In re J.H. CA4/2

CourtListener 10119723Calctapp17 sept. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 9/17/24 In re J.H. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.H., et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E083276

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J296670,
J296671 & J296672)
v.
OPINION
J.S., et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson,

Judge. Affirmed.

Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant R.H.

Caitlin E. Howard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant J.S.

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Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Pamela J. Walls, Special Counsel, for Plaintiff

and Respondent.

A mother and father appeal from orders terminating parental rights over their

minor children. They argue the county welfare department’s inquiry (the department)

into their children’s possible Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)

was inadequate, as the department was unable to contact one identified extended

relative.1 They also argue the trial court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parental

bond exception to adoption. We find the department’s ICWA inquiry was sufficient, and

there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the beneficial

parental bond exception did not apply. We therefore affirm the termination of parental

rights.

BACKGROUND

A. Dependency

Defendants and appellants R.H. and J.S. are the mother and father, respectively, of

the three children who are the subject of this dependency: G.S. (born 2014), M.S. (born

2020) and J.H. (born 2022).

The family initially came to the department’s attention in June 2022, after a

referral alleging physical abuse. The department interviewed G.S. privately, and he

expressed that he felt safe around mother but not father. He said father sometimes hits

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. “In
addition, because ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

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him, including punching him in the face and hitting him with a belt. Indeed, he said

father hit him with a belt a few days earlier, and the department found a bruise on his left

leg near his hip. G.S. also told the department father hit M.S. on the bottom. When

interviewed, father admitted hitting G.S. with a belt. In response, the department made a

safety plan with mother.

In April 2023 mother took J.H. to the hospital with injuries to his head, including

bruising along the side of his forehead and a laceration on his upper lip. Mother alleged

J.H. was sleeping with her on the bottom bunk of a bunk bed and she woke to him lying

face down on the floor next to the bed. Father said he was at work at the time. Hospital

staff reported that mother’s story was not consistent with the injuries and they suspected

abuse. Doctors eventually told the department J.H. suffered a subdural hematoma,

fracture to the occipital part of his head, and a torn frenulum. The last of these injuries

were consistent with forceful feeding, and the rest were consistent with abusive head

trauma. The doctors also discovered bruises consistent with blunt impact or squeezing,

and abrasions consistent with pinching. Finally, the doctors noted that J.H. had a severe

diaper rash and low weight, suggesting neglect. In general, the doctors reported that it

appeared J.H. suffered “multiple episodes of inflicted trauma and physical abuse.”

After going to the hospital, social workers went to mother and father’s home.

They saw G.S. had a Band-Aid on his left cheek which he said was because he had been

rubbing his face, and M.S. had scratches on her legs.

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The department filed petitions under section 300 as to all three children. J.H.’s

petition contained an allegation of serious physical harm under section 300,

subdivision (a), and all three contained numerous allegations that mother and father failed

to protect the children under section 300, subdivision (b). The next day the court found

the petitions stated a prima facie case and ordered the children detained.

The department interviewed mother and father later that April. Mother told the

department she never hit her children but that father “hits the kids.” She also denied any

domestic violence in the home, but described one instance where father hit her, she hit

him back, and the police were called. Father admitted spanking G.S. once with an open

hand and hitting furniture with a belt to scare them, but denied ever hitting them with a

belt.

The department then visited G.S. and M.S. at their placement, where the foster

parents reported that both children had abnormal bruising when they arrived, that G.S.

had a lip injury, and that M.S. had severe diaper rash. They also reported that both

children exhibited concerning behaviors. When a baby in the home cried, M.S. would

shake her fists in the air while saying “ ‘[f]uck, stop, stop stop.’ ” She was also very

aggressive with the baby, at one point even taking a sippy cup and slamming it into the

baby’s face. In addition, she acted fearful after a small spill, wincing and repeating to

herself “ ‘everything is ok, everything is ok.’ ” G.S. initially exhibited violent behaviors

as well. Upon placement he became very angry, punched the table, kicked chairs, and

threw things. He also made concerning statements, such as “ ‘[m]y father is going to kill

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me,’ ” and “ ‘he is going to beat me bad,’ ” and hid under the table afterward. He told the

caregivers that he was present when a family member shot someone and then shot

themselves, insisted that his younger brother was poisoned, and that mother and father

give him beer “but he is not allowed to tell or he will be arrested by police.”

