CourtListener 10103558•People v. Wilson CA2/1
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Filed 9/3/24 P. v. Wilson CA2/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B322501
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Riverside County
Super. Ct. No. INF1500163)
v.
KENNETH MICHAEL WILSON
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Johnnetta E. Anderson, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Patricia Ihara; Appellate Defenders, Inc., and Howard C.
Cohen, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Kenneth Michael Wilson.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jesse Keith Cottom.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Annie Featherman Fraser
and Alan Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
______________________
This case is before us on remand from the California
Supreme Court. Pursuant to the court’s instructions, we are to
vacate our previous opinion in this case and reconsider the cause
in light of People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin). We
do so and, on reconsideration, affirm the judgment of the superior
court as modified.1
In January 2015, appellant Kenneth Michael Wilson,
his brother Wayne Wilson, and Jesse Keith Cottom planned to
sell fake cocaine to an acquaintance. This ultimately resulted
in Cottom fatally shooting the acquaintance in the neck. At the
1 Our initial opinion addressed two judgments of
conviction: one regarding then-appellant Jesse Cottom and one
involving appellant Kenneth Wilson. Both Cottom and Wilson
filed petitions for review with the California Supreme Court. In
a single order, the Supreme Court granted Wilson’s petition, but
denied Cottom’s petition. Therefore, on December 7, 2023, this
court issued the remittitur in Cottom’s case, at which point our
original opinion “bec[a]me final as to appellant Jesse K Cottom
only.” Thus, our vacatur of the original opinion has no effect
the disposition of Cottom’s appeal, nor does the instant opinion
address Cottom’s appeal.
2
time of the incident, Wilson2 was 20 years old. A jury convicted
Wilson and Cottom of felony murder and attempted robbery.
Wilson contends that: (1) substantial evidence does not
support that he acted with the “reckless indifference to human
life” necessary to support the felony murder conviction;3
(2) the trial court reversibly erred in admitting evidence of his
involvement in a later, unrelated robbery to prove intent to rob
in the instant case; (3) Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h)4
violates equal protection because it denies youth offender parole
hearings to those who committed life without parole (LWOP)
offenses while between the ages of 18 and 25 years (see § 3051,
subds. (b)(4) & (h)); (4) one of the statutes under which he
was sentenced (§ 190.5) violates his right to equal protection;
(5) taken together, the statutes under which he was sentenced
(§§ 190.2 & 190.5) violate constitutional prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment; and (6) as applied, his LWOP
sentence is cruel and unusual because it is disproportionate to his
culpability. None of these arguments warrants relief on appeal.
2 To avoid confusion, we refer to Kenneth Wilson by his
surname and to Wayne Wilson as “Wilson’s brother.”
3 Wilson does not challenge that substantial evidence
supports he was a major participant in the robbery. (See § 189,
subd. (e)(3) [defining applicable version of first degree felony
murder as requiring both that the defendant “was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life”].)
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
3
We agree, however, with both Wilson and the People that
the restitution order should be modified. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment as modified to reflect this change.5
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. Background: Individuals and Witnesses
Involved
In 2019, the Riverside County District Attorney charged
Wilson and Cottom with first degree felony murder and
attempted robbery. Both counts also alleged that Cottom
personally discharged a weapon causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)), and that Wilson was a principal armed with a firearm
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
The events relevant to these charges involved a group
of adolescent males, comprised of then 20-year-old Wilson,
Wilson’s older brother, Wilson’s neighbors Miguel “Mike”
Ramirez and his brother Lorenzo Ramirez, then 17-year-old
Cottom, and Cottom’s younger brother Justin Cottom. Around
the time of the crimes at issue (January 2015), this group
regularly gathered in the driveway of the Ramirez brothers’ home
in La Quinta Cove, which was across the street from the Wilson
brothers’ home. There were surveillance cameras on the Ramirez
brothers’ home.
5 We also agree with Wilson and the People that he was
entitled to custody credits he did not receive. Given that we
affirm his LWOP sentence, however, we decline to modify the
judgment in this respect.
4
Adrian Vivas and Bradley Olds also had been part of
this group at one point, and occasionally joined the others in
front of the Ramirez brothers’ home.
Dylan Sniffin, a friend of Vivas’s who lived outside
La Quinta Cove, was acquainted with Cottom and Mike Ramirez
from juvenile hall. His cousin, Ryan Sniffin, is the victim of the
crimes at issue.
B. January 30, 2015 Fake Drug Deal
Around the end of January 2015, Ryan Sniffin asked his
cousin Dylan Sniffin if the latter could connect him with someone
to buy an ounce of cocaine. Dylan Sniffin thought of Cottom.
Cottom and Ryan Sniffin arranged to meet on January 30.
At 5:22 p.m. that day, Cottom texted Ryan Sniffin, “come
around 6:30.” Cottom also called him at 5:52 p.m., and at
5:59 p.m., Cottom texted him again and arranged to meet at an
address in La Quinta Cove.
Around 6:19 p.m., Ryan Sniffin drove his car to the
agreed-upon address, taking with him Dylan Sniffin and Ryan
Sniffin’s roommate Noel Reimers. Once there, Reimers knocked
on the door of the home, which appeared to be vacant, but no one
answered. She then returned to the car and sat in the front
passenger seat. Dylan Sniffin sat in the back seat. At 6:19 p.m.,
Ryan Sniffin texted Cottom, “What’s up, man?” At 6:22 p.m., he
called Cottom.
Surveillance footage shows Cottom standing in the Ramirez
brothers’ driveway at 6:26 p.m. and Wilson riding up to him on
5
a mountain bike, wearing a sweatshirt.6 At 6:27 p.m., both rode
their bikes down the driveway and in the direction of the crime
scene.
At 6:31 p.m., Ryan Sniffin texted Cottom, “Hey, I got to
get headed up the hill.” Soon thereafter, Dylan Sniffin saw three
bike riders wearing hooded sweatshirts ride past the car in which
Reimers and Dylan and Ryan Sniffin were sitting.
What happened over the course of the next few minutes—
the specific circumstances under which Cottom shot Ryan Sniffin,
and what Wilson was doing when this happened—was the subject
of conflicting testimony at trial, which we outline in more detail
in the following section.
