CourtListener 10119774•People v. Gutierrez CA2/6
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Filed 9/17/24 P. v. Gutierrez CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330656
(Super. Ct. No. BA369668)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
JONATHAN GUTIERREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jonathan Gutierrez appeals from an order denying his
Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.1 The denial
occurred at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
In April 2012 a jury convicted appellant and his
codefendants – David Contreras and Andrew Garcia – of the first
degree murder of Moises Castro. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189.)
Contreras was the actual killer. As to each defendant, the jury
found true allegations that a principal had discharged a firearm
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)) and that the crime had
been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The trial court sentenced each
defendant to prison for 50 years to life: 25 years to life for first
degree murder plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the
firearm-gang enhancement. (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e).)
Appellant and his codefendants appealed. We affirmed the
judgment in an unpublished opinion: People v. Gutierrez et
al. (March 27, 2014, B244448, as modified on April 23, 2014)
(Gutierrez I).)
In 2022 appellant filed his section 1172.6 petition. He
claims that an instruction given at his trial – former CALJIC No.
3.00 – allowed the jury to convict him of murder by imputing
malice to him based solely on his participation in a crime. The
instruction provided in relevant part: “‘Persons who are involved
in committing a crime are referred to as principals in that crime.
Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of
participation is equally guilty. Principals include: [¶] 1. Those
who directly and actively commit the act constituting the crime,
or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet the commission of the crime.’
(Italics added.)” (Gutierez I, supra, slip opn. at p. 7.)
We conclude appellant failed to make a prima facie case
that he “could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) In addition, adverse legal determinations
in Gutierrez I are the law of the case and preclude appellant from
obtaining relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Facts
Our factual summary is taken verbatim from the factual
summary at pages 2-4 of the unpublished Gutierrez I slip
2
opinion.2 We summarize the facts “for background purposes and
to provide context for the parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2.) In determining whether
appellant made a prima facie case for relief, we do not consider
the facts as stated in Gutierrez I. (See Id. at p. 988 [“the factual
summary in an appellate opinion is not evidence that may be
considered at an evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner’s
eligibility for resentencing. (§ [1172.6], subd. (d)(3) . . . .) If such
evidence may not be considered at an evidentiary hearing to
determine a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for resentencing, we
fail to see how such evidence could establish, as a matter of law, a
petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing at the prima facie
stage”].)
“In March 2010 [appellant] and Garcia were members of
the Breed Street criminal street gang. One or two days before
March 29, 2010, [appellant, Garcia and Contreras] were inside
Maria Luna's apartment . . . . [Appellant] and Garcia said that
they were going to ‘jump’ Contreras into the gang. A gang expert
explained: ‘Gang members can join a gang by being jumped in,
which means they’re beaten by numerous members of the gang.’
“[Appellant, Garcia, and Contreras] left Luna’s apartment
and returned about 20 minutes later. . . . [Appellant] and Garcia
said that they had jumped Contreras into the gang. [Appellant]
also said that he was going to take Contreras on his ‘first
mission.’ A gang expert testified that a ‘mission’ is a criminal act
committed by a gang member. The more violent the act, the more
the reputation of the gang and gang member will be enhanced.
2 We previously took judicial notice of the record on appeal
in Gutierrez I, including our opinion.
3
Murder ‘is the ultimate crime that . . . gangs commit to instill the
most fear and intimidation in the community.’
“ . . . At about noon on March 29, 2010, [appellant, Garcia,
and Contreras again] left Luna’s apartment. Approximately 15
to 20 minutes later, [Amber] Maples[, who was inside Luna’s
apartment,] heard four or five gunshots. Three minutes after the
gunshots, [appellant, Garcia, and Contreras] ran into the
apartment. They were ‘out of breath, sweaty, panicky, nervous.’
Garcia and [appellant] ran to the bathroom, where they washed
and urinated on their hands. An expert on gunshot residue
testified that suspects will sometimes urinate on their hands in
an attempt to remove traces of gunshot residue.
“Contreras went to the kitchen and spoke with Elisa
Penalber, a friend of Maria Luna. . . .
“Penalber saw [appellant, Garcia, and Contreras] ‘stashing
the guns.’ There were three guns, and she saw [appellant] put
one inside a vacuum cleaner. Penalber asked [appellant] and
Garcia if they had taken Contreras ‘on his first mission.’ One of
them answered, ‘Yes,’ and stated that ‘he emptied the clip.’
