CourtListener 10115265•People v. Bridgette CA4/3
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Filed 9/12/24 P. v. Bridgette CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062195
v. (Super. Ct. No. 16WF2665)
THOMAS ANDRE BRIDGETTE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael A. Leversen, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant Thomas Andre Bridgette was convicted of sexually
assaulting two different women on two separate occasions in the fall of 2016.
On appeal, he contends 1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress
incriminating evidence that was seized during a warrantless search of his
home, 2) the trial court erred in denying his request for a separate trial as to
each victim, and 3) the jury instruction on the use of propensity evidence was
fundamentally unfair. Although we find these contentions unpersuasive,
defendant also raises a narrow sentencing issue that, as respondent concedes,
does have merit. Therefore, we will reverse one aspect of his sentence and
remand the matter for limited resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm
the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Incident Involving Jane Doe 2 (JD2)
In 2016, JD2 was a young single mother living with her parents
in Anaheim. Hoping to find a place of her own, she joined a Facebook group
designed to help people locate room rentals in Orange County. Defendant
contacted her through the group on October 1, 2016. At his request, she
agreed to meet him at a Jack in the Box restaurant later that day to discuss a
property he supposedly had for rent.
During the meeting, defendant said he had a pool-house studio
that he was looking to rent for $600 a month, and after seeing pictures of the
alleged property on his phone, JD2 said she was interested. She even offered
to give defendant half of the first month’s rent as a down payment. However,
rather than closing the deal with JD2 at that point, defendant suggested that
they meet back at the restaurant in a couple hours to discuss the matter
further, and she agreed to do so.
2
When JD2 returned to the restaurant that afternoon, she brought
along her four-year-old daughter. Defendant arrived in a blue Toyota pickup
truck. He offered to take JD2 to see the studio, and because defendant
“looked harmless” to her, she got in his truck with her daughter. However,
instead of taking them to see the studio, defendant drove to a Home Depot
store in Garden Grove.
Upon pulling into the parking lot, defendant stopped his truck
and told JD2 he was a federal drug agent. Although defendant was not
actually associated with law enforcement, JD2 believed he was a police officer
because he showed her an official looking card and spoke in an authoritative
manner. She also noticed he had a pair of handcuffs with him at that point.
Defendant told JD2 he had been trying to track her down for
some time. He then began questioning her about some murder case that was
supposedly connected to the pool-house studio. JD2 had no idea what
defendant was talking about. However, when she tried to tell him that, he
told her he was going to have to take her to the Fullerton police station for
additional questioning.
Still thinking defendant was a police officer, JD2 asked him if
they could drop off her daughter at her parents’ house first, and he agreed to
do so. On arrival at the house, defendant told JD2 that if she did not return
to his truck after taking her daughter inside, he was going to come into the
house and arrest her. So, she entered the house, left her daughter with her
mother, and promptly returned to defendant’s truck. Then they headed back
out on the road together.
As they were driving, defendant made a phone call to a female
and asked her to bring him his gun. He also asked JD2 to hand him a
cigarette package that was in the truck. However, when she handed him the
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package, she noticed it did not have any cigarettes inside. Defendant told her
the package contained methamphetamine, and now that her fingerprints
were on it, he could have her arrested for drug possession. Fearing defendant
was a crooked cop, JD2 became very worried. Her anxiety only increased
when she realized defendant was not driving in the direction of the Fullerton
police station.
Instead of taking JD2 to the station, defendant took her to a quiet
alley in Buena Park, where he stopped his truck and put her in the
handcuffs. When she tried to escape, defendant grabbed her hair and
slammed her head into the center gear shifter. Then he pulled out a
switchblade-like knife, held the blade up to her neck, and asked her how bad
she wanted to go home. JD2 took that to mean defendant wanted something
from her. Although she begged him to let her go, he told her the only “easy
way” out was for her to give him oral sex.
When JD2 refused, defendant forcibly kissed her and grabbed her
breasts and vagina over her clothing. Then he tried to reach underneath her
clothing, but JD2 successfully resisted that attempt by squirming around and
fighting back the best she could. She also tried to yell for help, however,
defendant covered her mouth and continued to pull her hair and rough her
up. Out of desperation, JD2 made an appeal to defendant’s religious faith and
promised not to tell anyone about their encounter if he would only let her go.
At that point, defendant finally relented and agreed to take JD2 back to her
parents’ house.
As he was dropping her off, he removed her handcuffs and gave
her $20 to buy a pizza for her daughter. He also told her to delete all of the
messages that they had exchanged about the room rental that day. However,
JD2 did not do that, nor did she keep quiet. Instead, she proceeded to tell her
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parents what defendant had done to her. As it turned out, her father did not
believe her, and her mother was skeptical of her story. So, she called a friend
and told her about the ordeal. JD2 does not remember who called the police,
but Garden Grove Police Officer Jane Raney came out to talk to her at her
parents’ house at about 11:45 that evening.
After briefly speaking with JD2 at the house, Raney took her to
the station for further questioning. JD2 told Raney that in addition to pulling
a knife on her and pressuring her for oral sex, defendant had threatened to
tase her and spray her with pepper spray. She also claimed that defendant
punched her in the side of the head during the attack.
Following the interview, JD2 identified defendant from a
photographic lineup. She also turned over a cell phone to the police, but it
was not the one she had used to communicate with defendant about the room
rental. And although the police drove her around the area where she said
that defendant had attacked her, she could not identify the precise location
where the attack occurred.
Nevertheless, the police obtained a warrant to search defendant’s
home in Garden Grove. During the search, they found a box of .22 caliber
ammunition, a fake police badge, and a box for a stun gun. And inside
defendant’s pickup truck, they found pepper spray, handcuffs and a
switchblade-like knife. Both the pepper spray and the handcuffs had JD2’s
DNA on them.
Defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be
interviewed. (See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).) At
first, he denied knowing JD2 or communicating with her about any room
rental. But after the police showed him surveillance photos of them together
at the Jack in the Box, he admitted “hitting her up” on Facebook and meeting
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her there to discuss property rentals. He also admitted driving JD2 to the
parking lot of Home Depot. However, he insisted that she went along with
him willingly and that he never told her he was a police officer. He also
claimed that he never handcuffed her, demanded sex from her, or hurt her in
any way. Rather, according to defendant, he was just trying to help her out
by finding her a place to stay.
Following his interview, defendant was released pending further
investigation. Less than six weeks later, he was involved in a second incident
of alleged sexual misconduct that occurred on November 11, 2016.
