CourtListener 10103326•People v. Mitchell CA2/2
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Filed 9/3/24 P. v. Mitchell CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B329928
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA028590)
v.
JOHN ROBERT MITCHELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant John Robert Mitchell appeals
from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.61 (former § 1170.95).2 Because
defendant is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Preliminary Hearing
In 1996, an information was filed charging defendant with
murder (§ 187, subd (a); count 1), first degree residential burglary
(§ 459; count 2), and first degree residential robbery (§ 211;
count 3), all committed against one victim. The information also
alleged that defendant had killed the victim during the burglary
and robbery.
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution called multiple
witnesses, including Officer Cindy Gayda, a police officer for the
City of Torrance, who described a videotaped interview she
conducted with defendant immediately after his arrest. After
waiving his Miranda rights, defendant told Officer Gayda that he
needed money and food, and remembered that his brother-in-law
had a copy of the keys to the victim’s house. Defendant took the
keys from his brother-in-law’s truck, used them to enter the
empty house, and began ransacking it.
When the victim came home, defendant hid from her.
Fearful that she might be able to identify him, he waited for the
1 All further references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new numbering.
2
victim to approach, then “jumped out at her from his hidden
position and . . . placed his hands around her neck and put her
down on the ground and then laid his body on top of her while he
choked her.” “After several seconds of choking [the victim] she
was unconscious. But again he thought that there might have
been some chance that she had recognized him or had seen him.
So he obtained . . . a[] [metal] bowl and hit her on the head with
[it].[3] After which he went through her purse. Removed some
currency from her purse. He had already taken some other
change and” other things from the house. “[A]bout ten minutes
after the attack he left the house through the side door[.]”
Defendant’s trial counsel briefly cross-examined Officer
Gayda. He asked only two types of questions regarding her
interviews with defendant: (1) Had Officer Gayda interviewed
defendant on other occasions (answer: yes), and (2) Was the
recording of defendant’s confession substantially complete
(answer: yes). Trial counsel did not challenge the accuracy of
Officer Gayda’s description of the confession. Nor did he argue
that defendant’s confession was involuntary or otherwise invalid.
After the prosecution rested, the defense did not put on an
affirmative defense or submit any motions.
II. Plea and Sentence
Defendant subsequently pled guilty to one count of first-
degree murder, along with the burglary and robbery charges. He
also admitted the allegation that he committed the murder
during the burglary and robbery. Defendant’s trial counsel
stipulated that a factual basis existed for the plea, and did not
3 The victim never regained consciousness, succumbing to
her injuries after four days in the hospital.
3
object to the trial court’s use of preliminary hearing transcripts to
render its factual findings. The trial court accepted his plea,
“find[ing] a factual basis” for the plea “[b]ased on the reading of
the preliminary hearing transcript[.]”
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court invited final
statements from the prosecution and defendant. The prosecution
summarized its theory of the case, asserting that defendant,
acting alone, killed the victim while burglarizing her home. In
his recitation, the prosecutor reminded the court “that we know
many of these things because they came out in a videotaped
confession that was given to us by” defendant.
When the prosecution concluded its presentation,
defendant’s trial counsel did not offer an alternate theory of the
case. He clarified that he was “not standing up here to contest
any of the facts that [the prosecution] has just re[cit]ed. In fact,
most of the facts come from the mouth of [defendant] who did in
fact give a very long videotaped confession . . . . He just wanted
to tell . . . [Officer] Gayda that he was guilty [and] that he did it.
[¶] That he was alone, and that he was sorry[.]”
Per defendant’s plea deal, the trial court sentenced him to
life in prison without the possibility of parole on the murder
conviction. The trial court stayed sentences on the remaining
counts pursuant to section 654.
III. Resentencing Petition
In May 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6.
The prosecution opposed the petition, arguing that the
transcript of the preliminary hearing demonstrated that
defendant was prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of the
murder. As exhibits to the opposition, the prosecution attached
4
copies of the preliminary hearing, plea hearings, and sentencing
hearing transcripts.