The department interviewed G.S. alone. He told them that “he missed his mother

and could hardly wait to see her.” He said when he is in trouble he gets hit with a belt or

with a hand on his back and butt. He said M.S. and J.H. also get hit, but the parents only

use their hand on J.H. He reported that mother normally uses her hand, and father uses a

belt. He said he gets hit because he is not a good kid, and that even though his parents

spank him he still loves them. He told the department that “since the social workers

came to the home that father was not going to hit him anymore.” When asked what he

would use three wishes for, he said “he wishes that he was a better kid, that he would

listen, try my best, and [to] play with [his] sister and brother.” He repeated the claim that

he drank beer twice and was told not to tell anyone because he would go to jail. He said

there was not any ongoing domestic violence, but recalled one time when “ ‘my dad hit

my mom real hard.’ ” He told the department “that he loves his parents and is looking

forward to visiting them.”

The department filed several amended petitions. In their final form, all the

children’s petitions had multiple allegations of serious physical harm under section 300,

subdivision (a), failure to protect under subdivision (b), and abuse of sibling under

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subdivision (j). In addition, J.H.’s petition alleged severe physical abuse under

section 300, subdivision (e).

The court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in October 2023. It

sustained the allegations in the petitions. It also found by clear and convincing evidence

that reunification services need not be provided because of the sustained allegations

under section 300, subdivision (e). (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(5).) The court set a hearing under

section 366.26.

Between the jurisdiction and disposition hearing and the section 366.26 hearing,

the department reported the children did well in their placement. M.S. told the

department that she likes her caregivers. G.S. also referred to the caregivers as “ ‘mom’ ”

and “ ‘dad.’ ”

The parents were initially consistent with in-person visitation, but father had to

leave for a few months for a work obligation and was not able to attend visits in person

during that time. However, mother often called father via FaceTime for visits, and M.S.

would gather around the phone or walk around the room with the phone while father was

calling. The children were always happy to see him, and after he returned to in-person

visits, G.S. “ran to him and jumped in his arms and buried his face in his chest.” The

parents would bring lots of gifts and snacks to visits. J.H. did not appear to have as close

a relationship to father, crying and protesting when picked up. However, the children

were generally eager to leave visits, and did not cry or express discomfort. The children

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also referred to the caregiver as “ ‘Mom’ ” during visits, and did so consistently enough

that mother stopped responding when they called for “ ‘Mom.’ ”

Though there were no issues with the children at visits, there were issues between

the parents. The first visit after father returned from being away ended early because he

and mother fought in front of the children. The caregivers eventually requested to have

visits at a foster family agency because they did not feel safe hosting the parents. At a

visit in January 2024, father brought a new girlfriend and the parents got into another

verbal fight in front of the children. After that the parents visited separately. Moreover,

a caregiver told the department that during visits father “does not engage,” and mother

mostly engages with the older two children. The caregiver did not see a close connection

between the children and father, but “can tell that they love their mother.”

Father testified at the section 366.26 hearing. He testified that he visited the

children as often as he could given his work obligations, that he visited via video call

when he could not be present, and that he had a close connection to them. He said the

children called him daddy, hugged him, kissed him, and told him they loved him. He

said they used to act pained when visits would end, and would cling to him and not want

the visits to end. Both parents argued the court should apply the beneficial parent-child

relationship exception to the termination of parental rights.

The court found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. It

stated it had “no doubt in its mind these children love their mom . . . [b]ut the Court is

also cognizant of the emotional outbursts evidenced by these kids and, how under their

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caregivers[’] care, these are being ameliorated.” Looking at the factors under In re

Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), the court concluded father’s visitation was

not consistent because “[t]here were months that went by without him visiting.” The

court acknowledged this was “through no fault of his, but Caden C. is what Caden C. is.

I have to look at it literally.” (Italics added.) However, it added that even if father met

that requirement, neither parent met the second prong of the Caden C. analysis. The

court was concerned that “[i]f Mom and Dad cannot control their behavior in a setting

such as visitation, that gives the Court great concern with respect to these negative

behaviors coming back again.” The court also looked at whether there was “evidence

that there is distress . . . when the parents have to go,” and found that to the contrary,

“when the visit ends, the children are eager to leave. [M.S.] grabs the caregiver’s hand to

walk out the door. That says a lot to this Court.”

Accordingly, the court terminated the parents’ parental rights. Both mother and

father appealed.

B. ICWA

Both parents consistently did not know or denied any Indian ancestry throughout

the dependency. Mother and father both filed Family Find and ICWA Inquiry forms.

Mother identified and provided contact information for a godmother and two maternal

aunts, one of which was unrelated by blood. The department contacted both maternal

aunts and the godmother, all of whom denied any Indian heritage. Father identified and

provided contact information for the same godmother and a paternal aunt, whom the

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department had spoken with regarding the safety plan it put in place before this

dependency. Sometime between October and November 2023 the department

unsuccessfully attempted to contact the paternal aunt, both by calling and sending a text

message.

At the 366.26 hearing, the parties stipulated the department attempted to call the

paternal aunt four times that morning, and received messages indicating the subscriber

was out of the area and the number could not be reached. The court then found ICWA

did not apply.