By 6:38 p.m., Dylan Sniffin called 911 on a cell phone and
told the 911 operator that Cottom had shot Ryan Sniffin.
A few minutes later, at 6:40 p.m., surveillance footage
shows someone running up the Ramirez brothers’ driveway.
Moments later, surveillance footage shows a person riding down
the driveway on a bicycle and to the north and the person who
ran up the driveway walking south. At 6:47 p.m., Mike Ramirez
appears in his driveway. At 6:53 p.m., a female walks up the
driveway. At 6:58 p.m., Mike Ramirez walks south. At 7:21 p.m.,
a person walks, then runs, south.
At the scene of the homicide, in the trunk of Ryan Sniffin’s
car, the police found a jacket stained with what appeared to be
blood. A pocket contained a gray case holding six little baggies
of white powder. A test of the powder taken at the scene was
6 Although there was testimony that the time was
7:25 p.m., it is later described as being 6:28 p.m. Testimony
established that the time on the surveillance video was
57 minutes later than the actual time.
6
negative for methamphetamine or cocaine. Police also found
$555 in cash on the floorboards inside the car and a cigarette butt
on the ground by the driver’s door. The parties stipulated that
forensic testing of the cigarette butt detected male DNA that was
not Wilson’s.
Ryan Sniffin died later that night from the gunshot wound.
C. Evidence at Trial Regarding Circumstances of
Ryan Sniffin’s Death
The evidence presented at trial included testimony and
other evidence establishing the general sequence of events, which
we summarized above. It also included testimony presenting
conflicting accounts of what happened between the time Dylan
Sniffin saw three individuals in hoodies approaching the car and
the time Cottom shot Ryan Sniffin.
1. Dylan Sniffin’s Eyewitness Testimony
Suggesting Wilson Was Not Near Cottom
at the Time of the Shooting
The only witness to the shooting who testified at trial was
Dylan Sniffin, called by the prosecution. He testified that, after
seeing the three individuals in hoodies drive past on bikes, “one
stayed at the top of the street . . . [then] two of them rode down,
and one rode back up, which was [Cottom]. And he rode up to . . .
the car.” The individual who rode back down did not come to
the car with Cottom, but instead waited behind a car at a nearby
intersection at the top of the street. Dylan Sniffin described this
rider as being more heavy set than the others, and subsequently
identified him as Mike Ramirez, whom Dylan Sniffin knew from
juvenile hall. Dylan Sniffin was not sure whether the third rider
waited at the top of the street or went elsewhere.
7
Dylan Sniffin testified that Cottom, alone, rode his bike
to the driver’s side of the car. Ryan Sniffin opened his door but
stayed seated inside. He got out of the car and shook hands with
Cottom. Cottom “got to business” and handed Ryan Sniffin two
baggies of white powder. Ryan Sniffin opened one of the baggies,
examined it, then gave it back. He told Cottom, “ ‘Let me know
if . . . you get some better stuff.’ ” They said, “Later” and Ryan
Sniffin said, “Bye.”
Dylan Sniffin got back in the car and Ryan Sniffin closed
his door as Cottom rode his bike to the intersection. Cottom then
got off his bike and walked back to the car with his hand in his
sweatshirt pocket. The car windows were open. Pulling a gun
from his pocket, Cottom told Ryan Sniffin, “What’s up. Give
me all your money,” and pointed the gun at him. Cottom’s hand
was shaking. Ryan Sniffin pushed the gun away when Cottom
touched it to the former’s head and neck. Cottom fired a shot into
his neck.
Cottom fled as Ryan Sniffin screamed and lunged over
Reimers and out the passenger side window. Dylan Sniffin got
out of the car and ran trying to get help while Reimers held Ryan
Sniffin.
About 10 to 15 minutes after the shooting, Dylan Sniffin
saw Wilson and another person drive by in a red car. Wilson and
the other individual hung out the windows staring and giving
Dylan Sniffin a “dirty look.”
8
2. Testimony That Wilson Was Armed and
Near Cottom at the Time of the Shooting
a. Vivas’s testimony7
Vivas testified that around 10:00 a.m. the day Ryan Sniffin
was shot, Cottom visited Vivas’s home, where they used drugs.8
Cottom told Vivas that he and Wilson were going to “do a lick”
later that night, which Vivas defined as “[a] fast way to get
money or something,” possibly by committing a robbery. Their
plan was to ride their bicycles to Ramirez and Durango streets
and try to sell two bags halfway full of baking soda or another
white substance as cocaine for $600 or $700. If they could not
sell the fake cocaine, they would just take the money. Cottom
told him the “lick” was Wilson’s idea, and that Wilson and
Wilson’s brother helped plan it. During this same visit, Wilson
showed Vivas a silver .38 revolver.
Two days after Ryan Sniffin’s death, Wilson again visited
Vivas. Wilson told Vivas that he and Cottom had ridden bikes
to Ramirez Street and tried to sell “these boys in their car”
fake cocaine. Vivas testified that Wilson explained the “guy”
had tested it and gave it back saying, “ ‘What the hell is this? ’ ”
7 Vivas testified about things he claimed Cottom and
Wilson had told him about the evening Ryan Sniffin died. Vivas
testified that, after he found out that he was facing over 16 years
in prison for an armed robbery (unrelated to this case), he agreed
to testify about statements Cottom and Wilson had made to him
over a year earlier, in exchange for which Vivas would serve no
actual jail or prison time for the armed robbery charges he was
facing.
8 Cottom’s brother and mother testified that Cottom was at
school that day.
9
“[T]he guy” then reached for something and both Wilson and
Cottom told him to stop. Cottom got nervous and shot the guy
in “the head.” When asked at trial whether Wilson said anything
to Vivas “about whether [Wilson] was there during the time of
the lick,” Vivas responded, “Yes. . . . [H]e said he was . . . there
pointing—pointing his gun [at Ryan Sniffin]. A little—I can’t—
I don’t know what kind of gun it was. I—a TEC-9—but he said—
he said he was pointing the gun, too, right there on the side of
[Cottom] and watching everything that was happening.” Vivas
later more unequivocally testified that Wilson told him that
Wilson “was right there at the scene with . . . Cottom . . . [¶] . . .
