Stone v. Raven CA2/4

CourtListener 10121945Calctapp19 sept. 2024

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Filed 9/19/24 Stone v. Raven CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

DONALD M. STONE, B336380

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23BBCV00410)
v.

RAYMOND B. RAVEN, M.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Frank M. Tavelman, Judge. Affirmed.
Donald M. Stone, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Schmid & Voiles, Denise H. Greer, Patrick W. Mayer, and
Dena J. Hayden Lambirth, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Donald M. Stone sued defendant Raymond B.
Raven, M.D. for medical negligence following a surgery
performed on plaintiff’s hand. The trial court granted summary
judgment in defendant’s favor, finding plaintiff did not present
expert testimony to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff
appealed, arguing defendant did not meet his moving burden and
that the alleged negligence is a question of common knowledge
that does not require expert opinion testimony. We affirm the
judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Surgery and Medical Malpractice Action
In August 2022, plaintiff consulted defendant, an
orthopedic surgeon, about right-hand pain, numbness, and
tingling. Defendant diagnosed plaintiff with carpal tunnel
syndrome, right-ring trigger finger, and osteoarthritis in the
right hand.
On August 31, 2022, plaintiff underwent surgery.
Defendant performed an open carpal tunnel release surgery and
a tenosynovectomy and release of the right-long and right-ring
fingers. Plaintiff was referred to physical therapy after the
procedure and saw defendant for post-operative care.
Plaintiff filed this action against defendant asserting a
single cause of action for medical negligence. Plaintiff alleged
that at the conclusion of the surgery, defendant “did not close
(suture) the incision and/or did not close it completely such that it
was left open to the environment.” Plaintiff claimed that as a
result, his hand became infected, leaving an unsightly scar when
it healed, and he required therapy to make his hand and fingers
close completely.

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B. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) he
complied at all times with the standard of care, and (2) nothing
he did, or did not do, caused plaintiff’s injuries. Defendant
supported his motion with the declaration of Stuart Kuschner,
M.D. (Dr. Kuschner).
The record does not indicate there were any objections to
Dr. Kuschner’s declaration, and it does not include the medical
records that were submitted with it. The declaration indicates
that on September 8, 2022, approximately one week after the
surgery, plaintiff was seen by defendant, and plaintiff’s “incisions
were intact[,] sutures were in place[,] and there was no sign of
infection.” A few days later, plaintiff appeared for occupational
therapy and complained of inflammation and pain. Plaintiff
reportedly “suspected infection after swimming pool hand
submersion.” The following day, plaintiff returned to see
defendant. An examination of plaintiff’s right hand revealed
swelling and erythema around the incisions, but the sutures were
still intact. The sutures were removed at a follow-up visit.
Defendant assessed plaintiff with “post carpal tunnel release and
trigger finger releases, complicated by wound dehiscence” and
prescribed antibiotics. Plaintiff was also provided with
instructions on how to care for the wound by washing it and
avoiding wearing bandages all day long.
Dr. Kuschner opined it was appropriate to remove the
sutures and allow the wound to “heal from the inside out.” He
stated suturing the wound “in the face of a possible infection
would be ill advisable,” as the way to heal an open wound was to
do exactly what defendant did, prescribe antibiotics and instruct
the patient on appropriate wound care. Dr. Kuschner indicated

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plaintiff’s wound went on to heal, and according to an
occupational therapist’s notes from December 2022, plaintiff had
no more reports of functional difficulties. Dr. Kuschner opined
defendant met the standard of care for orthopedists in all
respects in the treatment of plaintiff, including his operation and
post-operative care. Further, it was Dr. Kuschner’s opinion that
there was nothing defendant did or failed to do that caused
plaintiff to suffer an infection or any harm.
In opposition, plaintiff submitted only his own declaration.
He said he was awake during the surgery and at the end of the
procedure, defendant stated, “[N]ow let’s close it.” Plaintiff said
that when he saw defendant on September 8, 2022, defendant
removed a bandage wrap from his hand, and plaintiff saw
“stiches on the incision and did not look at it closely and thought
nothing of it.” He said he saw for the first time about a week
later that the incision was open and the stitches did not go all the
way through.
After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion
for summary judgment. The court found Dr. Kuschner’s
declaration was sufficient to carry defendant’s moving burden.
The court did not find persuasive plaintiff’s argument that the
medical treatment at issue was within a layperson’s knowledge,
and it determined plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact by
not presenting expert evidence contradicting Dr. Kuschner’s
declaration.
Plaintiff timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no
triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 631, 636.) “A defendant moving for summary
judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s
cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete
defense. [Citation.] If the defendant meets this burden, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence creating a
triable issue of material fact. [Citation.] A triable issue of fact
exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find
the fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment” (Id.
at pp. 636–637.) “We review the trial court’s decision de novo,
considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection
with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded)
and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably
supports.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)

B. Inadequate Argument and Record
Defendant points out several procedural defects in
plaintiff’s appeal. First, plaintiff did not support his appeal with
“‘cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record,’” which is required to demonstrate error. (United Grand
Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
Plaintiff does not cite the record for most of his factual assertions
and arguments, and his brief offers almost no authority in
support of his contentions. He cites only Evidence Code
section 801 and one case, Kotla v. Regents of University of

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California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 283 (Kotla), which as discussed
further below, is inapposite.
Second, plaintiff did not submit an adequate record on
appeal. To properly conduct our de novo review of the order
granting summary judgment, we must consider all the evidence
and papers submitted in connection with the motion. (Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 476.) Plaintiff has not
included the medical records reviewed by and attached to the
declaration of Dr. Kuschner, the separate statement of
undisputed material facts filed with the motion,1 defendant’s
reply to plaintiff’s opposition, and defendant’s objections to
plaintiff’s declaration, several of which were sustained by the
trial court.
Appealed orders and judgments are presumed correct, and
appellants must overcome this presumption by affirmatively
showing error on an adequate record. (See Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Because the record provided by
plaintiff is deficient, his claims of error are forfeited. (See Id. at
p. 609; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, supra, 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 153.) However, even when we consider the
merits, plaintiff’s arguments are not persuasive.

