CourtListener 10120899•People v. Leaea CA1/1
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Filed 9/18/24 P. v. Leaea CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167858
v.
BRITTANIE LEAEA, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 18-CR-012255)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Brittanie Leaea challenges an order awarding direct victim
restitution. She contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order
restitution after a change to the Penal Code shortened her probationary term
from five years to two.1 Additionally, in supplemental briefing requested by
this court, Leaea argues she did not consent to the court’s continued
jurisdiction when the restitution hearing was delayed to a date beyond her
probationary term.2 We reject these contentions and affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Following our review of the record, we requested supplemental
briefing regarding whether Leaea was estopped from challenging the
continuance of the restitution hearing to a date after her probationary term
expired. We informed the parties that if they did not believe the record in the
trial court was sufficiently developed to address the issue raised in our order,
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I. BACKGROUND
In February 2019, Leaea was charged by information with felony
assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The information alleged
that in the commission of the assault, she personally inflicted great bodily
injury, causing the offense to become a serious felony. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8),
12022.7, subd. (a).) The information further alleged that Leaea was
previously convicted of felony grand theft of personal property.
(§ 487, subd. (a).)
In October 2019, Leaea pleaded no contest to the assault with a deadly
weapon count as charged. Prior to her plea, the trial court informed Leaea
that she would have to pay her victim if her victim “has suffered any
financial loss as a result of the crime and puts in a claim for it.”
At the sentencing hearing on November 13, 2019, the trial court
suspended imposition of sentence and placed Leaea on formal probation for
five years subject to various terms and conditions, including that she pay
$5,428.26 in restitution to the Victim Compensation Board.
Effective January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950) amended section 1203.1 to limit periods of felony
probation to two years, with some exceptions not applicable here. (Stats.
2020, ch. 328, § 2; see § 1203.1, subds. (a) & (l).)
In June 2021, the People requested a hearing for “Determination of
Restitution—DREST” for September of that year. (Capitalization and
boldface omitted.) The trial court mailed Leaea a notice that a restitution
hearing was scheduled for October 2021 but the mailing was returned. Leaea
they could identify the additional facts or evidence needed. Neither party
took the position that additional evidence was needed to address the question
presented.
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failed to appear at the October hearing, so the court issued a bench warrant
and revoked her probation. She appeared at a hearing on November 2, 2021,
approximately two weeks before her probation was to expire under Assembly
Bill 1950, and the court recalled the bench warrant and continued the
restitution hearing to February 2022.
At the February 2022 hearing, the People presented a claim for
$14,229.96 in victim restitution. Thereafter, a contested restitution hearing
was set and continued numerous times. At a September 2022 hearing,
Leaea’s probation was reinstated. In January 2023, the restitution hearing
was continued for a couple of weeks because of the “AB 1950 issue.”
At a hearing in late January 2023, this matter was heard together with
eight other cases regarding whether the trial court had authority to order
restitution after probation had terminated pursuant to Assembly Bill 1950.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled that “[p]robation cannot be
extended” but that “[r]estitution can be ordered.” The restitution hearing
was continued to March 2023, over defense counsel’s objection.
At the March 2023 hearing, the trial court deemed Leaea’s probation
terminated as of November 13, 2021 and ordered Leaea, pursuant to the
parties’ stipulation, to pay her victim $3,000 in restitution.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Authority Governing Restitution
The California Constitution provides that “all persons who suffer losses
as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure
restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they
suffer.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) A trial court must order
such restitution “in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition
imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.” (Id., subd. (b)(13)(B); People
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v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652.) To implement this constitutional
mandate, the Legislature has enacted a restitution scheme codified primarily
in sections 1202.4 through 1202.46. (Giordano, at pp. 651–653.) We review
de novo whether the court exceeded the limits on its jurisdiction set by that
statutory scheme. (People v. Zuniga (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 870, 874.)
In any case in which a victim suffers economic loss, the sentencing
court “shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim . . . in
an amount established by court order.” (§ 1202.4, subds. (f) & (a)(3)(B).) If
the court cannot ascertain the amount of a victim’s losses when it imposes
sentence or orders probation, it must include in its restitution order “a
provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court.”
(Id., subd. (f).) In such a case, “the court shall retain jurisdiction over a
person subject to a restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying
restitution until such time as the losses may be determined.” (§ 1202.46.)
Our Supreme Court recently interpreted sections 1202.4 and 1202.46 in
a similar case and held that a court that reserves jurisdiction under those
sections has the power to fix the amount of victim restitution once the
victim’s losses become ascertainable, even if the defendant has completed
probation. (People v. McCune (2024) 16 Cal.5th 980, 985–986 (McCune).)
