People v. Medina CA2/8

CourtListener 10120970Calctapp18 sept. 2024

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Filed 9/18/24 P. v. Medina CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B332906

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA100266
v.

MARCOS MEDINA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
After reviewing this appeal pursuant to People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we affirm. Code citations are to
the Penal Code.
I
In February 2019, David Amaro stood outside near a family
friend’s house in Gardena, California. His mother was inside,
delivering a party invitation.
A car pulled up. A man got out of the back seat and
approached Amaro.
Amaro turned and ran. The approaching man shot Amaro
in the back. Amaro died at the hospital.
II
Police determined one car in the episode belonged to
Marcos Medina and another person. Police questioned Medina.
One officer read Medina his Miranda rights. (See Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) Medina responded to each query
that yes, he understood. The officers then tried two methods to
get information from Medina.
Officers put Medina in a cell with a microphone. Medina
and the other person in the cell talked off and on about the
shooting. During these conversations, Medina described some
the arrangements for the shooting, mentioned someone disposed
of the gun, said the shooting was his idea, and admitted he didn’t
know how many bullets hit Amaro.
The officers also gave Medina partial or false information to
prompt a confession. They told him his accomplice had admitted
driving the car Medina arrived in and had identified Medina as
the shooter. They showed him an initialed six-pack with his
picture circled on it and told him a witness to the shooting had
identified him. Neither of these claims was true. But Medina
then admitted being at the scene of the shooting. When an officer
asked Medina whether perhaps he had started shooting because
of adrenaline, Medina said yes, that was what had happened.

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III
Prosecutors charged Medina with two counts. The first was
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with the additional enhancement
allegation that Medina personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (d)). The
second count was that Medina was a felon in possession of a
firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)).
With the advice of counsel and following admonitions by
the trial court, Medina admitted to the prior conviction that made
him a felon at the time of the murder.
A jury found Medina guilty of first degree murder and of
being a felon in possession of a firearm, and found true the
§ 12022.53 enhancement allegation. The court sentenced Medina
to 25 years to life on the first count, an additional 25 years to life
for the enhancement, and two years for the second count.
IV
Medina appealed from the judgment, and we appointed
counsel to represent him. Appointed counsel examined the record
and filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court
to review the record independently under Wende. Counsel also
advised Medina of his right to file a supplemental brief for us to
consider.
We note at the outset that police deception, alone, does not
make a suspect’s confession involuntary. (See People v. Farnam
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 182-183.) Our review of the record did not
reveal other factors that would create an arguable issue as to the
voluntariness of Medina’s statements. We also note that
surreptitious recording of a detained person’s incriminating
statements is allowed unless the person was “lulled into
believing” the conversation was confidential. (People v.

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Hammons (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1710, 1715.) No one lulled
Medina.
Medina filed a supplemental brief of four pages, in which
he argues that his trial and the jury deliberations were too short,
that two of the jurors were from Gardena (the town where the
murder took place), and that no witness positively identified him
as the murderer.
The trial took place over four court days. The jury
deliberated for half an hour. There is no indication in the record
that Medina’s counsel failed to adequately represent him, in voir
dire or otherwise, or that the jury members failed to perform
their duties. Further, a murder conviction does not require
eyewitness identification. In this case, Medina confessed.
Medina also argues that the jury improperly credited the
testimony of a “lying gang member” and a witness who described
the shooter as “tall” but was never asked “How tall?” The weight
to give to witness testimony is appropriately decided by the fact
finder. The gang member witness, according to Medina, was sent
to juvenile hall because of this murder. That fact does not show
trial error.
In his brief, Medina contends that the prosecutor was
“over-emotional” in her closing arguments and that this
improperly swayed the jury. We see no unusual emotion in the
transcript. No one commented on the prosecutor’s arguments at
all during the trial, and the prosecutor specifically exhorted the
jury members not to succumb to “passion or prejudice” in their
deliberations.
Finally, Medina claims that he recalls testimony given
during the trial that does not appear in the transcript, and that

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there must therefore be missing portions of that transcript. We
have reviewed the transcript. There is no sign it is incomplete.
V
Medina’s counsel fully complied with counsel’s
responsibilities. No arguable issues exist. (See Wende, supra, 25
Cal.3d at pp. 441–442.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

WILEY, J.
We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

GRIMES, J.

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