompson
heard 12 gunshots. Kuete and Coco began shooting at the
victims multiple times and then returned to the car. Montes
drove them away. Green was hit in the arm and the buttocks
area. Thompson was shot below the waist and as a result wears
a colostomy bag.
During the shooting, Thompson saw Montes’s car move
from where it had initially stopped. It moved two houses down
the road in the same direction as Kuete and Coco. After the shots
were fired, someone yelled “Eastside Wilmas.”
Montes was arrested approximately three weeks after the
shooting. Montes told Detective Smith (the interviewer) that he
would see Kuete with a gun all the time and that on the day of
the shooting Kuete “must have had one.” Montes said Kuete is
“trigger happy” and always trying to make a name for himself.
Montes eventually admitted to being at the scene of the
shooting. Montes stated Kuete wanted Montes to give him
(Kuete) and Coco a ride to look for the guys who had jumped their
fellow gang member the day before. Kuete and Coco told Montes
he had to help them out because they were from the same hood.
Montes drove Kuete and Coco to the area they had directed him
to. Kuete told Montes to pull over because Kuete and Coco “had
seen some black guy.” Montes pulled over. Kuete and Coco got
out of the car and began to run after the black guys and then to
shoot at them. Montes panicked and tried to drive away, but
Kuete and Coco yelled “come here,” ran toward Montes’s car, got

4
in and said, “what the fuck, you were going to leave us.” Montes
then drove them away and dropped them off at Kuete’s house.
Montes saw two guns during the shooting. He testified he
never would have taken Kuete and Coco in his car if he had
known they were going to shoot someone. He felt that if he had
refused to drive them, he would have been in danger from them.
Officer Mark Maldonado, a Los Angeles Police Department
gang expert, testified that Montes is a member of the Eastside
Wilmas criminal street gang. He based this on Montes’s tattoos
and having seen him associate with Eastside Wilmas gang
members in that gang’s territory. He testified that a “walk-up” is
when someone drives shooters to a location and the shooters
make the call “where you from?” They get out of the car, chase
and shoot at the victims, get back in the car, and leave. The
person asked to drive is typically a member of the same gang as
the shooters. Maldonado testified he had not seen Montes
participate in common Eastside Wilmas gang-related activities
and found no gang-related paraphernalia, photos or weapons
during a search of Montes’s home.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) amended “the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 (Gentile),

5
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v.
Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.) Senate Bill No. 1437
accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 2, 3; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created former section 1170.95
(now codified as section 1172.6), which established a procedure by
which defendants convicted of murder under prior law may seek
resentencing in the trial court if they believe they could not be
convicted of that crime after the amendments to sections 188 and
189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) extended that sentencing relief to individuals
convicted of attempted murder and manslaughter. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).)
Petitions under section 1172.6 address convictions where a
defendant was not the shooter but was held vicariously liable on
one of several theories of liability identified in the statute. If the
record establishes ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of
law, the petition is properly denied. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–972.) However, the petition and record must establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief. (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 [a “petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law if the record of conviction
conclusively establishes, with no factfinding, weighing of
evidence, or credibility determinations, that . . . the petitioner
was the actual killer.”].)
After appointment of counsel, the trial court assesses when
a prima facie case for relief has been made. The prima facie
inquiry is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In
assessing whether a defendant has made a prima facie case for

6
relief pursuant to section 1172.6 ruling on a resentencing
petition, the trial court is entitled to review the record of
conviction, which includes the jury summations, jury
instructions, verdict forms, and prior appellate opinions. (Lewis,
at pp. 971–972.) However, Lewis cautions that although
appellate opinions are generally considered to be part of the
record of conviction, the prima facie bar was intentionally set
very low and the probative value of an appellate opinion is case-
specific; a trial court should not engage in “ ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at
p. 972.)
If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement
to relief, the court issues an order to show cause and holds an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
conviction at issue, recall the sentence, and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)
At the hearing, the prosecution bears the burden to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by changes
to section 188 or 189. If the prosecution fails to sustain its
burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and
the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.”
(Id., subd. (d)(3).) The prosecutor and petitioner may offer
evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law and may also offer new or
additional evidence to meet their respective burdens. (Ibid.)
At an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3), “the superior court acts as an independent fact finder and
determines whether the People have met their burden in proving