Incident Involving Jane Doe 1 (JD1)
On that day, JD1 was working as a prostitute at the Quality Inn
motel in Westminster. Sometime after 3:00 p.m., defendant called her about
an advertisement for sexual services that she had placed online. JD1 gave
defendant her location and then went to a nearby liquor store to get a bottle
of water. When she returned to her room, she thought she closed the door
behind her, but it was actually slightly ajar. She realized this a few minutes
later when defendant abruptly entered her room with a gun and told her to
take off her clothes. He also threatened to kill her if she screamed or made
any loud noises.
After JD1 disrobed, defendant took off his pants and directed her
to put on a black dress that was lying on the bed. But after she put it on,
defendant told her to take it off and became violent. He grabbed a towel off
the bed, wrapped it around JD1’s neck, and pulled her hair. He also grabbed
her breasts and buttocks and tried to kiss her. JD1 tried to resist and get
away. However, defendant was too strong, and because he was choking her
with the towel, she was having trouble breathing and could not yell for help.
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Defendant eventually eased up with the choking. However, while
still holding the gun, he demanded that JD1 suck his penis, or he would kill
her and throw her in the bathtub. JD1 complied out of fear for her life.
Defendant then pushed her onto the bed and tried to have intercourse with
her. But he could not achieve an erection and was only able to penetrate her
vagina slightly with his flaccid penis.
Defendant also put his fingers inside JD1’s vagina momentarily
and touched her anus. While doing so, he directed her to call him “daddy” and
to tell “daddy” how much she wanted him. However, due to his inability to
obtain an erection, he eventually gave up the cruel charade and ceased the
attack.
As he was getting dressed, defendant warned JD1 not to call the
police. He also picked up the bottle of water that she had purchased from the
liquor store and threatened to kill her with it. But instead of doing that,
defendant took JD1’s phones—both her personal phone and her “business”
phone—and left the room.
After that, JD1 went down to the lobby and called 911. Even
though she was not able to identify defendant as her attacker at trial,
surveillance videos captured defendant leaving the motel shortly before she
called the police. Defendant’s DNA was also found on JD1’s neck and on the
towel and the bottle of water that she described in her testimony. However,
defendant’s DNA was not found on JD1’s genitals, and her DNA was not
found on his penis.
When interviewed at the scene by members of the Westminster
Police Department, JD1 was scared and nervous. Although she initially gave
the police a false name and denied engaging in prostitution activity that day,
she eventually admitted she was a sex worker. She said a man robbed her at
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gunpoint in her room, pulling her hair and choking her with a towel. She also
alleged that he digitally penetrated her vagina and anus and that he
unsuccessfully tried to sodomize her. Consistent with her claim of being
choked, JD1 had red marks—possibly scratches—on her neck. After
photographing the marks, the police transported her to the hospital for a
sexual assault examination.
The examination was performed by nurse Jennifer Rivera. Rivera
did not observe any external injuries on JD1, but she did notice that she had
a fresh bruise on the inside of her left cheek. The bruise was consistent with
JD1 biting her cheek during some type of trauma, such as being strangled.
JD1 also reported having head pain, trouble swallowing, and difficulty
recalling the details of her attack, which was consistent with her claim of
being choked.
While JD1 did not have any physical signs of strangulation in the
area around her neck, and her voice did not sound hoarse or raspy, Rivera did
not find that unusual. In fact, she said that roughly half of all assault victims
who report being strangled do not have any physical manifestations of such
abuse. Rivera also downplayed the lack of physical injury to JD1’s genital
area, saying that about three quarters of all rape victims show no signs of
trauma in that area.
During the time that JD1 was speaking with the Westminster
police and undergoing her examination, another important development in
her case was beginning to unfold. The impetus for that development was
JD1’s boyfriend, A.M. On the night in question, he did not know anything
about what had happened to JD1 or that defendant had stolen her phones.
All he knew is that JD1 was not answering her phone or returning any of his
numerous phone calls, which was very unusual for her. Eventually, he
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became so worried about JD1 that he reported her to the police as a missing
1
person.
A.M.’s missing person’s report came in at about 1:00 a.m. on
November 12, 2016, roughly eight hours after JD1 was attacked by defendant
in her motel room. A.M. told the authorities that by using a location finder
app on his phone, he had been able to track JD1’s phone to a residential
neighborhood in Garden Grove. Fearing for JD1’s wellbeing, he then drove to
that neighborhood from his home in Los Angeles to look for her.
To assist A.M. in that endeavor, officers from the Garden Grove
Police Department were dispatched to his location. When they arrived on the
scene and contacted A.M., the officers did not know about the incident that
had transpired earlier that evening between JD1 and defendant in
Westminster. But based on previous contacts with defendant, they did know
that he lived in the area where they met A.M. And with A.M.’s help, they
were able to find JD1’s phones, which were located in the backyard of
defendant’s rear neighbor. After finding the phones, the police contacted
defendant at his home, and he agreed to talk to them about his encounter
with JD1.
At the start of the interview, defendant claimed that nothing
happened between him and JD1. But in response to further questioning, he
admitted contacting JD1 through her ad and negotiating to have sex with her
for $100. He said that when he arrived at JD1’s motel room, he noticed she
did not look like the woman who was pictured in her ad.2 Nevertheless, he
1
A.M. did not know that JD1 was a prostitute. She had told him
that she worked as a mobile hairdresser.
2
At trial, JD1 admitted she used the photo of another woman in
her ad.
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took off his clothes and washed his hands, in anticipation of having sex with
her. However, at that point, JD1 raised her price to $250 and began rifling
through his wallet, and therefore he decided to call things off before they had
any sexual relations.
Defendant told the police that he did not have a gun with him
during his encounter with JD1, nor did he attack her or hurt her in any way.
But he did admit taking her phones because he was angry over the situation.
He also admitted throwing the phones into his neighbor’s backyard. The
police arrested defendant and took him into custody. When interviewed at the
station, he again denied attacking JD1.
Later that morning, the police conducted a consent search of
defendant’s residence and found a .22 caliber handgun in the garage. The gun
was located in a pouch inside of a toolbox. Although the pouch was open and
the toolbox was very dusty, the gun was clean. According to the officer who
found it, the gun “did not appear that it had been sitting in there gathering
dust and cobwebs, or anything like that.”
In order to help the jury understand why JD1 might have been
reluctant to tell the police she was a prostitute and to testify at trial (she
testified under a grant of immunity), the prosecution called an expert witness
on sex trafficking. He testified that prostitutes often use fake names and ad
photos to conceal their identity. And because they work outside the confines
of the law, they are highly vulnerable to exploitation and violence.
The Defense
The main witness for the defense was defendant’s wife, L.M. She
testified that at the time this case arose, she was defendant’s girlfriend and
was living with him, along with her mother, in a house in Garden Grove. She
said she decided to marry defendant while his trial was pending because he is
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honest and caring and would never do any of the things he was accused of
doing.