1 Plaintiff included his response to defendant’s separate
statement in the record. However, plaintiff’s response did not comply
with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f). It
did not identify the purported undisputed facts to which plaintiff was
responding and did not state whether plaintiff was disputing each fact.

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C. Summary Judgment was Properly Granted for
Defendant
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because (1) Dr.
Kuschner’s declaration was insufficient to support summary
judgment and (2) plaintiff was not required to present conflicting
expert testimony to create a triable issue of fact because the facts
of the case were within the common knowledge of a layperson.
We disagree.
An action for medical malpractice requires a plaintiff to
prove four elements: “‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such
skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession
commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a
proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and
the resulting injury’”; and (4) resulting damages. (Gami v.
Mullikin Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 877.) “‘“The
standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be
measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts;
it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be
proved by their testimony [citations], unless the conduct required
by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge
of the layman.” [Citations.]’” (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial
Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001 (Flowers).)
Further, proximate cause must be proven within a reasonable
medical probability based on competent expert testimony.
(Chakalis v. Elevator Solutions, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557,
1572 (Chakalis); Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 379, 385 [“medical causation can only be
determined by expert medical testimony”].)

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The common knowledge exception, which dispenses with
the need for expert testimony, is narrow. (Scott v. Rayher (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1542.) It “is principally limited to
situations in which the plaintiff can invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, i.e., when a layperson ‘is able to say as a matter of
common knowledge and observation that the consequences of
professional treatment were not such as ordinarily would have
followed if due care had been exercised.’” (Flowers, supra, 8
Cal.4th at p. 1001, fn. omitted.) Unless the common knowledge
exception applies, expert testimony is conclusive, and a defendant
is entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff does not come
forward with conflicting expert evidence. (Id. at p. 1001; Borrayo
v. Avery (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 304, 310.)
Dr. Kuschner’s declaration was adequate to satisfy
defendant’s moving burden on summary judgment. Dr. Kuschner
opined defendant complied with the applicable standard of care
in all respects. This included the operation on plaintiff’s hand
and allowing plaintiff’s wound to heal “from the inside out,” as
suturing the wound “in the face of a possible infection would be ill
advisable.” Moreover, Dr. Kuschner opined to a reasonable
degree of medical probability that nothing defendant did or failed
to do caused or contributed to any injury alleged by plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends he was not required to submit conflicting
expert testimony to raise a triable issue of fact because the facts
of this case are such that they are within the common knowledge
of the average layperson. Plaintiff argues a layperson could tell
that defendant never properly closed the incision made during
surgery.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s argument implies the wound
was not sutured at all, that is not the case. Dr. Kuschner

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indicated that when plaintiff was seen by defendant on
September 8, 2022, plaintiff’s incisions were intact and the
sutures were in place.2 Plaintiff himself admitted he “saw
stitches on the incision” that day.
In this case, the question is more complicated. Dr.
Kuschner opined it was appropriate to remove the sutures and
allow the wound to “heal from the inside out” as there was a
possibility of infection. Plaintiff cites no authority to show that a
layperson can assess whether or not this is correct. He cites
Evidence Code section 801, but it merely contains the rule that
expert testimony is limited to subjects sufficiently beyond
common experience such that expert opinion would assist the
trier of fact. The case he cites, Kotla, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 283,
is inapposite. Kotla concerned a human resources management
expert who was allowed to testify about retaliation “indicators” in
a wrongful termination action. (Id. at pp. 286, 289.) The
appellate court held the expert’s testimony was inadmissible
because the expert “was in no better position than [the jury] to
evaluate the evidence concerning retaliation.” (Id. at p. 293.)
Thus, Kotla does not establish expert testimony was not required
to prove standard of care or causation in this medical malpractice
case.
Plaintiff does not show the procedures performed by
defendant (an open carpal tunnel release surgery and a
tenosynovectomy and release of the right-long finger and right-

2 We must assume the medical records submitted to the trial
court or the uncontested facts, neither of which plaintiff provided on
appeal, supported Dr. Kuschner’s opinion. (See Jameson v. Desta,
supra, 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [failure to provide an adequate record on an
issue requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant].)

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ring finger), the assessment of plaintiff with post-operative
wound dehiscence after suturing, and the post-operative care of
plaintiff’s open wound are matters within a layperson’s common
knowledge. Accordingly, plaintiff was required to present
conflicting expert testimony to meet the shifted burden. Because
plaintiff did not do so, he did not raise a triable issue of fact.
(Flowers, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1001; Chakalis, supra, 205
Cal.App.4th at p. 1572.) Summary judgment for defendant must
therefore be affirmed.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendant is awarded costs on
appeal.

MORI, J.
We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

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