[¶] . . .[and] [t]hat [Wilson] had his gun pointed, too, at the
people.”
b. Olds’s statements
The prosecution presented testimony regarding statements
Wilson made to his neighbor and friend Olds.
i. The investigator’s testimony
relaying Olds’s statements
The investigator testified at trial that Olds told him the
following: Approximately two weeks after Ryan Sniffin’s death,
Wilson told him that he (Wilson) had been involved in a homicide
and had smoked in the area of the crime scene, possibly leaving
a cigarette butt. Wilson stated he was worried that he would
be going away for a long time because the cigarette butt might
contain his DNA. Wilson also told Olds that Wilson felt he had
given Cottom the wrong gun, a .38, and wished he had given
Cottom a “TEC-9 or MAC-10 or Glock 19,” because if he had,
“this” would not have happened. Wilson said that he was armed
with a MAC-10 when Cottom shot Ryan Sniffin. Olds had been
10
to Wilson’s house and had seen a TEC-9, MAC-10, Glock 19, and
shotguns. Olds and Wilson were both using methamphetamine
at Olds’s house when Wilson made these statements to Olds.
ii. Lea Martin’s testimony conveying
Olds’s statements
Olds’s live-in girlfriend Lea Martin (Martin) testified as
follows regarding Olds’s statements to her: Early one morning
in February 2015, she had found Olds “quite zoned [out]” and
“completely terrified” in their garage. Olds stated to Martin
that Wilson had told him about “some sort of drug deal gone
wrong” and that Wilson “was sitting next to the kid when it had
happened” and “after the initial death of the kid, they had parted
ways,” which she understood to mean they walked off in different
directions. Wilson told Olds he was worried that he would be
caught because he may have left a cigarette butt behind at the
crime scene.
c. Raul Barazza’s testimony
Raul Barazza testified that while he was in juvenile
hall with Cottom, Cottom told Barazza that Cottom was in for
murder because he was “gonna do a lick.” “He was trying to rob
somebody, but then it went wrong[,] so he shot him.” Barazza
testified that Cottom said, “They [the victims] wanted to buy
some [cocaine], but I guess the guy didn’t want to give them
nothing; so he shot him.” Barazza further testified that Cottom
said he had done the “lick” with a “friend[ ],” and that the friend
was “[b]ehind him” during the “transaction.”
Barazza admitted he had agreed to testify because the
prosecutor promised him a substantially reduced sentence in
11
connection with three counts of robbery unrelated to Cottom’s
case. He also was an informant in multiple other cases.
d. Cottom’s statements to his mother
The prosecutor played recorded jail calls between Cottom
and his mother on February 9, 2015. In one, Cottom states, “You
know I wish I never did this.” In another call recorded later that
day, Cottom’s mother asks him, “You’re saying there was Kenny
near you?” and Cottom answers, “Yeah.” She then asks, “And
then how did you separate from Kenny?”, to which Cottom
responds, “Mom, I can’t talk about it.”
3. Evidence Regarding Unrelated Subsequent
Robbery
Over Wilson’s objection, the court admitted evidence of
Wilson’s involvement in the robbery of Donald “Ian” Moore (the
Moore robbery) on the basis that it was relevant under Evidence
Code section 1101 to prove Wilson’s intent to permanently
deprive Ryan Sniffin of his property.
Moore testified that he invited Wilson to his house to
smoke methamphetamine with him. At that time, Moore had
been using methamphetamine daily for two years. At Wilson’s
request, Moore opened the garage door to let Wilson’s brother in.
Ian then heard banging from inside his house. He went
into his father’s room to investigate and saw Wilson’s brother in
the closet. Wilson entered the room and told Moore not to fight,
they just wanted the money and the guns. Wilson forced Moore
to sit on the bed and said, “ ‘Why shouldn’t I just kill you right
now. You are going to snitch.’ ” Wilson’s brother told Moore to
put his face in a pillow and not to look. Wilson’s brother and
Wilson broke a wall to remove a safe from the closet, then took
12
the safe, guns, a suitcase full of various items, and Moore’s cell
phone and left.
Additional details about the Moore robbery came through
Vivas’s testimony and the investigator’s testimony. Vivas
testified that Wilson told him that he had robbed Moore. The
investigator testified that Olds told him he lived across the street
from Moore’s house and had seen Wilson in Moore’s garage with
a hatchet in his hand. Moments later, Olds saw Wilson and
Wilson’s brother run up the street with a safe in a trash can.
D. Jury Verdict
The jury found both defendants guilty as charged. For
the murder count, the court sentenced Cottom to 25 years to
life and Wilson to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
Pursuant to section 654, the court stayed both defendants’
respective sentences for the attempted robbery counts and the
firearm enhancements.
The court ordered Wilson to pay $1,794 in restitution, and
ordered Cottom to pay restitution in an amount to be determined.
The court awarded Cottom credit for 2,093 actual days spent in
presentence custody, but did not award Wilson any presentence
custody credit.
Wilson and Cottom each timely appealed. As noted,
Cottom’s appeal was resolved in a March 1, 2023 unpublished
opinion of this court, which became final as to Cottom on
December 7, 2023.
13
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports That Wilson
Acted with Reckless Indifference to Human
Life
Felony murder is a murder that “is committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate” one of enumerated
felonies, including robbery. (§ 189, subd. (a).) “A participant in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [such] a felony . . .
in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if ” the
prosecution also proves one of the following: “[t]he person was
the actual killer,” “[t]he person was not the actual killer, but,
with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in
the commission of murder in the first degree,” or “[t]he person
was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).) At trial, the prosecutor
proceeded on a theory that Wilson was guilty of felony murder
because he was a major participant in an attempted felony
(robbery) who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
On appeal, Wilson challenges only the finding that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life—not that he was a major
participant in the underlying attempted robbery.
Reckless indifference encompasses a willingness to assist
another in killing to achieve a particular goal, even if the victim’s
death was not specifically intended. (See People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522, 617 (Clark) [reckless indifference to human
life “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another
in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does
not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions”].)
