CourtListener 10105450•People v. Snell CA2/7
Texte intégral
Filed 9/5/24 P. v. Snell CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B326958
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA046545)
v.
EDWIN SNELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from a judgment and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. The
judgment is vacated and remanded with instructions; the appeal
from the order of September 21, 2022 is dismissed as moot.
Sydney Banach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R.
Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and
Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Edwin Snell was convicted of robbery in 2001 and
sentenced to a total term of 48 years to life, including consecutive
one-year terms on three prior prison term enhancements under
Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).1 Twenty years later,
through Senate Bill No. 483, the Legislature retroactively
invalidated all sentencing enhancements under section 667.5,
except those for sexually violent offenses. (See People v. Burgess
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 379-380 (Burgess).)
In 2022, Snell in propria persona filed two motions for
relief under Senate Bill No. 483. In response to Snell’s second
motion, the trial court ordered his section 667.5 enhancements
stricken nunc pro tunc. The court did not appoint counsel for
Snell nor did it hold a resentencing hearing.
Snell appeals, arguing Senate Bill No. 483 entitles him to a
full resentencing hearing, including the application of any
ameliorative changes in law since his original sentencing. We
dismiss his appeal from the court’s denial of his first motion as
moot. As to his appeal from the second motion, because the trial
court did not conduct a full resentencing, we vacate the sentence
and remand for resentencing proceedings in accordance with
Senate Bill No. 483.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Snell’s Conviction and Sentence
In 2001, a jury convicted Snell of second degree robbery
(§ 211). The sentencing minutes reflect that Snell was found to
have personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), had two
prior serious felony convictions under the three strikes law
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and had served three prior prison terms
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced Snell to a total of 48 years to life:
25 years to life on the robbery count, 10 years for the firearm
enhancement, five years for each of the two prior serious felony
convictions, and one year each for three prior prison term
enhancements.
B. Section 1172.75 Resentencing Proceedings
On September 19, 2022, Snell filed a motion in propria
persona requesting resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483 and
to recall his three prior prison term enhancements. Snell also
requested the appointment of counsel. The court denied Snell’s
motion on September 21. The court stated that Snell “has no
standing to initiate a recall of his sentence. . . . The defendant,
however, may be able to ‘invite’ the court’s consideration of the
recall. This court has reviewed the case file and preliminary
hearing transcript. This court does not accept this defendant’s
invitation for resentencing and chooses not to initiate a
resentencing on its own motion.”
Snell filed a second motion for resentencing on November 1,
2022. On November 21, without appointing counsel or holding a
hearing, the trial court ordered Snell’s three section 667.5
3
enhancements “stricken nunc pro tunc.” The court stated,
“Remaining sentence is unchanged.” The court amended Snell’s
abstract of judgment to reflect a total sentence of 45 years to life.
Snell timely appealed.2
DISCUSSION
Snell argues the trial court erred by failing to conduct a full
resentencing hearing in addition to striking the section 667.5
enhancements. We first examine whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider Snell’s second motion, which in turn
determines whether we have jurisdiction to consider his appeal.
A. The Trial Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction To
Consider Snell’s Motion for Resentencing
As a threshold matter, we consider whether the trial court
had jurisdiction to entertain Snell’s motion under
section 1172.75. “[S]ection 1172.75 does not authorize a
defendant to seek resentencing on his or her own motion or
2 Snell appealed from the court’s September 21 order
denying his motion, and this court appointed counsel to represent
him. Snell also timely appealed from the November 21 order
striking his enhancements, but this notice of appeal was not
processed by the superior court. This court granted Snell’s
motion to deem his second notice of appeal constructively filed
and to consolidate the two appeals. Because we reverse the trial
court’s November 21 order and remand for a full resentencing, we
dismiss as moot Snell’s appeal from the September 21 order. (See
MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [“‘When no effective relief can be
granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’”].)
4
petition. Rather the process is triggered by the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation identifying a defendant as a
person serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term
enhancement.” (People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332
(Cota); accord, People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447-
448 (Escobedo); Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 384.)
Without the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) identification of the defendant, the trial
court lacks jurisdiction to resentence the defendant. (See
Burgess, at p. 382.)
This court asked the parties to brief the jurisdictional issue.
Snell argues that the trial court and this court have jurisdiction
because CDCR identified him as eligible for resentencing relief.
The People argue there is no jurisdiction because it does not
appear that “CDCR was involved in the resentencing process.”
On our own motion we take judicial notice that Snell appears on
the June 16, 2022 list that CDCR transmitted to the Judicial
Council. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c) [permitting judicial
notice of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments” of California], 459; People v. Gram (2012)
202 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135 [taking judicial notice of CDCR
records].)
Since CDCR identified Snell as eligible for relief, the court
had jurisdiction to consider Snell’s motion under section 1172.75.
(See Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 332-333; but see
Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 448, 450 [rejecting
defendants’ argument that trial court could consider their propria
persona section 1172.75 petitions because CDCR identified them
to the court as eligible].) That Snell initially filed “a procedurally
unauthorized motion” did not “depriv[e] the trial court of the
5
jurisdiction afforded to it by statute to resentence [Snell] as
mandated by section 1172.75.” (Cota, at p. 333.) Accordingly, we
in turn have jurisdiction to consider his appeal. (See id. at
p. 331, fn. 7.)