Speaking to those accusations, L.M. said that when she had
lunch with defendant on the day of the incident involving JD2, he told her
that he was going to be helping a young woman and her daughter find a place
to stay. That did not seem unusual to L.M., because she knew defendant as a
kind and generous person. However, when she tried to contact defendant
later that day—during the time that he was allegedly attacking JD2—he did
not answer his phone or respond to any of her numerous text messages.
L.M. also testified that she owned the blue pickup truck that
defendant was driving at the time he met up with JD2 and allegedly attacked
her. L.M. claimed the pepper spray and the switchblade-like knife that the
police found in the truck belonged to her. And, she also owned a small taser
at that time. But she did not know anything about the handcuffs that were
found in the truck.
In an attempt to discredit JD2’s allegations, the defense also
presented testimony from her father. Contrary to what JD2 said in her
testimony, he said he was not at home on the day she was allegedly assaulted
by defendant. He was also confronted with statements he allegedly made to a
defense investigator impugning JD2’s credibility and parenting skills.
Regarding the incident involving JD1, the defense presented
evidence that, in speaking with her boyfriend A.M. about the incident, JD1
told him that defendant took her phones. But she did not say anything to him
about defendant having a gun.
Trial Proceedings
As to JD1, defendant was charged with two counts of forcible
sexual penetration with a foreign object and one count each of forcible rape,
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forcible oral copulation, assault with the intent to commit a sex offense, and
robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); 261, subd. (a)(2); 288a, subd.
3
(c)(2)(A); 220, subd. (a)(1) & 211, subd. (a).) It was further alleged that
defendant personally used a firearm during those offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd.
(b).)
As to JD2, defendant was charged with kidnapping to commit a
sex offense, sexual battery by restraint, assault with intent to commit a sex
offense, and attempted forcible oral copulation. (§§ 209, subd. (b)(1); 243.4,
subd. (a); 220, subd. (a)(1) & 664/287, subd. (c)(2)(A).) And he was alleged to
have used a deadly weapon during the latter two crimes. (§ 12022.3, subd.
(a).)
Prior to trial, the court denied defendant’s request to sever the
counts involving JD1 from the counts involving JD2, and therefore all of the
charges were adjudicated in a single trial. In the end, the jury convicted
defendant as charged and found all of the weapon enhancement allegations to
be true. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court then found true additional
allegations that defendant had suffered three prior strike convictions and
three prior serious felony convictions. (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A); 1170.12,
subds. (b), (c)(2)(A); 667, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court sentenced him to prison
for 54 years and 4 months, plus an indeterminate term of 7 years to life.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends his convictions must be reversed for three
reasons. First, the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the gun
that was found in his garage. Second, the trial court erred by denying his
3
Unless noted otherwise, all further statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
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request for a separate trial as to each of the victims. And third, the trial court
erred in giving CALCRIM No. 1191B on the use of propensity evidence. For
the reasons explained below, we find defendant’s claims unconvincing.
However, due to an undisputed sentencing error, he is entitled to
resentencing on one of his offenses.
I.
SUPPRESSION MOTION
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun and
any other incriminating evidence stemming from the warrantless search of
his home on November 12, 2016. Although defendant, L.M., and L.M.’s
mother each consented to the search, defendant maintained their consent
was tainted by illegal police activity that proceeded the search. In particular,
defendant accused the police of unlawfully entering his home while they were
investigating the whereabouts of JD1.
At the motion hearing, the court heard from several police
officers who were involved in that investigation, as well as L.M. The court
also considered various statements that were picked up by the officers’ body
microphones while they were talking with L.M. and defendant at their home.
A. Factual Background
1. Prosecution Evidence
At about 1:15 a.m. on November 12, Garden Grove Police Officers
Charles Starnes and Troy Haller were dispatched to defendant’s
neighborhood in response to A.M.’s missing person’s call. This was not the
first time the officers had been to that neighborhood. Roughly a month
earlier, in October 2016, they had been to defendant’s house to investigate
JD2’s allegations that defendant had kidnapped and sexually assaulted her
after taking her to a Home Depot store in Garden Grove.
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On this occasion, however, Starnes and Haller were investigating
a different matter, namely the whereabouts of JD1. As noted in the
statement of facts above, JD1’s boyfriend A.M. had reported her missing
because she was not answering her phone and he did not know where she
was. Although A.M. had managed to track JD1’s phone to the area around
defendant’s house, he did not know exactly where the phone was, or how to
retrieve it in the middle of the night, which is why he called the police.
When Starnes and Haller arrived at the scene, they spoke with
A.M. about his concerns. A.M. said that despite repeated attempts to contact
JD1, he had not heard from her in about eight hours. He was worried about
her because she had children to care for, and it was not like her not to answer
her phone, or at least return his calls.
According to the locator app on A.M.’s phone, JD1’s phone was in
close proximity to defendant’s house. The officers instructed A.M. to keep
calling the phone, in the hope that they would hear it “pinging” in the area.
They then began knocking on doors to see if anyone in the neighborhood had
seen JD1 or heard her phone. When they got to defendant’s house, L.M.
answered the door alone. The officers told her they were looking for a missing
person whose phone was in the area, and she said she had heard a pinging
sound coming from the rear of her residence.
Following that brief encounter with L.M., Starnes and Haller
went back and talked to A.M. By then, Garden Grove Police Officer Aldo
Guereca had also arrived on the scene. Like Starnes and Haller, Guereca
knew that defendant had previously been investigated for kidnapping and
sexually assaulting JD2. In fact, Guereca was part of the team that had
arrested defendant at his house in connection with that earlier incident, in
October 2016. The officers decided to have Starnes stay with A.M. and
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monitor his phone, and for Haller and Guereca to go back to defendant’s
house to see if L.M. would let them enter her backyard to look for JD1’s
missing phone.
During this second contact, L.M. reiterated that she had heard a
pinging sound coming from the rear of her residence. She also stated that she
and defendant had been to Walmart earlier that evening. Haller asked if he
could go into her backyard to look for the phone, and she said yes or
something to that effect.
Haller walked to the side of the house and looked over a wall into
the backyard, where he saw defendant running from the rear of the yard
toward the back of the house. Haller yelled out to him, identifying himself as
a police officer, and in response, defendant stopped running and joined him
by the wall. When Haller asked him what he was doing, defendant said his
girlfriend had heard a phone pinging in their backyard, so he went to check it
out. Although he was not happy about the police being at his house, he
eventually allowed Haller to enter his backyard to look for the phone.
Guereca also entered the backyard around this time. He stayed
with defendant and L.M., while Haller walked to the rear fence to
investigate. While looking over the fence into the adjoining backyard, Haller
heard a pinging sound coming from that location. He radioed Officer Starnes
to let him know where the sound was coming from. Then he jumped the fence
and met Starnes on the other side. Within minutes, they found JD1’s pinging
phone, along with her other phone. The phones were located inside a plastic
Walmart bag in the backyard of defendant’s rear neighbor.