14
“This definition encompasses both subjective and objective
elements. The subjective element is the defendant’s conscious
disregard of risks known to him or her. But recklessness is
not determined merely by reference to a defendant’s subjective
feeling that he or she is engaging in risky activities. Rather,
recklessness is also determined by an objective standard,
namely what ‘a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, the California Supreme
Court identified circumstances that may be considered in
determining whether a non-shooter aider and abettor to a
felony acted with reckless indifference for human life. These
are: (1) the “defendant’s awareness that a gun will be used in
the felony,” the number of guns used, and/or the “defendant’s
use of a firearm, even if the defendant does not kill the victim”
(id. at p. 618, italics omitted), (2) the defendant’s “physical
presence at the crime and opportunities to restrain the crime
and/or aid the victim” (id. at p. 619, capitalization & italics
omitted), (3) the “[d]uration of the felony” (id. at p. 620,
capitalization & italics omitted), (4) the “defendant’s knowledge
of [the] cohort’s likelihood of killing” (id. at p. 621, capitalization
& italics omitted), and (5) the “defendant’s efforts to minimize
the risks of the violence during the felony.” (Ibid., capitalization
& italics omitted); see id. at pp. 618−621 [adopting these factors
as initially set forth in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks)].) “ ‘[Not] one of these considerations is necessary, nor
is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ [Citation.]” (Clark,
supra, at p. 618.)
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for
substantial evidence, meaning we determine, based on the “entire
15
record[,] whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that
the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt[,] . . . consider[ing] the evidence in a light most favorable
to the judgment.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.)
Wilson argues that Vivas’s testimony and Olds’s
statements—the only evidence supporting that Wilson was
present at the scene of the killing and in a position to facilitate
or prevent the actual murder (the proximity factor) and the only
evidence that Wilson himself was armed—is not “reasonable,
credible, and of solid value” and thus cannot constitute part
of the substantial evidence supporting a finding of reckless
indifference. (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128.)
To support this argument, he points to contrary testimony of
the only percipient witness (Dylan Sniffin); Vivas’s and Olds’s
lack of credibility as felons, drug users with impaired memories,
and/or jailhouse informants; inaccuracies in their statements;
inconsistencies in their statements over time; and an inherent
implausibility of their version of events.
Wilson’s argument ignores the scope of our role in
reviewing for substantial evidence. “If there is conflicting
testimony, we must accept the [trier of fact’s] resolution of
disputed facts and inferences, . . . and the version of events
most favorable to the [judgment], to the extent the record
supports them.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327,
342; Peradotto v. State Personnel Board (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d
30, 33 [substantial evidence review “ ‘begins and ends with a
determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports the conclusion
reached, disregarding any evidence in the record contrary to
the trier’s finding’ ”].) Thus, inconsistencies between Dylan
16
Sniffin’s testimony and Vivas’s testimony or Olds’s statements
are not a basis on which we may reject the latter. Nor is
anything “so inherently implausible about [Vivas’s testimony
and Olds’s statements] to justify disregarding [them] under
the substantial evidence rule.” (Fortman v. Hemco, Inc.
(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 241, 254; see also People v. Shelmire
(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1059 [the court had “no doubt
that a defendant’s story (his version of the events in question)
constitutes substantial evidence, in and of itself, even if the story
is implausible and seriously contradicted by other evidence”].)
Likewise, we may not reject this evidence because Vivas and
Olds each had a strong motive to lie. (See Evje v. City Title
Ins. Co. (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 488, 492 [“ ‘testimony which is
subject to justifiable suspicion do[es] not justify the reversal of
a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or
jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or
falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends’ ”]; see
also Evid. Code, § 780.) We thus consider Vivas’s and Olds’s
statements as a source of evidence in assessing the sufficiency
of the evidence under the Clark factors.
As to the first Clark factor, “[a] defendant’s use of a
firearm, even if the defendant does not kill the victim . . . ,
can be significant to the analysis of reckless indifference to
human life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Here, Vivas’s
testimony supports that Wilson supplied the murder weapon
to Cottom, and the jury could reasonably infer that Wilson gave
it to him loaded. Vivas, Martin, and the investigator’s testimony
also supports both that Wilson was armed during the robbery
and a reasonable inference that Wilson’s weapon was loaded.
Introducing loaded weapons into a robbery substantially
17
increases the risk that the robbery will end in lethal violence—
simply put, “[e]veryone knows the main purpose of a loaded
gun is to hurt people.” (People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
1, 10; see ibid. [Use of a loaded gun and lack of efforts to mitigate
attendant risk of harm supported reckless indifferences, because
“[the defendant’s] plan was a gun plan. . . . He gave [a loaded
gun] to [the shooter] but made no effort to unload it or to caution
[the shooter] about restraining his conduct” or to otherwise plan
the crime in a manner to minimize the risk of harm].)
Another consideration is the proximity of the defendant
to the killing. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) A defendant’s
presence close to the shooting “ ‘gives him an opportunity to act
as a restraining influence on murderous cohorts. If the defendant
fails to act as a restraining influence, then the defendant is
arguably more at fault for the resulting murders.’ ” (Ibid.) Here,
the jury could reasonably infer from the testimony that Wilson
was standing next to Cottom at the time of the shooting. The
record does not suggest that Wilson made any effort to restrain
Cottom from returning to the car after Ryan Sniffin refused the
fake drugs, or to restrain Cottom from shooting Ryan Sniffin once
Cottom had returned to the car. Moreover, Wilson’s proximity to
Cottom—particularly when combined with Wilson being armed—
also increases the likelihood that Cottom might use potentially
lethal force to achieve the ends of the robbery. There is strength
in numbers; all else being equal, a man who knows he has an
armed compatriot beside him is more likely to feel emboldened to
use his weapon. A reasonable person in Wilson’s position would
understand that his armed presence next to Cottom at the scene
could embolden Cottom to use his own gun, and thus increase
the likelihood of lethal violence beyond that inherent in any
18
armed robbery. As a corollary to proximity, courts also consider
a defendant’s efforts to assist the victim. Nothing in the record
suggests Wilson attempted to assist Ryan Sniffin after Cottom
shot him.