There, the defendant was placed on five years probation with the condition
that he pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. (Id. at p. 986.)
Like here, the defendant’s probationary term was shortened by Assembly
Bill 1950, but the trial court concluded it still had authority to set the amount
of victim restitution after his probationary term expired. (McCune, at p. 986.)
The defendant appealed the restitution order, claiming the court lacked
jurisdiction under section 1203.3, which generally prohibits courts from
modifying probation conditions after probation has ended. (McCune, at
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pp. 986–987.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, reasoning that
section 1202.46 provided “clear instructions” that the “sentencing court
retains jurisdiction to fix the amount of restitution until the amount of the
victim’s losses can be determined.” (McCune, at p. 986.)
Our high court agreed with the Court of Appeal: “There is no statutory
conflict here that would justify reading an implicit time limit into a court’s
power to fill in a missing amount once the victim’s losses can be ascertained
and thus ensure the victim receives full restitution,” as required by
section 1202.4. (McCune, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 996.) Because the trial
court was not imposing an entirely new restitution order, and because the
defendant did not claim any “unfair surprise,” the court concluded the trial
court had jurisdiction under sections 1202.4 and 1202.46 to set the amount of
victim restitution, even though the defendant’s probationary term had
expired. (McCune, at pp. 997–998, 1000.)
B. The Trial Court Properly Imposed Victim Restitution
Leaea seeks to set aside the restitution order on the ground that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to order restitution in March 2023, more than
one year after her probation terminated by operation of law under Assembly
Bill 1950. She relies on the minute order for the sentencing hearing, in
which the boxes next to “Restitution is reserved” and “Restitution to be
determined by the Court (PC 1202.4(f))” were left unchecked, while the box
next to “Pay restitution to victim compensation fund” was checked and the
amount owed to the Victim Compensation Board was handwritten in the
order. From this minute order, Leaea concludes the court ordered only
$5,428.26 in victim restitution and did not reserve jurisdiction to order
further restitution. Looking beyond the minute order to the entirety of the
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record, we conclude the court had jurisdiction under sections 1202.4 and
1202.46 when it fixed the amount of victim restitution in March 2023.
Leaea agreed as part of her plea to compensate her victim for any
losses she incurred because of the assault “if a claim is put in.” Prior to
sentencing, probation recommended that Leaea be ordered to pay restitution
of $5,428.26 to the Victim Compensation Board for medical bills it had paid
on behalf of the victim and that restitution be reserved for further
determination. The victim sent an e-mail to the court the day before
sentencing describing her physical injuries—which included stab wounds—
and the ongoing mental distress she was experiencing as a result of the
assault. At sentencing, the court said it had reviewed the probation report
and noted that prior to the victim’s e-mail, it had “no information regarding
the nature and extent of the injuries, including permanence and the effects of
those and her feelings about the case.” It acknowledged that the e-mail “says
a little bit to me about the seriousness of the wounds,” and that the victim
“obviously feels very, very strongly about this.” The court said it would treat
the amount the Victim Compensation Board paid on behalf of the victim as
the “presumptive amount,” but that it would set the matter “for D-rest”
(presumably shorthand for “Determination for Restitution”) if there was a
dispute. “It’s just a direction we start from.”
From this record, (and contrary to appellants’ assertion at oral
argument that the amount of victim restitution was entirely “ascertainable”
at the time of sentencing) it is apparent that when the trial court placed
Leaea on probation, the parties and the court understood that the amounts
owed to the Victim Compensation Board might not constitute the full amount
of the victim’s losses and that victim restitution could be ordered in the
future. In this context, the court’s comments at sentencing reflect its intent
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to reserve jurisdiction to fix the amount of victim restitution in the future if
necessary to fully compensate the victim under section 1202.4. (See People v.
Guardado (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 757, 763 [holding that it was not error for
the court to order restitution under former Government Code section 13967
“in an as-yet-undetermined amount as a means of retaining jurisdiction over
the issue of restitution”].)
While the minute order left the relevant boxes unchecked, we give
greater credence to the transcript of proceedings. (See In re Abram L. (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 452, 459, fn. 3 [“We presume the reporter’s transcript is the
most accurate statement of the court’s intent.”]; People v. Smith (1983)
33 Cal.3d 596, 599.) The minute order is a form document with boilerplate
language requiring that court personnel check boxes and fill in blanks; it does
not reflect the court’s intent to use the amounts paid by the Victim
Compensation Board as a starting point for determining the full amount of
victim restitution. We therefore conclude that the Supreme Court’s holding
in McCune applies here, and the court did not act in excess of jurisdiction
when it set the amount of victim restitution in March 2023.