[¶] . . .
“Maples saw [appellant] and Garcia ‘wiping down some
guns with . . . T-shirts.’ . . . Minutes later, the police arrived at
the apartment and ordered everyone ‘to come out one by one with
[their] hands up.’
“At about 12:25 p.m. on March 29, 2010, Moises Castro left
his apartment to go to work. . . . Stephanie Rios was walking
nearby. She saw Castro running toward an alley. Four or five
men were chasing him. The men appeared to be 17 or 18 years
old, and all of them were holding handguns. They were pointing
the guns at Castro. Rios got ‘a good look’ at the face of the
4
pursuer who was closest to Castro. She recognized him as
Contreras, who had attended the same school as Rios. The other
pursuers said ‘Stop’ and ‘Get that fool.’ Contreras . . . shot five
times at Castro. Castro died from a gunshot wound to the left
upper back. . . .
“After the shooting, Castro’s pursuers ran away and
Stephanie Rios telephoned 911. Officer Jose Rios drove to the
scene of the shooting. There, he heard a police radio broadcast
that the suspects had run into an apartment at 125 Matthews
Street. This was where Maria Luna lived. Rios and other officers
went to that location, which was about 10 houses away from the
shooting.
“ . . . The police searched the apartment and found three
handguns inside a vacuum cleaner. One of the handguns was an
unloaded stainless steel .357 magnum revolver with wooden
grips. (Gun #1.) The other two handguns – another stainless
steel .357 magnum revolver with wooden grips and a blue steel
.357 magnum revolver – were fully loaded. A firearms expert
opined that a bullet jacket fragment found at the scene of the
shooting had been fired from gun #1. . . .
“Gunshot residue was found on Contreras's hands but not
on the hands of [appellant] and Garcia. . . .
“In a hypothetical question, the prosecutor presented the
facts of the shooting to a gang expert. The expert opined that the
shooting was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
The expert explained that the shooting ‘enhances [the gang’s]
reputation as a violent criminal street gang. . . . [¶] It enhances
the reputation of those members that are involved because
murder is the ultimate crime to gain the most status.’”
5
Trial Court’s Ruling at Prima Facie Hearing
The trial court ruled: “[T]he record of conviction readily
demonstrates [appellant] was convicted as an aider and abettor,
and that neither felony murder, natural and probable
consequences, or any theory upon which criminal liability could
be imputed to defendant merely on the basis of his involvement
in the crime was presented at trial by way of instructions to the
jury or argument of counsel. The petition is therefore DENIED.”
Section 1172.6
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides that “[a] person
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime . . . may file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
[charges] when” certain conditions apply. One of the conditions is
that the petitioner “could not presently be convicted of
murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
After a section 1172.6 petition is filed, “the court shall hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.” (Id., subd. (c).)
If an order to show cause is issued, the court shall conduct
an evidentiary hearing to determine the petitioner’s eligibility for
relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing the
burden is on the People “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . .” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
6
Prima Facie Stage of Section 1172.6 Proceeding
“[T]he prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. . . . ‘“[T]he court
takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.
If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.”’ . . . ‘However,
if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the
court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to
the petitioner.”’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971
(Lewis).)
“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial
court's prima facie inquiry . . . , allowing the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless. This is consistent with the statute's overall purpose: to
ensure that murder culpability is commensurate with a person's
actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless petitions can
be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step prima facie review
process.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
“Appellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part
of the record of conviction. . . . In reviewing any part of the
record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.] . . . [T]he ‘prima
facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) “‘If the petition and record in the
case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. . . .’” (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450.)
7
Appellant Failed to Make a Prima Facie Case for Relief
Appellant acknowledges “that the jury was not instructed
on felony murder or on the doctrine of natural and probable
consequence[s].” He contends he made a prima facie case for
relief because “[t]he jury may have relied on [another] ‘ . . . theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime.’ (Pen. Code § 1172.6, subd.
(a)(1).)”
Appellant’s imputed malice theory is premised on former
CALJIC No. 3.00’s language that principals in the commission of
a crime are “equally guilty.” Appellant argues that this language
“was misleading and allowed the jury to find him guilty based on
imputed malice under the particular facts of this case, including
the gang expert’s testimony and the context of the specific gang
‘mission’ at issue.” “[J]urors were allowed to impute malice to
[appellant] because he was on a gang ‘mission’ in which one of the
gang members harbored malice.”