We also consider whether a defendant attempts to
minimize the risks of violence during the robbery. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621–622.) Here, the evidence supports
that Wilson helped plan the robbery at a location in front
of a vacant home after dark and using two guns—a plan that
increased, rather than reduced, the likelihood of lethal violence.
By contrast, in Clark, the defendant planned the robbery to
occur at a time when most of the employees would be gone,
the gun used in the robbery was supposed to be unloaded, and
the gun recovered after the shooting had only been loaded with
one bullet. (Ibid.) The record does not support that any similar
circumstances were present here.
Considering the record as a whole, we conclude that the
jury could reasonably infer that Wilson acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
None of the cases Wilson cites in which evidence of reckless
indifference was found insufficient involves a defendant who
was himself armed and in close proximity to the killing when
it occurred. (See People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077,
1090 [“[t]he defendants who have shown their culpability was too
slight under Banks and Clark ‘are those who were not wielding
guns themselves and also not present for the shooting’ ”].) In
In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, for example, the defendant
“did not use a gun, nor did he know that a gun would be used
during the felony” (id. at p. 677) and he “did not arrive at the
crime scene until after the shooting occurred.” (Id. at p. 678.)
19
In In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, the defendant was
waiting in the car during the planned robbery (id. at p. 559)
and “did not supply [the shooter] with the murder weapon[,]. . .
[n]or did [the defendant] have or use his own weapon during
the crime. Thus, . . . there [was] little about [the defendant’s]
use or knowledge of firearms that suggest[ed] he appreciated
the planned robbery posed a heightened risk of death.” (Id.
at pp. 557–558.) The other cases on which Wilson relies are
similarly distinguishable. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 805 [defendant was not armed, had no role in procuring arms
for others, and “[d]uring the robbery and murder, . . . was absent
from the scene, sitting in a car and waiting”]; Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 619 [defendant not armed and was waiting across
the parking lot from the store where his cohort shot the victim];
In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 404 [defendant was
not himself armed and “was not at the immediate location of
the killing”].)
Finally, Wilson argues that his youth should be considered
in determining whether he acted with reckless disregard for
human life. He cites sentencing cases and statutes that
contain or imply “the observation that recklessness is one of
the distinctive attributes of youth.” But even a 20-year-old
can understand that two armed individuals attempting to trick
someone into buying fake drugs on a dark, empty street involves
a high risk of someone getting shot and killed. And the defense
did not present evidence suggesting that anything about Wilson
20
at age 20 or his childhood rendered him generally less capable
of appreciating the risk of death in such a situation.9
B. Admission of Evidence Regarding the Moore
Robbery
Wilson challenges the admission of evidence regarding
the Moore robbery, arguing that the court abused its discretion
in admitting the evidence. Specifically, he argues that the
evidence was not admissible under Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (b), which establishes an exception to the general rule
that character evidence is inadmissible to prove a defendant’s
conduct on a specific occasion, and that even if it was admissible
under that section, the court should have excluded it under
Evidence Code section 352. We need not decide whether he is
correct, because even if the court erred in admitting the evidence,
any such error was not prejudicial.
9 To this extent, the recent decision of the First District
Court of Appeal considering the age of a young adult in
assessing reckless disregard for human life is distinguishable.
(See People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1091 [“the
record of conviction included a report provided by the defense
for the sentencing hearing pursuant to . . . People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 . . . and section 3015 . . . assert[ing] that
he had a traumatic and violent upbringing, had suffered from
under-diagnosed mental health issues and drug abuse, witnessed
his first murder at age 10, had become numb to violence, was
vulnerable to increased aggression, and appeared to be impulsive
rather than criminally sophisticated”].) To the extent that case
stands for the proposition that being 20 years old is a factor that
inherently weighs against a finding of reckless indifference, we
disagree.
21
Wilson first urges that the admission of this evidence
was so prejudicial, it denied him a fair trial, requiring reversal
unless the state “prove[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) To establish
prejudice on this ground, the error must “ ‘render[ ] the trial so
arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due
process.’ ” (Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d
918, 920.) “[F]ailure to comply with the state’s rules of evidence
is [not] . . . a sufficient basis for” establishing such fundamental
unfairness. (Id. at p. 919.) Wilson simply has not established
that the effects of the Moore robbery evidence permeated and
tainted the entire trial to such an extent that the trial was
arbitrary and fundamentally unfair. Therefore, Chapman
does not provide the appropriate standard for our harmless
error analysis.
Rather, in assessing prejudice from any error in admitting
the Moore robbery evidence, we apply People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, and consider whether it is reasonably probable
that, had the jury not heard the Moore robbery evidence, the jury
would have entered a verdict more favorable to Wilson. (See id.
at p. 836.)
Wilson takes the position that such a reasonable likelihood
exists, first arguing that “[t]his highly inflammatory evidence
would have obviated any concerns the juror[s] would have had
about [Vivas’s] compromised credibility as well as the credibility
of other witnesses,” namely Barazza and Olds. Wilson impeached
the credibility of these individuals at trial based on their being
felons, drug addicts, and/or themselves criminal defendants
with a self-serving motive to provide helpful testimony to
22
the prosecution. But the fact that Wilson committed felonies
and used drugs cannot rehabilitate a witness following such
impeachment; indeed, such evidence has no logical bearing on
the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses at all. And Wilson
did not offer testimony contradicting Vivas’s, Olds’s, or Barazza’s
respective versions of events, so Wilson’s credibility relative to
that of others is not at issue.
Wilson also contends that admission of this evidence
was prejudicial in that it “allowed the jurors to prejudge [Wilson]
and conclude that, because of his criminal propensity and bad
character, he had to have committed the felony[ ]murder, even
though [Vivas’s] and [Olds’s] credibility was doubtful and their
statements were inconsistent, unreliable, and too convenient for
the prosecution.” But the jury was instructed “not [to] consider
[the Moore robbery evidence] for any other purpose except for
the limited purpose of intent to deprive the owner of the property
permanently” and “not [to] conclude from this evidence that the
defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit a crime.”