7
the defendant guilty” under the amendments to the Penal Code
made by Senate Bill No. 1473. (People v. Henley (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1016.) A trial court’s factual findings at a
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing are reviewed for
substantial evidence. Under this standard, the record is
reviewed in the light most favorable to the judgment and a
reviewing court decides whether the record discloses substantial
evidence such that a reasonable trier of act could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We look to whether
the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence of reasonable,
credible, and solid value to support a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that petitioner is guilty. (Henley, at p. 1017.) We must
affirm the superior court’s order if supported by substantial
evidence even if “there is also substantial evidence to support a
contrary conclusion.” (People v. Riley (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th
1152, 1165–1166.) Indeed, the reviewing court will not reverse
unless there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial
evidence exists to support the trial court’s decision. (People v.
Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.)
Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
liability because an accomplice must personally possess the
culpable mental state, unlike an accomplice under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 848, superseded on other grounds by § 1172.6, subd. (g);
People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548; People v. Estrada
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 945 [Senate Bill No. 1437 did “not
eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because
a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice
aforethought”].) “To be guilty of a crime as an aider and abettor,
a person must ‘aid[ ] the [direct] perpetrator by acts or

8
encourage[ ] him [or her] by words or gestures.’ [Citations.] In
addition . . . the person must give such aid or encouragement
‘with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the [direct]
perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing,
or of encouraging or facilitating commission of,’ the crime in
question. [Citations.] When the crime at issue requires a specific
intent, in order to be guilty as an aider and abettor the person
‘must share the specific intent of the [direct] perpetrator,’ that is
to say, the person must ‘know[ ] the full extent of the [direct]
perpetrator’s criminal purpose and [must] give[ ] aid or
encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the
[direct] perpetrator’s commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Lee
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623–624, superseded by statute on other
grounds by People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816, 824;
see § 31 [a defendant may be convicted as the direct perpetrator
or as an aider and abettor].)
Aiding and abetting attempted murder requires a finding of
express malice. Specifically, to establish that Montes is liable for
aiding and abetting the attempted murders of Green and
Thompson, the court must find that the perpetrators (here, Kuete
and Coco) acted with express malice (i.e., intended to kill) and the
aider and abettor (Montes) must have known the perpetrators’
purpose and intended to facilitate it. Thus, both perpetrator and
aider must act with express malice. (People v. Lee, supra,
31 Cal.4th at p. 624 [“to be guilty of attempted murder as an
aider and abettor, a person must give aid or encouragement with
knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the
purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of
the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill”].)

9
“Direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the
intent to kill must be inferred from the statements and actions of
the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.”
(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.) “ ‘Among the
factors which may be considered in making the determination of
aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime,
companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.’ ”
(People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054.) The test is
“whether the accused in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the
perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by words or gestures.”
(People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 134; People v. Smith
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1469 [intent is generally proved by
the act and surrounding circumstances].)
Here the evidence showed that Montes was driving a car
with two fellow gang members who were looking for rivals
responsible for shooting one of their own the day before. Montes
knew they were looking for rival gang members and agreed to
drive. He also knew Kuete was always armed and he saw that
both Kuete and Coco had guns as they chased the victims. He
followed Kuete’s instructions, stopped the car so they could
interact with the two victims, saw them shoot at the victims,
followed them slowly in his car as they ran after the victims, and
drove them away from the scene of the shooting. Without a doubt
Montes directly aided the shooters by driving them to and from
the scene of the shootings. He had an opportunity to drive away
after the shooting started, but he remained at the scene and
drove the shooters away so they could make their escape.

10
As to intent, the evidence supported an inference that
Montes, as a member of the gang and knowing Kuete was always
armed, knew Kuete had an intent to kill as their purpose was to
avenge the shooting of their fellow gang member the night before.
Driving Kuete and Coco to the scene, helping them escape, and
not stopping to assist the victims support the inference that
Montes himself also had an intent to kill. As the trial court
found: “[Appellant] retaliated for the near fatal assault on a
fellow [East Side] Wilmas Gang Member ‘Clown’ Payaso the day
before. The evidence further demonstrated that [appellant] knew
that his fellow gang member shooter Kuete would be armed with
a gun. [Appellant] admitted that Kuete called him to join in the
pursuit of ‘Clown’s’ assailants. [Appellant] chose to drive the
armed Kuete and another gang member, ‘Coco’ into rival gang
territory. [Appellant] chose to wait as Kuete and Coco exited the
car with guns drawn, one shouting ‘Eastside Wilmas,’ before
running toward the victims and opening fire. [Appellant] could
have withdrawn by refusing to drive the shooters, or by notifying
them that he was no longer participating. He never withdrew
from intended murder.” We agree.
Because substantial evidence supports a finding that
Montes acted with express malice when he aided Kuete and Coco
in the attempted murders of Green and Thompson, the court did
not err in denying Montes’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 as to the counts of conviction for attempted
murder.

11
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

WILEY, J.

12

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.