In a written reply, defendant’s appointed counsel urged
that the preliminary hearing transcript could not be used to
conclusively establish defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing
relief.
The matter proceeded to a hearing. After hearing
arguments from both sides, the trial court denied defendant’s
petition. Based on People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649
(Patton), review granted June 28, 2023, S279670, as well as a
“review of the preliminary [hearing] transcript [and] . . . all of the
minute orders and the record in this case[,]” the trial court found
defendant “ineligible for relief as a matter of law . . . [as] all the
facts point to the fact that [he] was the actual killer.” The court
noted that no evidence in the record contradicted its finding.
IV. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Background
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) to “amend the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
“Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism whereby people ‘who
believe they were convicted of murder for an act that no longer
qualifies as murder following the crime’s redefinition in 2019[]
5
may seek vacatur of their murder conviction and resentencing by
filing a petition in the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Arnold
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 382.)
In order to obtain resentencing relief, a defendant convicted
of murder must allege that (1) an information was filed against
him allowing the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder
under the felony murder rule, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any “other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)); (2) he was convicted of murder
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)); and (3) he could not now be convicted
“because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).
Upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing, the trial court must conduct a prima facie analysis
to determine the defendant’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b)(3) & (c).) “[T]he prima facie inquiry . . . is limited
. . . ‘“[T]he court takes [a] [defendant]’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
[defendant] would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause”’” and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971(Lewis).)
In making this assessment, the trial court may consider the
defendant’s record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–971.) As our Supreme Court explained in Lewis, “[t]he
record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima
facie inquiry . . . allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis,
supra, at p. 971.) However, “the court should not make
6
credibility determinations or engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at
p. 974.)
II. Use of Preliminary Hearing Transcript at the Prima
Facie Stage
When a defendant’s conviction follows a plea rather than a
trial, the record of conviction includes the transcript of the
defendant’s preliminary hearing if the transcript “reliably
reflect[s] the facts of the offense for which the defendant was
convicted.” (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223; see
Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 657.)
“Courts of Appeal are split on the import of the preliminary
hearing transcript in determining whether a petitioner has made
a prima facie case for resentencing under section 117[2.6].”
(People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 989 (Flores); compare
People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1167 (Mares), review
granted May 1, 2024, S284232 [record of conviction, including
preliminary hearing transcript, supported no theory other than
defendant acted alone as the actual killer]; People v. Pickett
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643
[courts can rely on preliminary hearing transcripts to determine
prima facie eligibility even if a defendant does not stipulate to it
as a factual basis for a plea]; Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649
[court may rely on preliminary hearing transcript at prima facie
stage if evidence contained therein is uncontroverted], People v.
Williams (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 375 [even if a preliminary
hearing transcript provides probable cause that a defendant was
the actual perpetrator, an information containing a generic
charge of murder would still permit the prosecution to proceed at
trial under an invalid theory of murder]; People v. Davenport
7
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481 (Davenport) [trial court
erroneously relied on preliminary hearing transcript in making
prima facie determination because defendant did not stipulate to
the transcript as a factual basis for his plea].)
III. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section
1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539.)
IV. Analysis
Defendant’s record of conviction precludes him from
making a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6.
As described above, a successful prima facie case requires a
defendant to aver, inter alia, that he could no longer be convicted
“because of” the 2019 changes to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).) Those legislative changes did not eliminate murder
liability for persons prosecuted and convicted under a theory that
they were the actual killer. (Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1176.) It follows that, “[a]s a matter of law, resentencing relief
under section 1172.6 is not available to an ‘actual killer.’”4
(People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973.)