ANALYSIS

Mother and father argue the department failed to conduct a sufficient initial

inquiry as required by California law implementing ICWA because it failed to ask

identified extended family members whether any of their children may be Indian

children. They also argue the trial court erred when it did not apply the beneficial

parental bond exception. We disagree and affirm.

A. ICWA

ICWA establishes minimum national standards “for the removal of Indian children

from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which

will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) Under California

law, the trial court and county welfare department have “an affirmative and continuing

duty to inquire” whether a child subject to a section 300 petition may be an Indian child.

(§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566 (D.F.).) “This

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continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of

further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (D.F., at p. 566.) Only

the initial duty is at issue in this appeal.

The initial duty applies in every dependency. (In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th

678, 686; see § 224.2, subd. (b).) The initial duty expands under subdivision (b) of

section 224.2, when a child is removed from their home. Under that provision, “[i]f a

child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to

Section 306,” the department’s obligation includes asking the “extended family

members” about the child’s Indian status. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The Judicial Council

revised rule 5.481 of the California Rules of Court to implement section 224.2,

subdivision (b), by requiring inquiry of extended family in every case in which the

department seeks to place the child. (Cal. Rules of Court2, rule 5.481(a)(1).)3

Our Supreme Court has recently held “that error resulting in an inadequate initial

Cal-ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare

agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in

2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

3 Opinions from our division disagree on whether that rule of court correctly
interprets the statute by requiring the department to inquire of extended family members
in every case where a child is removed from home. (Compare In re Robert F. (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 492, review granted July 26, 2023, S279743 [holding the duty does not
apply where a child is removed via protective custody warrant] with In re Delila D.
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953 (Delila D.), review granted Sept. 27, 2023, S281447 [holding
the duty applies in all cases where children are removed from home].) However, we need
not address which interpretation we find persuasive, because we conclude that the
department satisfied the more expansive duty of initial inquiry set out in Delila D. and its
progeny.

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compliance with rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the notice provision

of section 224.3. When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is impossible to ascertain

whether the agency’s error is prejudicial.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1136

(Dezi C.).) While that court did not address how to assess whether an inquiry was

erroneous, it noted “[i]f a child welfare agency fails to obtain meaningful information or

pursue meaningful avenues of inquiry—by, for example, failing to discover that a parent

was adopted, or failing to inquire further after a parent identified an extended family

member with more information about the child’s potential Indian ancestry—those facts

would be relevant to whether the initial Cal-ICWA inquiry is adequate.” (Id. at p. 1151.)

“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate,

proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to

a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) Therefore, if

“a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not

apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record documentation as

required by California law [citation], there is no error and conditional reversal would not

be warranted even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the

child.” (Ibid.) However this rule only applies when there is a well-developed record,

and “ ‘ “the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily

becomes.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a

reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or

resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614 at p. 640.)

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Here, we are not reviewing a fact that comes through a trial court’s resolution of

an evidentiary conflict, but the trial court’s implied finding that the department’s “inquiry

and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.)

We thus are “not concerned with the outcome” as to the likelihood of whether the child is

an Indian child. (Id. at p. 1144.) We are thus not to limit our review to “[e]nforcing the

requirement of an adequate inquiry only in cases in which the record affirmatively

demonstrates a reason to believe the child is an Indian child.” (Id. at p. 1147.) Instead,

we are “ensuring that tribal heritage is acknowledged and inquired about in dependency

cases.” (Id. at p. 1148.) This mission surely requires that we engage in a searching

review to protect the tribal interests that Dezi C. explained are compelling and legally

protected. (Id. at p. 1148.) Yet the deferential standard requires that we not find error

just because the inquiry was not flawless.

We conclude the trial court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and therefore the

implied finding that the inquiry was adequate, to be supported by substantial evidence.

The department spoke to everyone mother and father were able to identify save for one

notable exception. Though this was not a large number of people in all—the department

was ultimately only able to talk to two maternal aunts—it was nevertheless duly diligent

given the constraints. Indeed, we cannot ask for much more from the department when

faced with such little information about the parents’ extended families and no indication

that unidentified family members may be reachable.

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Nevertheless, father alleges the department erred by failing to inquire with the

identified paternal aunt, and mother also argues the department erred by failing to

independently identify extended relatives by referencing her own history with child

welfare. Neither of these alleged failures are enough to reject the trial court’s finding.