Our Supreme Court has “recognized that [former CALJIC
No. 3.00] ‘generally stated a correct rule of law,’ in that ‘[a]ll
principals, including aiders and abettors, are “equally guilty” in
the sense that they are all criminally liable.’” (People v. Amezcua
and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 918.) But “contrary to a possible
implication of former CALJIC No. 3.00, an actual killer and an
aider/abettor are not always guilty of the same offense. Rather,
in a homicide prosecution not involving felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, the aider/abettor’s
guilt is based on the combined acts of all the principals and on
the aider/abettor’s own knowledge and intent. Consequently, in
some circumstances an aider/abettor may be culpable for a
greater or lesser crime than the actual killer. [Citation.] . . .
8
[F]ormer CALJIC No. 3.00 ‘could be misleading if the principals
in a particular case might be guilty of different crimes and the
jury interprets the instruction to preclude such a finding.’”3 (Id.
at pp. 917-918.)
In Gutierrez I Contreras contended the “equally guilty”
language was erroneous, and Guitierrez joined in the contention.
(Gutierrez I, supra, slip opn. at pp. 7-8.) We concluded:
“‘[A]s a general proposition and in most cases, CALJIC No. 3.00 is
a correct statement of the law. [Citations.] As such, [Contreras
has] forfeited [his] claim of error since [he] failed to request
modification or clarification in the court below. [Citations.]’
(People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 624.)” (Id. at p. 8,
bracketed material in original.)
We further concluded that the “equally guilty” language
was not misleading in view of other jury instructions: “[T]he trial
court also gave CALJIC No. 3.01, which ‘advised the jury that it
must base its decision of each [defendant’s] liability not simply on
the mental state of the direct perpetrator of the crime, but on
that [defendant’s] state of mind and the extent to which he knew
of and intended to facilitate the purpose contemplated by the
perpetrator.’ [Citation.] Moreover, the last paragraph of CALJIC
No. 3.00 advised the jury that, when the crime charged is
murder, the guilt of each participant depends upon his own
mental state. ‘. . . CALJIC No. 3.01 [and the last paragraph of
CALJIC No. 3.00] adequately clarified any ambiguity created by
the “equally guilty” language of CALJIC No. 3.00. The charge as
a whole, therefore, did not mislead the jury. . . .’” (Gutierrez I,
3 Current CALJIC No. 3.00 provides that, “[e]xcept as to
the crime of murder, each principal . . . is equally guilty.”
9
supra, slip opn. at p. 8, last pair of brackets in original, fn.
omitted.)
The Gutierrez I opinion continued: “‘Even were we to find
the instruction misleading under the facts of this case, which we
do not, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Given
the strength of the evidence demonstrating that [appellant and
his accomplices] . . . intend[ed] to kill [Castro], we find that if the
instruction was error, beyond a reasonable doubt a rational jury’s
verdict would not have been different had the challenged
language been omitted. [Citation.]’” (Gutierrez I, supra, slip opn.
at p. 8.)
“We independently review an order denying section 1172.6
relief at the prima facie stage.” (People v. Berry-Vierwinden
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 930 (Berry-Vierwinden).) Based on
Berry-Vierwinden, as a matter of law appellant is not entitled to
relief under section 1172.6. In 2010 Berry-Vierwinden was
convicted of first degree murder. In his section 1172.6 petition
for resentencing, he argued that the jury instructions permitted
the jury to convict him of murder by imputing malice to him
based solely on his participation in a crime. The allegedly
erroneous instruction was former CALCRIM No. 400, which
contained the “equally guilty” language of former CALJIC No.
3.00.4
4 Former CALCRIM No. 400 provided: “‘A person may be
guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he may have directly
committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator.
Two, he may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly
committed the crime. A person is equally guilty of the crime
whether he committed it personally or aided and abetted the
perpetrator who committed it.’” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at pp. 926-927, italics added.)