“When, as here, there are no indications to the contrary, we
assume that the jurors followed the trial court’s instructions” and
did not, based solely on their viewing Wilson as a generally bad
person who commits crimes, find him guilty of murder without
supporting evidence. (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370,
1413.)
In arguing to the contrary, Wilson describes the
prosecution’s murder case against Wilson as weak, a description
based primarily on his characterization of Vivas, Olds, and
Barazza as unreliable witnesses. Wilson’s efforts to find
inconsistencies in these witnesses’ statements notwithstanding,
many aspects of their statements were either uncontradicted or
23
corroborated by other evidence, such that any credibility concerns
have a more limited effect on the strength of the prosecution’s
case. Still, Vivas’s, Olds’s, and Barazza’s respective statements
do conflict with other evidence on two key points: Wilson’s
proximity to Cottom at the time of the shooting and Wilson’s use
of a firearm, both of which are crucial to the reckless indifference
analysis. But this conflicting evidence does not assist Wilson
in establishing prejudice from the admission of the Moore robbery
evidence. First, even assuming the jury ignored the limiting
instruction and inferred Wilson had a general propensity to
commit crimes, a general criminal propensity does not make it
more likely that one will participate in a crime in a specific way—
namely, by using a gun, or by brandishing a gun himself during
a shooting, which by all accounts, was unplanned. Second, the
Moore robbery evidence does not support more specific propensity
inferences, such as a propensity to use firearms. The Moore
robbery did not involve firearms. It is thus not reasonably
likely that the Moore robbery evidence caused the jury to make
improper propensity inferences that allowed them to more easily
believe the key testimony from the witnesses Wilson identifies.
Thus, even assuming the court incorrectly admitted the Moore
robbery evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 and/or
Evidence Code section 352, Wilson has not established Watson
prejudice from any such error.
C. Constitutional Arguments
Wilson raises several constitutional challenges to the
statutes under which he was sentenced (§§ 190.2, 190.5), the
statute deeming him ineligible for a youth offender parole
24
hearing (§ 3051), and the imposition of a LWOP sentence in his
case.10
1. Equal Protection Arguments
As a preliminary matter, Wilson’s equal protection
arguments distinguish between those who committed crimes
while under 18 years, and those who committed crimes between
the ages of 18 and 25 years, a period during which, according
to relatively recent neurological research Wilson cites, the brain
is still developing, in particular the portions responsible for
“ ‘executive functions’ ” like foreseeing and weighing potential
consequences and moderating “ ‘correct’ ” and risk-taking
behavior. For ease of reference, we shall refer to those under
18 years as “juveniles” and to those between the ages of 18 and
26 years as “young adults.”
Wilson first challenges the constitutionality of the sections
under which he was sentenced to LWOP (§§ 190.2, 190.5),
arguing that their “retention of mandatory LWOPs for [young
adult] offenders [who commit special circumstances murder] . . .
deprives such offenders of equal protection.” He also challenges
section 3051, the statute addressing eligibility for a youth
offender parole hearing as violating constitutional equal
protection guarantees.
The California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th 834 changed the analytical framework we
apply in considering certain types of equal protection challenges.
Before Hardin, this was a two-step analysis, in which “ ‘[t]he
10 The People argue that Wilson has forfeited his
constitutional arguments by failing to raise them below.
We exercise our discretion to consider these arguments.
25
first prerequisite . . . is a showing that the state has adopted a
classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups
in an unequal manner.’ [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not
whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but
‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law
challenged.’ [Citation.]” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29
Cal.4th 228, 253, italics omitted.) The second step of the analysis
considered whether, when a class of criminal defendants is
similarly situated to another class of defendants that is sentenced
differently, there is a rational basis for the difference. (See
Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 882.)
“[E]qual protection of the law is denied only where there is no
‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and
some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) Hardin clarified, however, that
“when plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between
identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the
distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal protection, courts
no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two groups
are similarly situated for purposes of the law in question. The
only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in
treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard
of review”—namely, rational basis review. (Hardin, supra,
at pp. 850–851.) “Under this deferential standard, we presume
that a given statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger
shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is
reasonably conceivable.’ ” (Id. at p. 852.)
a. Sentencing statutes
Taken together, sections 190.2 and 190.5 create a
mandatory LWOP sentence for those who commit first degree
26
special circumstances murder as a young adult, but not for
those who commit the offense as juveniles. (See §§ 190.2,
subd. (a), 190.5, subd. (b).) Wilson argues that there is
no constitutionally justifiable basis for the law to distinguish
these two similarly situated groups because, based on the
scientific research Wilson cites, both groups “ ‘have a diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform.’ ”
The Supreme Court has “held on multiple occasions
that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so
for children.” (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 481.)
Courts of Appeal have rejected equal protection challenges to
the disparate treatment of young adult LWOP offenders and
juvenile LWOP offenders under other laws, concluding that,
even if these two groups are similarly situated, such disparate
treatment is constitutionally justifiable. (See People v. Sands
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204, review den. Dec. 22, 2021,
S271797 [addressing equal protection challenge to section 3051];
In re Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 481 [addressing equal
protection challenge to section 1170, subdivision (d), which
entitles certain offenders convicted of crimes they committed
as juveniles to submit a petition for resentencing].) Neither
the holding nor the reasoning of Hardin is inconsistent with
these decisions. We find this same reasoning persuasive here.
In drafting section 190.5, the Legislature had a rational basis
for distinguishing between offenders who commit the same crime
“based on their age” (Sands, supra, at p. 204), any neurological
similarities between the two types of offenders notwithstanding.
27
b. Youth offender parole hearing
statute
We next consider Wilson’s equal protection challenges
to the youth offender parole hearing statute, section 3051.