The record of conviction conclusively establishes that
defendant was prosecuted and convicted as the actual killer. As
in Patton, supra, which remains good law during the pendency of
the Supreme Court’s review (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105,
8.1115), the transcript of defendant’s preliminary hearing
contained testimony from an investigating officer conclusively
4 Defendant argues that Senate Bill No. 1437 “eliminated the
offense of second-degree felony murder, even for the actual
killer.” Assuming arguendo that defendant is correct, his point
has no bearing on his conviction for first degree murder.
8
establishing that defendant was the sole and actual killer. (See
Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 657.) But here, that evidence
was even more decisive: In Patton, the testifying officers relied
on surveillance video to determine that the defendant alone killed
the victim; at defendant’s preliminary hearing, Officer Gayda
testified that defendant confessed to her that he brutally beat the
victim and left her for dead while burglarizing her home.
Additionally, defendant subsequently stipulated that a
factual basis existed for his guilty plea and did not object to the
trial court’s use of the preliminary hearing transcripts to confirm
that basis. This further establishes that the preliminary hearing
transcripts are sufficiently reliable to establish defendant’s
ineligibility for resentencing relief.5 (See Davenport, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 483 [a preliminary hearing transcript can
“not conclusively ‘refute’ [the] allegations” in a section 1172.6
petition unless the defendant “stipulate[d] that the [preliminary
hearing] transcript provided [the] factual basis for [his] . . . plea”];
contra, Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 991 [a defendant’s
“stipulation that the [preliminary hearing] transcript provided a
factual basis for the plea is not a ‘“binding admission for all
purposes[]”’ [Citation.]”].)
5 Defendant argues that the record does not establish the
identity of the actual killer, since “[a]n admission to being the
actual killer was not necessary to plead to first degree murder”
and “being the actual killer was not an element of the offense of
first degree murder.” He ignores that the factual basis of his plea
was not nebulous or constrained to the technical elements of first
degree murder; as stipulated to by defendant during the plea
hearing, his plea was based in part on the fact that he confessed
to being the actual killer.
9
The preliminary hearing transcript is not the only
document in the record of conviction that supports our conclusion.
At the sentencing hearing, both the prosecution and the defense
agreed that defendant’s videotaped confession established that he
was the sole and actual perpetrator of the victim’s murder.6
These statements reinforce the reliability of the preliminary
hearing transcript as regards defendant’s confession, and
independently confirm that he confessed to being the actual
killer.
Finally, even if we did “not credit the truth of any fact in
the preliminary hearing transcript[,]. . . [w]hat matters is that
the record supports no theory other than those where [defendant]
was the actual killer, acting with no accomplice.” (Mares, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1167.) At the preliminary hearing, the
prosecution proffered evidence that defendant, acting alone,
burglarized and killed the victim. Later, at the sentencing
hearing, the prosecution explained its theory of culpability in
detail, arguing that defendant alone killed the victim.7
6 Defendant argues that the record of conviction following a
plea conviction includes only “the charging document and the
explicit terms of the plea agreement.” But transcripts of both the
preliminary hearing and sentencing hearing are properly
considered as part of the record of conviction, including in
postconviction proceedings after a guilty plea. (People v. Thoma
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1101.)
7 Defendant argues that the information nonetheless could
have allowed the prosecution to go to trial on a different theory of
murder liability. But the hypothetical possibility that the
prosecution could have chosen to pursue an invalid murder
theory if the case had gone differently has no bearing on what
actually happened in this case. The record shows that, at all the
proceedings before and after defendant’s guilty plea, the
10
Defendant’s trial counsel agreed, stating that he was “not
standing up here to contest any of the facts that [the prosecution]
has just re[cit]ed[,]” because “most of the facts come from the
mouth of [defendant] who did in fact give a very long detailed
videotaped confession” admitting that he was the sole killer.
No evidence in the record of conviction suggests that
anyone other than defendant was the actual killer, or that
anyone other than he and the victim were involved in the fatal
struggle that took the victim’s life. (See Mares, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1167.) Therefore, “the record of conviction
establishes ‘“‘facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,’
. . . [justifying] ‘the court . . . in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.’”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
pp. 1168–1169.)