While Haller and Starnes were tracking down the phones,
defendant told Guereca he was uncomfortable with the police being on his
property and asked him to leave. Guereca walked over to a side gate that
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leads to defendant’s front yard and radioed Haller his location. He remained
there for several minutes as defendant and L.M. returned to their home.
Before long, Haller returned to defendant’s house and met up
with Guereca at the side gate. Given all of the circumstances, Haller was
concerned that A.M.’s girlfriend, i.e., JD1, might be inside defendant’s
residence and in need of help. He wanted to speak with defendant and L.M.
about allowing him to enter their home to look for her.
The conversation about entering the home occurred at
defendant’s back sliding door, while Officers Guereca and Haller were
standing in the backyard, and defendant and L.M. were standing inside their
house. When Haller said he would like the enter the house to search for
A.M.’s girlfriend, defendant and L.M. became agitated. L.M. said she had
been willing to cooperate with the officers up until that point, but now she
was tired and wanted to go to bed. And defendant indicated he was worried
about the officers planting evidence in his home.
Haller told defendant that was not going to happen. He assured
defendant and L.M. that he did not want to conduct an extensive search of
their home but merely wanted to make sure A.M.’s girlfriend was not inside.
In making his pitch for entry, Haller also asked defendant and L.M. to
consider how they would feel if one of their relatives were missing. He told
them, “The best way to get us (the police) out of your hair right now is [to]
make sure nobody’s in the house.”
L.M. replied, “No way . . . I can’t help you[.] I can’t do it.” She
insisted that no one else was in the home, and so did defendant. However,
during the back and forth, defendant told Haller, “I’ll make you a deal” and
alluded to the prospect of Haller getting a supervisor to conduct the search.
Defendant also indicated that the officers could come in if they allowed him to
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accompany them during the search. Although Haller rejected that idea for
officer safety reasons, he said L.M. could follow him around the house during
the search if she wanted to. Haller also told defendant, “We’re not trying to
get anybody. We’re going to come in. We would like to do it cooperatively[.]”
At that point, defendant said alright, fine and let the officers into his house.
Once inside, Guereca took defendant into the living room, and
L.M. followed Haller as he conducted a protective sweep around the house in
search of JD1. As it turned out, the sweep turned up empty, as no one else
was in the house. However, that did not bring an end to the encounter
because right after Haller completed the protective sweep, new information
came to light.
It just so happened that while Guereca and Haller were inside
defendant’s house carrying out the protective sweep, JD1 called A.M., who
was still standing by with Officer Starnes outside the house. Starnes spoke to
JD1 on A.M.’s phone to see if she was okay. She reported that she had been
sexually assaulted in Westminster earlier that evening by a white man with
tattoos who was driving a red Chevy El Camino. Because defendant fit that
description and there was just such a vehicle parked outside his home,
Starnes directed Haller to detain defendant as a possible suspect in JD1’s
attack.
That made defendant upset. He told Haller, “We let you into this
house under the assumption you were going to search the house,” and now
that you are done, “We’re asking you to leave.” However, based on the new
information from Officer Starnes, Haller and Guereca detained defendant
and L.M. at their home pending further investigation.
Because the incident involving JD1 occurred in Westminster,
police officers from that city were called to the scene. At about 2:30 a.m.,
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defendant agreed to speak to them in his front yard. He was not handcuffed
at that time, but he was informed that he was being detained.
Defendant admitted to the officers that there was a gun in his
house. When asked if the police could search his car and bedroom, defendant
said they could search “all day long[.]” At one point, he also gave the officers
broader permission to search the entire house.
However, after defendant was arrested and taken into custody,
the police spoke to L.M., as well as her mother, who owned the house and had
arrived there from work in the early morning hours following defendant’s
arrest. Because L.M. and her mother both declined a request to search, the
police began the process of obtaining a warrant to search the house.
Meanwhile, the police contacted defendant for further
questioning at the police station. After waiving his Miranda rights, he again
consented to a search of his car and bedroom. He also called L.M. and told her
it was okay for the police to search the house. Although L.M. had previously
refused to give consent to search, defendant told her to sign the officers’
consent-to-search form, and that is what she did. Her mother also gave
written consent to search the house. At that point, the police stopped working
on the search warrant application and searched the house, which led to the
discovery of the handgun in defendant’s garage.
2. Defense Evidence
L.M. testified that she did not give the officers permission to
enter her backyard when they initially asked her to do so. However, she
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eventually capitulated and gave in to them because they were being
persistent and she was greatly outnumbered.4
L.M. also testified about the situation that unfolded at her back
sliding door after the police found JD1’s phones. She claimed that she and
defendant repeatedly told the officers they did not want them coming into
their house, but they said they had the right to enter and were going to do so
anyway. According to L.M., the officers also tried to open the sliding door at
that time, but it was locked. Then they told her that she needed to open the
door. Fearing the officers were going to break it down, L.M. opened the door
and allowed them inside.
Upon entering, the officers said they were going to look around
the house to see if anyone else was present. Although L.M. and defendant
objected to that, the officers told them that did not matter and proceeded to
search the house. After that, the police detained L.M. inside the house for
several hours before eventually taking her outside and asking if they could
search the house. L.M. refused to give her consent at first, but after
defendant called her and gave her the okay, she had a change of mind. By
that point, L.M. had been outside for quite some time and was concerned
about not being able to access certain medications that were inside the house.
In light of all the circumstances, she signed the consent form at about 10:30
a.m.
B. Trial Court’s Ruling
Defendant’s suppression motion focused on the officers’ initial
entrance into his home to search for JD1. Although that search did not turn
4
L.M. was unable to recall how many officers were present when
she answered her door, but she testified that it felt like there were four or
five of them.
19
up any incriminating evidence, defendant argued it tainted any subsequent
consent that was given to search his house.
The trial court ruled by minute order. As a preliminary matter, it
found the police had consent to enter defendant’s backyard to look for JD1’s
phone. Although L.M. testified her consent was coerced, the court “did not
find her testimony credible as to the issues she testified to.”
The court also found the police had consent to enter defendant’s
home through the back sliding door after finding JD1’s phones. While
recognizing that defendant and L.M. balked at the officers’ initial requests to
open the door, and the officers were somewhat persistent about coming in,
the court did not believe the situation was so hostile, threatening or coercive
as to render defendant’s consent to enter involuntary.
Assuming otherwise, the court ruled the officers’ entry into
defendant’s house was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement. In fact, based on all of the information available to
the officers, the court concluded they would have been derelict in their duties
if they had not entered defendant’s house to look for JD1.
