Duong v. Uffer CA4/3

CourtListener 10115271Calctapp12 sept. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 9/12/24 Duong v. Uffer CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TRUONG DINH DUONG,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063914

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIC1816642)

MARK UFFER et al., OPINION

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Chad W. Firetag, Judge. Affirmed.
Khouri Law Firm, Michael J. Khouri and Valery R. Polyakov for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips and Charles E. Weir for Defendant
and Respondent Mark Uffer.
Pearlman, Brown & Wax and Corinne D. Spencer for Defendant
and Respondent Isaac Kung-Yu Tsai.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith and Raul L. Martinez for
Defendants and Respondents Alaa Yousseff Afifi and Ihab Bassam Alomar.
* * *
The trial court sustained the demurrers of defendants Mark
Uffer, Alaa Yousseff Afifi, M.D., Isaac Kung-Yu Tsai, M.D., and Ihab Bassam
Alomari, M.D, to plaintiff Truong Dinh Duong, M.D.’s third amended
complaint without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of
defendants. On appeal, Duong contends the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrers and denying him leave to amend.
We affirm. Duong failed to include key items from the trial
court’s record in his appellant’s appendix, including the court’s written order
sustaining the demurrers, the demurrers themselves, any opposition by
Duong reflecting his representations to the court regarding his ability to
amend his complaint to state a claim, and Duong’s prior pleadings, the prior
demurrers and the court’s prior orders relating to the same.
Duong’s opening brief also is deficient. It contains only conclusory
argument, unsupported by any meaningful analysis and legal authority.
Duong cited cases relating to the elements of each of his causes of action, but
he failed to present argument with citation to authority addressing how the
facts alleged state any viable cause of action against defendants. It is not
apparent from the minimal records Duong did include in his appendix—
including the third amended complaint, register of actions, and judgment1—

1
Duong also included the notice of appeal and notice of
designating record on appeal in the appendix.

2
that the demurrers should have been overruled or, alternatively, that further
leave to amend should have been granted. It is not our role to discern
whether Duong’s third amended complaint should have survived demurrers
that are not even contained in the record before us or to develop his
arguments for him. Defendants raised these deficiencies in their respondents’
brief on appeal, but Duong did not file a reply brief and failed to respond to
them. Without an adequate record and briefing, Duong has failed to
demonstrate grounds to reverse the judgment against him.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Duong is a licensed independent cardiologist who had clinical
privileges at Corona Regional Medical Center (the hospital). Uffer was the
hospital’s chief executive officer, Afifi its chief of staff, and Tsai its chief of
cardiology. Alomari is another cardiologist who worked at the hospital.
Duong filed this action after a series of events led to the suspension of his
privileges at the hospital and his required attendance at an anger
management course.
According to the register of actions, Duong filed his initial
complaint against the hospital on August 14, 2018. The hospital responded
with a demurrer and motion to strike. The trial court sustained the demurrer
in part, with 30 days’ leave to amend, and deemed the motion to strike moot.
Duong did not include his initial complaint, the demurrer and motion to
strike (and related briefing), or the court’s minute order, as part of his
appendix on appeal.
It appears from the register of actions Duong added the
individual respondents to the underlying action by Doe amendments. Afifi,
Tsai, and Alomari demurred to the complaint, and the trial court sustained
the demurrer in part, with 30 days’ leave to amend. Duong did not include

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these demurrers (and related briefing), or the court’s minute order, as part of
his appendix on appeal.
Duong filed a first amended complaint, and then sought and was
granted leave to file a second amended complaint. Defendants Afifi, Alomari,
Tsai, Uffer, the hospital, and another defendant, Adriane Rodriguez, the
hospital’s medical staff director, all demurred to the second amended
complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrers and granted Duong 30
days’ leave to amend. Duong did not include his first amended complaint,
second amended complaint, the demurrers to the second amended complaint
(and related briefing), or the court’s minute orders sustaining these
demurrers in his appellant’s appendix.
Duong filed his third amended complaint on January 6, 2021,
alleging causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, and unlawful business
practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.
(UCL). Duong included the third amended complaint in his appendix on
appeal.
In the third amended complaint, Duong alleged Alomari filed two
separate complaints against him, falsely accusing him of bullying and
disruptive behavior. As a result, Duong was required to attend two medical
executive committee (MEC) meetings, one for each of the two separate
complaints made by Alomari. According to Duong, he was not given the
opportunity to submit a written response to Alomari’s allegations in advance
of the first MEC meeting, even though the hospital’s bylaws, which expressly
state they are a contract between the hospital and staff members like Duong,
allowed him to do so. He also alleged he was blindsided at the second MEC
meeting by new, separate complaints made against him by two nurses.