On appeal, defendant urges us to turn away from Patton,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649 and similar cases, arguing that a
preliminary hearing transcript can never be relied upon at the
prima facie stage. He makes two basic counterarguments in this
vein. First, defendant contends that “[a] purely legal
determination that the evidence at the preliminary hearing was
sufficient to sustain the finding that defendant was the actual
killer” can never amount to a factual finding conclusively
establishing that defendant was the actual killer. Defendant
thus insists that “[t]here is no way to arrive at the conclusion
that [he] was the actual killer without weighing the preliminary
hearing evidence and making an independent finding.”
prosecution only advanced the theory that defendant was the sole
killer.
11
But there is no improper weighing of evidence or credibility
determination when, as here, the evidence presented in the
preliminary hearing transcript is uncontroverted. (Patton, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 658.) At the preliminary hearing, defendant
had the opportunity to challenge the introduction of his
confession, but he declined to do so.8 And at the sentencing
hearing, both the prosecution and defendant’s trial counsel
confirmed that defendant had admitted to being the sole and
actual perpetrator of the victim’s murder. The record is
undisputed that defendant was prosecuted and convicted as the
actual killer.
Further, as explained above, the record establishes
defendant’s ineligibility without the need to credit or weigh any
facts in the preliminary hearing transcript: Because the record
contains no evidence suggesting that defendant could have been
convicted under a now invalid theory of murder liability,
defendant is not eligible for relief under section 1172.6. (Mares,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1167.)
8 Defendant argues that he should not be faulted for failing
to challenge the introduction of his confession, because
defendants have little incentive to challenge evidence introduced
at a preliminary hearing. But defendant’s trial counsel was not a
silent witness to the preliminary hearing proceedings; he cross-
examined every witness at the preliminary hearing, including
Officer Gayda (although he did not question the accuracy of
Officer Gayda’s testimony describing defendant’s confession).
Trial counsel’s failure to similarly attack defendant’s confession,
together with his later admission that the confession established
defendant’s guilt, suggests that the defense understood the
confession to be valid and not susceptible to challenge.
12
Second, defendant argues that Patton, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th 649, impermissibly renders “preliminary hearing
evidence sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of
ineligibility for relief,” essentially requiring a petitioner in
defendant’s position to “make an offer of proof sufficient to show
that his . . . eligibility for relief is indeed a disputable and
disputed factual issue.” He urges that this evidentiary burden is
contrary to the basic prima facie hearing procedures established
by section 1172.6, as well as the “very low” prima facie bar set by
the Legislature. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
Defendant is correct that, under section 1172.6, he has no
burden to produce evidence at the prima facie stage to support
the allegations in his petition. But otherwise, his argument
misstates the prima facie inquiry in section 1172.6 proceedings.
When reviewing a resentencing petition, a court does not ask
whether sufficient evidence supports the allegations in a
defendant’s petition. The correct question is whether the record
of conviction conclusively contradicts those allegations, such that
it definitively establishes a defendant’s ineligibility for
resentencing relief.9 (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
In this case, the preliminary hearing transcript does not
create a rebuttable presumption of ineligibility that defendant
must overcome by an offer of proof. Rather, the record of
conviction as a whole conclusively establishes that defendant was
9 We take no position on whether, as some appellate courts
have suggested, a defendant could hypothetically revive an
allegation contradicted by the record of conviction by offering new
evidence at the prima facie stage. (See, e.g., Mares, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.) Here, defendant made no such
proffer.
13
prosecuted and convicted as the actual killer. Having confessed
to being the sole perpetrator of the victim’s murder—and having
allowed the judge presiding over his plea hearing to use that
confession to find a factual basis for his guilty plea—defendant
cannot resurface almost 30 years later and assert that he was not
the actual killer.
Accordingly, defendant is ineligible for resentencing relief
under section 1172.6.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT
14
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