Furthermore, the court found that even if the officers’ initial
entrance was illegal, the taint from that illegality was attenuated by the
subsequent consent to search that was given by defendant, L.M. and her
mother. And, irrespective of that, the police had an independent basis to
search the house through the search warrant process. Therefore, the evidence
they found during the search would have been admissible under the
inevitable discovery doctrine. For all these reasons, the court denied
defendant’s motion to suppress that evidence.
20
C. Standard of Review
“In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we consider the
record in the light most favorable to the disposition and defer to the court’s
factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Any conflicts
in the evidence are resolved in favor of the court’s order. [Citation.]” (People v.
Mathews (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 130, 137.) Construing the evidence in that
deferential light, we then “independently assess, as a matter of law, whether
the challenged search or seizure conforms to constitutional standards of
reasonableness.” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327.)
D. Consent
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement that may be given in direct express terms, or by implication.
(Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219; People v. Robles (2000)
23 Cal.4th 789, 795; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 990, disapproved on
another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
However, consent may not be the product of coercion. (Bumper v. North
Carolina (1968) 391 U.S. 543, 550.) Thus, when the legality of a search turns
on the issue of consent, the prosecution must prove not only that the
necessary consent was given, but that it was freely and voluntarily offered,
meaning it was not obtained by threats or force, or granted in submission to a
claim of lawful authority. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497; People v.
Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 445–446.)
Defendant does not challenge the legality of the officers’ actions
in entering his backyard. However, he contends the officers lacked consent to
enter his home through the backdoor slider to look for JD1. In defendant’s
view, express consent was never given, and any implied consent was merely a
submission to the officers’ claim of lawful authority.
21
Actually, though, the record reflects that defendant did give his
verbal consent for the officers to enter his home. He can be heard on the
recording of Guereca’s body microphone saying “alright . . . fine” and “[c]ome
on” in, in response to the officers’ repeated requests to enter. But that was
after defendant had already asked the officers to leave his property, and after
he and L.M. had made it clear that they did not want the officers to enter
their home. The fact that defendant gave his consent in response to repeated
and persistent requests for entry suggests it was not freely and voluntarily
given. (United States v. Clark (D.V.I. 2019) 2019 WL 3456813 [defendant’s
consent found involuntary where it “constituted mere acquiescence to the
officers’ repeated requests”]; State v. Garcia (Kan. 1992) 827 P.2d 727 [same
where the defendant “was subjected to repeated requests by the trooper for
permission to search”]; State v. Diede (Minn. 2011) 795 N.W.2d 836, 848
[consent given in response to dogged police questioning deemed invalid].)
It is true that defendant offered to make a “deal” with the officers
in regard to letting them come inside his house. His proposal was for Officer
Haller to get a supervisor to conduct the search, or for Haller to let him
(defendant) accompany him during the search. However, Haller did not
accept either one of those proposals. Instead, he offered to let L.M. follow him
around during the search. He also told defendant, “We’re going to come in.
We would like to do it cooperatively[.]” This implied the officers were
prepared to enter the house forcefully if defendant did not agree to let them
in. It was immediately after this implied threat that defendant gave the
officers permission to enter his house.
On this record, it is hard to tell whether defendant consented in
response to Haller’s offer to let L.M. accompany him during the search, which
would favor a finding defendant’s consent was voluntary, or whether he
22
consented because the officers told him they were going to come in regardless
of what he said to them, which would favor a contrary finding. The trial court
did not make any findings in regard to that particular issue. Instead, it
focused on what defendant and L.M. said after the officers entered their
home, in finding the officers had consent to enter.
In that regard, the trial court found it significant that defendant
and L.M. expressed regret for letting the officers into their home, once they
realized the officers were not going to let them go in the wake of the search.
However, the fact defendant and L.M. expressed what the trial court
described as “buyer’s remorse” after letting the police into their home does
not speak to the circumstances under which consent was given in the first
place.
If the circumstances indicated that resistance to the officers’
repeated requests to enter the home would be futile, which is what Haller’s
statement “[w]e’re going to come in” strongly implied, it would be hard to
characterize defendant’s consent as being free and voluntary. Indeed, courts
have been reluctant to find a suspect’s consent valid when it was given under
similar circumstances. (See, e.g., Gregg v. Ham (4th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 333,
342 [consent to enter deemed involuntary because, inter alia, the requesting
authorities told the resident that if she did not let them in, they were going to
come in anyway]; United States v. Allen (N.D. Cal. 1972) 349 F. Supp. 749,
752 [consent deemed involuntary where although the defendant “ultimately
uttered words of assent to the request by the officers to open the bag, his
acquiescence came only after repeated requests by the agents accompanied by
references to the inevitability of a search by the local authorities”]; People v.
Valenzuela (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 832-833 [consent will be deemed
involuntary if it was given in response to an officer’s suggestion that it would
23
be fruitless or unwise to decline a request to search]; Campos v. State (Ind.
2008) 885 N.E.2d 590 [by telling the defendant that the search was
necessary, the police effectively conveyed to him that he had no real choice in
the matter]; State v. Johnson (Wis. 2007) 729 N.W.2d 182 [defendant’s
consent deemed involuntary where it was preceded by an officer’s statement
indicating the police were going to search his vehicle].)
However, we need not decide whether the officers had lawful
consent to enter defendant’s home. That is because, as we now explain, their
entry was clearly justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. (See United States v. Murray (N.D.W.V. 2022) 2022
WL 356352 [officers did not need consent to undertake warrantless search
where exigent circumstances for the search existed].)
E. Exigent Circumstances
Under the exigent circumstances exception, a warrantless search
is permitted “[w]hen there is a compelling need for official action and no time
to secure a warrant[.]” (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 580,
overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046,
1069, fn. 13.) Although the parameters of the exception defy precise
description, a warrantless entry into a suspect’s home will be upheld so long
as “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the entry would cause a
person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate.
[Citation.]” (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1157.) This includes the
situation where there is “probable cause to believe that a person reliably
reported missing is within” the home and in need of aid. (People v.
Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 580.)
In this case, when the officers entered defendant’s home to search
for JD1, they were aware of the following facts: 1) defendant had been
24
arrested about a month earlier for kidnapping and sexual assault; 2) A.M.
was very concerned about JD1’s welfare because he had not been able to get a
hold of her for eight hours, and it was unlike her not to return his calls or
neglect the care of her children; 3) A.M. reported JD1’s phone was located in
the vicinity of defendant’s house; 4) while the officers were looking for the
phone, they saw defendant running in his backyard; 5) soon thereafter, the
officers found JD1’s phones in the backyard of defendant’s rear neighbor; and
6) the phones were located inside a bag from a store (Walmart) that
defendant had been to earlier that evening.
