People v. Leavelle CA4/3

CourtListener 10115262Calctapp12 sept. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 9/12/24 P. v. Leavelle CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062862

v. (Super. Ct. No. 00NF1154)

KEVIN DESHAN LEAVELLE, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
We appointed counsel to represent Kevin Deshan Leavelle on
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appeal from the denial of his petition under Penal Code section 1172.6.
Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue
against her client but advised the court she found no issues to argue on his
behalf.
The procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436,
and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, do not apply to appeals from
the denial of section 1172.6 petitions. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216, 226, 227, 231 (Delgadillo).) Therefore, when appointed appellate counsel
finds no viable issues, counsel must file a brief informing the court that
counsel found no arguable issues and include a concise narration of facts. (Id.
at p. 231.) The reviewing court must send the brief to the defendant with
notice the defendant may file a supplemental brief or letter within 30 days.
(Id. at pp. 231–232.)
If the defendant raises issues in a supplemental brief or letter,
the court must evaluate the arguments raised and issue a written opinion.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) Leavelle has filed a supplemental
brief, and we address his claims below. We have also independently reviewed
the record and found no arguable issues on appeal. We affirm the
postjudgment order.
FACTS
A complete recitation of the facts can be found in our prior
nonpublished opinion, People v. Leavelle (May 21, 2003, G030574). The sole
issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred when it found Leavelle

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. We include here only the
facts relevant to the limited issue on appeal.
A jury convicted Leavelle of, inter alia, attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. The trial court had provided the jury a
set of standard instructions, which included CALJIC No. 8.67 (attempted
murder—willful, deliberate, and premeditated). Under those instructions, to
convict Leavelle of the relevant offense, the jury was required to find that he
had acted with the intent to kill. The court did not instruct the jury on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, aiding and abetting, or any
other theory of vicarious liability for attempted murder. Following the jury’s
verdict, the court sentenced Leavelle to life in prison with the possibility of
parole.
In May 2023, Leavelle filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. After the prosecution filed a response, the trial court
appointed the public defender, who filed a brief in support of Leavelle’s
petition. The court conducted a prima facie hearing and denied the petition,
finding Leavelle had not established a prima facie case of eligibility. It
explained: “[T]he jury was instructed solely on the crime of ‘Attempted
Murder’ and [a lesser included offense] per the appropriate [standard jury
instructions]. The only theory of guilt upon which the jury was instructed
required a finding of a ‘specific intent to kill’ on the part of [Leavelle]. The
instructions given to the jury included no vicarious theory of guilt. Therefore,
he was convicted under a still-viable definition of [a]ttempted [m]urder.”
Leavelle appealed.

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DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019, to
eliminate natural and probable consequences liability for murder and to limit
the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957, 959 (Lewis).) Under sections 188 and 189, as amended, murder liability
can no longer be “imposed on a person who [was] not the actual killer, did not
act with the intent to kill,” and “was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) SB 1437 also
added section 1172.6,2 which, as originally enacted, set forth a procedure
whereby a “person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory” could petition for resentencing relief. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1,
2022, amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a), to expand the category of
individuals entitled to petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1,
subd. (a).) Subdivision (a) of section 1172.6 now expressly permits individuals
convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a now-invalid theory
to file a petition for resentencing relief. A section 1172.6 petition must make
“‘a prima facie showing’ for relief. [Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
960.) In Lewis, our Supreme Court held, “The record of conviction will

2
Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section
1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§10.) For clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the
opinion.
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necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.) To be eligible for relief under
section 1172.6, the petitioner must make a prima facie showing that he or she
“could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).)
Here, the trial court correctly denied Leavelle’s petition because
the record revealed he was convicted on a theory of attempted murder that
remained valid notwithstanding SB 1437’s amendments to sections 188 and
189. Specifically, the jury instructions given at trial established that the jury
found Leavelle had acted with the intent to kill. He could not have been
convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or any other
theory of vicarious liability for the simple reason that the jury was not
instructed on such theories.
In his supplemental brief, Leavelle contends: (1) both his
appointed counsel in the trial court and his appointed appellate counsel
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance; and (2) he was having a
mental health crisis at the time of his offense and his crime was unplanned.3
These contentions raise no arguable issue.

3
Leavelle also conclusorily claims that his current and former
counsel both discriminated against him in violation of the California Racial
Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, §§ 1–7). His failure to develop any
argument on this point forfeits his contention, and we do not consider it.
(People v. Lombardo (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 553, 565 [undeveloped argument
is forfeited].)
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“There is no federal constitutional right to counsel under
subdivision (c) of section 1172.6,” the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 227.) Nor is there a constitutional right to
counsel on appeal from that proceeding. (Ibid.) Thus, Leavelle can raise no
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As for Leavelle’s claims regarding
his mental state at the time of the offense, the jury resolved that matter
against him, without relying on any theory later invalidated by SB 1437. We
discern no error.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

GOODING, J.

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