B. Legal Background and Standard of Review
In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 added section 1171.1 to the
Penal Code, now renumbered as section 1172.75. (See People v.
Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 42, review granted Feb. 21,
2024, S283169.) “‘Section 1172.75 states that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)’” (Escobedo,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (b), provides that the CDCR
“‘shall identify those persons in [its] custody currently serving a
term . . . that includes an enhancement’” for a prior prison term
under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and “‘provide the name of
each [such] person . . . to the sentencing court that imposed the
enhancement.’” (People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
300, 310 (Christianson), review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189,
quoting § 1172.75, subd. (b).) The sentencing court “shall review
the judgment” and verify that the judgment includes a prior
prison term enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) “If the court
determines that the current judgment includes [such] an
enhancement . . . the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.)
6
Section 1172.75 provides “specific instructions” for
resentencing. (People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966
(Carter).) “First, the resentencing ‘shall result in a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the
elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety. . . . ’ [Citation.] Second, the trial
court ‘shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and
apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.’ (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) Third, the court ‘may consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and
record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated,
evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances
have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.’ [Citation.]
Fourth, ‘[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term, the
court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation that . . . have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . .’ [Citation.] Finally, the court ‘shall
appoint counsel’ for the resentencing.” (Id. at pp. 966-967;
accord, People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855-856,
fn. 12 (Garcia); People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399
(Monroe).)
7
We review de novo whether section 1172.75 entitles a
defendant to a full resentencing. (See Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 308.)
C. The Trial Court Erred by Striking Snell’s Prior Prison Term
Enhancements Without Conducting a Full Resentencing
Snell argues he is entitled to a full resentencing hearing
under section 1172.75. He seeks the benefit of changes to the
sentencing law made by Senate Bill Nos. 1393, 81, and 620, and
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, which
collectively impact his other sentencing enhancements and his
prior felony strikes under the three strikes law.
The People contend that Snell’s appeal is moot. The People
argue this court “cannot grant any effective relief” because the
trial court already struck his three section 667.5 prior prison
term enhancements and “determined that appellant was not
entitled to a full resentencing hearing.” They further contend
that Snell has forfeited his argument for additional sentencing
relief under Romero, because he did not raise it in his request for
section 1172.75 resentencing.
“By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly
‘invalid’ enhancements.” (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 402; accord, Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 855; People v.
Montgomery (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 768, 773, review granted
May 29, 2024, S284662; People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
1270, 1276, review granted March 12, 2024, S283547 (Saldana);
Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 968; Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 314; People v. Renteria (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282.) Here, the trial court did not conduct
8
a full resentencing and instead struck Snell’s section 667.5
enhancements without holding a hearing, appointing counsel, or
hearing argument from Snell as to the postconviction factors
under section 1172.75 or other ameliorative sentencing relief.
This was error. (See Carter, at p. 968 [“simply striking the one-
year enhancement . . . deprive[d] [defendant] of his right to full
resentencing”]; Renteria, at p. 1282 [“trial court was required to
fully resentence Renteria applying any ameliorative changes in
the law”]; People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 567
[trial court erred by “fail[ing] to provide [defendant] with a full
resentencing hearing, meaning a hearing in which he could have
sought further sentencing relief under at least two other statutes
that were enacted after his conviction”].)
Despite the People’s arguments, Snell’s appeal is not moot
nor did he forfeit his arguments. First, remand would not be
futile because under section 1172.75, Snell is entitled to a full
resentencing hearing, at which he can request ameliorative
sentencing relief beyond the striking of his prior prison term
enhancements. (See Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 401-
402 [rejecting “the Attorney General’s argument that Monroe is
not entitled to a full resentencing on remand because . . . the
prior prison term enhancements have already been stricken”];
accord, Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1275-1276;
Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) Second, Snell did
not forfeit a full resentencing by failing to ask for it in his motion
because the statute imposes on the trial judge the mandatory
duty to conduct a full resentencing (§ 1172.75, subd. (c) [“the
court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant”]),
and as noted above, the statute does not contemplate a motion or
petition from a defendant requesting such relief. (See § 1172.75,
9
subd. (b); Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 384.) Further,
Snell did not have a meaningful opportunity to request relief
without a full resentencing hearing with the assistance of
appointed counsel. (See People v. Zuniga (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th
81, 84 [sentencing claim is not forfeited if defendant lacked “the
opportunity to address the court on the matter of sentence and to
object to any sentence or condition thereof imposed by the
court”].)
Snell was “entitled to, but did not receive, a full
resentencing under the terms of section 1172.75, including the
application of ‘any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion’ . . . . To correct this error, remand
for a full resentencing in compliance with section 1172.75 is
necessary.” (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for
resentencing consistent with section 1172.75, including the
appointment of counsel, a full resentencing hearing, and the
application of any other ameliorative sentencing provisions.
Snell’s appeal from the trial court’s September 21, 2022 order
denying his motion for resentencing is dismissed as moot.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J. STONE, J.
10
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.