Section 3051 requires that an offender convicted of a crime
he or she committed before the age of 26 receive a “youth offender
parole hearing” after a certain period of incarceration.11 (§ 3051,
subd. (b).) The requirement for such a hearing does not apply,
however, to, inter alia, “cases in which an individual is sentenced
to [LWOP] for a controlling offense that was committed after the
person had attained 18 years of age,” as here. (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
At such a hearing, the reviewing board is to “give great
weight to . . . the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent
growth and increased maturity of the prisoner.” (§ 4801,
subd. (c); see Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 283.) Such
hearings are intended “ ‘to give youthful offenders “a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release” after [a certain amount of time]
in prison (§ 3051, subd. (e)) and . . . “ ‘a showing of rehabilitation
and maturity’ ” ’ and ‘to account for neuroscience research that
the human brain—especially those portions responsible for
judgment and decisionmaking—continues to develop into a
person’s mid-20s.’ [Citation].” (People v. Wilkes (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1159, 1166.)
Wilson challenges the constitutionality of section 3051
in two ways. First, he argues it guarantees juveniles who commit
LWOP offenses an opportunity to obtain release on parole, but
11 An earlier version of section 3051 only required youth
offender parole hearings for juveniles. In 2018, the Legislature
amended it to provide this benefit to young adults under certain
circumstances, as outlined above.
28
denies such an opportunity to young adults who commit LWOP
offenses. This argument fails for the same reasons Wilson’s
challenge to the sentencing statutes fails: the Legislature
is constitutionally justified in treating juveniles and young
adults differently. (See Discussion ante, part C.1.a.)
Wilson’s second argument is that section 3051 violates
equal protection because it denies a youth offender parole
hearing for defendants convicted of LWOP offenses they
committed as young adults, but grants such a hearing to
an offender of the same age who receives a de facto LWOP
sentence—that is, one comprised of sentences for multiple
non-LWOP crimes that result in a required period of
incarceration that is longer than the offender’s natural life.
This argument has been rejected by our state Supreme
Court. “[T]here is a rational basis justifying section 3051’s
disparate treatment of individuals who . . . are serving sentences
of life without parole for special circumstance murder.” (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.) In his supplemental briefing
following remand, Wilson does not argue to the contrary.
Accordingly, Wilson has not established that section 3051
violates equal protection, and the court did not err by applying
the statute.
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Arguments
Wilson argues his LWOP sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in various ways under both the federal and
California constitutions. For the reasons we discuss below, we
disagree.
29
a. Neuroscientific research does not
justify expanding existing law to
LWOP sentences for young adult
offenders
The United States Supreme Court and California Supreme
Court have held that imposing the death penalty or an LWOP
sentence on defendants for crimes they committed as juveniles
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (See Roper v.
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 568−575 (Roper); Miller, supra,
567 U.S. at p. 476-477; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262,
268.) The Court’s reasoning in this line of cases focuses in part
on scientific research regarding the “fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds” (Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48, 68 (Graham)) and how the juvenile brain is still
developing, as a result of which juveniles are “more capable
of change than are adults.” (Ibid., citing Roper, supra, 543 U.S.
at p. 570.)
As Wilson acknowledges, these cases address cruel
and unusual punishment for those who committed offenses
as juveniles, not young adults. (See People v. Morales (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347 [“the United States and California
Supreme Courts have not held that LWOP sentences for youthful
offenders violate the Eighth Amendment”].) Wilson argues that,
based on recent neuroscientific research that renders use of an
age-18 dividing line outdated, we should hold that an LWOP
sentence for a crime committed while the offender was a young
adult is categorically cruel and unusual punishment as well.
But the United States Supreme Court long ago recognized
that “qualities . . . distinguish[ing] juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18”—and that “a line
must be drawn” nevertheless. (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 574.)
30
Our state Supreme Court has similarly refused to extend the
principles under Miller, Graham, and Roper to young adults
18 years of age or older. (See People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th
371, 429–430 (Flores); People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191;
People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 405.) Consistent with
this, Courts of Appeal have uniformly rejected arguments similar
to Wilson’s. (See, e.g., People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
1478; People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211.) California
courts have reached the same conclusion under the California
constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
(See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234 (Tran); In re
Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 437–439; id. at p. 439
[“[t]o the extent petitioner contends an LWOP sentence is an
unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on
any 21-year-old defendant, . . . our Supreme Court has essentially
rejected that very argument in the context of the death penalty,”
italics omitted].)
As have other courts presented with similar arguments,
we “decline [the] invitation to conclude new insights and societal
understandings about the juvenile brain require us to conclude
the bright line of 18 years old in the criminal sentencing context
is unconstitutional. Our nation’s, and our state’s, highest
court have concluded 18 years old is the bright-line rule and
we are bound by their holdings.” (People v. Perez (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 612, 617; accord, People v. Montelongo (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1016, 1032 (Montelongo).)12
12 We are also not persuaded by Wilson’s arguments that
section 3051 “extend[ing] mitigated culpability up to the age of
25” supports Wilson’s cruel and unusual punishment argument
31
b. Wilson’s LWOP sentence is not so
grossly disproportionate to his crime
that it constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment
Wilson next argues that his LWOP sentence violates
California’s constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment
because it is grossly disproportionate to his individual moral
culpability. When faced with such a claim, “[a] reviewing
court determines whether a particular penalty given ‘ “is
so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that
it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity.” ’ ” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1235.)
“We . . . use a three-pronged approach to determine whether a
particular sentence is grossly disproportionate. First, we review
‘the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular
regard to the degree of danger both present to society.’ ” (People
v. Johnson (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 253, 296.) This analysis
requires consideration of “ ‘the circumstances of the offense,
including the defendant’s motive, the extent of the defendant’s
involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was
committed, and the consequences of the defendant’s acts[,]’ ”
as well as “ ‘the defendant’s age, prior criminality[,] and mental
capabilities.’ [Citation.]” (Cole, supra, at p. 1235.) “Second,
we compare the challenged punishment with punishments
prescribed for more serious crimes in our jurisdiction. [Citation.]
in the manner he suggests. Section 3051 itself maintains the
18-year-old dividing line in the context of LWOP offenses (see
§ 3051, subd. (h)), and our state Supreme Court has rejected
similar arguments based on section 3051 that challenge the
death penalty for young adults. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1235, quoting Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 429.)
32
Third, and finally, we compare the challenged punishment
to punishments for the same offense in other jurisdictions.