The authority Leaea relies on is distinguishable. Unlike this case, the
trial court in People v. Waters (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 822 made no mention of
victim restitution when it placed the defendant on probation, and the
prosecution did not seek restitution until more than two years after the
defendant had completed probation. (Id. at pp. 825–826, 829.) In Hilton v.
Superior Court (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 766, the trial court ordered the
defendant to pay a specific amount of victim restitution, and then ruled after
the defendant’s probation expired that it had jurisdiction to modify the
restitution amount. (Id. at p. 770.) In contrast, here, the court did not fix the
amount of restitution only to modify it after Leaea’s probation terminated.
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Rather, the court expressed an intent to hold hearings in the future if needed
to determine the proper amount of restitution.3
Further, even assuming the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
order victim restitution in March 2023, we conclude that Leaea is estopped
from arguing the court lacked jurisdiction. As our Supreme Court observed
in People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, probationers may be estopped from
challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction to award restitution after the
probationary period has expired if, by their conduct, they consented to or
acquiesced in the trial court’s act. (Id. at pp. 287–288.) Notably, the
defendant in Ford did not request the continuance that delayed the
restitution hearing beyond his probationary term. (Id. at p. 286.) The court
explained, “estoppel can also apply to a party who merely consents to a
continuance to a date beyond the court’s ordinary authority to act. [Citation.]
We have long recognized that a failure to object can constitute implied
consent to an act in excess of the court’s jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 288.)
Ford’s reasoning applies here. Leaea was notified of but failed to
appear at the initial restitution hearing, which was scheduled on a date
before her probation expired in November 2021 under Assembly Bill 1950.
She appeared at the next hearing, again before her probation lapsed, but the
restitution hearing was continued several more times. The record does not
reveal that Leaea ever objected to these continuances.4 The only time she
3 The other cases cited by Leaea are inapposite because they do not
address a court’s jurisdiction under sections 1202.4 and 1202.46 to fix the
amount of victim restitution. (See People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771; In
re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343; People v. Lewis (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1949;
People v. White (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 677.)
4 The record does not contain transcripts for many of these hearings,
and the minute orders do not indicate whether Leaea affirmatively consented
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appears to have objected to a continuance was over a year later, in January
2023, when the trial court concluded that restitution could be ordered. The
parties thereafter stipulated to the amount of restitution Leaea owed her
victim. Under these circumstances, we conclude Leaea impliedly consented
to the court’s continued jurisdiction. Permitting her to allow the restitution
hearing to be continued for over a year beyond the expiration of her probation
term without objection or notice to the court and only then belatedly to object
it had lost the jurisdiction to determine the amount of victim restitution
would “ ‘trifle with the courts.’ ” (In re Griffin, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 348.)
Although Leaea contends she had no reason to object because the trial
court did not order her probation terminated until March 2023, Assembly
Bill 1950 had been in effect for nearly a year at the time the restitution
hearing was first continued. Nothing in the record indicates Leaea sought
relief from the court earlier or that she was prevented from objecting on the
ground that Assembly Bill 1950 shortened her probation. Moreover, much of
the delay was a result of her own actions in failing to appear at the first
scheduled restitution hearing. Allowing her to avoid her constitutional
obligation to make restitution under these circumstances would work an
inequity for her victim.5
to or objected to these continuances. For this reason, Leaea contends the case
is distinguishable from Ford. This argument ignores the fundamental
principles of appellate review that “ambiguities are resolved in favor of
affirmance” of the order and that “ ‘all intendments and presumptions are
indulged in favor of its correctness.’ ” (Winograd v. American Broadcasting
Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631.) Therefore, absent evidence to the
contrary, we presume Leaea did not object to the continuances.
5 At oral argument, Leaea’s counsel argued the equities weighed
against estoppel because the People did not request a restitution hearing
until two years into Leaea’s probationary term. Because this argument was
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In sum, the trial court had jurisdiction under sections 1202.4 and
1202.46 to set the full amount of victim restitution in March 2023. And, in
any event, we find Leaea’s implicit consent to the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction after November 13, 2021 estops her from challenging it here.
III. DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.
raised for the first time at oral argument, we do not consider it here. (People
v. Pena (2004) 32 Cal.4th 389, 403.)
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LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
BANKE, ACTING P. J.
SIGGINS, J.*
A167858
People v. Leaea
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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