Based on these circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers
to believe that defendant discarded JD1’s phones in his neighbor’s backyard
in response to the police arriving at his residence. Defendant obviously did
not want the police to find the phones or know they had been in his
possession. Attempting to hide a missing person’s phones is suspicious in its
own right. But factoring in defendant’s recent arrest for kidnapping and
sexual assault, it is easy to see why the officers were concerned that
defendant may have done something more than simply steal a missing
person’s phones. Given everything the officers knew about defendant’s
criminal history and his connection to the phones, they had good reason to
believe that JD1 might be inside his home and in need of emergency
assistance.
This is true regardless of the fact that the police did not know
whether JD1 was in danger, or whether defendant had ever threatened her.
Nor does it matter that the officers did not hear any suspicious noises
consistent with a woman being held against her will inside defendant’s home.
Defendant argues a warrantless search of his home was unjustified absent
such evidence. But the police “do not need ironclad proof of a ‘likely serious,
25
life-threatening’ injury” to enter a home under the exigent circumstances
exception. (Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. 45, 49; People v. Troyer (2011)
51 Cal.4th 599, 602.)
When a woman is reported missing to the police, it always raises
the specter of foul play. And given defendant’s recent arrest for serious sexual
misconduct and his highly suspicious conduct respecting JD1’s phones, the
police had every right to believe he might have taken JD1 inside his home
against her will. (Dempsey v. Gibson (9th Cir. 2023) 2023 WL 2064546 [citing
the defendant’s deceptive conduct as a factor justifying the warrantless entry
into his room under the exigent circumstances doctrine].) Therefore, the
officers were justified in entering defendant’s home to look for her. (People v.
Rogers, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1157 [noting that even in the absence of
obvious signs of distress, a warrantless entry may be appropriate to look for a
person who has been reliably reported as missing and may be in need of
help]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465-466 [upholding the
warrantless search of defendant’s apartment to look for a person who had
been missing for several hours]; People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1017
[perceived danger to missing children justified warrantless entry and search];
People v. Hochstraser (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 883 [concern over missing
woman’s safety justified warrantless police entry into the defendant’s home].)
Defendant argues that even if exigent circumstances existed at
the time the officers entered his home to look for JD1, they ceased to exist
once Officer Starnes spoke to JD1 and learned that she was safe. That may
be true, but in speaking with Starnes, JD1 reported that she had been
sexually assaulted earlier that evening by a man who looked like defendant
and who drove the same type of car that was parked outside his home. The
receipt of this new information, coupled with all of the other attendant
26
circumstances, fully justified defendant’s detention pending further
investigation. (See generally In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894 [a
suspect’s detention is permissible when the police have reasonable suspicion
he or she has engaged in criminal activity].) The police were not required to
let defendant go the instant they learned that JD1 was no longer in danger.
And, of course, once defendant, L.M. and L.M.’s mother consented
to a search of their home, the police were fully justified in searching it
without a warrant. Defendant argues their consent was tainted by the
officer’s initial entry to look for JD1. But, as we have explained, that entry
was permissible under the exigent circumstances exception. Because there
was no illegality to begin with, defendant’s tainted-consent argument lacks
merit. (United States v. Sandoval-Vasquez (7th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 739, 744;
People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 466.)
Therefore, we need not consider whether the alleged taint was
attenuated by other circumstances, or whether the gun found inside
defendant’s garage would inevitably have been discovered through other
lawful means. As there was no violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights, the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress.
II.
SEVERANCE MOTION
Defendant contends the trial court also erred in denying his
motion to sever the charges involving JD1 from the charges involving JD2.
That motion was litigated in conjunction with the prosecution’s request to
give CALCRIM No. 1191B on the use of propensity evidence, which we
discuss in the next section of our opinion. Therefore, we will combine the
background section for these two related issues.
27
A. Procedural Background
Defendant filed extensive points and authorities in support of his
request for separate trials as to each victim. As a threshold matter, he argued
the statutory requirements for joinder were not satisfied because, in his view,
the alleged offenses against JD1 and JD2 were not connected together in
their commission or of the same class of crime, nor were they merely different
statements of the same offense. (See § 954.)
Alternatively, defendant argued severance was required because
trying all of the charges together in a single trial would create a substantial
danger of undue prejudice. His prejudice argument rested on the assumption
that the evidence pertaining to the alleged attacks was not cross-admissible
and that “joinder of the charges would result in the admittance of additional
prejudicial evidence in each of the cases, allowing two weak cases to be
combined in order to create one seemingly stronger case.”
In its opposition papers, the prosecution disputed both aspects of
defendant’s argument. It maintained joinder was proper under section 954,
and it would not cause undue prejudice because, among other things, the
evidence as to each of the victims was cross-admissible under Evidence Code
sections 1101, subdivision (b), and Evidence Code section 1108.
In conjunction with its opposition motion, the prosecution
requested the court to give CALCRIM No. 1191B, which allows jurors to
consider the defendant’s charged sexual offenses as evidence of his propensity
to commit other charged sexual offenses. The prosecution argued that
instruction was a logical extension of Evidence Code section 1108, which
authorizes the use of propensity evidence in sex crime cases.
At the hearing on these issues, the trial court ruled the incident
regarding JD1 and the incident regarding JD2 involved the same class of
28
crimes because both incidents were sexually motivated and characterized by
violent assaultive behavior. Therefore, the severance issuance and the
instructional issue came down to the question of cross-admissibility and
fundamental fairness. Relying on Evidence Code section 352 and due process,
defense counsel argued that trying all of the charges together would inflame
the jury and create an uneven playing field for his client. However, the trial
court disagreed. It determined any inference of prejudice was negated
because the evidence as to each incident was cross-admissible pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1108. It thus denied defendant’s severance motion.
The court then turned to the instructional issue, at which time
defense counsel renewed his Evidence Code section 352 and due process
objections. Counsel simply did not think it was fair to allow the jury to use
the evidence as to one victim to prove the charges against the other victim.
But the court, having listened to all the arguments and having read the
parties’ extensive briefing on the issue “two or three times,” ruled that
CALCRIM No. 1191B was “probably . . . an appropriate instruction.” And
ultimately, it did give that instruction to the jury.
B. Standard of Review
“In reviewing whether the trial court improperly denied a
defendant’s motion to sever, ‘“we apply the familiar standard of review
providing that the trial court’s ruling may be reversed only if the court has
abused its discretion. [Citations.] An abuse of discretion may be found when
the trial court’s ruling ‘“falls outside the bounds of reason.”’” [Citations.]
Defendant has the burden of showing error in denial of a motion to sever and
does so only on a clear showing of prejudice to establish the trial court abused
its discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 750.)
29
C. Applicable Law
In the interest of judicial economy, there is a preference that all
charges against a defendant be handled in one proceeding. (People v.
Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 848.) Joinder of charges “ordinarily avoids
the increased expenditure of funds and judicial resources which may result if
the charges were to be tried in two or more separate trials. [Citations.]”
(Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 632, 639.) Joinder also speeds up
the disposition of criminal charges. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919,
940.)
To that end, section 954 permits joinder in a variety of situations,
including when the accusatory pleading charges two or more offenses that are
of the same class of crime or were connected together in their commission. If
the statutory criteria for joinder have been met, “the burden is on the party
seeking severance to establish clearly that a substantial danger of prejudice
exists requiring that the charges be tried separately. [Citation.]” (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 985.) Prejudice may arise where the
evidence related to the charges to be tried would not be cross-admissible in
separate trials, some of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury
against the defendant, or a weak case has been joined with a strong case.
(Ibid.)
D. The Charges Were Properly Joined
For purposes of section 954, criminal offenses are “of the same
class,” and thus subject to joinder, when they share common characteristics
or attributes. (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 76; People v. Carson
(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 978, 990.) Defendant admits the desire for sexual
gratification was a common characteristic of the crimes he was accused of
committing, and that sex crimes are typically considered to be of the same
30
class. (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1113.) However, he
argues the crimes against JD1 and JD2 were carried out in such a dissimilar
manner that they should not be deemed to be of the same class.
In so arguing, defendant correctly notes that the crimes against
JD2 involved a ruse, a knife and handcuffs, whereas the crimes against JD1
involved an ambush and a gun. But by focusing on these particular factual
differences, defendant overlooks the broader common circumstances that link
these two criminal episodes. Namely, that they were both sexually motivated,
assaultive in nature, and carried out with a deadly weapon. As the trial court
rightly found, these shared characteristics were sufficient to satisfy the same-
class-of-crimes requirement. (People v. Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 76;
People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 409; People v. Lindsay (1964) 227
Cal.App.2d 482, 492.) Therefore, all of the charged offenses were joinable
under section 954.
E. Joinder Did Not Create a Substantial Danger of Prejudice
Turning to the issue of prejudice, we must keep in mind that of
all the various factors noted above, “[c]ross-admissibility is the crucial factor
affecting prejudice.” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 531.) “Where
evidence would have been cross-admissible in separate trials, . . . ‘“any
inference of prejudice is dispelled.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gray (2005) 37
Cal.4th 168, 222.)
In this case, the trial court determined the crimes involving JD1
and the crimes involving JD2 would have been cross-admissible in separate
trials pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108. Although evidence of
uncharged offenses—sometimes called character or propensity evidence—is
generally prohibited in criminal trials, that section states: “In a criminal
action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the
31
defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made
inadmissible by [Evidence Code] [s]ection 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code] [s]ection 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1108,
subd. (a).) This provision was specifically enacted “to expand the
admissibility of disposition or propensity evidence in sex offense cases.”
(People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911.)
Since defendant was accused of committing sex crimes against
both his victims, the only potential obstacle to cross-admissibility would have
been Evidence Code section 352. That section empowers the trial court to
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability its admission would cause undue prejudice. This weighing process
is highly discretionary; a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence
under Evidence Code section 352 will only be disturbed if it is arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd. (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 783;
People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124; People v. Soto (1998) 64
Cal.App.4th 966, 984-985.)
While admitting this deferential standard of review applies in
most cases involving Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352, defendant claims
it should not govern here because the trial court did not expressly balance the
probative value of cross-admissibility against the potential prejudice it might
cause. However, an express, on-the-record assessment and weighing of the
pertinent factors is not required. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 122.)
Rather, it is sufficient if the record shows the trial court understood and
fulfilled its responsibility under Evidence Code section 352, which is simply
to weigh the probative value of the proffered evidence against its potential
prejudicial effect. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 214.)
32
Such is the case here. The parties’ briefing on the joinder issue—
which the trial court read multiple times—included numerous references to
Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352. And at the hearing on that issue,
defense counsel reiterated he was relying on Evidence Code section 352 and
the lack of cross-admissibility as the basis for opposing joinder. It was
abundantly clear from his remarks that he felt the prejudicial impact of
joinder outweighed the probative value of trying all the charges in a single
trial. Under these circumstances, we may infer the court engaged in the
requisite weighing process and made an informed decision on the issue of
cross-admissibility. (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 924.) Therefore,
the abuse-of-discretion standard applies in reviewing that decision.
Anticipating that could be the case, defendant contends the trial
court abused its discretion under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352 in
determining the evidence as to each victim was cross-admissible as to the
other. While admitting the charged offenses had a common sexual theme to
them, he claims the episode involving JD1 was so factually, temporally and
geographically distinct from the episode involving JD2 that any probative
value of cross-admissibility was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial
impact of allowing the jury to consider both episodes together in assessing
the truth of the charges.
To be sure, defendant’s two attacks were temporally and
geographically distinct. However, they were only separated by a few weeks
and a few miles. Compared to other cases which have addressed this issue,
they were not so disconnected from one another as to render the probative
value of cross-admissibility insignificant. (See People v. Frazier (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 30, 40-41 [upholding the admission of evidence regarding a 15-
year-old sexual offense]; People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 284-285
33
[30-year-old sexual offense not unduly remote or prejudicial under Evidence
Code section 352].)
As for the factual differences between the two episodes,
defendant asserts, “[a]n elaborate ruse ending in a sexual assault,” which is
how he describes the incident involving JD2, “is fundamentally different than
a prostitution negotiation . . . gone bad,” which is how he describes the
incident involving JD1. However, JD1 testified that defendant confronted her
with his gun, demanded her to take off her clothes, and threatened to kill her
right when he entered her room. There was no negotiating for anything under
her version of events.
Moreover, contrary to defendant’s understanding, similarity
between the two episodes is not required under Evidence Code section 1108.
(People v. Frazier, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 40-41.) Indeed, courts have
recognized that imposing a similarity requirement would undermine the
purpose of the statute and ignore the fact many sex offenders are not
specialists in terms of the crimes they commit. (People v. Soto, supra, 64
Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) We are satisfied the circumstances surrounding the
two sexual assaults that defendant committed were sufficiently alike to
support the conclusion he had a propensity to engage in sexual misconduct.
In that regard, it is telling that during both assaults defendant
utilized threats and a weapon in attempting to gain compliance from the
victim, he pulled the victim’s hair, he demanded the victim to orally copulate
him, and he kissed and groped the victim without her consent. Defendant
also subjected both victims to a frightening level of physical violence, yet
neither assault was particularly more inflammatory than the other. So, the
danger of the jury being emotionally swayed to convict defendant across the
board based solely on the evidence of one assault or the other was very low.