[Citation.] The importance of each of these prongs depends
upon the facts of each specific case[,] [citation] . . . we may base
our decision on the first prong alone.” (Johnson, supra, 183
Cal.App.4th at p. 297.) “ ‘Our Supreme Court has emphasized
“the considerable burden a defendant must overcome in
challenging a penalty as cruel or unusual.” ’ ” (People v. Sullivan
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 569.) “ ‘Whether a punishment is
cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but
the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the judgment.’ ” (Ibid.)
Wilson argues his LWOP sentence is grossly
disproportionate based solely on the first prong of this analysis:
namely, “the nature of the offense and/or the offender[, examined]
with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to
society.” (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1145.)
He notes he was not the killer and that the evidence did not
establish he intended to kill, citing authority for the proposition
that “the [Supreme] Court has found criminal penalties to
be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional
wrongdoing.” (Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 800.)
But acting with an intent to kill is not necessary for an LWOP
sentence to survive a cruel and unusual punishment challenge.
(See People v. Young (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1309 [LWOP
is not a cruel and unusual punishment for a 19-year-old young
adult with no significant criminal record who was convicted of
first degree felony murder for unintentionally killing a bystander
during a high speed chase while fleeing from the scene of a
robbery].) As we conclude above, substantial evidence supports
33
that, considering the totality of the evidence—including
substantial evidence that Wilson supplied the murder weapon,
was armed during the robbery, and that the robbery was his
idea—he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Wilson argues his lack of an intent to kill and his nonkiller
role in the crime, when considered together with the fact that
he was 20 years old at the time of the murder, the neurological
significance of this fact, and his personal and criminal
background, render his LWOP sentence grossly disproportional
to his culpability. Specifically, he argues that his criminal
record reflects largely nonviolent offenses; it includes sustained
juvenile petitions for misdemeanor vandalism, possession of
brass knuckles, and disturbing the peace, and adult convictions
for various misdemeanors, burglaries, and robberies with his
older brother and others. He notes that both of his parents
died a short time before the murder, and the two robberies
he committed thereafter. He argues that one of the hallmarks
of youth identified as a basis for the law treating juveniles
differently is that “they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure’ ” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 68)—here, the
criminal influences of his brother, to which Wilson argues he
was particularly susceptible after his parents died. He also
points to evidence suggesting that his criminal activity correlates
with his drug addiction, and that at some point after Ryan
Sniffin’s murder, he approached his aunt and uncle asking for
help with his addiction. On these bases, he argues he is not
the “ ‘rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption’ ” (see Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 479–480), but
rather a man in a difficult but temporary phase of his young
34
adulthood, fueled in part by lack of full neurological development.
But neither “irreparable corruption,” nor anything like it, is a
requirement for imposing an LWOP sentence on a young adult
offender. (People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 672;
see ibid. [“[u]nder Montgomery, Miller must be regarded as
announcing a substantive rule barring LWOP terms for a specific
class of juvenile offenders, namely, those ‘ “whose crimes reflect
the transient immaturity of youth,” ’ not irreparable corruption,”
italics added].) We acknowledge that Wilson’s personal
background could provide reason to believe he may be able
to change the trajectory of his life. But this does not mean
that an LWOP sentence denying him that chance is grossly
disproportionate as a punishment for his being a major
participant in a robbery resulting in the death of another, in
connection with which Wilson acted with reckless disregard for
human life. Moreover, in order for his sentence to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, such disproportionality would
need to be so extreme that it “shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8
Cal.3d 410, 424.) Wilson has not met the extremely high burden
of establishing this. (See People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169,
174 [defendant must overcome a “considerable burden” to show
a sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to the defendant’s level
of culpability]; see also People v. Weddle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th
1190, 1196 [“[f]indings of disproportionality have occurred with
exquisite rarity in the case law”].)
In sum, we cannot say that the additional circumstances
Wilson identifies here are sufficient to render his LWOP
sentence so disproportional as to be cruel and unusual. Thus,
the “ ‘ “ ‘ “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the
35
commission of the offense’ ” ’ ” (People v. Meneses (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1092)—including Wilson’s personal
background and age—do not make his LWOP sentence
unconstitutional.
D. Wilson’s Custody Credits
We agree with both Wilson and the People that Wilson
is entitled to presentence custody credits for the 1,340 days
he spent in custody between his arrest and his sentencing.
(See §§ 2900.5, 2933.05, 4019; People v. Taylor (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 628, 647.) “A sentence that fails to award legally
mandated custody credit is unauthorized and may be corrected
whenever discovered.” (Ibid.) We decline to amend the judgment
in this respect, however, given Wilson’s LWOP sentence.
E. Joint and Several Liability for Restitution
Order
The court ordered Wilson to pay $594 to reimburse the
California Victim Compensation Board and pay $1,200 for Ryan
Sniffin’s burial expenses.13 The court must order restitution
in an amount sufficient to reimburse the victim “for every
determined economic loss incurred as the result of the
defendant’s criminal conduct.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) A trial
court has authority to make the restitution obligation joint and
several. (See, e.g., People v. Neely (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787,
13 The restitution amount for burial expenses would be
payable to a “victim” of the crime, which for the purposes of
section 1202.4 could include, for example, “[t]he immediate
surviving family of the actual victim.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (k) &
(k)(1).)
36
800.) Because the goal of the victim restitution statute is “that
a victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of
the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from
a defendant convicted of that crime” (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1)), we
agree with both Wilson and the People that the victim in this
case is entitled to collect restitution from all those convicted of
Ryan Sniffin’s murder.
37
DISPOSITION
Kenneth Wilson’s convictions are affirmed, but the court
shall modify the order of restitution to be joint and several
with any other defendant convicted of the murder of Ryan Sniffin.
As so modified, the judgment against Kenneth Wilson is affirmed.
This court issued the remittitur in Jesse Keith Cottom’s
appeal on December 7, 2023, at which point our original opinion
filed March 1, 2023 “bec[a]me final as to appellant Jesse Keith
Cottom only.” Thus, our vacatur of the original opinion has no
effect on the disposition of Cottom’s appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
I concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
38
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