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According to the third amended complaint, Afifi led the MEC meetings and
failed to properly investigate the complaints against Duong, ignored evidence
presented by Duong, did not allow Duong to defend himself, and found the
allegations against Duong to be true without any factual basis.
Duong was ordered to attend an anger management course (the
PACE program), but he initially refused to do so. The MEC then voted to
suspend Duong’s clinical privileges. Duong ultimately agreed to, and did,
attend the PACE program, but his suspension remains on his official record
at the hospital and must be disclosed to other hospitals and to insurance
providers.
As to Afifi, Duong alleged he is liable as the hospital’s chief of
staff under theories of negligence and intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage for failing to ensure a fair and proper
investigation into the allegations made against Duong and for making false
representations about Duong to the hospital’s board and the MEC. Duong
alleged Uffer had the ability to intervene to stop what Duong characterized
as harassment of him by Tsai, Alomari, and Afifi, and the sham investigation,
but failed to do so. As to Tsai and Alomari, Duong alleged they conspired to
submit Alomari’s false and defamatory complaints against Duong in order to
prevent Duong from successfully operating an important cardiac program at
the hospital. Finally, Duong alleged Rodriguez made false representations to
Duong and the members of the hospital’s board regarding Duong’s
disagreement with having to attend the PACE Program, falsely gave
information to other inquiring hospitals that suggested Duong had been
suspended, and manipulated meeting attendance records resulting in Duong
being demoted to “‘inactive’” status at the hospital while he was working full
time. Duong alleged that, as a result of defendants’ misconduct, Duong’s

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relationships with the hospital and others were disrupted and his hospital
schedule was minimized, which (along with having to attend the PACE
program) caused him to lose money. Finally, in a conclusory fashion, Duong
alleged defendants’ conduct constituted unlawful business practices under
the UCL.
Tsai, Afifi, Alomari, Uffer, and Rodriguez each demurred to the
third amended complaint. Duong opposed the demurrers. The trial court
sustained all of the demurrers (except Rodriguez’s) without leave to amend
2
on March 18, 2022. Duong did not include the demurrers and related
briefing, or the court’s March 18 minute order, as part of his appellant’s
appendix.3
The trial court entered judgment on January 3, 2023, in favor of
Tsai, Afifi, Alomari, and Uffer based on the March 18, 2022 order sustaining
the demurrers. Duong timely appealed the judgment as to these four
defendants.

2
After the court overruled Rodriguez’s demurrer, Rodriguez and
the hospital successfully moved for summary judgment on Duong’s entire
third amended complaint, and a separate judgment was entered in their
favor. Our colleagues in Division Two dismissed Duong’s appeal from that
separate judgment on grounds of untimeliness and resulting lack of
jurisdiction.

3
The register of actions indicates the trial court posted tentative
rulings on the demurrers prior to the hearing and held a telephonic hearing
with all counsel and a court reporter present. All parties submitted on the
tentative rulings without oral argument on the demurrers by Uffer,
Rodriguez and Tsai. Counsel for Afifi and Alomari requested and presented
oral argument on their demurrers. On appeal, Duong opted to proceed
without a record of the oral proceedings.

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DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We independently review the ruling on a demurrer and
determine de novo whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a
cause of action. [Citation.] Construing the allegations in a reasonable
manner, we assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations,
facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and
matters of which judicial notice can and have been taken.” (Crouch v. Trinity
Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1010.) “‘We
affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer,
regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.’” (Santa Ana Police Officers
Assn. v. City of Santa Ana (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 317, 324.)
Even though our review is de novo, “‘[a] judgment or order of the
lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error
must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate
practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’”
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is the appellant’s job
to “‘frame the issues for us, show us where the superior court erred, and
provide us with the proper citations to the record and case law.’” (Crawley v.
Alameda County Waste Management Authority (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 396,
404; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellate brief must “support
each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].) “‘Mere
suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than
general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate

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review.’ [Citation.] ‘Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail.’” (Multani v.
Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457.)
II.
ANALYSIS
“It is the burden of appellant to provide an accurate record on
appeal to demonstrate error. Failure to do so precludes an adequate review
and results in affirmance of the trial court’s determination.” (Estrada v.
Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1.) Rule 8.124(b) of the California
Rules of Court sets out the required contents of an appellant’s appendix. The
appendix must include the notice of appeal, the judgment and orders
appealed from, and the register of actions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
8.124(b)(1), 8.122(b)(1).) In addition, the appendix must include any other
document from the superior court file necessary for proper consideration of
the appeal, including any document the respondent is likely to rely on. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 8.124(b)(1)(B), 8.122(b)(3)(A).)
Duong’s appendix does not comply with these rules. His appendix
consisted of only his third amended complaint, the judgment, the notice of
appeal, the notice of designation of record on appeal, and the register of
actions. Duong did not provide us with the trial court’s order sustaining the
demurrers to the third amended complaint, the demurrers, the opposition
papers and related briefing, or Duong’s prior pleadings, all of which are
necessary for our consideration of Duong’s contention on appeal that the
court erred in sustaining defendants’ demurrers to the third amended
complaint without leave to amend.
Duong also failed to provide in his opening brief anything more
than bare conclusory arguments regarding the sufficiency of his third
amended complaint, and his brief is completely devoid of meaningful legal

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analysis with citations to legal authority. An appellant must “support each
point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “‘An appellate brief “should contain a legal
argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished
on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without
consideration.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . ‘This court is not inclined to act as
counsel for him or any appellant and furnish a legal argument as to how the
trial court’s rulings in this regard constituted an abuse of discretion’
[citation], or a mistake of law.” (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344,
368; Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 832, 854
[forfeiture of points without meaningful argument or citation to authority].)
Having failed to provide both an adequate record on appeal and
an opening brief with meaningful legal argument and authority, Duong failed
to sustain his burden of showing the trial court erred.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Respondents shall recover costs on
appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

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