34
(Compare People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, 738-741 [evidence of
the defendant’s prior sex offense should have been excluded because it was
much more inflammatory and violent than the charged sex crimes].)
For all these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s finding on cross-admissibility. And because the evidence regarding
one assault was admissible to prove the other, there is no reason to question
the court’s decision to try all of the charges in a single trial. (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030 [cross-admissibility dispels any inference of
prejudice].)
As a fallback argument, defendant contends that even if the trial
court did not err in denying his severance motion at the time it was heard,
the subsequent joint trial was so fundamentally unfair that it violated his
right to due process of law. (See People v. Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 77.)
In so arguing, defendant renews his claim that the evidence pertaining to the
two attacks was not cross-admissible. However, for the reasons explained
above, we find that claim unpersuasive.
We also reject defendant’s claim that joinder impermissibly
allowed the prosecution to bootstrap a weaker case with a stronger case.
Granted, the charges involving JD1 might have been a little harder to prove
in comparison to the charges involving JD2, because JD1 was working as a
prostitute at the time of her encounter with defendant, and she did not have
any significant injuries to substantiate her claim that defendant physically
assaulted her. But, JD1 was clearly rattled when the police interviewed her
at the scene, and the nurse who examined her testified it is not uncommon
for sexual assault victims to lack outward signs of their abuse. JD1’s
allegations were also corroborated by the fact that a gun was found in
defendant’s garage.
35
On the other hand, defendant lied to the police so often during
his police interviews that his claim of innocence likely carried very little
weight with the jury. It is not just that he lied with respect to one episode or
the other. Rather, as respondent puts it, defendant lied “[a]t every turn”
during his police interviews, thus evidencing a consciousness of guilt as to all
of the charges. Defendant’s clumsy attempt to dispose of JD1’s phones was
also a glaring sign that his encounter with JD1 involved more than a simple
misunderstanding over the price he was willing to pay to have sex with her.
Suffice it to say, the relative strength of the evidence as to the
victims was not so disparate as to create an undue danger of prejudice by
virtue of a joint trial. Whether considered at the time it was made, or in light
of the evidence adduced at trial, the court’s denial of defendant’s severance
motion did not render his trial unfair or violate due process. (See People v.
Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 41-43 [upholding the denial of the defendant’s
motion to sever sexually related charges involving different victims]; People v.
Nguyen, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1114 [same].)
III.
PROPENSITY INSTRUCTION
Defendant also contends the trial court committed reversible
error by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1191B on the permissible
use of propensity evidence. Again, we disagree.5
5
Respondent argues defendant forfeited his right to challenge the
giving of CALCRIM No. 1191B because although he objected to the
instruction before trial, he did not renew his objection later on, during the
evidentiary phase of the trial. However, because the instruction arguably
violated defendant’s right to a fair trial, we will entertain his challenge to it.
(§ 1259 [a jury instruction impacting the defendant’s substantial rights is
reviewable on appeal even if he did not object to it at trial].)
36
A. Procedural Background
As explained in the previous section, the trial court adjudicated
the instructional issue in conjunction with defendant’s severance motion.
After finding the evidence as to each victim was cross-admissible, the court
granted the prosecution’s request to give CALCRIM No. 1191B. Pursuant to
that instruction, the jury was told:
“The People presented evidence that the defendant committed
the crimes of Sexual Penetration by Foreign Object and Force as charged in
Counts 1 and 2; Forcible Rape as charged in Count 3; Forcible Oral
Copulation as charged in Count 4; Assault with Intent to Commit Sexual
Offenses as charged in Counts 5 and 8; Kidnapping to Commit Sex Offenses
as charged in Count 7; Attempted Forcible Oral Copulation as charged in
Count 9; and Sexual Battery by Restraint as charged in Count 10. Please
refer to the separate instructions that I will give you on those crimes.
“If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but you are not
required to, conclude from that the evidence that the defendant was disposed
or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also
conclude that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit the other
offenses charged in this case.
“If you find that the defendant committed one or more of these
crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other
evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of
another crime. The People must still prove each charge and allegation beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
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B. Analysis
In challenging this instruction, defendant concedes the California
Supreme Court upheld a materially similar instruction in People v. Villatoro
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152 (Villatoro). Although Evidence Code section 1108 is
typically used in sex crimes cases to introduce evidence of uncharged sex
crimes, Villatoro determined “nothing in the language of [that] section . . .
restricts its application to uncharged offenses.” (Id. at p. 1164.) To the
contrary, Evidence Code section 1108 was broadly intended to allow the jury
to consider any evidence of the defendant’s propensity to commit sex crimes.
(Ibid.) Therefore, Villatoro held it was permissible for the jury to consider the
defendant’s charged sex offenses in deciding whether he committed other
charged sex offenses. (Ibid.)
Despite this holding, defendant urges us not to follow Villatoro
for several reasons. First, as a foundational matter, defendant maintains the
trial court failed to undertake the necessary weighing process under Evidence
Code section 352 in finding the charged offenses were cross-admissible under
Evidence Code section 1108.
However, as we explained in the previous section, the parties’
written and verbal arguments highlighted the importance of Evidence Code
section 352 on the issue of cross-admissibility, which was the pivotal issue in
terms of the trial court giving CALCRIM No. 1191B. Although the trial court
did not explicitly explain its reasoning under that section, “an express
statement” of reasons was not required. (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p.
1168.) Based on the extensive briefing and argument the parties presented on
the Evidence Code 352 issue, we are satisfied the trial court implicitly
conducted the necessary analysis under that section. (Ibid.)
38
Defendant also argues that Villatoro was wrongly decided
because an instruction like CALCRIM No. 1191B undermines the
presumption of innocence and impermissibly allows the jury to make a guilty
finding based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, as a lower appellate court, we are not at liberty to disregard the
Supreme Court’s decision in Villatoro, which held to the contrary. (Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; People v.
Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 67-68.) Like the instruction in Villatoro,
CALCRIM No. 1191B “clearly told the jury that all offenses must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, even those used to draw an inference of
propensity.” (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1167-1168.) As such, the
instruction did not lower the standard of proof or violate defendant’s rights in
any respect. (Ibid.)
IV.
SENTENCING
Lastly, the parties agree, as do we, that the trial court erred in
sentencing defendant to a full consecutive sentence of three years for
attempted forcible oral copulation on count 9. In so doing, the trial court
appears to have applied section 667.6, subdivision (d), which requires a full
consecutive term for certain sex offenses. However, that provision does not
apply to attempted sex offenses. (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
204, 217.) Therefore, we will reverse defendant’s sentence on count 9 and
remand for limited resentencing. (People v. Le (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1, 11,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Piper (1986) 42 Cal.3d 471, 477, fn.
5.)
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DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence for attempted forcible oral copulation in
count 9 is reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing on that
count. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOETHALS, J.
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