10
The Court of Appeal noted that section 1172.6 provides
relief only if the petitioner “‘could not presently be convicted of
murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019’ by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437). (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics
added.)” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 925.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that “the trial court correctly
denied relief at the prima facie stage because Berry-Vierwinden’s
claim of instructional error fails to establish that he” could not be
presently convicted because of these statutory changes. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal explained: “Senate Bill No. 1437 did
not change the law to prohibit direct aider and abettor liability on
an imputed malice theory – this was already settled California
law by the time of Berry-Vierwinden’s 2010 trial.” (Berry-
Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 936.) “[A] court may
deny the petition at the prima facie stage if the record of
conviction conclusively establishes that the petitioner was
convicted on a theory not affected by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Id.
at p. 931; see also People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 867
(Burns) [“A [section 1172.6] petition . . . supplements a
defendant’s traditional direct appeal by providing an opportunity
to make arguments that did not exist at the time of the appeal,
but have arisen since 2019 as a result of recent statutory
amendments”]; Id. at p. 868 [“The Supreme Court’s McCoy
decision [People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111], as explained
and developed in Samaniego [People v. Samaniego (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 1148] and Nero [People v. Nero (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 504], made clear that the direct perpetrator’s mental
state could not be imputed to an aider and abettor, whose mental
state had to be independently evaluated”].)
11
In Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 862, in 2010 Burns was
convicted of murder after the jury had been instructed pursuant
to former CALCRIM No. 400. The court denied Burns’s section
1172.6 motion. It reasoned that the instruction “did not operate
to offer the jury a theory of legal liability that can no longer
support a conviction for murder as a result of the recent statutory
changes” made by Senate Bill No. 1437. (Burns, at pp. 868-869.)
Like Berry-Vierwinden and Burns, appellant cannot satisfy
the section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) requirement that he “could
not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he record of conviction conclusively establishes that
[appellant] was convicted on a theory not affected by Senate Bill
No. 1437.” (Berry-Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 931.)
In any event, appellant is not entitled to relief because the
following legal determinations in Gutierrez I were the law of the
case at the prima facie hearing: (1) the “equally guilty” language
of former CALJIC No. 3.00 did not mislead the jury into
convicting appellant based on his accomplices’ state of mind; and
(2) even if the language was misleading, the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because of “ ‘the strength of the
evidence demonstrating that [appellant and his accomplices] . . .
intend[ed] to kill [Castro]. . . . ’”5 (Gutierrez I, supra, slip opn. at
p. 8, first pair of brackets added.)
5 We need not consider whether, for purposes of the prima
facie hearing, the law of the case doctrine applied to Gutierrez I’s
determination that appellant had forfeited his claim of
instructional error by failing to request modification or
clarification of the instruction during the jury trial.
12
“Under the law of the case doctrine, when an appellate
court ‘“states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to
the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case
and must be adhered to throughout [the case’s] subsequent
progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent
appeal . . . .”’ [Citation.] Absent an applicable exception, the
doctrine ‘requir[es] both trial and appellate courts to follow the
rules laid down upon a former appeal whether such rules are
right or wrong.’” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246.)
Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, the above-
specified legal determinations in Gutierrez I were binding at the
prima facie hearing. (See People v. Medrano (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 1254, 1264 (Medrano) [law of the case doctrine
applies at prima facie stage of section 1172.6 proceeding where
the appellate court’s prior legal determination could not be
controverted by new evidence introduced at an evidentiary
hearing conducted pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3)].) Here, new evidence introduced at the evidentiary
hearing could not controvert Gutierrez I’s determination that the
“equally guilty” language of former CALJIC No. 3.00 did not
mislead the jury into convicting appellant based on a theory of
imputed malice.
In view of the binding legal determinations in Gutierrez I,
appellant cannot make a prima facie showing that he was
“convicted of . . . murder under . . . [a] theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The jury was not misled by
the “equally guilty” language of CALJIC No. 3.00. It must have
found that appellant had personally harbored the mental state
required for first degree murder.
13
“‘[T]he doctrine [of the law of the case] will not be adhered
to where its application will result in an unjust decision, e.g.,
where there has been a “manifest misapplication of existing
principles resulting in substantial injustice” [citation], or the
controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a
decision [or statutory amendment] intervening between the first
and second appellate determinations [citation].’” (Medrano,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1262-1263, brackets in original.)
Appellant has not shown that he falls within this exception to the
application of the law of the case doctrine.
Disposition
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
14
Craig Elliott Veals, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Richard A. Levy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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