First, the department did attempt to contact the paternal aunt, once in the fall of 2023 and

four times the morning of the section 366.26 hearing. The first attempt at contact was via

phone call and text message, and the paternal aunt never responded. The latter four

attempts revealed that the phone number the department had for the paternal aunt could

not be reached, suggesting that further attempts to contact her would be fruitless. In

short, any information paternal aunt may have had was not readily obtainable, and

therefore substantial evidence supports a finding that the department’s failure to obtain

that information did not render its inquiry inadequate. Nor is the department required to

conduct an independent fishing expedition into a parent’s child welfare history to identify

extended relatives. The department’s “obligation is only one of inquiry and not an

absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native American ancestry.” (In re Antoinette S.

(2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413.) Mother did not identify or provide contact

information for any maternal relatives besides the maternal aunt because she was not in

contact with them. Therefore, there was substantial evidence to conclude the department

had fulfilled its duty of inquiry by speaking to the relatives mother did identify.

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B. Beneficial Parental Bond Exception

“By the time of a section 366.26 hearing, the parent’s interest in reunification is no

longer an issue and the child’s interest in a stable and permanent placement is

paramount.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348 (Jasmine D.).)

Adoption is the Legislature’s preferred permanent plan. (In re Autumn H. (1994)

27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) “[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the

parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.”

(Jasmine D., at p. 1350.)

To avoid this outcome, the parent must show that termination of parental rights

“ ‘would be detrimental to the minor’ due to any of certain specified circumstances.”

(Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) One circumstance, the

parental bond exception, applies where the parent can show they “have maintained

regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing

the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) There are three elements to this

exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of

which would benefit the child[ren] such that (3) the termination of parental rights would

be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, italics omitted.)

“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is straightforward. The

question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent

permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) For the second

element, courts may take into account “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child,

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the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative”

effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.)

As for the third element “in assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial

court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent

outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 632,

italics omitted.)

On review, we apply the substantial evidence standard to the findings on the first

two elements and a hybrid standard for the third. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.)

Specifically, we review whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to

the child because of the beneficial parental relationship for abuse of discretion. (Id. at

p. 640.) But we review any factual findings underlying that decision for substantial

evidence. (Ibid.) In doing so, we look only at the evidence admitted at the

366.26 hearing. (In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 207-208.) This hybrid

standard embodies the principle that as the reviewing court, we may not “substitute [our]

own judgment as to what is in the child’s best interests for the trial court’s determination

in that regard.” (Caden C., at p. 641.)

The trial court found that father failed to demonstrate either of the first two

prongs, while mother failed under the second prong. We conclude there was substantial

15
evidence to support the trial court’s findings as to the second prong for both parents, and

therefore need not address whether father’s visitation was consistent enough.4

G.S. was clear and consistent in reporting father physically abused all three

children and mother at minimum failed to protect them from this abuse. Indeed, all three

children showed the scars of that treatment. G.S. told the department he believed he was

hit because he was not a good kid, and would use a magic wish to make himself a better

kid. He was happy that since the social worker intervened his dad would no longer hit

him. When first removed he exhibited violent, angry behavior that calmed the longer he

was away from his parents, and said he was afraid father would kill him and “ ‘beat [him]

bad.’ ”

Though his much younger siblings did not articulate the same concerns, they too

expressed signs that their relationship to their parents was not beneficial. M.S. appeared

extremely distressed whenever a baby cried in her placement home, shaking her fists and

repeating “ ‘[f]uck, stop, stop stop’ ” in apparent imitation of behavior she saw at home.

She was aggressive towards younger children in the home, and winced and attempted to

self-soothe after a small spill. These behaviors indicate a fearful, anxious environment at

4 While we need not address the trial court’s findings regarding the first prong, we
disagree with the trial court’s implicit conclusion that only in-person visitation counts
under Caden C. As the recent COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated, virtual visits may be
the only feasible option for visitation in some circumstances, and there may be, for
example, financial or work constraints that sometimes make that visitation appropriate.
Crediting those virtual may at times be appropriate when considering the consistency of
visitation, and Caden C. does not forbid considering virtual visits.

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home, as does the fact that these behaviors subsided while the children remained out of

the home.

Finally, the children’s behavior during visits suggests that they did not have a

strong, beneficial bond with their parents. They were often eager to leave visitation, did

not exhibit any negative behaviors as they were leaving or after they left, and referred to

the caregivers as mom and dad. Indeed, they called their female caregiver mom so

consistently that mother learned to stop responding. J.H. even appeared somewhat

fearful of father and did not like being picked up or held by father.

All of this is sufficient evidence for a court to conclude that the bond between the

children and the parents was far from beneficial. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence to

suggest that the relationship was actively harmful. While we join the trial court in saying

that we do not doubt that the children love their mother, this does not mean their

relationship with either mother or father was to their benefit, and there was substantial

evidence to support the conclusion it was not.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating both parents’ parental

rights.

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DISPOSITION

We affirm.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

MILLER
J.

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